Hill International, Inc. v. JTS Realty Corporation, Perkins Rowe Associates, L.L.C. and Perkins Rowe Associates II, L.L.C. ( 2021 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2021 CA 0157
HILL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
VERSUS
JTS REALTY CORPORATION, PERKINS ROWE ASSOCIATES,
L.L.C., AND PERKINS ROWE ASSOCIATES II, L.L.C.
JUDGMEN"r RENDERED: OCT 2 0 2022
Appealed from
The Nineteenth Judicial District Court
Parish of East Baton Rouge • State of Louisiana
Docket Number 591, 590 • Section 27
The Honorable Trudy M. White, Presiding Judge
Juston M. O' Brien COUNSEL l OR APPELLANT
Brad M. Barback DEFFNDANI'--Glen R. Jarrell,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Trustee of the Spinosa Class
James E. Moore Jr. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS
Brian L. McCullough DEFENDANTS--- JTS Realty
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Corporation; JTS Realty Services,
L. L. C.; JTS Management
Company, L. L.C.; Perkins Rowe
Associates, L.L. C.; Perkins Rowe
Associates II, L.L.C.; and Joseph
T. " Tommy" Spinosa
David M. Moragas COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Mandeville, Louisiana PLAINTIFF— Hill International,
and Inc.
John Lynd, pro hac vice
Houston, Texas
BEFORE: MCCLENDON, WELCH, AND THERIOT, JJ.
WELCH, J.
In this suit on an open account, defendants appeal an amended judgment
rendered after a one -day bench trial that awarded the plaintiff damages, interest,
and attorney' s fees. For the following reasons, we recall our rule to show cause
order and maintain the appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This lawsuit arises out of conflicts concerning the construction of the
Perkins Rowe mixed-use development in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. On May 31,
2006, Perkins Rowe Associates, LLC (" PRA") contracted with EMJ Corporation
EMJ") to perform certain work on the Perkins Rowe project (" the Project"). For
various reasons, including alleged irregularities with costs associated with the work
performed by EMJ, the contract between PRA and EMJ was terminated.
Subsequently, EMJ sued PRA and Perkins Rowe Associates II, LLC (" PRAII")
collectively referred to as the " PRA entities").
To defend the EMJ lawsuit, Joseph T. Spinosa (" Mr. Spinosa") the
manager, a member, and an owner of the PRA entities— approached Hill
International, Inc. (" Hill") around September 2008 to conduct an in- depth audit of
the costs as recorded and billed by EMJ. On October b, 2008, Hill executed its
Standard Form ofJ Agreement for Claims and Consulting Services" ( the
contract"), which contained the following choice -of l-aw provision:
15. GOVERNING LAW: DISPUTE RESOLUTION. This
Agreement shall be governed by and construed and interpreted in
accordance with the laws of the State of New Jersey. Any disputes
arising out or relating to this Agreement shall be resolved by an
arbitration proceeding held in accordance with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association,
such proceeding to be located in the State of New Jersey. In any such
proceeding, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of costs
and reasonable attorney' s fees.
The contract identified JTS Realty Corporation (" JTS Realty Corp.") as the
Client." Hill sent the contract to Mr. Spinosa, who is also the corporate
PA
representative and president of JTS Realty Corp., for execution. Prior to
execution, PRA and PRAII were typed above Mr. Spinosa' s signature line, which
identified him as " Manager," with both PRA and PRAII identified as " Client";
however, the " Client" designation was not correspondingly adjusted in the body of
the contract. Mr. Spinosa signed the contract, and Jerri Vasta with JTS Realty
Services, LLC returned it to Hill via email on October 22, 2008.
Between November 2008 and October 2009, Hill provided professional
services pursuant to the contract and incurred reimbursable fees and expenses. Hill
billed " JTS Realty" on a monthly basis. Hill was paid $ 199, 460. 06 for its services
provided under the contract, leaving a total of $405, 587. 35 in unpaid invoices. Hill
suspended its services and made amicable demand for payment in the amount of
402, 839. 80. After receiving Hill' s demand, Mr. Spinosa allegedly acknowledged
the debt was due and owing; however, the amounts remained unpaid.
Hill filed suit against the PRA entities and JTS Realty Corp., seeking
damages under Louisiana' s Open Account Statute, La. R.S. 9: 2781, for its expert
consulting services in the amount of $405, 587.35, plus attorney' s fees, costs, and
interest. Hill later amended its original petition, alleging that the PRA entities and
JTS Realty Corp. were engaged in a single business enterprise or were alter egos of
each other. Hill further pled breach of contract, quantum meruit, and promissory
estoppel; requested attorney' s fees; and sought declaratory judgment in its
amended petition. Hill filed a second amended petition that named JTS Realty
Services, LLC (" JTS Realty Servs."); JTS Management Company, LLC (" JTS
Management"); and JTS Interests, LLC as additional defendants. Hill alleged
these companies were also engaged in a single business enterprise and/ or were
alter egos along with the PRA entities and JTS Realty Corp.
Thereafter, Hill filed a third amended petition, removing JTS Interests, LLC
as a defendant and naming Mr. Spinosa and the Spinosa Class Trust (" the
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Trust")— represented by trustee Lawrence R. Spinosa— as defendants. Hill again
alleged that all defendants were engaged in a single business enterprise and/ or
were alter egos of one another.
Ultimately, the trial court held a one -day bench trial on September 3, 2019.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment on October 13, 2019, awarding Hill
1, 063, 265. 68 in actual damages against defendants, plus prejudgment contractual
interest; declaring that all defendants were solidarily liable under the doctrines of
single business enterprise and/ or alter ego; awarding Hill postjudgment interest as
allowed by law; and awarding Hill reasonable attorney' s fees and costs " in an
amount to be hereafter determined." Following a hearing on Hill' s motion to set
the amount of the attorney' s fees, the trial court issued a second judgment on
August 17, 2020, awarding Hill $390,000. 00 in attorney' s fees and costs against all
defendants.
Defendants now appeal. Lawrence R. Spinosa, in his capacity as trustee of
the Trust, filed a motion with this court to substitute the successor trustee, Glen R.
Jarrell, in his place as appellant in the instant appeal.' The PRA entities, JTS
Realty Corp., JTS Management, JTS Realty Servs., and Mr. Spinosa ( collectively
referred to as " the Spinosa defendants") also filed an answer to the appeal.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This court, ex proprio rnotu, issued an order on March 23, 2021, ordering the
parties to show cause by briefs why the appeals should not be dismissed, noting
defects in the October 13, 2019 and August 17, 2020 judgments, as well as defects
2
in the motions for appeal filed by the appellants, The parties timely filed their
respective show cause briefs, all agreeing that this matter should be remanded to
This court referred the motion to the panel to which the appeal is assigned. Hill Intl, Inc. V.
JTS Realty Corp., 2021- 0157 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 22/ 21) ( unpublished action).
2 This court referred the motion to the panel to which the appeal is assigned. Hill Intl, Inc. v.
JTS Realty Corp., 2021- 0157 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 6/ 21) ( unpublished action).
4
the trial court to correct the deficiencies in the orders of appeal and the apparent
non -final judgments.
Thereafter, we remanded this matter for the limited purpose of instructing
the trial court to sign an amended final judgment( s) correcting the cited.
deficiencies. We further instructed the trial court to sign an amended order( s) of
appeal specifying which party or parties appealed from which judgment( s).
Finally, we ordered the trial court to supplement the record on appeal with the
amended judgment( s) and order( s) of appeal no later than 45 days following
issuance of our remand opinion. Hill Int' l, Inc. v. JTS Realty Corp., 2021- 0157
La. App. 1st Cir. 12130121), 342 So. 3d 322, 328.
Pursuant to the remand opinion, the Clerk of Court for the 1. 9' Judicial
District Court (" Clerk") supplemented the record on appeal with an amended
judgment signed on February 14, 2022. The February 14, 2022 amended
judgment, rendered in favor of Hill and against all defendants, awarded Hill
1, 063, 265. 68 in actual damages, plus pre judgment contractual interest that
continued to accrue on Hill' s unpaid invoices in the amount of $ 5, 742. 83 per
month from September 1, 2019, until entry of the February 14, 2022 amended
judgment; awarded Hill postjudgment interest as allowed by law; awarded Hill
reasonable attorney' s fees and costs of court in the amount of $390, 000. 00; and
decreed that all defendants " are solidarily liable under the doctrines of single
business enterprise and/ or alter ego liability for payment of the said amounts." The
February 14, 2022 amended judgment also stated that it is a final judgment that
adjudicates all outstanding issues: "[ A] ny and all claims of all parties not herein
granted are dismissed with prejudice."
The Clerk further supplemented the record on appeal with an amended order
of appeal signed on February 9, 2022, granting Lawrence R. Spinosa, in his
capacity as trustee of the Trust, an appeal of the February 14, 2022 amended
5
judgment. The Clerk also supplemented the record on appeal with an amended
order of appeal signed on February 9, 2022, granting the Spinosa defendants an
appeal of the February 14, 2022 amended judgment.
Considering this, we find the February 14, 2022 amended judgment is a final
judgment, and it cured the identified deficiencies in the original October 13, 2019
and August 17, 2020 judgments and in the October 20, 2020 and October 26, 2020
orders of appeal. The rule to show cause order is recalled, and the appeals are
maintained.
MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE APPELLANT
Lawrence R. Spinosa, in his capacity as trustee of the Trust, filed an
unopposed motion with this court to substitute the successor trustee, Glen R.
Jarrell, in his place as appellant in the instant appeal.' According to Lawrence R.
Spinosa, "[ b] ased upon the declining health of the Trustee, Lawrence Randall
Spinosa, on August 16, 2020, an Act of Removal of the Trustee and Appointment
of Successor Trustee, Glen R. Jarrell, was executed." Thereafter, " Glen R. Jarrell,
successor trustee of the Trust, executed an Acceptance of Trust Following
Removal of Original Trustee on August 26, 2020."
Given the settlors' authority to replace a trustee per the trust documents, the
settlors' act of removal of Lawrence R. Spinosa as trustee and appointment of Glen
R. Jarrell in his place, and Mr. Jarrell' s acceptance of same, as well as the fact that
this motion is unopposed, Lawrence R. Spinosa' s Motion to Substitute is granted,
and Mr. Jarrell is hereby substituted in Lawrence R. Spinosa' s place as appellant in
his capacity as trustee of the Trust.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
The February 14, 2022 amended judgment awarded damages, interest, and
3 This court referred the motion to the panel to which the appeal is assigned. Hill Int'[, Inc. v.
JTS Realty Corp., 2021- 0157 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 4122/ 21) ( unpublished action).
3
attorney' s fees to Hill and further found that all defendants are " solidarily liable
under the doctrines of single business enterprise and/ or alter ego liability for
payment of the said amounts." The trial court did not provide reasons for its
finding. However, we note at the outset that, on appeal, there is no allegation that
the trial court erred in finding the PRA entities liable for the amounts owed to Hill.
Accordingly, the PRA entities' liability is not discussed in this opinion. We
instead focus our attention on the liability of JTS Realty Corp., JTS Realty Servs.,
JTS Management, Mr. Spinosa, and the Trust.
Contractual Liability
Although not explicitly assigned as error, the parties clearly disagree as to
whether JTS Realty Corp. was a party to the contract. Therefore, it is necessary to
determine whether JTS Realty Corp. is liable under the terms of the contract along
with the PRA entities.
Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the
parties." La. Civ. Code art. 2045. When a contract can be construed from the four
corners of the instrument without looking to extrinsic evidence, the question of
contractual interpretation is answered as a matter of law. Fee v. S. Packaging,
Inc., 2018- 1364, 2018- 1365 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 24/ 19), 277 So. 3d 787, 797. Parol
or extrinsic evidence is generally inadmissible to vary the terms of a written
contract unless the written expression of the common intention of the parties is
ambiguous. Id. at 796- 97. The determination of whether a contract is clear or
ambiguous is a question of law. Id. at 797. A contract is considered ambiguous on
the issue of intent when either it lacks a provision bearing on that issue, its terms
are susceptible to more than one interpretation, there is uncertainty or ambiguity as
to its provisions, or the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained from the
language employed. Id.
The executed contract at issue identified JTS Realty Corp. as the " Client" in
7
the first paragraph and refers only to " Client" throughout the body of the contract.
The end of the contract provides, " IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Client and Hill have
executed this Agreement as of the date first written above." PRA and PRAII, with
the designation as " Client," are typed underneath that sentence. Below that is Mr.
Spinosa' s signature as " Manager." Despite the designation of the PRA entities as
Client" at the end of the contract at the signature line, the only time " Client" is
defined in the contract is at the beginning of the document, and that definition does
not include the PRA entities. There is no dispute that the PRA entities are bound
by the contract. However, the two separate client designations in the contract
create ambiguity as to whether the parties intended to bind JTS Realty Corp. to the
contract in addition to the PRA entities; thus, we may look to parol evidence to
determine the intention of the parties.
Intent is an issue of fact that is to be inferred from all of the surrounding
circumstances. Martin Expl. Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 93- 0349 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
5120194), 637 So. 2d 1202, 1205, writ denied, 94- 2003 ( La. 11/ 4194), 644 So.2d
1048. During trial, Dennis Allen, Hill' s corporate representative, testified that he
prepared the contract identifying JTS Realty Corp. as the " Client." Mr. Allen
emailed Mr. Spinosa on October 6, 2008, attaching a proposal letter, the contract,
and a rate schedule, which he stated were in the file titled " JTS package." The
proposal letter was addressed to Mr. Spinosa and JTS Realty Corp., and it outlined
how Hill could " assist JTS Realty Corp," referenced " JTS" throughout the
correspondence, and set forth Hill' s proposed services including a Phase I scope of
services. On October 22, 2008, Jerri Vasta of JTS Realty Servs. returned the
signed contract to Hill and authorized Hill to proceed with the Phase I scope of
services as outlined in its October 6, 2008 letter. The identification of JTS Realty
Corp. as " Client" was not struck through on the signed contract. Mr. Allen
testified that he assumed the PRA entities were additional clients, along with JTS
8
Realty Corp., when Mr. Spinosa listed the PRA entities above his signature line on
the executed contract. Further, Hill invoiced " JTS Realty" for its work, and Mr.
Allen testified that Mr. Spinosa never informed Hill that the wrong entity was
billed. In fact, Mr. Allen stated that the first time Mr, Spinosa informed him that
there was a " discrepancy" as to the entities involved was approximately three
months after Hill instituted litigation.
Mr. Spinosa' s initial testimony was that he executed the contract " in the
name of Perkins Rowe" and informed Hill that JTS Realty Corp. was not the
proper client by contacting Mr. Allen. Mr. Spinosa stated, " I recall executing an
agreement that was inappropriately addressed[,] ... making the change with [ Mr.
Allen' s] knowledge and approval, and forwarding the document back." However,
Mr. Spinosa later testified that if Hill was informed that its invoices were
improperly addressed, such communication would appear in the record. Nothing
of the sort appears in the record on appeal. Mr. Spinosa also contradicted his
previous testimony regarding allegedly changing the contract to name the PRA
entities as the " Client" by testifying that he does not know how the PRA entities
came to be listed on the contract.
The trial court would be well within its discretion as the factfinder to
disregard Mr. Spinosa' s inconsistent testimony. We find the remaining evidence
sufficiently demonstrates that the parties intended JTS Realty Corp. to be a party to
the contract and that JTS Realty Corp. is contractually liable for the amounts owed
under the contract along with the PRA entities. Consequently, it is unnecessary for
us to determine whether JTS Realty Corp. was engaged in a single business
enterprise in order to affirm liability as to JTS Realty Corp.
Choice ofLaw
The Spinosa defendants and the Trust allege that the trial court erred in
finding that the remaining JTS entities ( JTS Management and JTS Realty Servs.),
E
Mr. Spinosa, and Lawrence R. Spinosa, in his capacity as trustee of the Trust, are
solidarily liable for the debt under the single business enterprise and/ or alter ego
theories of liability. The Spinosa defendants and the Trust first assert that the trial
court erred in applying Louisiana law to the issues despite the contract' s choice -of -
law provision declaring that it " shall be governed by and construed and interpreted
in accordance with the laws of the State of New Jersey." 4 New Jersey law does not
recognize the single business enterprise doctrine. See Verni ex rel. Burstein v.
Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 903 A.2d 475, 497 ( N.J. App. Div. 2006). Therefore, the
Spinosa defendants and the Trust maintain that they cannot be held liable under
that theory of liability because New Jersey law governs their claims per the
contract. The determination as to which state' s law shall be applied to an issue is a
question of law, which this court reviews de nova Safeway Ins. Co. - Mississippi
v. Nash, 2020- 1296 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 4/ 21), 327 So. 3d 1048, 1050.
A contract between the parties is the law between them. See La. Civ. Code
art. 1983. It is well- established that where the parties stipulate the state law
governing the contract, Louisiana conflict -of laws
- principles require that the
stipulation be given effect, unless there is statutory or jurisprudential law to the
contrary or strong public policy considerations justifying the refusal to honor the
contract as written. See La. Civ. Code art. 3540; O' Bannon v. Moriah Techs.,
Inc., 2017- 0728 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 3/ 29/ 18), 248 So. 3d 392, 404- 05. The parties to
4 We note that ( 1) JTS Realty Servs., JTS Management, and Mr. Spinosa and (2) the Trust sought
summary judgment in their favor on the basis that New Jersey law governs the contract and all
issues pertaining thereto, and since New Jersey law does not recognize the single business
enterprise theory of liability, Hill' s claims against them should be dismissed with prejudice. The
trial court denied both motions in a January 6, 2017 order. The Trust filed a writ application
with this court, This court declined to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction and denied the writ
application. See Hill Intl, Inc. v. JTS Realty Corp., 2017- 0034 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 18/ 17),
2017 WL 1386389 ( unpublished). The Spinosa defendants and the Trust have implicitly sought
review of the district court' s 2017 judgment on their motions for summary judgment in the
instant appeal. When an unrestricted appeal is taken from a final judgment, the appellant is
entitled to seek review of all adverse interlocutory or partial judgments prejudicial to it or that
involve the same or related issues, in addition to the review of the final judgment dismissing all
of its claims with prejudice. Bannister Properties, Inc. v. State, 2018- 0030, 2018- 0031, 2018-
0032, 2018- 0033 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 2/ 18), 265 So. 3d 778, 784 n.6, writ denied, 2019- 0025
La. 316119), 266 So. 3d 902.
10
the contract— Hill, JTS Realty Corp., and the PRA entities— chose New Jersey law
to govern their claims.
However, we decline to apply the terms of the contract to claims against
non -signatories to the contract. See NorAm Drilling Co. v. E & PCo Int' l, LLC,
48, 591 ( La. App. 2d Cir. 12111113), 131 So. 3d 926. In NorAm, the plaintiff filed
suit against two defendants (" Dl" and " D2") alleging damages resulting from a
purported breach of contract to drill a horizontal methane well in. Louisiana. Id. at
927. The drilling contract was executed between the plaintiff and D1 and
contained a choice -of l-aw provision, which provided " the [ c] ontract is to be
construed, governed, interpreted, enforced and litigated, and the relations between
the parties determined in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas." Id.Although D2 was not a party to and did not sign the contract at issue in the lawsuit,
the plaintiff alleged that D2 was obligated for Dl' s debts under the single business
enterprise theory under Louisiana law. Id. D2 subsequently filed a motion for
summary judgment. In its motion, D2 argued that it could not be held liable
because ( 1) it was not a party to the drilling contract; and ( 2) Texas law, which did
not recognize liability on grounds of single business enterprise, applied to the
lawsuit. Id. at 927- 28.
The Second Circuit engaged in a choice -of l-aw analysis, starting with the
direct language of Article 3540 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Noting that the
contract at issue contained a Texas choice -of l-aw provision, the court
acknowledged the established Louisiana law principle that " where parties to a
contract stipulate the specific state law that will govern the contract, the choice -of -
law provision must be given effect unless there is statutory or jurisprudential law to
the contrary" and concluded that Texas law must govern any claim arising under
the drilling contract. Id. at 929. The NorAm court further recognized " the legal
conundrum of applying the contractual terms of the drilling contract to a claim
11
against [ D2,] who is not a party to the contract." Id. Rather than apply the
contractual choice of law to a non-party to the contract, the court used La. Civ.
Code art. 3537 to determine which state' s law would apply in the absence of a
choice of law. Id. Article 3537 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Title, an issue of conventional
obligations is governed by the law of the state whose policies would
be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue.
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of
the relevant policies of all involved states in the light of. ( 1) the
pertinent contacts of each state to the parties and the transaction,
including the place of negotiation, formation, and performance of the
contract, the location of the object of the contract, and the place of
domicile, habitual residence, or business of the parties; ( 2) the nature,
type, and purpose of the contract; and ( 3) the policies referred to in
Article 3515, as well as the policies of facilitating the orderly planning
of transactions, of promoting multistate commercial intercourse, and
of protecting one party from undue imposition by the other.'
The NorAm court ultimately concluded that the Article 3537 factors also
supported the application of Texas law because the parties were all formed under
the laws of and domiciled in Texas, the records of all the parties were also
maintained there, and the parties' operations all occurred in Texas. Id. at 929.
Further, the drilling contract was drafted, negotiated, and signed in Texas with the
expectation that any litigation arising under the drilling contract would be
governed by the laws of Texas. Id. at 930. After further concluding that, pursuant
to La. Civ. Code art. 3515, the law of the state of Texas would be most seriously
impaired if not applied, the NorAm court held that Texas law applied to the
lawsuit. Id.We find NorAm instructive. Like in NorAm, some of the defendants in this
case are signatories to the contract while others are not. New Jersey law applies to
the signatories of the contract, so New Jersey law governs any claim arising under
the contract as to the signatories thereto. The issues presented on appeal, however,
The significance of each of these factors varies according to the contract at issue. Dian Tooley-
Knoblett and David Gruning, 24 LA, Civ. L. TREATISE, Sales § 1: 15 ( 2021).
12
do not include liability under the contract. Instead, appellants claim the non -
signatory defendants— JTS Management, JTS Realty Servs., Mr. Spinosa, and the
Trust— are not solidarily liable for the debt to Hill. We find, just as the NorAm
court did, that the law governing the issues as they relate to the non -signatories to
the contract must be determined pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 3537.
In this case, the contract concerns forensic cost accounting services
pertaining to alleged costs, damages as a result of delay, and deficiencies arising
out of a dispute at the Perkins Rowe shopping center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
The underlying EMJ litigation also pertains to a construction project located in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The evidence introduced at trial established that Mr.
Spinosa resides in Louisiana, and the offices and operations of the PRA entities, as
well as the offices of JTS Management and JTS Realty Servs., are domiciled in
Louisiana, have registered agents in Louisiana, and have managers/ officers in
Louisiana. Although Hill is a Delaware corporation with its corporate
headquarters in New Jersey, it executed the contract and delivered it to Mr.
Spinosa ( on behalf of the PRA entities and JTS Realty Corp.) in Louisiana, where
Mr. Spinosa resides. Further, Louisiana has a distinct interest in determining the
fundamental issues of its own entities' corporate existence and/ or structure. See
Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats Inc., 294 F. 3d 640, 646- 47 ( 5th Cir. 2002),
citin Quickick, Inc. v. Quickick Int' 1, 304 So. 2d 402, 406 ( La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 305 So.2d 123 ( La. 1974) (" At least one Louisiana intermediate
appellate court has concluded that the law of the state of incorporation applies in
determining whether it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil."); see also
Energy Coal v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 836 F.3d 457, 462 ( 5th Cir. 2016)
Louisiana courts look to the state of incorporation not just when deciding issues
involving piercing, which as noted above is a close relative of the single business
enterprise theory, but also when deciding more general questions of corporate
13
structure.").
For these reasons, we find Louisiana law would be most seriously
impaired if not applied, and thus, the trial court did not err in applying Louisiana
law to Hill' s claims against the non -signatory defendants.
The Single Business Enterprise and Alter Ego Theories o.fLiability
The trial court' s ruling did not state which defendants it found liable under
the single business enterprise theory of liability versus the alter ego theory of
liability. Although the theories have some similarities, an important distinction
must be made between the two.
A limited liability company (" LLC") is a juridical person separate and apart
from its members. See Ogea v. Merritt, 2013- 1085 ( La. 12/ 10/ 13), 130 So. 3d
888, 894- 95, citin La. Civ. Code art. 24. Thus, members of an LLC are generally
not liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of the LLC. See La. R. S. 12: 1320( B).
In narrowly defined circumstances, however, individual members of an LLC have
been subjected to personal liability for obligations for which the LLC would
otherwise be solely liable. Fausse Riviere, L.L.C. v. Snyder, 2016- 0633 ( La.
App. 1st Cir. 2/ 15/ 17), 211 So. 3d 1188, 1192. When individual members of an
LLC mismanage the entity or otherwise thwart the public policies justifying
treating the entity as a separate juridical person, the court may " pierce the
corporate veil" to hold the LLC' s individual members liable for its debts. Id. The
court may pierce the corporate veil under two exceptional circumstances. The first
is where the shareholders, acting through the corporation, commit fraud or deceit
on a third party such that justice demands the corporate veil be pierced to allow the
third party to recover from the shareholders personally. See Id, at 1193. In the
second instance, which Hill asserts herein, the shareholders disregard the corporate
formalities to such an extent that the shareholders and the corporation become
indistinguishable, i.e., the corporation was operated as the " alter ego" of the
shareholder. Id., citin Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., 590 So. 2d 1164, 1168
14
La. 199 1).
The single business enterprise theory of liability is distinguishable from the
alter ego theory in several ways. The most important distinction is who may be
held liable under each theory. As opposed to alter ego doctrine, which " pierces the
corporate veil" to reach the members of an LLC, the single business enterprise
doctrine is a theory for imposing liability on two or more business entities when
they act as one. Brown v. ANA Insurance Group, 2007- 2116 ( La. 1. 011.4108),
994 So. 2d 1265, 1266 n.2, citing Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249,
257 ( La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 668 ( La. 1991). Under the single
business enterprise theory, the legal fiction of a distinct corporate entity is
disregarded when a corporation is so organized and controlled as to make it merely
an instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation.' Green, 577 So.2d at 257.
When a group of entities constitutes a single business enterprise, the assets of each
of the affiliated corporations are pooled together to satisfy the claims of creditors.
Brown v. Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 93- 2169 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 10/ 7/ 94), 644 So. 2d
723, 727, writ denied, 94- 2748 ( La. 116195), 648 So. 2d 932, citing Green, 577
So. 2d at 259. The single business enterprise doctrine permits multiple companies
to be treated as a single entity ---but still an entity separate from its human
ownersas if all of the different companies within an affiliated group had been
6 Since Green, the single business enterprise doctrine has been acknowledged by other appellate
courts of this state as well.See, e. g., GBB Properties Two, LLC v. Stirling Properties, Inc.,
2017- 352 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 10125117), 230 So. 3d 225, writ denied, 2017- 1931 ( La. 1129118), 233
So. 3d 606; Lee v. Clinical Rsch. Or. of Fla., L.C., 2004- 0428 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 11117104),
889 So. 2d 317, writ denied, 2004- 3002 ( La. 2118/ 05), 896 So. 2d 33; Khoobehi Properties, LLC
v. Baronne Dev. No. 2, L.L.C., 2016- 506 ( La. App. 5th Cir, 3/ 29/ 17), 216 So. 3d 287, 298, writ
denied, 2017- 0893 ( La. 9/ 29/ 17), 227 So. 3d 288, As Justice Crichton noted, "[ It is]
concerning
the Louisiana Supreme] Court has never considered the propriety of [ the] application [ of the
single business enterprise doctrine] despite its conceptualization by an appellate court 30 years
ago.... [ T] he authority of [the Louisiana Supreme] Court on the nature of business entities is
wanting, and more guidance is needed in this area of the law." St. Romain v. Cherokee Ins.
Co., 2021- 01412 ( La. 11123121), 328 So. 3d 72, 73 ( Crichton, J., assigning reasons to grant and
docket the writ application, though denied by the majority of justices). In light of recent
legislative history, namely Louisiana House Bill 313 of the 2020 Regular Session ( vetoed by
Gov. Edwards), guidance is needed on this issue. However, as the current case law stands, we
are bound by Green.
15
organized as just one, all- encompassing corporation or LLC. Glenn G. Morris and
Wendell H. Holmes, 8 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE, Business Organizations § 32: 15
2022). " In effect, [ single business enterprise] piercing rips through all of the
separate -company barriers within an affiliated group, moving in all directions ...
but then stops when it reaches the final ceiling within the group, the one that
separates the group as a whole from its human owners." Id. While the alter ego
theory provides a basis to impose liability on the individual members of a business
entity, single business enterprise provides a basis to impose liability on any
affiliated business entities operating as one.
The applicability of either theory is a factual determination. Grayson v.
R.B. Ammon & Associates, Inc., 99- 2597 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 1113100), 778 So. 2d
1, 15, writs denied, 2000- 3270, 2000- 3311 ( La. 1/ 26/ 01), 782 So. 2d 1026, 1027;
Holly & Smith Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate Facility, 2003- 0481
La. App. 1st Cir. 2/ 23/ 04), 872 So. 2d 1147, 1156. Based on the legal distinction
as to who is liable under the single business enterprise and alter ego theories of
liability, we are presented with two separate questions of fact: ( 1) whether JTS
Management and JTS Realty Servs, were operating in a single business enterprise
with any of the contractually bound parties ( the PRA entities and JTS Realty
Corp.); and ( 2) whether JTS Realty Corp., JTS Realty Servs., JTS Management
collectively referred to as " the JTS entities"), and/ or the PRA entities operated as
the alter ego of their member( s), namely Mr. Spinosa and the Trust, such that the
corporate veil should be pierced.
The plaintiff' s burden of proof under both the single business enterprise and
alter ego theories of liability is clear and convincing evidence.' Grayson, 778
7 To prove a matter by clear and convincing evidence means to demonstrate that the existence of
a disputed fact is highly probable, that is, much more probable than its nonexistence. In re
Fogg, 2019- 0719 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2/ 21120), 298 So. 3d 291, 294, writ denied, 2020- 00819 ( La.
10114120), 302 So. 3d 1124.
Wei
So. 2d at 14; Holly & Smith Architects, Inc., 872 So. 2d 1156. Further, on review,
the appellate court may not reverse the factfinder' s factual determinations unless
the record does not provide a reasonable factual basis for the finding and the
finding is manifestly or clearly wrong. Stobart v. State, Department of
Transportation and Development, 617 So. 2d 880, 882 ( La. 1993).
Liability ofJTS Management and JTS Realty Servs.
Louisiana courts consider a non -exhaustive list of 18 factors to evaluate
whether an entity is part of a single business enterprise with another entity. Those
factors include:
1. Corporations with identity or substantial identity of ownership, i.e.,
ownership of sufficient stock to give actual working control;
2. Common directors or officers;
3. Unified administrative control of corporations whose business
functions are similar or supplementary;
4. Directors and officers of one corporation act independently in the
interest of that corporation;
5. Corporation financing another corporation;
6. Inadequate capitalization;
7. Corporation causing the incorporation of another affiliated
corporation;
8. Corporation paying the salaries and other expenses or losses of
another corporation;
9. Receiving no business other than that given to it by its affiliated
corporations;
10. Corporation using the property of another corporation as its own;
11. Noncompliance with corporate formalities;
12. Common employees;
13. Services rendered by the employees of one corporation on behalf
of another corporation;
14. Common offices;
15. Centralized accounting;
16. Undocumented transfers of funds between corporations;
17. Unclear allocation of profits and losses between corporations; and
18. Excessive fragmentation of a single enterprise into separate
corporations.
Green, 577 So. 2d at 257- 58. This list is illustrative, and no one factor is
dispositive of the issue. Grayson, 778 So. 2d at 15, citing Green, 577 So.2d at
258. Rather, " the totality of the circumstances" should be considered in evaluating
the existence of a single business enterprise. Holly & Smith Architects, Inc., 872
17
So. 2d at 1156. Each defendant should be evaluated individually. See Lee v.
Clinical Research Ctr. of Fla., L.C., 2004- 0428 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 11117104), 889
So. 2d 317, 323, writ denied, 2004- 3002 ( La. 2118105), 896 So. 2d 33.
After comparing the evidence with the facts set out in Green, we conclude
the record contains ample evidence to support the trial court' s finding that JTS
Management and JTS Realty Servs. were engaged in a single business enterprise
with the contractually bound PRA entities. These entities have substantial identity
of ownership, as Mr. Spinosa andlor the Trust is a member in each entity. Mr.
Spinosa is also the manager of each of the defendant entities. JTS Management
and JTS Realty Servs. share an office and a fax machine with the PRA entities, and
they all have the same in- house accountant. Mr. Spinosa was identified as the
corporate representative for all of the defendant entities. During his Article 1442
deposition, Mr. Spinosa admitted that his businesses have " shared" or " borrowed"
employees. Mr. Spinosa also admitted that PRA had problems with capitalization
during the Project. Transaction reports for the PRA entities show numerous
monetary transfers between the defendant entities, and the evidence reflects
liabilities in the millions to JTS Management and JTS Realty Servs. from the PRA
entities. Defendants did not offer any evidence of promissory notes, IOUs, loan
agreements, or any other such documents that would legitimize these transfers and
liabilities between the entities.
Additionally, all defendant entities are in the real estate business, whether it
be construction, development, or management. It also appears the defendant
entities were operating interchangeably. For example, PRA' s operating agreement
calls for it to enter into a development and management agreement with JTS
Management or its designee. The executed management agreement admitted into
evidence, however, is between PRA and JTS Realty Servs., not JTS Management,
and no evidence was presented to show that JTS Management officially designated
18
JTS Realty Servs. to fill that role. Various certificates of occupancy issued to
tenants of Perkins Rowe list several different owners, including " JTS," " JTS
Interests," and " JTS Reality." Mr. Spinosa, in his capacity as manager and
registered agent of all of the defendant entities, also corresponded with the
Louisiana Secretary of State regarding the PRA entities and the JTS entities on
letterhead bearing a " JTS Interests" logo. Further, all communications and
discussions concerning the contract and the services provided by Hill were
between a representative of Hill and a representative from a JTS entity. Most
notably, the executed contract was returned to Hill via email from an employee of
JTS Realty Servs., and Mr. Spinosa' s own email signature line on correspondence
related to the Project identified him as CEO of JTS Realty Servs. Mr. Allen
testified at trial that Mr. Spinosa held himself out as " JTS," In light of this
evidence, we find no error in the trial court' s factual finding that JTS Management
and JTS Realty Servs. were engaged in a single business enterprise with the
contractually bound PRA entities.
As Mr. Spinosa is an individual, not a business entity, single business
enterprise is inapplicable to him. See NussIi US, LLC v. Nola Motorsports Host
Comm., Inc,, No. 15- 2372, 2016 WL 4063823, at * 18 ( E, D. La. 7129116) ( holding
single business enterprise may not be applied to an individual). Similarly, the
Trust is not a business entity but rather a " relationship resulting from the transfer
of title to property to a person to be administered by him as a fiduciary for the
benefit of another." La. R.S. 9: 1731. A trust is unlike a corporation because a
corporation is a juridical entity separate from its officers and stockholders. See
Edward E. Chase, Jr., 11 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE, Trusts § 1: 2 ( 2022); see also Ogea,
130 So. 3d at 894, citing La. Civ. Code art. 24 ( holding the same is true of an LLC).
Thus, we find single business enterprise is also inapplicable to the Trust. This does
not necessarily preclude a finding, however, that Mr. Spinosa and/ or the Trust are
19
solidarily liable under the alter ego theory of liability if grounds for piercing the
corporate veil exist.
Piercing the Corporate Veil o.fJTS Realty Servs. and/or PRA entities
When a party seeks to pierce the corporate veil, the totality of the
circumstances is determinative. Fausse Riviere, L.L.C., 211 So. 3d at 1193, citing
Riggins, 590 So. 2d at 1169. Some of the factors courts consider when determining
whether to apply the alter ego doctrine include, but are not limited to, ( 1)
commingling of corporate or shareholder funds; ( 2) failure to follow statutory
formalities for incorporating and transacting corporate affairs; ( 3)
undercapitalization; (
4) failure to provide separate bank accounts and bookkeeping
records; and ( 5) failure to hold regular shareholder and director meetings. Fausse
Riviere, L.L.C., 211 So. 3d at 1193. The fact that a person is the managing
member of an LLC and/or has a significant ownership interest therein does not in
itself make that person liable for its debts. Charming Charlie, Inc. v. Perkins
Rowe Assocs., L.L.C., 2011- 2254 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 7/ 10/ 12), 97 So. 3d 595, 599,
citing La. R.S. 12: 1320( B).
Under the alter ego theory of liability, a finding that technical formalities
were not followed is not enough; there must be something else, " some misuse of
the corporate privilege or other justification for limiting [ the recognition of a
separate corporate existence] under the facts of a particular situation." Prasad v.
Bullard, 2010- 291 ( La. App. 5th Cir. 10112110), 51 So. 3d 35, 41. "[ W] here fraud
or deceit is absent, other circumstances must be so strong as to clearly indicate that
the corporation and shareholder operated as one." Harris v. Best of Am. Inc., 466
So. 2d 1309, 1315 ( La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 470 So. 2d 121 ( La. 1985). " In
the absence of particular allegations of shareholder fraud, a plaintiff will bear a
heavy burden of proving that a shareholder disregarded corporate formalities to the
extent that the shareholder and the corporation had become indistinguishable."
20
New Orleans Jazz & Heritage Found., Inc. v. Kirksey, 2009- 1433 ( La. App. 4th
Cir. 5126110), 40 So. 3d 394, 407, writ denied, 2010- 1475 ( La. 10/ 1110), 45 So. 3d
1100.
In applying the principle of corporate immunity, the members have the
initial burden of showing the corporate existence. The burden then shifts to the
plaintiff to show exceptional circumstances, which must exist in order for the
corporate veil to be pierced and individual shareholders or members held liable for
a corporate debt. McDonough Marine Serv., a Div. of Marmac Corp. v.
Doucet, 95- 2087 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6128196), 694 So. 2d 305, 309. Depending
upon the various competing policies and interests involved, the same factual
scenario may result in recognition of a separate corporate identity for some
purposes, i. e., insulation of shareholders from liability and a disallowance of the
separate corporate entity privilege for others. Glazer v. Comm' n on Ethics for
Pub. Emps., 431 So. 2d 752, 758 ( La. 1983), abrogated on other grounds as noted
in Louisiana Bd. of Ethics in re Great S. Dredging, Inc., 2015- 0870 ( La. App.
1st Cir. 5127116), 195 So. 3d 631, 638 n.2, writ denied, 2016- 1208 ( La. 10117116),
207 So. 3d 1063.
The evidence is clear that the PRA entities and JTS Realty Servs. formally
exist under the laws of Louisiana. The burden then shifted to Hill to show that
exceptional circumstances exist to support piercing the corporate veil to hold Mr.
Spinosa liable as a shareholder. There is no evidence that Mr. Spinosa failed to
maintain separate bank accounts or bookkeeping records for JTS Realty Servs. or
the PRA entities, or otherwise failed to follow statutory formalities for the
formation of JTS Realty Servs. or the PRA entities or the conduct of their affairs.
A large majority of Mr. Spinosa' s responses during his personal deposition and the
La. Code Civ. P. art. 1442 deposition of the JTS entities and PRA entities, for
which he was designated the corporate representative, were that he did not recall
21
the answer; he would " defer to the documents" presented during the depositions;
he would " let the document speak to itself'; or he would " defer to the financial
statements." Accordingly, the trial court was forced to largely disregard Mr.
Spinosa' s depositions and consult the documentary evidence and Mr. Allen' s
testimony in making its factual determination as to whether any of the defendant
entities are merely the alter ego of Mr. Spinosa.
The exhibits admitted into evidence at trial are replete with examples of
commingling of corporate and shareholder funds. The exhibits document a large
number (
in both quantity and value) of debits to the PRA entities from " JT
Spinosa." In addition to the numerous " JT Spinosa" debits, the PRA and PRAII
transaction reports include " interest" debits and credits with the designation " JT
Spinosa"; wires in and out listed as debits and credits with the notation " JT
Spinosa"; debits for legal fees referencing payments to law firms under the heading
JTS Joseph T Spinosa" and further referencing two legal matters in which Mr.
Spinosa was named as a defendant; and at least one credit described as " 2009
Distrib JTs" under the heading " JTS Joseph T. Spinosa." Defendants did not offer
any evidence of promissory notes, IOUs, loan agreements, or any other such
documents that would legitimize these transfers. In a rare responsive answer
during his deposition, Mr. Spinosa admitted that he personally loaned money to the
Project, namely PRA, and has not been paid in full; however, there is no evidence
of the terms of any such loan.
Further, even in cases involving consensual creditors where veil piercing is
unusual, courts frequently decline to protect a shareholder against personal liability
where a single shareholder controls a number of different corporations and moves
assets back and forth between the various corporations. See Glenn G. Morris and
Wendell H. Holmes, 8 LA. Civ. L. TREATISE, Business Organizations § 32: 6 ( 2022)
describing piercing the corporate veil as a sort of "res ispa loquitur" remedy for
22
corporate creditors in such an instance). As discussed above, the evidence shows
numerous monetary transfers between the defendant entities and reflects liabilities
in the millions between those entities. Mr. Spinosa is the only shareholder or one
of only a few shareholders in nearly all of these entities. Considering the evidence
of unexplained commingling of funds and Mr. Spinosa' s overtly evasive deposition
testimony, we cannot say the trial court' s decision to pierce the corporate veil of
the PRA entities in order to also hold Mr. Spinosa personally liable for the debt
owed to Hill was manifestly erroneous.
Piercing the Corporate Veil ofJTS Management
The Trust has a 100% ownership interest in JTS Management. By virtue of
this ownership interest, Hill seeks to pierce the corporate veil of JTS Management
to hold the Trust liable for JTS Management' s debts on the basis that JTS
Management is the alter ego of the Trust.
Whether the alter ego doctrine may be applied to a trust as the sole member
of an LLC, as opposed to an individual or other business entity, is a res nova issue
in Louisiana. Even assuming the alter ego doctrine could be applied to a trust
under Louisiana law, no facts are alleged in the petition, nor was any evidence
presented at trial, that would support the existence of exceptional circumstances
that justify the application of that doctrine here. See Crutcher -Tufts Res., Inc. v.
Tufts, 2009- 1572 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 4128110), 38 So. 3d 987, 990. Hill did not
present evidence that satisfies any factors supporting the application of the alter
ego doctrine to the Trust. The record is also devoid of allegations or evidence
related to any specific actions of Lawrence R. Spinosa, either individually or in his
representative capacity, that would justify piercing the corporate veil.' In fact, Mr.
Allen testified that he was not even aware of the Trust until 2013, years after the
R We look to Lawrence R. Spinosa' s actions since a trust can only act through its trustee( s). See
Crutcher -Tufts, 38 So. 3d at 990, cion La. R. S. 9: 1781 and La. R.S. 9: 2091.
23
parties entered into the contract and years after litigation was instituted.
Accordingly, we find manifest error in the trial court' s decision to pierce the
corporate veil to hold the trustee of the Trust, in his representative capacity,
solidarily liable for any and all debts owed to Hill per the trial court' s February 14,
2022 amended judgment, including but not limited to actual damages, interest,
attorney' s fees, and costs.
ANSWER TO THE APPEAL
The Spinosa defendants filed an answer to the appeal " out of an abundance
of caution" related to the appearance of "some discrepancy as to Spinosa and the
Non -Trust Entities['] procedural status before the Court in this matter." The
discrepancy" seems to stem from issues recognized by the rule to show cause
order and subsequently rectified on remand. Accordingly, we deny the answer to
the appeal filed by the Spinosa defendants.
DECREE
For the above and foregoing reasons, we recall this court' s March 23, 2021
rule to show cause order and maintain the appeals.
The motion to substitute the successor trustee, Glen R. Jarrell, in the place of
trustee Lawrence R. Spinosa as appellant in the instant appeal that was filed by
defendant/ appellant Lawrence R. Spinosa, in his capacity as trustee of the Spinosa
Class Trust, is GRANTED.
We REVERSE the portion of the trial court' s February 14, 2022 amended
judgment that finds Lawrence R. Spinosa, as trustee of the Spinosa Class Trust,
solidarily liable under the doctrines of single business enterprise and/ or alter ego
liability for payment of the said amounts." We AFFIRM the trial court' s February
14, 2022 amended judgment in all other respects. All costs of this appeal are to be
equally shared by Plaintiff, Hill Intemational, Inc., and Defendants, JTS Realty
Corporation; JTS Realty Services, LLC; JTS Management Company, LLC; Perkins
24
Rowe Associates, LLC; Perkins Rowe Associates II, LLC; and Joseph T. Spinosa.
The answer to the appeal filed by defendants/ appellants Perkins Rowe
Associates, LLC; Perkins Rowe Associates II, LLC; JTS Realty Corporation; JTS
Realty Services, LLC; JTS Management Company, LLC; and Joseph T. Spinosa is
DENIED.
RULE TO SHOW CAUSE ORDER RECALLED; APPEALS
MAINTAINED; MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE APPELLANT GRANTED;
AMENDED JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN
PART; ANSWER TO APPEAL DENIED.
25
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2021 CA 0157
HILL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
VERSUS
TS REALTY CORPORATION, PERKINS ROWE ASSOCIATES, L. L.C., AND
PERKINS ROWE ASSOCIATES II, L. L. C.
McClendon, J., dissents in part and concurs in part.
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that ITS Realty Corp. was bound ander
the terms of the contract. The signature section of the contract provides as follows:
IN WITlGM WHEREOF, Clint end Hill have executed
Chia Agm meat ae of the date Ctrat written above,
CLOT'] PERKINS ROWE ASSOCIATES, LLC
INS ROWE ASSQCTATES. II, LLC
7wNTMEMNAMON
Vim
ep ' T,
INC.
Sp,
in
Nome: Dennis L. Allen
This Senior vice Ptawldent
Although the parties may have intended for ITS Realty Corp. to be a client to the
contract, and although JTS Realty Corp. is identified as a client in the body of the
contract, no one signed the contract on behalf of ITS Realty Corp. Mr. Spinosa signed
the contract solely as the manager of Perkins Rowe Associates, LLC and Perkins Rowe
Associates II, LLC. As such, JTS Realty Corp. cannot be bound by the contract as a
contracting party. The parties' intent as to the identity of ITS Realty Corp. as a client is
not determinative of the issue presented. Accordingly, I find that the majority erred in
determining that .ITS Realty Corp. was contractually liable for the amounts owed under
the contract.
Further, with regard to the Spinosa Class Trust, Lawrence Spinosa, as trustee,
was not a named defendant in this matter. Rather, the third amended petition added
the Spinosa Class Trust as a defendant. A judgment may not be rendered against a
party who is not named as a defendant. Dennison v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 94- 0026
La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 10/ 94), 645 So. 2d 1227, 1233. Accordingly, any judgment against
Lawrence Spinosa is absolutely void. See Hebert v. Hebert, 96- 2155 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
9/ 19/ 97), 700 So. 2d 958, 959. Further, in this matter, the trial court neither dismissed
all claims against the trust nor rendered judgment against the trust. Nevertheless,
finding no authority for applying the piercing the corporate veil/ alter ego theory to a
trust, I concur with the majority's conclusion that the trial court erred in holding the
trustee solidarily liable.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part and concur in part.
2