Erin and Owen C. Sketchler, Individually and on behalf of their minor son, Oliver Sketchler v. Daniel Hernandez, Octabio Hernandez, Louis C. Paxton, Audwin D. Finley, ADF Enterprises, Inc., Old American County Mutual Fire Insurance Company, National General Insurance Company, Cooper Insurance & Associates, Inc., The State of Louisiana through the L ( 2021 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA
j Eal COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2020 CA 0292
ERIN AND OWEN C. SKETCHLER, INDIVIDUALLY
AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR SON, OLIVER SKETCHLER
VERSUS
DANIEL HERNANDEZ, OCTABI0 HERNANDEZ, LOUIS C. PAXTON,
AUDWIN D. FINLEY, ADF ENTERPRISES, INC., OLD AMERICAN
COUNTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, NATIONAL GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, COOPER INSURANCE & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GRACO CHILDREN' S
PRODUCTS, INC. & AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.
JUDGMENT RENDERED: MAY 1 9 2021
Appealed from the
Twenty -First Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Tangipahoa • State of Louisiana
Docket Number 2015- 1152 • Division E
The Honorable Brenda B. Ricks, Judge Presiding
Michael C. Darnell COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS
Bruce Feingerts PLAINTIFFS— Erin and Owen
New Orleans, Louisiana C. Sketchler, individually and on
behalf of their minor son, Oliver
Sketchler
Jerry L. Saporito COUNSELS FOR APPELLEE
Caitlin Spieker DEFENDANT— Graco Children' s
New Orleans, Louisiana Products, Inc.
Stephen M. Copenhaver, pro hac vice
Joseph J. Krasovec, III, pro hac vice
Chicago, Illinois
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
WELCH, J.
Plaintiffs, Erin and Owen C. Sketchler, individually and on behalf of their
minor son, Oliver, appeal a summary judgment in favor of defendant, Graco
Children' s Products, Inc. (" Graco"), dismissing plaintiffs' claims against it with
prejudice. We reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 18,
2014, in the eastbound lane of Interstate 12 in Tangipahoa Parish.' Daniel
Hernandez, traveling westbound in the left lane on Interstate 12, collided with a
vehicle driven by Louis C. Paxton.2 The Hernandez vehicle then crossed the
median and entered the eastbound left lane, whereupon it crashed into the rear of
an 18 -wheeler driven by Audwin D. Finley. After striking the Finley vehicle, the
Hernandez vehicle struck the vehicle driven by Mr. Sketchler and in which Mrs.
Sketchler and Oliver were passengers. Each member of the Sketchler family was
seriously injured in the accident. Oliver, who was two -years old on the date of the
accident, suffered serious injuries including multiple skull fractures, subarachnoid
hemorrhage, subdural hematoma, traumatic encephalopathies, and two broken legs.
At the time of the accident, Oliver was secured in the rear, right seat of the
Sketchler vehicle in a Graco SnugRide® 30 child restraint system.
Plaintiffs filed suit against multiple defendants, including Graco, alleging a
claim under the under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (" LPLA"), La. R.S.
9: 2800. 51, et seq., for an allegedly defective child passenger restraint system.
Graco filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs would be
1 We borrow these facts from our earlier opinion. See Sketchler v. Hernandez, 2018- 1634 ( La.
App. 1St Cir. 9/ 4/ 20), 2020 WL 5269829, at * 1 ( unpublished), writrag_ nted, judgment rev' d,
2020- 01475 ( La. 3/ 2/ 21), 311 So. 3d 343 ( per curiam).
2 The manner and location of the Hernandez -Paxton collision is disputed. See Sketchler, 2020
WL 5269829 at * 2 ( Holdridge, J., dissenting).
0)
unable to meet their burden of proving that the product at issue was defective or
that it caused any injury to Oliver Sketchler." Specifically, Graco contended that
the plaintiffs either disposed of or misplaced the child restraint, and without the
ability for Graco to inspect the child restraint, there is no evidence in existence to
establish that it was defective. Plaintiffs opposed the summary judgment, arguing
that according to the opinions of their experts, the child restraint was defective,
failed to perform as it should have, and that such failure caused injuries and
damages to Oliver.
Following a hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.
Thereafter, the trial court issued reasons for judgment, finding that because the
child restraint was disposed of or misplaced, spoliation of evidence occurred,
rendering plaintiffs unable to present evidence sufficient to carry their burden of
proof on one or more element of their LPLA claim. Accordingly, the trial court
granted Graco' s motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' claims
against it, with prejudice. The trial court signed a judgment in accordance with its
written reasons on June 25, 2018.
The plaintiffs now appeal, raising two assignments of error. They contend
the trial court erred in granting Graco' s motion for summary judgment because
genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Graco' s child restraint was
defective or that it caused any injury to Oliver Sketchler. Plaintiffs alternatively
contend the trial court wrongly disregarded their expert' s affidavit by determining
that there was an insufficient basis for his opinion without following the
procedures set forth in La. C. C. P. art. 1425( F).
LAW
After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary
judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents
show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled
3
to judgment as a matter of law. La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(3). In reviewing a trial
court' s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, appellate courts review
evidence de novo using the same criteria that govern the trial court' s determination
of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Georgia- Pacific Consumer
1St
Operations, LLC v. City of Baton Rouge, 2017- 1553, 2017- 1554 ( La. App.
Cir. 7/ 18/ 18), 255 So. 3d 16, 22, writ denied, 2018- 1397 ( La. 12/ 3/ 18), 257 So. 3d
194.
The Code of Civil Procedure places the initial burden of proof on the party
filing the motion for summary judgment, here Graco. See La. C. C. P. art.
966( D)( 1). If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue
raised in the motion for summary judgment, as in the instant matter, the mover is
not required to negate all of the essential elements of the adverse party' s claim,
action, or defense. See La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1). See also Babin v. Winn- Dixie
Louisiana. Inc., 2000- 0078 ( La. 6/ 30/ 00), 764 So. 2d 37, 39. However, the mover
must demonstrate the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential
to the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense. La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1). See
also La. C. C. P. art. 966, Comments --2015, Comment 0).
Once the motion for summary judgment has been made and properly
supported, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce factual support,
through the use of proper documentary evidence attached to its opposition, which
establishes the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1). If the non-
moving party fails to produce sufficient factual support in its opposition which
proves the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1)
mandates the granting of the motion for summary judgment. See Babin, 764 So.
2d at 40; Jenkins v. Hernandez, 2019- 0874 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 6/ 3/ 20), 305 So. 3d
365, 371, writ denied, 2020- 00835 ( La. 10/ 20/ 20), 303 So. 3d 315.
4
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court' s role is not to
evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but
instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Janney v.
Pearce, 2009- 2103 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 7/ 10), 40 So. 3d 285, 289, writ denied,
2010- 1356 ( La. 9/ 24/ 10), 45 So. 3d 1078. 3 Because it is the applicable substantive
law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can
be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Georgia- Pacific
Consumer Operations, LLC, 255 So. 3d at 22.
The LPLA provides the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for
damage caused by their products. See La. R.S. 9: 2800. 52. A claimant may not
recover from a manufacturer for damage caused by a product on the basis of any
theory of liability that is not set forth in the LPLA. See La. R.S. 9: 2800. 52;
ExPert Riser Sols.,
LLC v. Techcrane Int' 1, LLC, 2019- 1165 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
12/ 30/ 20), So. 3d , 2020 WL 7770882, at * 4.
To recover under the LPLA, a plaintiff must establish four elements: ( 1)
that the defendant is a manufacturer of the product; ( 2) that the claimant' s damage
was
proximately caused by a characteristic of the product; ( 3) that this
characteristic made the product unreasonably dangerous; and ( 4) that the
claimant' s damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the
claimant or someone else. See La. R. S. 9: 2800. 54( A); Delahoussaye v. Boelter,
2019- 0026 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 15/ 19), 290 So. 3d 669, 674.
3
Simply showing the presence of disputed facts is insufficient if there is no legal issue presented
by those contested facts. See Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Gray, 2007- 1433 ( La. App. 4th
Cir. 1/ 14/ 09), 2 So. 3d 598, 603, writ denied, 2009- 0476 ( La. 4/ 17/ 09), 6 So. 3d 795. A
genuine" issue is a triable issue, which means that an issue is genuine if reasonable persons
could disagree. If on the state of the evidence, reasonable persons could reach only one
conclusion, there is no need for a trial on that issue. A fact is " material" when its existence or
nonexistence may be essential to a plaintiffs cause of action under the applicable theory of
recovery. Kasem v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2016- 0217 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2/ 10/ 17), 212
So. 3d 6, 13.
5
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 2800. 54( B) sets forth that a product is
unreasonably dangerous if and only if:
1) The product is unreasonably dangerous in
construction or composition as provided in R. S.
9: 2800. 55; 141
2) The product is unreasonably dangerous in design as
provided in R.S. 9: 2800. 56;[ 5]
3) The product is unreasonably dangerous because an
adequate warning about the product has not been
provided as provided in R.S. 9: 2800. 57; 161 or
4) The product is unreasonably dangerous because it
does not conform to an express warranty of the
manufacturer about the product as provided in R. S.
9: 2800. 58. 171
A plaintiff suing a manufacturer on the basis of a claimed injury resulting
from a defect in a product has the burden of proving the product was defective and
the defect caused plaintiffs injury. United Fire Group v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
2013- 2115 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 8/ 18/ 14), 2014 WL 4067756, at * 6 ( unpublished). A
plaintiff in a products liability action must prove that the product was defective,
i. e., unreasonably dangerous to normal use; that the product was in normal use at
the time the injury occurred; that the defect caused the injury; and that the
condition existed when the product left the control of the manufacturer or supplier.
Plaintiff must prove each of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. A
4 " A product is unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition if, at the time the product
left its manufacturer' s control, the product deviated in a material way from the manufacturer' s
specifications or performance standards for the product or from otherwise identical products
manufactured by the same manufacturer." See La. R.S. 9: 2800. 55.
5 A product is unreasonably dangerous in design if, at the time it left the manufacturer' s control,
there existed an alternative design that was capable of preventing the claimant' s damage, and the
likelihood and gravity of that damage outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of adopting
the alternative design and any adverse effect on the product' s utility. See La. R.S. 9: 2800. 56;
United Fire Group, 2014 WL 4067756 at * 5.
6
Liability may be imposed on a manufacturer, pursuant to La. R.S. 9: 2800. 57, because an
adequate warning about the product was not provided.
Liability may be imposed pursuant to La. R.S. 9: 2800.58, because a product does not conform
to an express warranty by the manufacturer.
0
preponderance of the evidence exists when the evidence, direct or circumstantial,
taken as a whole shows that the fact of causation sought to be proved is more
probable than not. United Fire Group, 2014 WL 4067756 at * 6.
DISCUSSION
Graco sought summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs would be unable
to meet their burden of proving essential elements of their LPLA claim— that the
child restraint was defective or caused any injury to Oliver. In their memorandum
in support of their motion for summary judgment, Graco argued that plaintiffs
could not meet their burden of proof on these two elements because plaintiffs
either disposed of or misplaced the child restraint at issue. Graco pointed out that
plaintiffs did not allege that the child restraint failed to secure Oliver during the
accident, but rather, that the child restraint flipped onto its side during the accident,
which allegedly contributed to Oliver' s injuries. Graco argued that the child
restraint itself is the best evidence of its condition and functionality, the manner in
which it was installed at the time of the accident ( including whether it showed any
evidence of improper installation), and its performance during the accident
including whether it moved within the vehicle and if so, how and why). Without
the ability to inspect the child restraint, Graco argued that there is no evidence in
existence to establish that the child restraint was defective or that such alleged
defect caused Oliver' s injuries.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Graco presented the petition
for damages; plaintiffs' responses to interrogatories and requests for production of
documents; the depositions of Owen and Erin Sketchler; the deposition of Derwin
Miley, a firefighter who responded to the accident; the deposition of Dr. Lori Ann
McBride, Oliver' s treating neurosurgeon; the deposition of Dr. William Accousti,
Oliver' s treating orthopedic surgeon; and a copy of the Graco SnugRideR 30 User
Manual. Based on our de novo review, the evidence submitted on behalf of Graco
7
was sufficient to point out an absence of factual support for one or more elements
essential to plaintiffs' LPLA claim.
Therefore, the burden shifted to plaintiffs to produce evidence sufficient to
establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. To support its position,
plaintiffs submitted their petition for damages; the affidavit of Erin Sketchler; the
affidavit of Gary R. Whitman, a mechanical engineer who consults in the fields of
occupant crash protection, crash safety, crash survival, emergency escape, and life
support engineering; and the affidavit of Dr. Morteza Shamsnia, a board certified
neurologist who treated the Sketchler family, including Oliver.
In considering expert testimony for purposes of a motion for summary
judgment, if an expert' s affidavit contains opinions that lack an adequate factual
basis, are not sufficiently reliable, or are otherwise inadmissible under La. C. E. art.
702 and La. C. C. P. art. 967( A), the opposing party must object to the affidavit.
See La. C. C. P. art. 1425( F). In the absence of an objection, as in this case, the trial
court is statutorily obligated to consider the expert' s opinions. See La. C. C. P. art.
966( D)( 2); Mariakis v. N. Oaks Health Sys., 2018- 0165 ( La. App. 1St Cir.
9/ 21/ 18), 258 So. 3d 88, 96. At that point, in determining whether the evidence
creates a genuine issue of material fact, the trial court cannot make credibility
determinations, evaluate testimony, or otherwise weigh the evidence. The trial
court must assume all affiants are credible. See Thompson v. Center for
Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine, L.L.C., 2017- 1088 ( La. App. 1St Cir.
3/ 15/ 18), 244 So. 3d 441, 446- 47, writ denied, 2018- 0583 ( La. 6/ 1/ 18), 243 So. 3d
1062; Bass v. DISA Global Solutions, Inc., 2019- 1145 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 6/ 12/ 20),
305 So. 3d 903, 909, writ denied, 2020- 01025 ( La. 11/ 4/ 20), 303 So. 3d 651;
Walker v. City of Independence Police Dep' t, 2018- 1739 ( La. App. 1St Cir.
2/ 7/ 20), 296 So. 3d 25, 34.
8
There was no objection to any of plaintiffs' evidence submitted in opposition
to Graco' s motion. Pursuant to La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 2), the court shall consider
any documents filed in support of or in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment to which no objection is made. Mariakis, 258 So. 3d at 96.
Accordingly, the law mandated that the trial court consider the expert affidavits
submitted by plaintiffs in their opposition.
Plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Whitman, reviewed the entirety of the evidence,
including the accident report, photos of plaintiffs' vehicle involved in the crash,
and a Graco SnugRide® 30 child restraint system. Mr. Whitman noted that
although the child restraint involved in the Sketchler accident was no longer
available for inspection, in his expert experience, he opined that " it is often
necessary and acceptable to rely on witness testimony and testing to reach
conclusions and formulate expert opinions regarding the design, use[,] and
performance of said item," therefore negating Graco' s contention that plaintiffs
could not prove a defect without producing the actual child restraint. Mr. Whitman
further opined that in his expert experience, " a well- designed and properly
installed rear -facing infant seat should be able to restrain and protect the infant and
prevent any serious injuries in an accident of this severity...." Based on his review
of the evidence, Mr. Whitman concluded that the child restraint was " properly
installed and secured by the vehicle' s seat belt at the time of the crash"; thus,
improper installation was not a contributing factor to Oliver' s injuries.
Mr. Whitman opined that the Graco SnugRide® 30 child restraint system
lacks a support leg to minimize the amount of forward and downward rotation that
occurs during a frontal crash. Mr. Whitman opined that the child restraint at issue
more probably than not failed to perform properly in this crash by allowing
excessive forward and downward rotation of the entire infant seat assembly, and/ or
allowed the carrier to detach from its base, and ultimately caused the injuries that
51
infant Oliver suffered in this crash." Although Mr. Whitman' s affidavit did not use
the term " defect," the affidavit established facts such that a fact -finder could
determine that the Graco child restraint was unreasonably dangerous.
Plaintiffs also presented the affidavit of another expert, Dr. Morteza
Shamsnia, a board- certified neurologist who treated the Sketchler family, including
Oliver, after the accident. Dr. Shamsnia evaluated and treated Oliver following the
accident; he also reviewed all of Oliver' s medical records generated following the
accident, in addition to the accident report and photographs of Oliver post-
accident. Dr. Shamsnia also noted that he " had an opportunity to review the work
of [ Mr. Whitman,] and [ agreed] with his conclusions that the injuries Oliver
experienced were caused by the lack of protection caused by the child restrain seat
and assembly." Dr. Shamsnia opined:
Based on my examination and evaluation, review of
Oliver' s medical records, and other material retrieved
relating to his injuries, including but not limited to the
Whitman report, I find that Oliver' s injuries were caused
by the car accident of April 18, 2014[,] and also caused
and enhanced by the failure of the child restraint system
to lessen the severity of the child' s injuries. This failure
will require the child to need lifetime care and will
effect [ sic] his future learning, earning, and psychosocial
capabilities, to his detriment.
Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, there is no evidence in the record, nor in
the trial court' s reasons for ruling, to indicate that the trial court weighed the
credibility of plaintiffs' experts, including Mr. Whitman and Dr. Shamsnia.
In granting Graco' s motion, the trial court found that spoliation occurred and
reasoned, " Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of proof without producing the child
restraint."' In civil litigation, the theory of spoliation of evidence refers to an
intentional destruction of evidence for the purpose of depriving the opposing
8 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966( F) sets forth that "[ a] summary judgment may be
rendered or affirmed only as to those issues set forth in the motion under consideration by the
court at that time." Here, Graco did not raise the issue of spoliation in its motion; rather, Graco
raised spoliation in its memorandum.
10
parties of its use. Gladney v. Milam, 39, 982 ( La. App. 2nd Cir. 9/ 21/ 05), 911 So.
2d 366, 369. Generally, a litigant' s failure to produce evidence that is available to
him raises a presumption that the evidence would have been detrimental to his
case. Gladney, 911 So. 2d at 369. However, this adverse presumption is not
applicable when the failure to produce the evidence is adequately explained.
Gladney, 911 So. 2d at 369.
In response to Graco' s requests for production of the child restraint involved
in the accident, plaintiffs stated:
After diligent search, [ Plaintiffs] have been unable to
locate the car seat at this juncture due to the fact that
Plaintiffs] were unconscious immediately following the
accident, moved in with Owen Sketchler' s father for
several months following the accident, and have since
moved from our home in Ponchatoula to a home in
Metairie. However, we will continue to look for the car
seat...."
As explained by plaintiffs, there was no intentional misplacement or
destruction of the child restraint. Plaintiffs were severely injured and incapacitated
after the accident, as was their two- year old son. Plaintiffs were treated in
hospitals and then forced to move in with relatives to care for them during their
recovery, and have since moved to a new home in a different parish. However, in
its reasons for judgment, the trial court stated: " Plaintiffs have not adequately
explained the disappearance of the child restraint." In ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, the trial court' s role is not to evaluate the weight of the
evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether
there is a genuine issue of triable fact. A trial court cannot make credibility
decisions on a motion for summary judgment. Janney, 40 So. 3d at 289. Here, the
trial court made an improper credibility determination that plaintiffs' explanation
of the missing child restrain was inadequate. Because no party objected to
plaintiffs' evidence in oppositiontheir responses to Graco' s requests for
11
production wherein they explained the missing child restraint— we must accept
plaintiffs' explanation of the missing child restraint as credible. See Janney, 40
So. 3d at 289. Therefore, the trial court erred in its finding that spoliation
occurred. Further, where the evidence on summary judgment presents a choice of
reasonable inferences, such inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the party opposing summary judgment. Campbell v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1
Caldwell Parish, 35, 015 ( La. App. 2nd Cir. 8/ 22/ 01), 793 So. 2d 521, 526. Any
doubt as to a dispute regarding a material issue of fact must be resolved against
granting the motion and in favor of a trial on the merits. Tillman v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 2020- 0250 ( La. App. I" Cir. 2/ 22/ 21), So. 3d , 2021
WL 672504, at * 2.
Based on our de novo review, we reverse the trial court' s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Graco, finding that genuine issues of fact exist.
DECREE
We reverse the trial court' s June 25, 2018 judgment and remand this matter
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. All costs of
this appeal are assessed against defendant/ appellee, Graco Children' s Products,
Inc.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
12