Zed Smith v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections ( 2020 )


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  •                                STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    2019 CA 0805
    ZED SMITH
    VERSUS
    JAMES LEBLANC AND LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
    PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
    JUDGMENT RENDERED: ``       JUL 0 8 2020
    Appealed from the
    Nineteenth Judicial District Court
    In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge • State of Louisiana
    Docket Number C675369 • Section 22
    The Honorable Timothy Kelley, Judge Presiding
    Zed Smith, D. O. C. # 315930                         APPELLANT, IN PROPER PERSON
    David Wade Correctional Center                       PLAINTIFF— Zed Smith
    Homer, Louisiana
    Susan Wall Griffin                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana                               DEFENDANT— Louisiana
    Department of Public Safety and
    Corrections
    BEFORE: MCCLENDON, WELCH, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ.
    HOLDRIDGE, J.
    Zed Smith, an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public
    Safety and Corrections ( the " Department")             and confined to the David Wade
    Correctional Center, appeals a judgment of the district court dismissing his petition
    for judicial review of Administrative Remedy Procedure No. DWCC-2018- 0469
    ARP")    and affirming the Department' s final decision in this matter.             For the
    following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Smith was convicted and sentenced for a crime in federal court under docket
    number 2004- 265 in the Eastern District of Louisiana.'                While he was in federal
    custody, on September 3, 2013, he appeared before and pled guilty to separate state
    criminal charges in the 20 Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson and
    was sentenced for those crimes by Judge Raymond S. Steib, Jr.'                     For the first
    count I), he was sentenced to 15 years ( to be served without benefit of probation,
    parole, or suspension of sentence for 5 years) and for the other charge ( count II), he
    was sentenced to 15 years.         As to count II, he was subsequently adjudicated as a
    habitual offender, the original sentence was vacated and he was sentenced to 15
    years without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.                     The minutes,
    sentencing transcript, and commitment order indicates that the sentences in the
    state proceeding were imposed " concurrently" with each other and " concurrent and
    coterminously" to his federal sentence.
    In June 2015,     Smith was released from federal custody. In June 2017, he
    was remanded to the custody of the Department for the completion of his state
    sentences.      In Smith' s ARP, he claimed that he was erroneously remanded to the
    1 The record does not contain any specific details concerning Smith' s federal conviction or
    sentence.
    2
    According to Smith' s ARP, the charges against him were possession with intent to distribute a
    controlled dangerous substance ( heroin) and obstruction of justice.
    2
    custody of the Department after his release from federal custody because in the
    state   proceedings,       his plea agreement was           for   concurrent      and   coterminous
    sentences to his federal sentence.            Thus, Smith sought to be immediately released
    from    the    custody of the Department.                The   Department      denied    the    relief,
    maintaining that while his federal and state sentences were running concurrent with
    each other, they did not end at the same time and Louisiana did not recognize
    coterminous      sentences.     Smith then instituted this proceeding, seeking judicial
    review of the Department' s decision.
    On March 18, 2019, the commissioner assigned to this matter issued a report
    recommending to the district court that the Department' s decision be affirmed and
    that Smith' s petition be dismissed.             The commissioner noted that although the
    sentencing court in the          state   proceedings       used   the   terms "   concurrent"     and
    coterminous"          interchangeably and did not distinguish the terms, there was no
    specific statement by the sentencing court that the Louisiana sentences were to run
    and end at the same time as Smith' s federal sentence.                  The commissioner further
    noted that in Louisiana, La. C. Cr.P.            art.   883 authorizes a court to sentence an
    offender      either    consecutively    or   concurrently, but     does not provide           for the
    imposition of coterminous sentences.              Lastly, the commissioner noted that there
    was nothing in the sentencing transcript to indicate that the use of the term
    concurrent and coterminous meant anything other than the intention that Smith
    would serve his Louisiana sentences concurrent to his federal sentence and, that
    once he finished his service requirements on the federal sentence, he would be
    transferred to the custody of the Department to begin serving the remainder of his
    Louisiana sentences minus credit for time served in federal custody. Accordingly,
    the commissioner concluded that Smith failed to establish that the Department' s
    decision was arbitrary, capricious, manifestly erroneous, or in violation of his
    statutory or constitutional rights because the Department' s decision was based on
    3
    the premise that Louisiana does not allow for the imposition of coterminous
    sentences.   Thus, the commissioner recommended that the Department' s decision
    be affirmed and Smith' s suit should be dismissed with prejudice at his cost.
    After considering the entire record of the proceedings, on April 9, 2019, the
    district court adopted the commissioner' s recommendation and signed a judgment
    dismissing   Smith' s   petition    with    prejudice   and   affirming the Department' s
    decision. From this judgment, Smith has appealed.
    LAW AND DISCUSSION
    There is a difference between " concurrent"             and " coterminous"   sentences.
    Strickland v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2017-
    0829 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 12/ 21/ 17), 
    240 So. 3d 970
    , 973.        Concurrent sentences are
    when two or more sentences of jail time are to be served simultaneously. 
    Id.,
    quoting Black' s Law Dictionary 1569 ( 10th ed. 2014).              A concurrent sentence
    does not mean that the sentences will end at the same time. Strickland, 240 So. 3d
    at 972, citing Brown v. Parker, 
    771 F. 3d 1270
    , 1272 ( 10th Cir. 2014). When the
    sentences are to end at the same time, the sentence is called " coterminous." 
    Id.
    As the commissioner correctly noted, Louisiana law authorizes concurrent
    and consecutive sentences, but does not provide for coterminous sentences.                See
    Strickland, 240 So. 3d at 974.      More specifically, La. C. Cr. P. art. 883 provides:
    If the defendant is convicted of two or more offenses based on the
    same act or transaction, or constituting parts of a common scheme or
    plan, the terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently unless
    the court expressly directs that some or all be served consecutively.
    Other sentences of imprisonment shall be served consecutively unless
    the court expressly directs that some or all of them be served
    concurrently.     In the case of the concurrent sentence, the judge shall
    specify, and the court minutes shall reflect, the date from which the
    sentences are to run concurrently.
    A review of the record reveals that the minutes of the court, the sentencing
    transcript, and the commitment order issued by the sentencing court provide that
    Smith' s   sentences    in   the   state   proceeding   were     imposed "   concurrent   and
    E
    coterminously"        to   his    federal    sentence.         Louisiana         does    not   recognize
    conterminous sentences.
    Louisiana law statutorily only authorizes concurrent and
    consecutive     sentences.       See La. C. Cr.P. art. 883; Strickland, 240 So. 3d at 974.
    Therefore, it is impossible to give effect to the coterminous provision in Smith' s
    sentence.
    Based on our review of the record, we find no error in the district court' s
    dismissal of Smith' s petition for judicial review.              Regardless of whether Smith' s
    claims concerning the legality of his sentence have merit, the 19'                      Judicial District
    Court lacked jurisdiction to grant Smith the relief that he sought. A district court
    lacks authority to correct an illegal sentence on a petition for judicial review.
    Boddye v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, 2014- 1836 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
    6/ 26/ 15),   
    175 So. 3d 437
    , 442, writ denied, 2015- 1688 ( La. 10/ 30/ 15), 
    180 So. 3d 303
    .    While an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time, only the sentencing
    court itself or the appellate court having jurisdiction over the sentencing court have
    authority to do so.        La. C. Cr.P. art. 882( A); Boddye, 
    175 So. 3d at 442
    .                    Since
    Smith was sentenced in Jefferson Parish, neither the 19th Judicial District Court nor
    this   court   have jurisdiction       over    petitioner' s    illegal     sentence      claims.     See
    Campbell v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2017-
    1002 ( La.     App.   1St Cir. 2/ 16/ 18),    
    2018 WL 914304
    ,             at *   1(   unpublished),   writ
    denied, 2018- 0359 ( La. 1/ 28/ 19), 
    262 So. 3d 900
    .
    The proper procedure for Smith to seek the relief he requests is through a
    motion to correct an illegal sentence filed in the court that imposed his sentence.
    Thus, any challenges to the legality of Smith' s sentence should be filed in the 2411
    Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson. Campbell, 
    2018 WL 914304
    , at
    2.    Accordingly, we do not find merit in Smith' s appeal and affirm the rulings of
    the district court and the Department.
    5
    CONCLUSION
    For the above and foregoing reasons, we affirm the April 9, 2019 judgment
    that dismissed Zed Smith' s petition for judicial review, with prejudice. All costs of
    this appeal in the amount of $1, 150. 50 are assessed to the plaintiff, Zed Smith.
    AFFIRMED.
    0
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    2019 CA 0805
    ZED SMITH
    VERSUS
    JAMES LEBLANC AND LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
    CORRECTIONS
    1
    McClendon, J., concurring.
    I disagree with the conclusion that the 19th Judicial District Court and this court
    lack jurisdiction.   However, based on the fact that Louisiana does not provide for
    coterminous    sentences,   I concur in   the affirmance of the trial   court's judgment.
    Additionally, I note that Mr. Smith has not raised with this court the potential nullity of
    his plea agreement.
    ZED SMITH                                                    NUMBER: 2019 CA 0805
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    VERSUS
    COURT OF APPEAL
    JAMES LEBLANC AND LOUISIANA
    DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
    AND CORRECTIONS                                              STATE OF LOUISIANA
    J   WELCH, J., dissenting.
    I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion in this matter because I
    believe there is a question as to the validity of Zed Smith' s plea agreement and that
    the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections should be ordered to
    comply with the sentencing order issued by Judge Raymond S. Steib, Jr. in the 24"
    Judicial District Court.
    As the majority correctly notes, there is a difference between " concurrent"
    and " coterminous"      sentences; however, Louisiana law only authorizes concurrent
    and consecutive        sentences and does not provide for coterminous             sentences..
    Strickland v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2017-
    0829 ( La.     App.   1St Cir. 12/ 21/ 17),    
    240 So. 3d 970
    , 973- 974.    Nonetheless, the
    sentencing court in the state proceedings, Judge Steib in the 20 Judicial District
    Court,    unquestionably and specifically ordered that Smith' s sentences in the state
    proceedings were to run " concurrent and coterminously" to his federal sentences
    and further, that these sentences were imposed pursuant to plea agreements. Thus,
    there is a question as to the validity of Smith' s plea agreement.
    In determining the validity of plea agreements, courts generally refer to rules
    of contract law.      Boddye v. LA. Dept. of Corrections, 2014- 136 ( La. App. 1St Cir.
    6/ 26/ 15),   
    175 So. 3d 437
    , 441, writ denied, 2015- 1688 ( La. 10/ 30/ 15),      
    180 So. 3d 303
    .   A contract is an agreement by two or more parties whereby obligations are
    created, modified, or extinguished.           La. C. C. art. 1906; Boddye, 
    175 So. 3d at 441
    .
    An obligation cannot exist without a lawful cause.             La. C. C. art. 1966; Boddye,
    
    175 So. 3d at 441
    .     The cause of an obligation is unlawful when the enforcement of
    the obligation would produce a result prohibited by law or against public policy.
    La. C. C. art. 1968; Boddye, 
    175 So. 3d at 441
    .           Moreover, a contract is absolutely
    null when it violates a rule of public order, as when the object of a contract is illicit
    or immoral; a contract that is absolutely null may not be confirmed.                Boddye, 
    175 So. 3d at 441
    , citing State v. Byrnside, 34948 ( La. App. 2" d Cir. 8/ 22/ 01),                 
    795 So. 2d 435
    , 437- 438.
    Herein, to the extent that Smith' s sentences in the state court proceedings
    were imposed " concurrent and coterminously" to his federal sentence and violates
    Louisiana law, the plea agreements on which Smith' s sentences are premised
    appear to be absolute nullities.'      However, notwithstanding whether the underlying
    plea agreement is an absolute nullity that the sentencing court in the state
    proceeding should not have accepted, it must be recognized that what is to be
    enforced by the Department is not the plea agreement itself, but the actual
    sentencing order imposed by the sentencing court. See Boddye, 
    175 So. 3d at 441
    .
    Herein,    given that the minutes of the court, the sentencing transcript, and the
    commitment order issued by the sentencing court provide that Smith' s sentences in
    the state proceeding were imposed " concurrent and coterminously" to his federal
    sentence, I find that the Department and the district court erred in failing to enforce
    the governing sentencing orders, in determining that Smith was not entitled to the
    relief that he requested in his ARP, or in otherwise concluding that Smith was
    properly remanded to the custody of the Department after his release from federal
    custody.
    1 However, I also recognize that "[ i]t is well settled in Louisiana jurisprudence that a guilty plea
    is constitutionally infirm when a defendant is induced to enter that plea by a plea bargain or by
    what he justifiably believes was a plea bargain, and that bargain is not kept. In such a case, a
    defendant has been denied due process of law because the plea was not given freely and
    knowingly." Boddye, 
    175 So. 3d at
    441 n.5, quoting Blair v. Stalder, 99- 1860 ( La. App. 1St Cir.
    1/ 31/ 01), 
    798 So. 2d 123
    , 138 n.7.
    It is well settled that the determination of the sentence a defendant is to
    serve, and what, if any conditions are to be imposed on that sentence is made by
    the sentencing trial judge, not the defendant' s custodian.              Boddye, 
    175 So. 3d at 441
    .   The custodian' s obligation is to see that the sentence imposed is the sentence
    served.     
    Id.
       As such,     the Department is charged with complying with any
    conditions placed on a sentence by the sentencing court.                       
    Id.
        Herein, the
    Department declined to follow the sentence imposed by the sentencing court on the
    basis that Louisiana did not recognize coterminous sentences.                  However, despite
    the illegality of Smith' s sentence, I believe that the Department lacked the
    authority to unilaterally correct the error committed by the sentencing court;
    instead, such error may only be corrected by the sentencing court itself or on direct
    appellate   review.    See Boddye, 
    175 So. 3d at 442
    .             Likewise, the district court
    herein lacked the authority to correct the illegal sentences on judicial review. 
    Id.
    Accordingly, I would find merit in Smith' s appeal and reverse the rulings of
    the district court and the Department. In accord, Boddye, 
    175 So. 3d at 442
    .2
    Thus, I respectfully dissent.
    2 I recognize that in Strickland, 
    240 So. 3d at 974
    , which involved the use of the terms
    concurrent and coterminous"     in reference to the imposition of multiple sentences, this Court
    found no error in the decision of the Department or the district court not to recognize the term
    coterminous with regard to the inmate' s sentence.    Therein, although the term coterminous was
    used, the sentencing transcript was clear that that in exchange for the inmate' s plea of no contest,
    he would be sentenced to a total of forty years and was advised that if he were eligible for good
    time, the shortest sentence he would serve in prison would be thirty-four years. Additionally, the
    no contest plea was not induced by a plea bargain which promised that the inmate would be
    released upon completion of his shortest sentence.    Strickland, 
    240 So. 3d at 974
    .    In this case,
    the sentencing transcript is clear that Smith' s sentences were concurrent and coterminous with
    his federal sentence and that such sentences were imposed as part of his plea agreement.
    Therefore, I find Strickland is distinguishable and the result reached in this case should be
    controlled by Boddye, 
    175 So. 3d at 442
    .
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2019CA0805

Filed Date: 7/8/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024