James Davis v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections ( 2021 )

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2020 CA 0988
JAMES DAVIS
VERSUS
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
U Judgment Rendered: MAY 12 2021
On Appeal from the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 691, 731
The Honorable Janice Clark, Judge Presiding
James Davis In Proper Person
Angie, Louisiana
Deborah A. Rutledge Attorney for Defendant/ Appellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Louisiana Department of Public Safety
and Corrections
BEFORE: McDONALD, HOLDRIDGE, AND PENZATO, JJ.
PENZATO, J.
James Davis, an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections ( DPSC), appeals the district court' s judgment that affirmed
DPSC' s final decision in administrative remedy procedure ( ARP) No. RCC -2019-
458 and dismissed his petition with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we
reverse the district court' s judgment and remand with instructions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Davis is housed at Rayburn Correctional Center ( RCC) in Angie, Louisiana.
On February 22, 2019, Davis was issued a rule violation report for violating Rule 11
Aggravated Fighting and Rule 30- V General Prohibited Behaviors— Failing to
Cooperate with an Investigation. Davis pled guilty to these rule violations and was
sanctioned on February 25, 2019, to 90 days Disciplinary Segregation Level 1, Four
Weeks Quarters Confinement, and Restitution in the amount of $10. 00 for the fight
exams.
Under DPSC' s Unit Specific For Offender Posted Policy (USOPP) # 35 and
436, offenders housed on Disciplinary Segregation Level 1 are allowed to possess
personal property in certain quantities. On April 24, 2019, an inventory was
conducted of Davis' s personal property. During the inventory, Davis refused to
cooperate with the inventorying officers, refused to sign the inventory forms, and
did not provide an address for the property to be sent home. The property was
initially stored in the mailroom. On May 1, 2019, Form C -02- 009- B,
Incoming/Outgoing General Correspondence, Farm Mail and E -Mail Notice of
Rejection (Notice of Rejection) was sent to Davis from the mailroom officer, stating
the following:
All items from your level 1 inventory were sent to the mailroom. The
inventory states that you would like these items sent home, but you also
refused to sign. You will need to send me something in writing stating
you want them sent home, and provide me with an address to send them
to.
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On that same date, Davis signed a Legal Mail Receipt Log indicating that he had
received the Notice of Rejection. Davis did not respond to the request for an address
in the Notice of Rejection and the stored property was destroyed.'
Davis filed a complaint under the Louisiana Corrections and Administrative
Remedy Procedure Act, La. R.S. 15: 1171, et seq. ( CARP), claiming that the
destruction of his property was not outlined in any offender policy. RCC denied his
relief at the first step of the administrative remedy procedure, and Davis responded
that no policy dictated that his property be destroyed. The Department denied his
relief at the second step. Thereafter, Davis filed a petition for judicial review in the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court ( 19th JDC), requesting compensation for all items
listed on his inventory forms; the necessary costs to obtain destroyed legal
documents from the courts; an order to DPSC to provide adequate storage space for
Disciplinary Segregation Level 1 offenders; and all other costs.' DPSC answered
the petition stating that RCC does not have sufficient space to store property, that
the procedure has been in place for years, and that Davis was given the option to
mail his property home. The Commissioner' issued a report recommending that
Davis' s petition be dismissed with prejudice, concluding that the record did not
support a finding that DPSC' s decision was arbitrary, capricious,
manifestly
erroneous, or in violation of Davis' s rights. After receiving Davis' s traversal, the
1 The record does not reflect the date upon which the property was actually destroyed.
2 Besides naming DPSC as a defendant, Davis also named as defendants in his petition for judicial
review James LeBlanc, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections,
and Robert Tanner, Warden of RCC. However, the only proper defendant in an administrative
appeal filed by a prisoner is the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. See La.
R.S. 15: 1177(A)( 1)( b); Martinez v. Tanner, 2011- 0692 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 9/ 11), 79 So. 3d 1082n. 1, writ denied, 2011- 2732 ( La. 7/ 27/ 12), 93 So. 3d 597.
3
The Office of Commissioner of the 19th JDC was created by La. R.S. 13: 711 to hear and
recommend disposition of criminal and civil proceedings arising out of the incarceration of state
prisoners. La. R. S. 13: 713( A). The Commissioner' s written findings and recommendations are
submitted to a district court judge, who may accept, reject, or modify them. La. R.S. 13: 713( C)( 5);
see Martinez, 79 So. 3d at 1084 n. 3.
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district court affirmed DPSC' s decision and dismissed his petition with prejudice in
a judgment signed July 10, 2020. It is from this judgment that Davis appeals.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Lost property claims by offenders are matters of prison administration or
conditions of confinement that are governed by La. R.S. 15: 1177 of CARP. See
Brown v. Louisiana Department ofPublic Safety and Corrections, 2015- 1958 ( La.
App. 1st Cir. 9/ 19/ 16), 277 So. 3d 326, 328. Louisiana Revised Statutes
15: 1177( A)(9) sets forth the appropriate standard of review by the district court,
which functions as an appellate court when reviewing DPSC' s administrative
decisions. Judicial review is mandated to be conducted by the trial court without a
jury and must be confined to the record. La. R.S. 15: 1177( A)(5). Specifically, the
court may reverse or modify the administrative decision only if substantial rights of
the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings are: ( 1) in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, ( 2) in excess of the statutory
authority of the agency, ( 3) made upon unlawful procedure, ( 4) affected by other
error of law, ( 5) arbitrary, capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion, or
unwarranted exercise of discretion, or ( 6) manifestly erroneous in view of the
reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. La. R. S.
15: 1177( A)( 9); Lightfoot v. Stalder, 2000- 1120 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 6/ 22/ 01), 808 So.
2d 710, 715- 716, writ denied, 2001- 2295 ( La. 8/ 30/ 02), 823 So. 2d 957.
On review of the district court' s judgment under La. R.S. 15: 1177, no
deference is owed by the court of appeal to the factual findings or legal conclusions
of the district court, just as no deference is owed by the Louisiana Supreme Court to
factual findings or legal conclusions of the court of appeal. McCoy v. Stalder, 99-
1747 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 9/ 22/ 00), 770 So. 2d 447, 450- 51.
Davis asserts that RCC does not provide adequate storage of personal property
for Disciplinary Segregation Level 1 offenders and any excess personal property
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must either be sent home or destroyed, while Level 2 offenders are provided
adequate storage space. He further maintains that the Inventory of Offender' s
Personal Property Form # 3. 1. 2( N) -C ( Form # 3. 1. 2( N) -C) and RCC Directive
3. 1. 2( N)4 afford an offender to have his property either placed in storage, sent
home, or destroyed. However, he asserts that the inventorying officer struck through
the option of adding excess property to storage, which is the reason Davis claims he
refused to sign Form # 3. 1. 2( N) -C. Davis admitted that he refused to sign Form
3. 1. 2( N) -C because he desired the option of storing his excess property as opposed
to the choices given him— send the property home or have it destroyed. Davis
alleges that Regulation C -03- 007( B) 5 was also violated.
As we stated above, lost property claims are governed by La. R.S. 15: 1177.
A reviewing court may reverse or modify DPSC if a substantial right ofthe petitioner
has been prejudiced. Barnes v. Ducote, 2011- 2216 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 12/ 12), 2012
WL 2130556, at * 2 ( unpublished). The substantial rights of an inmate were found
to be prejudiced when personal property was not returned to an inmate, thereby
entitling him to compensation. Barnes, 2012 WL 2130556, at * 2; see Truman v.
Louisiana Department ofPublic Safety & Corrections, 2015- 1616 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
12/ 15/ 18) ( remanding to allow inmate to introduce inventory sheets regarding his
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RCC Directive # 3. 1. 2( N) is not contained in the record. Davis addressed RCC Directive
3. 1. 2( N) in his traversal to the district court.
Pursuant to CARP' S statutory framework, the
opportunity for the parties to present evidence occurs at the administrative level, not at the trial
court level, and review by the trial court is limited to the record established at the administrative
level, absent alleged irregularities in procedure. Lee v. Louisiana Department ofPublic Safety and
Corrections, 2017- 0740 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 12/ 21/ 17), 240 So. 3d 244, 247. However, if the district
court determines that additional evidence is needed, it does have the authority to order the addition
of such evidence at the administrative level. Thus, the district court must remand the case to the
agency for the evidence to be introduced. See La. R.S. 15: 1177( A)(4) & ( A)( 8); Curry v. Cain,
2005- 2251 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 10/ 6/ 06), 944 So. 2d 635, 639. Davis appears to quote from RCC
Directive #3. 1. 2( N) in his appellate brief. This court has no ready means of ascertaining applicable
departmental regulations and no such authority has been introduced into evidence. See Anderson
v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 2017- 0987 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2/ 7/ 18),
242 So. 3d 614, 619.
5 Regulation C -03- 007( B) is also not contained in the record, and it does not appear that the
regulation was referred to at the administrative level or that the district court reviewed the
regulation in reference to the petition for judicial review.
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lost property); Curry, 944 So. 2d at 638 ( remanded to allow inmate to introduce
inventory sheets regarding his lost property claim).
The appellate record in the present case provides insufficient support for the
district court' s conclusion that the denial of Davis' s ARP was neither arbitrary,
capricious, manifestly erroneous, or in violation of his rights. The district court
relied upon USOPPs # 35 and # 36, which the Commissioner stated, " outline the type
and amount of property that offenders housed on Disciplinary Segregation Level [ 1]
may have" and RCC Directive # 5. 4. 2( N), which provides, " Should an offender fail
to provide postage for a package/ letter within 21 days after being notified, it will be
disposed of." The district court also relied on the DPSC' s answer stating "[ t] his
procedure has been in effect for years and [ Davis] was given the choice to mail his
property home."
In response to step one, DPSC referred to USOPPs # 35 and #36, outlined what
each provided, and stated, " In complying with these policies, offenders are given the
opportunity to have their excess property sent home or destroyed." Contained in the
record is USOPP # 36 which is a list of items allowed for the different areas of RCC,
including " Extended Lockdown Level 1." With regard to legal papers, we note that
an asterisk indicates that legal papers will be "[ k]ept in a filing cabinet on tier." We
also note that USOPP # 36 refers to DPSC regulation No. IS -A-3, which is not
contained in the record. USOPP # 35 is a time schedule for the different areas of
RCC and includes a list of some personal items that may or may not be kept, such
as radios, hobby crafts, or writing materials. USOPP # 35 refers to numerous DPSC
regulations, none of which are contained in the record. Nothing contained in
USOPPs # 35 and/or #36 provides authority for RCC to destroy an inmate' s property.
DPSC also relies on RCC Directive # 5. 4. 2( N), which contains a section titled
Outgoing Packages" that refers to the disposal of outgoing packages/ letters
following notification to an offender of lack of postage. However, RCC Directive
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5. 4. 2( N) makes no reference to personal property of inmates or legal papers, as it
is specific to outgoing packages/ letters lacking postage. Therefore, DPSC' s reliance
on RCC Directive # 5. 4. 2( N), regarding outgoing packages, is misplaced. We find
that the district court erred in finding that USOPPs # 35 and # 36 and RCC Directive
5. 4. 2( N) provided support for DPSC to destroy Davis' s personal property.
DPSC also asserted that "[ RCC] does not have sufficient space to store
property. This procedure has been in effect for years and [ Davis] was given the
choice to mail his property home." As we noted with regard to RCC Directive
3. 1. 2( N), the opportunity for the parties to present evidence occurs at the
administrative level, not at the trial court level, and review by the trial court is limited
to the record established at the administrative level, absent alleged irregularities in
procedure. Lee, 240 So. 3d at 247. The district court has no authority to accept
evidence or testimony at the hearing on review. Curry, 944 So. 2d at 639. However,
if the district court determines that additional evidence is needed, it does have the
authority to order the addition of such evidence at the administrative level. Thus,
the district court must remand the case to the agency for the evidence to be
introduced. See La. R.S. 15: 1177( A)(4) & ( A)( 8); Curry, 944 So. 2d at 639. Judicial
review of an adverse agency decision is available under CARP, but is " confined to
the record," as developed by the administrative proceedings. La. R. S.
15: 1177( A)(5); Boddye v. Louisiana Department ofPublic Safety and Corrections,
2010- 1008 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 22/ 10), 2010 WL 5465633, at * 1 ( unpublished).
DPSC has not set forth any statute, rule, promulgated policy, or regulation
authorizing its practice of destroying the personal property of an inmate. See
Anderson, 242 So. 3d at 618; Menesses v. Louisiana Department ofPublic Safety &
Corrections, 2017- 0386 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 16/ 17), 2017 WL 5494595, at * 2.
Furthermore, this court has no ready means of ascertaining applicable departmental
regulations and no such authority has been brought to this court' s attention.
Anderson, 242 So. 3d at 619.
We also note that the Form # 3. 1. 2( N) -C, listing the inventory of Davis' s
personal property, contained the typed headings " ADDED TO STORED
PROPERTY," " REMOVE FROM STORED PROPERTY," and " PROPERTY
SEAL # s." These headings were all scratched out and handwritten over to state
ITEMS SEND HOME." The heading " ITEMS SEND HOME OR DESTROYED"
had the " SEND HOME" circled. Davis asserted in his petition for judicial review
that he refused to sign Form #3. 1. 2( N) -C because the form specifically provided him
the option to store his excess property, which he desired to do. Davis maintains on
appeal that he did not sign the inventory form because the inventorying officer struck
through the option of adding the excess property to his storage. DPSC has not set
forth any statute, rule, promulgated policy, or regulation authorizing its practice of
destroying the personal property of an inmate rather than providing storage. See
Anderson, 242 So. 3d at 618- 19. In contrast to the present case, in Lewis v. Louisiana
Department ofPublic Safety & Corrections, 2019- 1693 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 8/ 5/ 20),
So. 3d , 2020 WL 4498170, at * 2, writ denied, 2021- 00158 ( La. 3/ 9/ 21),
2021 WL 869070, the agency had a specific policy that required inmates in extended
lockdown to send their property home or have it destroyed. No such policy has been
introduced into the record before us. Furthermore, we note that DPSC has not filed
a brief with this court.
Having concluded that the district court erred in finding that DPSC' s action
was neither arbitrary, capricious, manifestly erroneous, or in violation of Davis' s
rights, we pretermit any discussion as to Davis' s second assignment of error that he
was provided inadequate notice that his property would be destroyed. This matter
is remanded to the district court for consideration of the merits of Davis' s claims,
following remand to DPSC to obtain the addition of necessary evidence at the
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administrative level, and the basis of DPSC' s authority, if any, to destroy Davis' s
property due to lack of storage space at RCC.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the July 10, 2020 judgment of the district court
dismissing the petition for judicial review filed by James Davis is reversed, and this
matter is remanded to the district court with instructions for the court to consider the
claims raised therein following remand to the Louisiana Department of Public Safety
and Corrections to obtain the addition of necessary evidence at the administrative
level. All costs of this appeal, in the amount of $726. 50, are to be paid by the
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
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