In Re Interdiction of Angela Ann Amoroso ( 2020 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2019 CA 0987
IN RE: INTERDICTION OF ANGELA ANN AMOROSO
Judgment Rendered: FEB 2 17"70
On Appeal from the
19th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 105, 395
Honorable Janice Clark, Judge Presiding
Mark D. Boyer Attorneys for Plaintiff A
- ppellant,
Blake F. Harris Marian M. Wethey
Denham Springs, LA
Elzie Alford, Jr. Court -Appointed Counsel for
Baton Rouge, LA Angela Ann Amoroso
Bobby R. Lormand, Jr. Attorney for Intervenor -Appellee,
Adam W. Taylor Ronald W. Amoroso, Sr.
Baton Rouge, LA
BEFORE: HIGGINBOTHAM, PENZATO, AND LANIER, JJ.
HIGGINBOTHAM, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the full interdiction of Angela
Ann Amoroso. The judgment also appointed the interdict' s mother as curator and
the interdict' s father as undercurator. Additionally, though not requested in any
pleading, the judgment named the father' s counsel of record and the interdict' s
court-appointed counsel as co -counsel to further represent the interdict in litigation
regarding alleged injuries the interdict sustained as a result of medical malpractice.
BACKGROUND
On October 18, 2018, Marian M. Wethey filed a petition for full interdiction
of her 53 -year old adult daughter, Angela, who was mentally and physically unable
to make reasoned decisions regarding the care of her person or property. Angela' s
condition was caused by Cornelia de Lange syndrome, a form of mental retardation
with which she suffered since birth, and a medical emergency that occurred in
August 2018, resulting in a need for an increased level of care due to decreased
cognitive abilities. Angela' s mother requested that she be appointed curator and that
Angela' s adult brother, Ronald W. Amoroso, Jr., be appointed undercurator.
On December 7, 2018, Angela' s father, Ronald W. Amoroso, Sr., filed a
petition for intervention in the interdiction proceedings. Angela' s father requested
that the petition for full interdiction be dismissed or, in the alternative, that he be
appointed as curator or undercurator. An attorney was appointed to represent
Angela' s interests. After visiting with Angela and reviewing her medical records,
Angela' s attorney ultimately recommended at the interdiction hearing that Angela
be fully interdicted and that her parents be named as co -curators or that the father be
named as the undercurator.
At the start of the interdiction hearing on April 22, 2019, the father rescinded
his opposition to the full interdiction of his daughter. He also suggested to the trial
court that he was no longer opposed to Angela' s mother being appointed curator, but
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that he still desired to be appointed undercurator. The mother indicated that it was
in Angela' s best interest for Angela' s brother to be appointed undercurator. Finding
no reason to disqualify either parent, the trial court appointed the mother as curator
and the father as undercurator. Immediately after that ruling, the father' s attorney
requested that the trial court consider an additional matter of appointing his law firm
to continue its representation of Angela in a pending medical malpractice action.
The mother opposed the request since she had been appointed curator and had the
right to pursue lawsuits on behalf of Angela. Without any further discussion or
considering any evidence, the trial court ruled that the father' s attorney would be
allowed to continue representing Angela in the medical malpractice action. Further,
without any request by any party, the trial court appointed Angela' s court-appointed
attorney as co -counsel in the malpractice action. On April 30, 2019, the trial court
signed a judgment of full interdiction of Angela. In the judgment, the trial court
included the appointment of counsel to represent Angela in her medical malpractice
litigation.
Less than one month later, on May 21, 2019, Angela died. Nevertheless, the
mother filed a motion for appeal on May 31, 2019, contending that the trial court
legally erred in appointing attorneys to pursue a medical malpractice claim on behalf
of the interdict when the issue was not properly before the trial court. The mother
also argues that only the curator has the authority to bring lawsuits on behalf of the
interdict. The fact of Angela' s death is not contained in the appellate record per se;
rather, it is separately admitted in both parents' appellate briefs. Given the death of
Angela, the father argues that any issues regarding the interdiction judgment are now
moot since the interdiction and curatorship terminated on Angela' s death. The
mother counters that while the interdiction issues may be moot since Angela died,
the appointment of counsel to represent Angela' s interests in any pending medical
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malpractice action is null because that issue exceeded the scope of available relief
in the interdiction proceeding.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Initially, we observe that due to the parties' undisputed admissions that
Angela is deceased, the judgment of interdiction on appeal is at least partially moot.
Interdiction terminates upon the death of the interdict. La. Civ. Code art. 397. The
interdiction of Angela cannot now serve a useful purpose or give any practical effect.
See In re Interdiction of Shubert, 2017- 1738 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 24/ 18), 258
So. 3d 808, 810. Therefore, the only remaining issue is whether the portion of the
judgment that appoints counsel to represent Angela' s interests in the pending
medical malpractice action has any legal effect.
We are well aware, as the father aptly points out in his appellate brief, that
appellate courts do not decide abstract or hypothetical controversies or render
advisory opinions about controversies. See Joseph v. Ratcliff, 2010- 1342 ( La. App.
1st Cir. 3/ 25/ 11), 63 So. 3d 220, 225. Angela' s death mooted any attack on the
interdiction proceeding solely for the purpose of invalidating the interdiction itself.
See Interdiction of Stephens, 488 So. 2d 426, 427 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
However, the appointment of counsel for a medical malpractice claim is a
completely separate issue. Cases submitted for adjudication must be justiciable, ripe
for decision, and not brought prematurely. In re C.C., 2015- 0140 ( La. App. 1 st Cir.
12/ 23/ 15), 2015 WL 9435190, * 2 ( unpublished), writs denied, 2015- 2251 ( La.
12/ 23/ 15), 184 So. 3d 687 and 2016- 0197 ( La. 3/ 4/ 16), 188 So. 3d 1055, writ not
considered, 2016- 1304 ( La. 7/ 12/ 16), 194 So. 3d 1130. A "justiciable controversy"
is one presenting an existing actual and substantial dispute involving the legal
relations of parties who have real adverse interests and upon whom the judgment
may effectively operate through a decree of conclusive character. Thus, a
justiciable controversy" is distinguished from one that is hypothetical or abstract,
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academic, or moot. City of Hammond v. Parish of Tangipahoa, 2007- 0574 ( La.
App. 1st Cir. 3/ 26/ 08), 985 So. 2d 171, 178.
We find that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it entered a judgment
appointing counsel to represent Angela in a separate medical malpractice action.
The trial court may only grant relief warranted by the arguments contained in the
pleadings and the evidence. See Smith v. Franklin, 2010- 2055 ( La. App. 1 st Cir.
5/ 6/ 11), 2011 WL 2023478, * 2 ( unpublished). Furthermore, due process requires
adequate notice to the parties of the matters that will be adjudicated. Glover v.
Medical Center of Baton Rouge, 97- 1710 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 29/ 98), 713 So. 2d
1261, 1262. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised
by the pleading. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1154. A timely objection to an attempt to
enlarge the pleadings, coupled with the failure to move for an amendment to the
pleadings, is fatal to an issue not raised by the pleadings. Smith, 2011- 2023478 at
2.
During the hearing, the mother objected to the appointment of the father' s
counsel to represent Angela' s interests in a separately pending medical malpractice
proceeding. That particular issue does not appear in any pleading and was raised for
the first time at the end of the interdiction hearing. The record actually lacks
evidence of anything concerning the pending medical malpractice action. The trial
court appointed counsel over the mother' s objection. By doing so, the trial court' s
judgment impermissibly went beyond the pleadings and was without proper notice
to the mother. A judgment beyond the pleadings is a nullity. Domingue v. Bodin,
2008- 62 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 11/ 5/ 08), 996 So. 2d 654, 657.
CONCLUSION
For the outlined reasons, we find that the trial court exceeded its authority by
considering issues beyond the pleadings. We also find that the trial court violated
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Marian M. Wethey' s right to due process of law by not giving her reasonable notice
of the intervenor' s request to have his counsel appointed to represent the interests of
Angela Ann Amoroso in a separately pending medical malpractice action.
Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the trial court' s April 30, 2019 judgment that
appoints counsel to represent Angela Ann Amoroso' s medical malpractice claim.'
Additionally, we conclude that the remainder of the appeal of the trial court' s April
30, 2019 judgment of full interdiction is moot due to the death of the interdict. All
costs of this appeal are assessed to intervenor, Ronald W. Amoroso, Sr.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL CONTAINED IN APRIL 30, 2019
JUDGMENT VACATED; REMAINDER OF APPEAL DISMISSED AS
MOOT.
1 Moreover, we note that when a decedent leaves no surviving spouse or child, the decedent' s
surviving father and mother are the proper persons to bring any wrongful death and survival action.
Those actions must be brought within one year of the decedent' s death. See La. Civ. Code arts.
2315. 1 and 2315. 2. Each parent may seek the assistance of whatever legal counsel desired if they
choose to bring any such action.
G