Duplessis Buick-GMC Truck, Inc. v. Michael Chauncey, David Richard, Gretna Used Car Outlet, LLC ( 2020 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NO. 2019 CA 1304
DUPLESSIS BUICK-GMC TRUCK, INC.
v
VERSUS
MICHAEL CHAUNCEY, DAVID RICHARD,
GRETNA USED CAR OUTLET, LLC
Judgment Rendered.-
endered.
MAY 1 1 2020
Appealed from the 23rd Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Ascension
State of Louisiana
Case No. 115, 093
The Honorable Jason M. Verdigets, Judge Presiding
Christopher A. Mason Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
Nicole F. Gould Frey Duplessis Buick -GMC Truck, Inc.
Katherine M. Cook
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Yigal Bander Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Michael Chauncey
BEFORE: HIGGINBOTHAM, PENZATO, AND LANIER, JJ.
LANIER, J.
In the instant appeal, plaintiff, Duplessis Buick -GMC Truck, Inc.
Duplessis"), challenges the trial court' s July 19, 2019 judgment, sustaining
several peremptory exceptions filed by defendant, Michael Chauncey. For the
reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
According to the record, Mr. Chauncey was employed as the used car
manager at Duplessis until April 2014. Duplessis alleged that after Mr. Chauncey
left its employ, it realized " significantly higher profits in the used car division."
Thereafter, Duplessis asserted that it discovered that Mr. Chauncey had regularly
undersold Duplessis' s inventory to Gretna Used Car Outlet, LLC, and one of its
members, David Richard. Duplessis filed the instant suit in February 2016 against
Mr. Chauncey, alleging claims for breach of Mr. Chauncey' s fiduciary duty owed
to Duplessis, as well as fraud claims and claims under the Louisiana Unfair Trade
Practices Act (" LUTPA"), La. R.S. 51: 1401. 1
In response, Mr. Chauncey filed peremptory exceptions raising the
objections of prescription and no cause of action, asserting that Duplessis' s claims
set forth under general fraud and the LUTPA were prescribed. The trial court
sustained the exception raising the objection of no cause of action as to the fraud
claims, denying all other exceptions raised by Mr. Chauncey. In an unpublished
writ action, this court ultimately determined that Duplessis' s tort claims sounding
in negligence and fraud were prescribed. This court further found that Duplessis
did not allege sufficient facts to establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship
between Mr. Chauncey and Duplessis that would support the application of a ten -
Also named as defendants in this suit were Mr. Richard and Gretna Used Car Outlet, LLC. On
motion of Duplessis, the claims against Mr. Richard and Gretna Used Car Outlet, LLC were
subsequently dismissed, with prejudice, on July 25, 2019; they are not parties to the instant
appeal.
2
year prescriptive period. However, this court remanded the matter, allowing
Duplessis an opportunity to amend its petition. See Duplessis Buick -GMC
Truck, Inc. v. Chauncey, 2016- 0574 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 10/ 6/ 16) ( unpublished writ
action).
On August 13, 2018, Duplessis filed an amended petition, attempting to set
forth allegations to establish a fiduciary relationship. In response, Mr. Chauncey
filed peremptory exceptions raising the objections of prescription, no cause of
action, res judicata and/ or law of the case, and peremption. Therein, Mr. Chauncey
asserted that Duplessis failed to set forth specific facts to establish that he owed a
fiduciary duty. Following a hearing on Mr. Chauncey' s exceptions, the trial court
signed a judgment on July 19, 2019, which provides as follows:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the Exception of No Cause of Action and
Prescription related to breach of fiduciary duty filed by the Defendant,
Michael Chauncey, is hereby SUSTAINED and Duplessis Buick -
GMC Truck, Inc.' s claims against Mr. Chauncey for breach of
fiduciary duty are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the Exception of Prescription related to fraud filed by
the Defendant, Michael Chauncey, is hereby SUSTAINED and
Duplessis' s claims against Mr. Chauncey to fraud are hereby
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the Exception of No Cause of Action and/ or Res
Judicata related to relative nullity filed by the Defendant, Michael
Chauncey, is hereby SUSTAINED and Duplessis' s claims against Mr.
Chauncey for relative nullity are hereby DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the Exception of Peremption related to claims under
the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
LUTPA) filed by the Defendant, Michael Chauncey, is hereby
SUSTAINED and Duplessis' s claims against Mr. Chauncey under
LUTPA are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
This appeal by Duplessis followed. After the record was lodged in this
court, we issued a rule to show cause, ex proprio motu, noting that the judgment
3
appeared to be a partial judgment that was not designated by the trial court under
La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915( B). This court ordered the parties to show cause, by
briefs, why the appeal should not be dismissed and further remanded the matter for
the limited purposes of inviting the trial court to either designate the judgment if it
chose to do so or " advise this court in writing that the judgment at issue does not
warrant or need the La. C. C. P. art. 1915( B) designation." In response to this order,
we received correspondence from Judge Verdigets and a brief from Duplessis.
Judge Verdigets responded to this court' s order with the following letter:
Considering the Rule to Show Cause Order issued in the above
referenced case by the First Circuit Court of Appeal, this court is
advising that the judgment at issue does not warrant or need the La.
C. C. P. art. 1915( B) designation. Here, the court has issued a partial
judgment as to one or more, but less than all of the claims, demands,
issues, or theories against a party, and thus the judgment does not
constitute a final judgment unless designated as a final judgment by
the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay. Since the judgment at issue is only a partial judgment and the
judgment was not designated as a final judgment, a La. C. C. P. art.
1915( B) designation is unnecessary.
To the contrary, Duplessis argued in brief that the trial court' s July 19, 2019
judgment effectively dismisses the entirety of Duplessis' s suit with prejudice.
Specifically, Duplessis alleged that all of its claims were dismissed against Mr.
Chauncey by the judgment at issue, and the judgment " issued and written by the
trial court was intended to be a final, appealable judgment." Duplessis further
noted that it sought the trial court' s intervention to inform this court that all claims
were dismissed and that the judgment at issue is a final judgment, or alternatively
requested that the trial court amend its written judgment regarding same.
Duplessis asserted that it had done what is in its power to correct the judgment to
show on its face that the entirety of its claims were dismissed, adding that counsel
for Mr. Chauncey has consented and agreed that the judgment at issue is a final,
appealable judgment, and that same is apparent from the court record.
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DISCUSSION
As an appellate court, we have the duty to examine our subject matter
jurisdiction and to determine sua sponte whether such subject matter jurisdiction
exists, even when the issue is not raised by the litigants. Marrero v. I. Manheim
Auctions, Inc., 2019- 0365 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 19/ 19), So. 3d , 2019
WL 6167832, * 1; Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions v. Lathan
Company, Inc., 2017- 1250 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 20/ 18), 268 So. 3d 1044, 1046 ( en
banc). This court' s appellate jurisdiction only extends to " final judgments." Rose
v. Twin River Development, LLC, 2017- 0319 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 1/ 17), 233
So. 3d 679, 683; see also La. Code Civ. P. art. 2083( A).
A valid judgment must be precise, definite, and certain. Laird v. St.
Tammany Parish Safe Harbor, 2002- 0045 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 20/ 02), 836 So. 2d
364, 365. Moreover, a final appealable judgment must contain decretal language
and must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against
whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied. Matter of
Succession of Weber, 2018- 1337 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 29/ 19), 276 So. 3d 1021,
1026- 1027. These determinations should be evident from the language of the
judgment without reference to other documents in the record. Advanced Leveling
Concrete Solutions, 268 So. 3d at 1046. Thus, a judgment that does not contain
decretal language cannot be considered as a final judgment for the purpose of an
immediate appeal, and this court lacks jurisdiction to review such a judgment. See
Johnson v. Mount Pilgrim Baptist Church, 2005- 0337 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 24/ 06),
934 So. 2d 66, 67.
In the instant case, while the parties maintain that the July 19, 2019
judgment dismissed all the claims that Duplessis asserted against Mr. Chauncey,
the judgment contains no such decretal language. To determine same would
require consideration of other documents in the record outside of the judgment
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itself Moreover, in its October 16, 2019 correspondence to this court, the trial
court indicates that the judgment at issue is a partial judgment. In the event that
the judgment is partial, it is not a final appealable judgment absent a designation by
the trial court, which the trial court has not done. See La. Code Civ. P. art.
2
1915( B)( 1). Considering the foregoing, we dismiss the instant appeal. See
Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions, 268 So. 3d at 1046- 1047 ("[ I] n the
absence of a valid final judgment, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and
the appeal should be dismissed.") Once a valid final judgment is signed, any party
can thereafter appeal.
DECREE
For the above and foregoing reasons, we dismiss Duplessis' s appeal of the
trial court's July 19, 2019 judgment. We decline to assess costs pending the
rendition of a final judgment.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
2 Here, we recognize that we have discretionary authority to convert an appeal from an
interlocutory judgment to an application for supervisory writ. Matter of Succession of Porche,
2016- 0538 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 17/ 17), 213 So. 3d 401, 406 n.2. However, the appellate courts of
this state ordinarily convert an appeal to an application for supervisory writ only if the motion for
appeal is filed within the thirty -day time period allowed for the filing of an application for
supervisory writ under Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 4- 3. See e. g., KAS Properties,
LLC v. Louisiana Bd. of Supervisor for Louisiana State University, 2014- 0566 ( La. App. 1
Cir. 4/ 21/ 15), 167 So. 3d 1007, 1010; Wadick v. General Heating & Air Conditioning, LLC,
2014- 0187 ( La. App. 4 Cir. 7/ 23/ 14), 145 So. 3d 586, 593, writ denied, 2014- 1913 ( La.
11/ 21/ 14), 160 So. 3d 972. In the instant case, Duplessis did not file its motion for devolutive
appeal until August 29, 2019, after the expiration of the thirty -day period for filing an application
for supervisory writ; accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretionary authority to convert
this appeal to an application for supervisory writ.
N.