State Of Louisiana in the Interest of N.J. ( 2020 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NO. 2020 KJ 0056
STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF N.J.
Judgment Rendered.
JUL 2 4 2020
Appealed from the
Juvenile Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Case No. 113488
The Honorable Adam J. Haney, Judge Presiding
Lakita Leonard Counsel for Appellant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana N.J.
Hillar Moore, III Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Amanda Gros
Assistant District Attorney
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
BEFORE: McDONALD, THERIOT, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
THERIOT, J.
The juvenile, N.J., was charged by petition with unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle, a violation of La. R. S. 14: 68. 4.' N.J. denied the charge. N.J. then
withdrew her denial of the charge and entered an admission to the charge. The
juvenile court imposed a term of commitment for two years, suspended the
commitment, and placed N.J. on supervised probation for one year. Following a
hearing on the matter, the juvenile court ordered N.J. to pay restitution in the
amount of $3, 229. 15.
N.J. now appeals, designating three assignments of error.
We affirm the adjudication and disposition.
FACTS
Because N.J. entered an admission to the charge, there was no adjudication
hearing to develop the facts. The following testimony was adduced at the
restitution hearing. Nan Miller lived in Denham Springs, Louisiana. On January
22, 2019, she was packing her car, a white Toyota, with the belongings of her
daughter, who was moving to Gonzales, Louisiana. When Miller and her daughter
went inside their house, an unknown person stole the Toyota. Miller indicated that
the car was found approximately three days later.2 The spare tire and tire tools had
been taken from the car. According to Miller, all of her daughter' s belongings had
been taken from the car, which included jackets, jeans, T- shirts, shorts, shoes,
boots, a Michael Kors purse, a Dell laptop, pajamas, perfume, yoga pants, sweat
suits, a $ 50 Academy gift card, makeup, underwear, socks, jewelry, sunglasses,
scarves, hats, and a blow dryer.
N.J. denied stealing Miller' s car. According to N.J., a white woman she did
not know gave her a ride in the Toyota in Baton Rouge. When they got to a store,
1 To protect N.J.' s identify as a minor child, we have recaptioned this case and refer to her by her
initials. See Uniform Rules -Courts of Appeal, Rule 5- 2.
2 At the restitution hearing, N.J.' s attorney pointed out to the juvenile court that while Miller
testified that she got the car back three days later, N.J. was caught in Miller' s car in March of
2019.
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the woman told N.J. that she could use the car for a little while, so N.J. took the
car. N.J. indicated she did not take any of the items in the car and that she had
been in the car for two to three hours before she was stopped by the police.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
In her first assignment of error, N.J. argues the juvenile court erred in
ordering her to pay restitution for items that were reported stolen from Livingston
Parish.
N.J. was charged with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in East Baton
Rouge Parish. Nan Miller' s car was stolen from her house in Denham Springs,
which is located in Livingston Parish. According to N.J., she could not be ordered
to pay restitution because the juvenile " court' s jurisdiction does not exceed outside
of East Baton Rouge Parish."
The foregoing statement is the extent of N.J.' s argument. N.J. cites no
authority for this proposition regarding jurisdiction and restitution. It is well
established that a court of appeal may consider as abandoned any specification or
assignment of error which has not been briefed. State in Interest of J.M., 2013-
2573 ( La. 12/ 9/ 14), 156 So. 3d 1161, 1164; see also Uniform Rules -Courts of
Appeal, Rule 2- 12. 4( B)( 4) and State v. Johnson, 2000- 0680 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
12/ 22/ 00), 775 So. 2d 670, 682, writ denied, 2002- 1368 ( La. 5/ 30/ 03), 845 So. 2d
1066 ( noting defendant' s single sentence was not sufficient to be viewed as an
attempt to brief the issue on appeal). Moreover, as discussed more fully below, the
restitution N.J. was ordered to pay was tied to her having broken the law, which
caused loss to Miller, and had nothing to do with the location of the theft. See
State in Interest of D.B., 2013- 1364 ( La. App. 3rd Cir. 4/ 23/ 14), 137 So. 3d 1282,
writ denied, 2014- 1092 ( La. 1/ 9/ 15), 157 So. 3d 596.
This assignment of error is without merit.
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 2 and 3
In these related assignments of error, N.J. argues, respectively, that the
juvenile court erred in ordering her to pay restitution because the State failed to
prove N.J. stole the vehicle or the items in it; and that the amount of restitution is
excessive because N.J. is indigent.
N.J. suggests the only credible documentation provided at the restitution
hearing was an estimate for the missing spare tire. The value of the other items,
Miller' s daughter' s belongings, was provided by Miller' s testimony with no
accompanying receipts or documentation. N.J. points out she never admitted to the
theft of the car or the theft of any of the items that were in the car. According to
N.J., the juvenile court abused its discretion in imposing restitution without
documentation and because the court desired to make the victim whole.
The juvenile court took into consideration the number of items stolen, as
well as N.J.' s overall role in the various losses suffered by Miller and her daughter.
The cost to replace the stolen spare tire, tools, and jack was $ 722. 15. At the
restitution hearing, the juvenile court indicated it had no reason to disbelieve the
amounts that Miller provided for the items stolen from her car. The juvenile court
also indicated it understood that N.J. had not pled guilty to stealing the car. In
ordering restitution in the amount of $ 3, 229. 15, the juvenile court found in
pertinent part:
You know generally I know it' s not exactly the same but there
is solidary liability for criminal acts and now -- you know there' s a
question in this case as to whether if you -- you know believe that she
did not have a hand in stealing the car would she be [ solidarily] liable
with the person that did as part of the -- that offense — it' s probably an
argument. It' s a [" no".] So that -- but I think that the prospect of
solidary liability is indication that a crime has happened, the victim is
un --
we are talking about unjusted [ sic] enrichment on part of the
defendant but the victim has been [ unjustly] deprived -- of the -- their
property and the -- idea is that folks that are concern[ ed] with a
commission of a crime you know is you -- you bear that -- you bear
that responsibility -- and so it' s -- I definitely -- I see it both ways. I
think it' s difficult[,] it' s a desire to make a victim whole. There' s also
a desire to hold people accurately responsible for their actions in what
they action [ sic] in what they actually did -- and so it can be you know
it can be I think very difficult to make those -- those conclusions --
in this case but I also you know it' s -- if there' s a default and I -- and
if the court is going to use [ its] discretion [ it' s] gonna use its
discretion to make whole the person who has been -- who has been
wronged[.]
Regarding the court' s reliance on the testimonial evidence regarding the
value of items, the third circuit in State v. Johnson, 2004- 1266 ( La. App. 3rd Cir.
2/ 2/ 05), 893 So. 2d 945, 955, stated:
T] he trier of fact is to consider the value that the stolen items have to
the victim. " Unless it is shown the owner lacks knowledge of the
value of a movable, his testimony as to value is generally admissible,
with its weight being left to the jury." Further, the owner of stolen
property may testify regarding the value of the stolen items without
the necessity of being qualified as an expert, and such testimony " can
constitute ample evidence of the property's value." ( citations omitted)
In D. B., 137 So. 3d at 1283, the juvenile was adjudicated a delinquent on the
charge of unauthorized use of a movable and ordered to pay $ 750 in restitution to
the victim. The victim had tools in his truck that were missing when the truck was
returned, and he testified that the value of the missing tools totaled $ 1, 552. 73. Id.
at 1283, 1285. D.B. cited La. Ch. Code art. 897( B)( 2)( c), which provided that a
condition of probation was the requirement that the child make reasonable
restitution to any victim for any personal or property damage caused by the child in
the commission of the delinquent act. D.B. argued that $ 750 in restitution was
unreasonable because the charges against him did not allege any theft and there
was no allegation that he stole the tools. Id. at 1286. The third circuit in D. B.
found that the order of restitution was reasonably related to D.B.' s rehabilitation
and that simple logic and deduction demanded a conclusion that the loss suffered
by the victim was caused by the offense committed by D.B. Id. at 1288.
In State in Interest of K.Z., 2015- 1029 ( La. App. 3rd Cir. 3/ 2/ 16), 186
So. 3d 799, 800- 01, writ denied, 2016- 0610 ( La. 5/ 2/ 16), 206 So. 3d 881, the
juvenile entered an admission to the charge of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle
5
and was ordered to pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $3, 200. 21. The
victim' s truck was being used by his son when it was stolen from a friend' s house.
When the truck was recovered, the tires were blown out, and the body of the truck
was damaged. Based on the insurance adjustment, the damage and towing totaled
3, 474. 92. There were also various items taken from the truck. Id. at 801. At the
restitution hearing, K.Z. denied damaging the truck or taking the missing items.
Id. at 802. On appeal, K.Z. noted he was never charged with, nor admitted to,
taking the property from the truck. Id. at 803. K.Z. also argued that since the
victim had not replaced the items stolen, he incurred no out- of-pocket expense for
the items. Id. at 807. The third circuit found the fact that the victim had not
replaced the items at the time of the hearing did not alter the fact that a loss was
incurred; it found also that the juvenile court had not abused its discretion in
ordering K.Z. to pay restitution for the items taken from the truck. Id.Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, we conclude that the findings herein
of the juvenile court were within its vast discretion as to the imposition of
restitution. See K.Z., 186 So. 3d at 807. While N.J. was not charged with theft of
the car, she was still liable for the losses incurred by both Miller and her daughter.
It was within the juvenile court' s discretion to choose an appropriate amount. See
Johnson, 893 So. 2d at 959- 60. Given that requiring N.J. to account for a portion
of the reasonable and direct consequences of her crime is an acceptable form of
rehabilitation despite her indigence, we find that the restitution amount of
3, 229. 15 was not an unreasonable burden to place on the now eighteen -year- old
N.J. See K.Z., 186 So. 3d at 808; D. B., 137 So. 3d at 1288- 89.
Accordingly, these assignments of error are without merit.
ADJUDICATION AND DISPOSITION AFFIRMED.
C
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2020 K] 0056
STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF N. J.
v
1"
McDONALD, J., concurring.
I agree with the majority's affirmance of the adjudication and disposition in this
case, but I will concur because I disagree that N. J. abandoned her first assignment of
error by failing to brief it. I do not think her failure to cite to authority equates to an
abandonment of or failure to brief the assignment.
On the merits, however, I think N. J.' s first assignment of error must be rejected.
The car and its contents were stolen from Livingston Parish. The East Baton Rouge
Juvenile Court would not have jurisdiction over the case had the State charged N. J. with
theft. But, the charge against N. J. in this case is not theft. Rather, the State charged
N. J. with the crime of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, which occurred in East
Baton Rouge Parish. Thus, the East Baton Rouge Juvenile Court had jurisdiction over
the case against N. J. for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in Baton Rouge, and it
also had jurisdiction to order N. J. to pay restitution for personal property stolen from
the car. See La. Ch. C. art. 897B( 2)( c) (" As conditions of probation, ... [ t] he court may
impose ... a requirement that the child make reasonable restitution to any victim for any
personal or property damage caused by the child in the commission of the delinquent
act.')