State Of Louisiana v. Curtis L. Hall ( 2020 )


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  •                          NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    1
    NO. 2019 KA 1588
    g
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    VERSUS
    CURTIS L. HALL
    Judgment Rendered.
    JUL 2 4 2020
    Appealed from the
    22nd Judicial District Court
    In and for the Parish of St. Tammany
    State of Louisiana
    Case No. 577425
    The Honorable William H. Burris, Judge Presiding
    Prentice L. White                     Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana                Curtis L. Hall
    Warren L. Montgomery                  Counsel for Appellee
    District Attorney                     State of Louisiana
    J. Bryant Clark, Jr.
    Assistant District Attorney
    Covington, Louisiana
    BEFORE: McDONALD, THERIOT, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
    THERIOT, J.
    The defendant, Curtis L. Hall,           was charged by bill of information with
    possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of La. R. S. 14: 95. 1.             He
    pled not guilty.    The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, a hearing was
    held on the matter, and the motion to suppress was denied.                Following a jury trial,
    the defendant was found guilty as charged.               The defendant filed a motion for
    postverdict judgment of acquittal, which was denied.               The State filed a habitual
    offender bill of information.'       In exchange for a " double bill" and an agreed upon
    sentence,   the defendant admitted to a prior conviction and stipulated as to his
    identity.    The trial court adjudicated the defendant a second -felony habitual
    offender and sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without
    benefit of parole,     probation,    or   suspension    of   sentence.     The defendant now
    appeals, designating two assignments of error. We affirm the conviction, habitual
    offender adjudication, and sentence.
    FACTS
    On    June    10,   2016,    Slidell   Police   Department        Officer Bradley    Peck
    conducted a traffic stop on the defendant, who was blocking traffic flow in the
    middle of an intersection in Slidell.         The defendant was driving a Buick LaCrosse
    rental vehicle.2 When the defendant pulled over, Officer Peck observed the driver
    making furtive movements toward the center console area.                    When Officer Peck
    approached the Buick, he noticed a strong odor of marijuana emanating from the
    vehicle.    The defendant did not have a driver' s license.         The defendant was asked
    to exit the vehicle.    As he got out, the defendant tried to lock and shut the driver' s
    The habitual offender bill of information indicated the defendant had prior convictions for
    possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, crime
    against nature, distribution of cocaine, aggravated battery, and possession of cocaine.
    2 At the pretrial motion to suppress hearing, the defendant testified that a lady who came to his
    house let him borrow her rental car. Jan Marie Homrich ( sometimes spelled " Homerich" in the
    record) rented the vehicle, using her boyfriend' s name and credit card, from Enterprise Rent-A-
    Car. Homrich was subpoenaed as a trial witness, but failed to appear for trial.
    2
    door, which Officer Peck prevented.        Officer Peck detained the defendant and
    placed him in the back of his unit. Officer Peck returned to the Buick and saw a
    firearm between the driver' s side seat and the center console.           Officer Peck
    retrieved the semi- automatic pistol, which was loaded and had a round in the
    chamber.     Officer Peck confirmed the defendant was a convicted felon and arrested
    him for possessing a firearm.
    The defendant did not testify at trial.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
    In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred
    in sentencing him without ruling on his motion for postverdict judgment of
    acquittal.
    Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 821( A) provides          that "[   a]
    motion for a post verdict judgment of acquittal must be made and disposed of
    before sentence."    Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 873 requires at
    least a twenty-four hour delay between denial of such a post -trial motion and
    sentencing unless the defendant expressly waives the required delay.           State v.
    Gardner, 2016- 0192 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 19/ 16), 
    204 So. 3d 265
    , 270.    The record
    before us indicates the defendant was found guilty on December 5, 2018.             The
    defendant' s motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal was filed on December
    26, 2018 and denied by the trial court on January 4, 2019.         The defendant was
    sentenced on August 20, 2019.
    This assignment of error is without merit.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
    In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court
    erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle.
    3
    Specifically, the defendant contends that Officer Peck did not have probable cause
    to search the vehicle.'
    Trial courts are vested with great discretion when ruling on a motion to
    suppress.      State v. Long, 2003- 2592 ( La. 9/ 9/ 04), 
    884 So. 2d 1176
    , 1179, cert.
    denied, 
    544 U.S. 977
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 1860
    , 
    161 L.Ed.2d 728
     ( 2005).              When a trial court
    denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be
    reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court' s discretion, i.e., unless
    such ruling is not supported by the evidence.            See State v. Green, 94- 0887 ( La.
    5/ 22/ 95),   
    655 So. 2d 272
    , 280- 81.       However, a trial court' s legal findings are
    subject to a de novo standard of review.              See State v. Hunt, 2009- 1589 ( La.
    12/ 1/ 09), 
    25 So. 3d 746
    , 751.      Although not required to do so, an appellate court
    may review testimony adduced at trial, in addition to the testimony adduced at the
    suppression hearing, in determining the correctness of the trial court' s ruling on the
    motion to suppress.      State v. Leger, 2005- 0011 ( La. 7/ 10/ 06), 
    936 So. 2d 108
    , 122,
    cert. denied, 
    549 U.S. 1221
    , 
    127 S. Ct. 1279
    , 
    167 L.Ed.2d 100
     ( 2007)
    The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 5,
    of the Louisiana Constitution protect people against unreasonable searches and
    seizures.      Subject only to a few well- established exceptions, a search or seizure
    conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is constitutionally
    prohibited.
    Once a defendant makes an initial showing that a warrantless search or
    seizure occurred, the burden of proof shifts to the State to affirmatively show it
    was justified under one of the narrow exceptions to the rule requiring a search
    warrant.      See La. Code Crim. P. art. 703( D); State v. Johnson, 98- 0264 ( La. App.
    1st Cir. 12/ 28/ 98), 
    728 So. 2d 885
    , 886.          Evidence derived from an unreasonable
    The defendant in brief labels this assignment of error as " Insufficiency of the Evidence
    Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence)." The defendant herein addresses only the pretrial
    ruling of the seizure of the gun and, as such, the evidentiary argument in this assignment of error
    is one of suppression, not sufficiency.
    M
    stop, i.e., seizure, will be excluded from trial.        State v. Benjamin, 97- 3065 ( La.
    12/ 1/ 98), 
    722 So. 2d 988
    , 989.
    The defendant does not contest the validity of the traffic stop itself.             The
    defendant argues in brief that the gun was confiscated from the vehicle without
    sufficient probable cause.   While Officer Peck indicated there was a strong odor of
    marijuana coming from the vehicle, the defendant avers there was no evidence of
    marijuana on his person or in the vehicle other than Officer Peck' s self-serving
    testimony. Thus, according to the defendant, the justification for the search was
    suspect since the alleged scent of marijuana coming from the vehicle could not
    have occurred as Officer Peck testified.
    Officer    Peck   testified   at   the   motion   to   suppress hearing that   as    he
    approached the vehicle that the defendant was driving, he noticed a strong smell of
    burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle. Officer Peck had previously been an
    undercover narcotics agent and was familiar with the odor of burning marijuana.
    At trial, Officer Peck testified he detected a very strong odor of burnt marijuana
    when he approached the vehicle.
    The detection of a strong odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle,
    viewed objectively, provided Officer Peck with probable cause to search the
    vehicle.   See State v. Arnold, 2011- 0626 ( La. 4/ 27/ 11),       
    60 So. 3d 599
    , 600 ( per
    curiam);   State v. Mitchell, 2010- 334 ( La. App. 5th Cir. 10/ 26/ 10), 
    52 So. 3d 155
    ,
    160, writ denied, 2011- 0355 ( La. 12/ 2/ 11),      
    76 So. 3d 1170
     ( noting that courts have
    consistently held that the odor of marijuana provided officers with sufficient
    probable cause to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles).             Accordingly, had
    Officer Peck searched the vehicle, the seizure of the gun from the vehicle would
    have been proper pursuant to probable cause to believe that contraband was
    present.
    5
    That marijuana was not found in the vehicle or on the defendant is of no
    moment.    The defendant could have earlier smoked marijuana or discarded it prior
    to being stopped.       Moreover, Officer Peck testified at the motion to suppress
    hearing that after he had been transported to jail, the defendant was found to have a
    plastic baggie on his person that had been ripped up and smelled very strongly of
    marijuana.
    At any rate, it appears from Officer Peck' s testimony that he never searched
    the vehicle the defendant was driving. After detaining the defendant in the back of
    his unit, Officer Peck testified that he walked back toward the vehicle with the
    intention of searching it. The driver' s side door was open and before he made
    entry into the vehicle to begin the search, Officer Peck saw the gun in the vehicle,
    in between the front seat and the center console.         Officer Peck specifically testified
    at the motion to suppress hearing that he never searched the vehicle, but noticed
    the handgun in plain view.
    Police may seize evidence under the " plain view" doctrine when there is
    prior justification for an intrusion into the protected area, and it is immediately
    apparent, without close inspection, that the item seized is evidence or contraband.
    See Horton v. California, 
    496 U.S. 128
    , 136- 137,        
    110 S. Ct. 2301
    , 2308, 
    110 L.Ed.2d 112
     ( 1990); Leger, 936 So. 2d at 155.       Officer Peck had the right to stand
    outside of the vehicle.     Based on his testimony, it is clear the firearm was obvious
    to   him   and   it   was   immediately   apparent   it    was    evidence   or   contraband.
    Accordingly, the firearm was properly seized.             See State v. Parker, 2010- 1038
    La. App. 5th Cir. 6/ 14/ 11),    
    71 So. 3d 383
    , 389; State v. Barnes, 2012- 0615 ( La.
    App. 1st Cir. 11/ 2/ 12), 
    2012 WL 5387692
     at * 6 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2013-
    0634 ( La. 8/ 30/ 13), 
    120 So. 3d 264
    .
    0
    Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not err or abuse its
    discretion in denying the motion to suppress evidence.                      Accordingly,   this
    assignment of error is without merit.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth herein, Curtis L. Hall' s conviction, habitual
    offender   adjudication,   and   sentence   are       affirmed.   All costs of this appeal are
    assessed to appellant, Curtis L. Hall.
    CONVICTION,           HABITUAL          OFFENDER             ADJUDICATION,        AND
    SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2019KA1588

Filed Date: 7/24/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024