State of Louisiana in the Interest of C.J. ( 2020 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
i
FIRST CIRCUIT
NO. 2019 CJ 1383
STATE OF LOUISIANA
IN THE INTEREST OF C.J.
Judgment Rendered.-
endered:
FEB 2 12020
AppealedAppealed from
The Juvenile Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
Case No. JU12303
The Honorable Adam J. Haney, Judge Presiding
Hillar C. Moore, III Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Laura " Lucy" Locker-Melancon Counsel for Appellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Department of Children and
Family Services
Lakita Miller Leonard Counsel for Appellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana C.J., Child
Rebecca E. May -Ricks Counsel for Appellant
Caitlin M.A. Chugg J.J., Mother
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
BEFORE: HIGGINBOTHAM, PENZATO, AND LANIER, JJ.
LANIER, J.
Appellant, J. J., seeks review of the trial court's judgment terminating her
parental rights as to her minor child, C. J. J. J. argues on appeal that the State of
Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services (" State") failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that there were grounds for termination and that
termination was in the child' s best interest. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
According to the record, J. J., who was 14 years old at the time, and her 6 -
month old son, C. J., originally entered the State's custody in August 2016 based
upon the State' s concerns with J. J.' s " diminished cognitive, emotional and behavior
protective capacities." J.J. and C. J. were continued in State custody, both being
adjudicated children in need of care. The State subsequently filed a petition for
termination of parental rights and certification for adoption on December 6, 2018,
seeking to terminate the rights of J.J. and the rights of the unknown father of C.J.
and to certify C. J. as free and eligible for adoption.
The State sought termination based on La. Ch. Code art. 1015( 5) and ( 6),
noting, in part, as follows:
5.
As to the mother, [ J.J.], it is respectfully submitted that her
parental rights be terminated under:
La. Ch. C. Art. 1015( 5), and in support thereof alleges the
following to wit:'
a) [ J. J.] has failed to provide her child with the basic
necessities of life, including but not limited to, a stable home.
b) [ J. J.] has failed to make significant contributions to the
child's care and support for at least six consecutive months.
La. Ch. C. Art. 1015( 6), and in support thereof alleges the
following to wit:
The Department of Children and Family Services developed
case plans in an attempt to provide services to the mother. [ J.J.] has
At the conclusion of the termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court dismissed the
allegations pursuant to Article 1015( 5) as grounds for termination.
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failed to substantially comply with the case plans sufficient to further
the goal of reunification. In addition to ongoing disruptive behaviors
and disrupted placements, there is no reasonable expectation of
significant improvement in the parents' condition or conduct in the
near future considering the child's age and need for a safe, stable, and
permanent home.
The matter proceeded to a hearing, at which time the trial court heard
testimony from various witnesses, including J. J. After considering the testimony
and evidence in the record, the trial court found that J.J. had failed to substantially
comply with the case plans put forth by the State and that there was no reasonable
expectation of significant improvement in the near future. Thus, the trial court
concluded that it was in the child' s best interest to terminate J. J.' s parental rights
pursuant to Article 1015( 6), to terminate the parental rights of any unknown fathers
of C. J., and to certify C. J. free and available for adoption. The trial court signed a
judgment on August 30, 2019, in accordance with these findings. This appeal by
J. J. followed.
On appeal, J. J. argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental
rights because the State failed to meet its burden of proof by establishing grounds
for termination by clear and convincing evidence and because there was no
evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child. J. J. argues that the
evidence and testimony in this case demonstrates the State failed to provide her
with ample assistance to remedy the barriers to reunification and that, absent
affirmative efforts of the State, termination is not possible under Article 1015( 6)."
J. J. further asserts that she is " well on her way to establishing the type of bond
C. J.] needs for reunification, and putting in the hard work" necessary.
A court of appeal may not overturn a judgment of a trial court absent an
error of law or a factual finding that is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.
Stobart v. State, Through Department of Transportation and Development,
617 So. 2d 880, 882 ( La. 1993); State, In Interest of GA, 94- 2227 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
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7/ 27/ 95), 664 So. 2d 106, 110. An appellate court reviews a trial court's findings as
to whether parental rights should be terminated according to the manifest error
standard. State ex rel. K.G., 2002- 2886 ( La. 3/ 18/ 03), 841 So. 2d 759, 762. The
Louisiana Supreme Court has expressed the unique concerns present in all cases of
involuntary termination of parental rights as follows:
In any case to involuntarily terminate parental rights, there are
two private interests involved: those of the parents and those of the
child. The parents have a natural, fundamental liberty interest to the
continuing companionship, care, custody and management of their
children warranting great deference and vigilant protection under the
law, and due process requires that a fundamentally fair procedure be
followed when the state seeks to terminate the parent- child legal
relationship. However, the child has a profound interest, often at odds
with those of his parents, in terminating parental rights that prevent
adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, and
continuous relationships found in a home with proper parental care.
In balancing these interests, the courts of this state have consistently
found the interest of the child to be paramount over that of the parent.
The State' s parens patriae power allows intervention in the
parent- child relationship only under serious circumstances, such as
where the State seeks the permanent severance of that relationship in
an involuntary termination proceeding. The fundamental purpose of
involuntary termination proceedings is to provide the greatest possible
protection to a child whose parents are unwilling or unable to provide
adequate care for his physical, emotional, and mental health needs and
adequate rearing by providing an expeditious judicial process for the
termination of all parental rights and responsibilities and to achieve
permanency and stability for the child. The focus of an involuntary
termination proceeding is not whether the parent should be deprived
of custody, but whether it would be in the best interest of the child for
all legal relations with the parents to be terminated. As such, the
primary concern of the courts and the State remains to secure the best
interest for the child, including termination of parental rights if
justifiable grounds exist and are proven. Nonetheless, courts must
proceed with care and caution as the permanent termination of the
legal relationship existing between natural parents and the child is one
of the most drastic actions the State can take against its citizens. The
potential loss to the parent is grievous, perhaps more so than the loss
of personal freedom caused by incarceration.
Title X of the Children's Code involuntary
governs the
termination of parental rights. [ Article]
1015 provides the statutory
grounds by which a court may involuntarily terminate the rights and
privileges of parents. The State need establish only one ground ... but
the judge must also find that the termination is in the best interest of
the child. Additionally, the State must prove the elements of one of
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the enumerated grounds by clear and convincing evidence to sever the
parental bond.
State ex rel. J.A., 99- 2905 ( La. 1/ 12/ 00), 752 So. 2d 806, 810- 811 ( citations
omitted).
A well- settled principle is that the " fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate
simply because they have not been model parents." State ex rel. SNW v.
Mitchell, 2001- 2128 ( La. 11/ 28/ 01), 800 So. 2d 809, 814 ( quoting Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 13885 1394- 1395, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606
1982)). A corollary principle is that in an involuntarily termination of parental
rights proceeding, a court must delicately balance the natural parent' s fundamental
right and the child's right to a permanent home. Mitchell, 800 So. 2d at 814- 815.
In terminating J. J.' s parental rights in the instant case, the trial court offered
extensive reasons for judgment. The trial court acknowledged that this is " an
extremely difficult and heartbreaking case," as both J. J. and C. J. are children who
have been in the State' s care for three years and who are " victims of their
unfortunate circumstances."
The trial court noted that the State made reasonable efforts to place J. J. and
C. J. together and that these placements continued until August 2017, when the
State received a validated complaint of abuse involving J. J. slapping C. J. in the
face. The trial court further stated, "[ t] he two were [ then] placed in separate
placements, and on September 28, 2017, CJ was placed with the foster family that
he is still with. That placement was made at the suggestion of JJ, who felt that
these foster parents were the best available caretakers for CJ." After reviewing
several aspects of J. J.' s case plan and her non- compliance with same, the trial court
made the following conclusions:
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This Court has no doubt that JJ loves and cares for CJ. It is
apparent in all of the Court's interactions with JJ and observations of
mother and child. This case, however, is not about how much JJ loves
CJ. This case is about whether CJ carried his burden in this casePI
The Court finds that he has. The court does not have a reasonable
expectation of significant improvement in the near future. This is not
a conclusion that the Court comes to lightly, but it is the proper
conclusion under the Children' s Code.
The law also requires the Court to determine whether this
termination is in the best interest of the child, regardless of what may
have been proven. In this case, CJ has been in a stable foster home
for over two years. It is a home that was specifically chosen by JJ
because she felt like this was the best place for CJ. Given the amount
of time that he has been in foster care, the likelihood that JJ will be
able to resume custody in the near future, and the apparently [ sic]
quality of his present placement, the Court also finds that it is in his
best interest that the termination be granted.
For the above reasons, the Court does terminate the parental
rights of JJ, as well as any known [ or] unknown fathers of CJ, and
does hereby certify CJ to be free and available for permanent adoption
into an appropriate home.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this matter and the history
leading up to the State' s petition for termination of J. J.' s parental rights. The record
clearly and convincingly demonstrates that it was in the best interest of C. J. that
J. J.' s parental rights be terminated and that C. J. be cleared for adoption. The trial
court's conclusion is supported by the evidence and, therefore, not manifestly
erroneous.
2 At the outset, we acknowledge that as an appellate court, we review judgments and not reasons
for judgment. Walton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 2018- 1510
La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 31/ 19), 277 So. 3d 1193, 1199. Indeed, judgments are often upheld on appeal
for reasons different than those assigned by a trial court. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 2009- 0571
La. 4/ 1/ 11), 61 So. 3d 507, 572. Nonetheless, we note that the trial court' s reasons for judgment
refer to the burden in this case as being the child's burden. Rather, as set forth in La. Ch. C. art.
1035, when seeking to involuntarily terminate parental rights, the State has the burden of proving
one of the statutory grounds for termination set forth in La. Ch. C. art. 1015 by clear and
convincing evidence. State in Interest of A.L.D., 2018- 1271 ( La. 1/ 30/ 19), 263 So. 3d 860, 863;
La. Ch. C. art. 1035( A).
For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed. All costs associated with this appeal are assessed against appellant, J. J.
We issue this memorandum opinion in accordance with Uniform Rules—Courts of
Appeal, Rule 2- 16. 1( B).
AFFIRMED.