Daniel Cathey v. State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles ( 2020 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NUMBER 2019 CA 1371
DANIEL CATHEY
VERSUS
STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY &
CORRECTIONS, OFFICE OF MOTOR VEHICLES
Judgment Rendered:
MAY 1. 1 ' 1920
Appealed from the
Twentieth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of West Feliciana
State of Louisiana
Suit Number 23587
Honorable Kathryn E. Jones, Presiding
Charles E. Griffin, II Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
St. Francisville, LA Daniel Cathey
Laura C. Hopes Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant
Stephen A. Quidd State of Louisiana, Department of
Baton Rouge, LA Public Safety and Corrections, Office
of Motor Vehicles
1
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C. J., GUIDRY, AND BURRIS, JJ.
6 A(C Pt'! / ' ) - ( o m c,, r-5 - ,
Judge William J. Burris, retired, serving pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana
Supreme Court.
GUIDRY, J.
Defendant/ appellant, State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety and
Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles ( DPSC), appeals from a judgment of the
trial court ordering it to immediately reinstate the driver' s license originally issued
to plaintiff/appellee, Daniel Cathey, and denying its exceptions raising the
objections of no cause of action and no right of action. For the reasons that follow,
we reverse the judgment of the trial court in part and remand this matter for further
proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 16, 2019, Daniel Cathey filed a Motion for Reinstatement of
Driving Privileges, naming the DPSC as a defendant. According to the motion,
Cathey was convicted on August 20, 2015, of driving while intoxicated, third
offense. The motion stated that Cathey had satisfactorily completed all the terms
of his sentence as of January 2019; more than three years had passed since the
period of his suspension of his driving privileges, which began in 2015; and,
during his suspension, he did not drive a vehicle. Cathey asserted that under La.
R.S. 32: 414, he applied to have his license reinstated with DPSC, but that he was
informed by DPSC he had to have an interlock device on his vehicle for eighteen
months. Cathey asserted that once he completed his suspension period under La.
R. S. 32: 414, there is no additional requirement that he have an ignition interlock
device installed in his automobile once he is eligible to drive, as that provision only
applies to hardship licenses issued during the suspensive period. Accordingly,
Cathey requested that DPSC be ordered to reinstate his driver' s license
immediately.
Thereafter, DPSC answered Cathey' s motion and filed exceptions raising the
objections of no cause of action and no right of action. DPSC asserted that Cathey
did not have a cause of action, because he failed to demonstrate that he had
PA
requested an administrative hearing within thirty days of the date of the arrest
pursuant to La. R.S. 32: 667( A)(2)( a), or that he had requested review by the
district court of his suspension and the associated reinstatement requirements if the
ruling of the administrative law judge was adverse to him pursuant to La. R.S.
32: 668( C) and La. R.S. 32: 414( F)( 4). DPSC also asserted that Cathey did not have
a right of action to petition the district court to review this matter, because he did
not exhaust his administrative remedies under La. R.S. 32: 667( A) and the delays
for requesting the administrative hearing have expired.
The trial court held a hearing on DPSC' s exceptions and Cathey' s motion on
August 28, 2019. Thereafter, the trial court signed a judgment denying DPSC' s
exceptions and ordering DPSC to reinstate Cathey' s driver' s license immediately.
DPSC now appeals from the trial court' s judgment.
DISCUSSION
Louisiana has enacted two statutory schemes concerning the suspension of
driving privileges of persons who drive while intoxicated or under the suspicion of
doing so. Walker v. State, Department of Public Safety, 589 So. 2d 622, 623- 624
La. App. 3rd Cir. 1991); see also In re Lafleur, 12- 1227, p. 3 ( La. App. 3rd Cir.
3/ 6/ 13), 129 So. 3d 540, 543. These schemes, found in La. R. S. 32: 667- 668 and
32: 414- 415. 1, permit DPSC to suspend the driving privileges of those persons
meeting the statutory requirements contained therein. In re Lafleur, 12- 1227 at p.
3, 129 So. 3d at 543. While the two schemes are parallel, they are not integrated;
rather, they are separate and distinct. Walker, 589 So. 2d at 624. The procedures
contained in La. R.S. 32: 667- 668 apply to those persons who have been arrested
upon suspicion of driving while intoxicated, while La. R.S. 414- 415. 1 apply to
those persons who have been convicted of and sentenced for, among other things,
operating a vehicle while intoxicated. In re Lafleur, 12- 1227 at pp. 3- 4, 129 So. 3d
at 543; Walker, 589 So. 2d at 624.
3
In the instant case, Cathey alleged that he was seeking reinstatement of his
driver' s license following suspension based on a conviction for driving while
intoxicated, third offense. However, the record is devoid of any evidence, either
testimonial or documentary, regarding the circumstances of his suspension or
fulfillment of any statutory requirements. Accordingly, absent any evidence to
substantiate the claims made by Cathey in his motion for reinstatement of driving
privileges, the trial court erred in granting his motion. See Walker, 589 So. 2d at
624.
With regard to DPSC' s exceptions raising the objection of no cause of action
and no right of action, however, we find no error in the trial court' s denial of these
exceptions. An exception raising the objection of no cause of action questions
whether the law affords the plaintiff any remedy under the facts alleged in the
petition. Vince v. Metro Rediscount Company, 18- 2056, p. 1 ( La. 2/ 25/ 19), 264
So. 3d 440, 441. The exception raising the objection of no cause of action is
triable on the face of the pleadings, and all well -pleaded facts in the petition must
be accepted as true. HPC Biologicals, Inc. v. UnitedHealthCare of Louisiana, Inc.,
16- 0585, p. 6 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 26/ 16), 194 So. 3d 784, 792. The purpose of the
exception raising the objection of no right of action assumes that the petition states
a valid cause of action for some person and questions whether the plaintiff is a
member of the class that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation.
HPC Biologicals, Inc., 16- 0585 at p. 7, 194 So. 3d at 792. On appellate review,
this court reviews the pleadings de novo, because these exceptions present a
question of law. HPC Biologicals, Inc., 16- 0585 at p. 7, 194 So. 3d at 792.
In the instant case, Cathey alleged in his motion for reinstatement of driving
privileges that he had been convicted of driving while intoxicated, third offense;
that he had satisfactorily completed all the terms of his sentence as of January
2019; that more than three years had passed since his driver' s license was
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suspended in 2015; and that he did not drive during his suspension. Accordingly,
Cathey applied for reinstatement of his driver' s license pursuant to La. R.S.
23: 414, but DPSC denied the issuance of a license unless he installed an ignition
interlock device in his vehicle for eighteen months.
As noted above, Louisiana has enacted two statutory schemes concerning the
suspension of driving privileges of persons who drive while intoxicated or under
the suspicion of doing so. Louisiana Revised Statutes 32: 414- 415. 1 apply to those
persons who have been convicted of and sentenced for operating a vehicle while
intoxicated. Louisiana Revised Statute 32: 414( D)( 2) provides upon termination of
the suspension period that " the person whose license has been suspended shall be
reinstated, provided no other suspension of license is outstanding and upon
satisfaction of any financial responsibility law requirements and upon payment of a
reinstatement fee as required by this Section." However, there is no requirement
that a person applying for reinstatement of his driver' s license following
termination of the suspension period must first have an ignition interlock device
2
installed in his vehicle. Furthermore, because Cathey is not seeking review of his
initial suspension, and installation of an ignition interlock device is not a
requirement for reinstatement of a driver' s license following termination of
Cathey' s suspension period, we find that the administrative review provisions
found in La. R.S. 32: 414( F)( 4) are not applicable to the instant action.
Accordingly, we find that Cathey' s motion for reinstatement of driving privileges
states a cause of action and that Cathey has a right to bring this action.
2 We note that a licensee who has had his license suspended for operating a motor vehicle under
the influence of alcoholic beverages shall be eligible to apply for a restricted driver' s license
after a period of twelve months upon proof that his motor vehicle has been equipped with a
functioning ignition interlock device, which shall remain on the motor vehicle for not less than
six months from the date the restricted driver' s license is granted. La. R.S. 32: 414( D)( 1)( b).
However, unlike the provisions found in La. R. S. 32: 667( I), this requirement is only with
reference to obtaining a restricted driver' s license and does not apply as a condition to
As noted
reinstatement of a driver' s license following completion of a period of suspension.
above, these two statutory schemes are separate and distinct, and they are not integrated. In re
Lafleur, 12- 1227 at p. 3, 129 So. 3d at 543.
E
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the portion of the trial court' s judgment
denying DPSC' s exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action and no
right of action. However, we reverse the portion of the trial court' s judgment
ordering DPSC to immediately reinstate Cathey' s driver' s license and remand this
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. All costs of this appeal
are assessed to Daniel Cathey.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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