State Of Louisiana v. Keith Trosclair ( 2020 )

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2020 KA 0187
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
KEITH A. TROSCLAIR
Decision Rendered:
DEC 2 12020
APPEALED FROM THE
17th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
LAFOURCHE PARISH, LOUISIANA
DOCKET NUMBER 573, 126
HONORABLE STEVEN M. MILLER, JUDGE
Prentice L. White Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Keith A. Trosclair
Kristine Russell Attorneys for Appellee
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Joseph S. Soignet
Jason Chatagnier
Allie Fournet
Assistant District Attorneys
Thibodaux, Louisiana
BEFORE: McDONALD, HOLDRIDGE, and PENZATO, 33.
tot ttAk
McDONALD, I
The grand jury indicted the defendant, Keith A. Trosclair, with second degree
murder, a violation of La. R. S. 14: 30. 1. After a hearing, the district court found him
competent to proceed. The defendant initially pled not guilty and not guilty by reason
of insanity. Thereafter, he changed his plea to not guilty. After a trial, the jury found
him guilty as charged, by a ten to two vote. He moved for a post -verdict judgment of
acquittal, for a new trial, and to declare Louisiana Constitution article I, § 17A and
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 782A unconstitutional. The district court
denied the motions and later sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment at hard
labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. He moved for
reconsideration of sentence, and the district court denied the motion.
The defendant now appeals, raising four assignments of error: ( 1) the district
court committed reversible error in denying his motion for post -verdict judgment of
acquittal, because the evidence failed to establish specific intent to kill and the
defendant acted in self-defense; ( 2) the district court abused its discretion: ( a) in
overruling defense counsel' s objections to the State' s persistent references to the
defendant' s post -arrest silence; ( b) by excluding crucial evidence surrounding the
hostility between the victim and the defendant that supported the defendant' s claim of
self-defense; ( c) in refusing to allow defense counsel to play the 911 call before the
jury; and ( d) in overruling defense counsel' s objections to the State's extended use of
gruesome photographs of the scene of the shooting; ( 3) the district court failed to
acknowledge that accepting a non -unanimous verdict violated the defendant's rights
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and ( 4)
the district court committed reversible error in denying his motion to reconsider
sentence and refusing to modify his sentence to one that was more appropriate for a
defendant with severe mental deficiencies. For the following reasons, we vacate the
conviction and sentence and remand to the district court.
2
FACTS
Stuart Reulet and the defendant lived directly across from one another on
Highway 20 in Thibodaux, Louisiana. Mr. Reulet had known the defendant for a long
time and considered him a good friend. On December 5, 2017, at around noon, Mr.
Reulet heard a loud noise like "[ a] gunshot, a tire exploding, or a crash. He looked
through the window and saw the defendant " coming out from his carport firing shots."
Mr. Reulet heard one shot and saw the defendant shoot two shots. The defendant was
firing at " an object lying on the ground." Mr. Reulet later learned the object was the
victim, Christopher Saunders, who was the defendant's next-door neighbor.
The victim died from multiple gunshot wounds. He was shot on the front of the
chest, with the bullet possibly passing through another object before striking his body.
He also had a re- entrance gunshot wound on the right side of his chest, most
commonly caused by the bullet passing through an arm before entering the torso. He
was also shot on the back of his right forearm, with the bullet then entering his chest.
Lastly, he had a gunshot wound to his right upper back with the bullet passing through
his right lung and heart. This last wound had ' very high potential to be fatal."
Tyronne Scott, a Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
employee working in the area of the shooting, testified at trial. At the time of the
incident, Mr. Scott was driving down Highway 20, when he saw the defendant shoot the
victim two times; the victim fell to the ground after the first shot. Mr. Scott did not see
the victim with a gun or anything in his hands. Mr. Scott testified that the defendant
and the victim appeared to be having a conversation before the shooting, but he did
not see any argument or hand raising between the men. Mr. Scott described the
defendant's demeanor after the shooting as " calm or he didn't look like he was in [ a]
rage or anything."
The defendant also testified at trial. He encountered the victim at about noon on
the day of the incident. According to the defendant, he was outside when he saw the
victim walking down the driveway, which they shared with the landowner living behind
them, and the two men " made eye contact." The defendant told the victim, " I saw
what [ you] did to my cousin Kenneth." The defendant stated that the victim
3
responded, "[ Y] ou motherf*** er[,] I' m going to kill you." In response to the victim' s
threat, the defendant " grabbed" his gun from his truck, walked around the truck, and
told the victim " don' t ever threaten me again." According to the defendant, the victim
then ' went for his gun," which he usually carried, and was then openly carrying, in a
holster on his right side. The defendant demonstrated in court how the victim allegedly
placed his hand near his midsection and reached down to the right side of his body.
The defendant testified that he then shot the victim three times, because he was scared
for his life.
The defendant acknowledged that he usually kept the rifle he used to shoot the
victim on " safe" when it was loaded and had to take the weapon off "safe" and aim it at
the victim before shooting him the first time. And, to shoot the victim a second and
third time, the defendant had to " work the mechanism of the bolt."
The defendant conceded the victim was standing on the shared driveway at the
time of the shooting. He also conceded that he was closer to his own carport door than
to the victim at the time of the incident. The defendant acknowledged that police
officers found the victim' s gun still in its holster after the incident. Although he claimed
he shot the victim three times, the defendant did not dispute that police officers
recovered four shell casings from his property.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In assignment of error number one, the defendant contends the evidence was
insufficient to support the conviction because he acted in " direct response to the imminent
threat that [ the victim] posed when [ the victim] reached for his firearm after threatening
the defendant] with bodily harm."
When issues are raised on appeal contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and
alleging one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency
of the evidence. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 734 ( La. 1992); State v. Duhon, 18-
0593 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 28/ 18), 270 So. 3d 597, 609. The reason for reviewing sufficiency
first is that the accused may be entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450
U. S. 40, 101 S. Ct. 970, 67 L. Ed. 2d 30 ( 1981), if a rational trier of fact, viewing the
evidence in accordance with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d
E
560 ( 1979), in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not reasonably conclude
that all of the essential elements of the offense have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Hearold, 603 So. 2d at 734; Duhon, 270 So. 3d at 609. When the entirety of the
evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, the accused must be discharged as to
that crime, and any discussion of trial error issues as to that crime would be pure dicta
since those issues are moot. However, when the entirety of the evidence is sufficient to
support the conviction, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal, and the reviewing court
must then consider the other assignments of error to determine whether the accused is
entitled to a new trial. If the reviewing court determines that there has been trial error
which was not harmless) in cases in which the entirety of the evidence was sufficient to
support the conviction, then the accused will be granted a new trial, but is not entitled to
an acquittal. See Hearold, 603 So. 2d at 734; Duhon, 270 So. 3d at 609.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates due process.
See U. S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The constitutional standard for testing
the sufficiency of the evidence, as enunciated in Jackson, requires that a conviction be
based on proof sufficient for any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. See La. C. Cr. P. art. 8216; State v. Ordodl, 06- 0207 ( La. 11/ 29/ 06), 946
So. 2d 654, 660. In conducting this review, we also must be expressly mindful of
Louisiana' s circumstantial evidence test, which states in part, ' assuming every fact to be
proved that the evidence tends to prove," every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is
excluded. La. R. S. 15: 438; Duhon, 270 So. 3d at 610.
In finding the defendant guilty, the jury rejected the claim of self-defense and
concluded that the use of deadly force under the particular facts of this case was neither
reasonable nor necessary. A rational juror could have reasonably concluded that the
killing was not necessary to save the defendant from the danger envisioned by La. R. S.
14: 20( 1) and/ or that the defendant had abandoned the role of defender and taken on the
role of an aggressor and, as such, was not entitled to claim self-defense. See La. R. S.
14: 21; State v. Tran, 98- 2812 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 5/ 99), 743 So. 2d 1275, 1291.
5
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we decline to discuss all of the
evidence in detail. Because this case must be retried, as discussed in the next section,
discussing the evidence in detail here would be tantamount to giving an impermissible
advisory opinion. See Louisiana State Bd. of Nursing v. Gautreaux, 09- 1758 ( La. App. 1
Cir. 6/ 11/ 10), 39 So. 3d 806, 811. Nevertheless, we cannot say that the jury's
determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. See
Ordodi, 946 So. 2d at 662. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the
evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning
a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and
rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 07- 2306 ( La. 1/ 21/ 09), 1 So. 3d 417,
418 ( per curiam). To otherwise accept a hypothesis of innocence that was not
unreasonably rejected by the fact finder, a court of appeal impinges on a fact finder's
discretion beyond the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due
process of law. See State v. Mire, 14- 2295 ( La. 1/ 27/ 16), 269 So. 3d 698, 703 ( per
curiam). This assignment of error is without merit.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NON -UNANIMOUS VERDICT
In assignment of error number three, the defendant argues the district court
committed reversible error in denying his motion to declare La. Const. art. I, § 17A and
La. C. Cr. P. art. 782A unconstitutional.
The district court conducted a written jury poll following the rendering of the
verdict. See La. C. Cr. P. art. 812. Ten of twelve jurors voted to convict the defendant of
second degree murder.
After the district court' s adverse ruling on the motion challenging the
constitutionality of La. Const. art. I, § 17A and La. C. Cr. P. art. 782A, the United States
Supreme Court overruled Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404, 92 S. Ct. 1628, 32 L. Ed. 2d 1841972), and held that the right to a jury trial under the United States Constitution Sixth
Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a unanimous
verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. _, ,
140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397, 206 L. Ed. 2d 583 ( 2020). The Ramos Court further noted that its
ruling may require retrial of those defendants convicted of felonies by non -unanimous
L
verdicts whose cases are still pending on direct appeal. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1406. Thus,
where the defendant's conviction was not final when Ramos was decided, the holding of
Ramos applies. State v. Bueso, 19- 01675 ( La. 6/ 22/ 20), 297 So. 3d 719 ( per curiam).
Accordingly, we determine assignment of error number three has merit. We vacate
the conviction and sentence and remand this case to the district court.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED.
7