State of Louisiana Versus Billy Lampton ( 2024 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-K-444
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
BILLY LAMPTON COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
October 22, 2024
Linda Wiseman
First Deputy Clerk
IN RE BILLY LAMPTON
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE JUNE B.
DARENSBURG, DIVISION "C", NUMBER 23-2560
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Fredericka Homberg Wicker, and Timothy S. Marcel
WRIT DENIED
Relator, Billy Lampton, seeks review of the district court’s August 23, 2024
ruling denying his motion to suppress evidence and identification. For the
following reasons, we deny Lampton’s writ application.
Procedural History
On June 1, 2023, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of
information charging Billy Lampton with one count of possession with intent to
distribute fentanyl, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A) (count one), and one count of
possession with intent to distribute marijuana weighing 2.5 pounds or greater, a
violation of La. R.S. 40:966(A) (count two), with both counts alleged to have
occurred on September 2, 2022. Lampton pled not guilty.
24-K-444
Lampton filed a motion to suppress evidence and identification. A hearing
on that motion was held on August 7, 2024.1 At the close of the hearing, the
district court took the matter under advisement after granting defense counsel’s
request to file a post-hearing memorandum. After defense counsel’s post-hearing
filing, additional arguments were heard on August 23, 2024, after which the district
court denied Lampton’s motion to suppress.2 This writ application seeking review
of the trial court’s ruling followed. The district court granted defense counsel’s
motion to stay the matter pending this Court’s ruling.
Factual Background
At the August 7, 2024 suppression hearing, Sergeant David Biondolillo
stated that he is a sergeant with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”)
Narcotics Division and has worked as a task force officer with the Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) – Height Task Force along with other
detectives, including Detectives Christopher Cade and Christopher Powe.
Biondolillo explained that beginning in 2021 or 2022, the task force investigated
high intensity drug trafficking using long-term wiretap investigations of criminal
organizations. During the wiretap investigations, the task force received
information from a confidential informant (“CI”), regarding Lampton dealing
heroin and fentanyl. This information was later corroborated by surveillance of
Lampton’s activities.3 The CI informed law enforcement that he knew Lampton
1
It does not appear from the record that Lampton ever filed a written motion to suppress.
2
The district court also denied Lampton’s motion for impeaching information regarding the
“cooperative defendant” or “confidential informant” in this case.
3
According to Biondolillo, the task force researched the information provided by the CI, and
through surveillance, identified Lampton’s vehicles and his residence on “Grandlake,” and observed
Lampton engaging in activities consistent with hand-to-hand transactions. Biondolillo explained that
Lampton was not arrested at that time because the transactions observed occurred in Orleans Parish, not
Jefferson Parish.
2
and identified Lampton as the dealer in a photograph. That photograph was
presented to the CI, individually, not in a six-pack lineup.4
Biondolillo testified that the task force conducted surveillance of Lampton at
his apartment on September 2, 2022. On that day, officers observed IV Waste
empty nearby trash dumpsters. Shortly thereafter, they saw Lampton exit his
apartment with a garbage bag, discard it in the dumpster, and then re-enter his
apartment. According to Biondolillo, who had observed the dumpster both before
and after it was emptied, Lampton’s garbage bag was the only item in the
dumpster. Officers then retrieved the discarded bag, which contained “three empty
packages [kilo wrappers] immediately identified as packaging used for kilograms.”
Biondolillo testified that upon opening the trash bag, officers recognized a pungent
“pickle like vinegary smell” “consistent with the odor of heroin/fentanyl.”5
Based on these findings, Biondolillo requested a search warrant for
Lampton’s residence. He confirmed the search warrant application was true to the
best of his knowledge. In his testimony, Biondolillo explained the warrant
application referenced “federal wiretaps” related to an ongoing federal
investigation into a New Orleans organization, but there were no wiretaps
pertaining to the instant case. Biondolillo further explained that the wiretaps
involved fentanyl transactions and that Lampton may have been a third party to the
transactions. However, Lampton never spoke in the wiretaps nor was his name
mentioned in the recordings.
According to Biondolillo, the officers waited outside Lampton’s apartment
for approval of the for the search warrant. While waiting, they observed Lampton
4
The CI was subject to criminal prosecution at the time he gave the information to the task force.
In briefing, and at the hearing, the CI was interchangeably referred to as the “confidential informant”
and/or “cooperating defendant (“CD”).” In the search warrant affidavit, the CI was referred to as a “CD.”
5
According to Biondolillo, he has worked in narcotics investigations since 2008 and is familiar
with the odor of marijuana, cocaine, fentanyl, and heroin.
3
exit his apartment and the officers stopped him in the parking lot so as to detain
him pending execution of the warrant. Lampton was handcuffed and patted down.
Biondolillo testified that he read Lampton his Miranda6 rights, during which
Lampton was cooperative and provided officers with a key to his residence. The
officers then secured Lampton’s residence for the officer’s safety to ensure no one
else was inside and to prevent the potential destruction of evidence. At Lampton’s
request, the officers relocated inside his apartment. Biondolillo stated that once he
received the signed search warrant, he executed it. The search of Lampton’s
residence yielded approximately 181 grams of what was believed to be fentanyl in
a box and a scale in the kitchen cabinet, where Lampton stated it would be located.
Additionally, the search yielded a quantity of marijuana in a cardboard box found
in the bedroom. The task force also discovered paperwork containing information
indicating another residence connected to Lampton. Lampton gave his consent for
the officers to search that residence, but nothing of evidentiary value was found
therein. Lampton was placed under arrest.
Post-Hearing Memorandum
In his post-hearing memorandum, Lampton claimed the State, through
Biondolillo, informed the district court that there was “not a single federal wiretap,
little less multiple federal wiretaps” in the task force’s investigation, and that the
officers had supplied false information to the court. Lampton alleged that there
were no calls in which he was recorded, his name was not mentioned in any federal
wiretap, and he made no transactions with the CI. Consequently, Lampton averred
that Biondolillo’s statement in the search warrant affidavit that information about
him was corroborated by “multiple federal wiretaps” was a false statement made
6
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
4
with the intent of misleading the court. Lampton argued there was no probable
cause that an identified controlled dangerous substance was located in his house.
Lampton further argued that the identification of the CI referred to in the
search warrant affidavit was unreliable because he was shown only a single
confirmation photograph.7 Lampton claimed the State refused to provide any
information regarding the CI’s background, or whether the CI was known by any
of the investigating officers. Lampton also argued that the crime lab report
admitted during the motion hearing established there was no scientific proof that
there was a detectable amount of any drugs found on the kilo wrappers discovered
in the trash bag he discarded in the dumpster.
According to Lampton, discovery of the kilo wrappers, which Biondolillo
claimed smelled like “heroin/fentanyl,”8 the scant information given about the CI,
and the single photo identification procedure, were insufficient to provide probable
cause for the issuance of the search warrant. As such, Lampton argues the district
court erred in failing to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to that warrant and
to suppress the identification by the CI.
The State countered that the information on Lampton was developed through
the wiretaps involved in the long-term wiretap investigations of criminal
organizations and through the CI. The State further argued that the information
was then corroborated by the surveillance and actions testified to by Biondolillo at
the hearing. The State explained that the reason for the single photo identification
was that the CI had already named Lampton and indicated that he/she knew him.
The trial court denied the motions to suppress evidence and identification.
7
Defense counsel had previously filed a motion to produce impeaching information regarding the
confidential informant, the hearing on which the trial court consolidated with the suppression hearing.
8
Attached to relator’s post-hearing memorandum was a “monograph” from the Center for Disease
Control providing facts about fentanyl, including that fentanyl has no smell.
5
Discussion
In his writ application, Lampton avers the district court erred in denying the
motions to suppress evidence and identification, and in denying his motion to
disclose the “impeaching information” relative to the CI. For the following
reasons, we disagree.
Motion to Suppress Identification
Lampton argues the district court should have suppressed the single photo
identification because it was suggestive and unreliable because the CI never made
any purchases from him, and the State never established exactly how the CI
purportedly knew him. Lampton claims that Biondolillo did not testify the CI ever
met him or that the CI gave a description of him. The State responded that it “in
no way whatsoever seeks admissibility at trial of the ‘identification’ of Lampton by
the confidential informant.” It contends that a motion to suppress relates solely to
information to be admitted at trial, not a step taken by police with a CI during an
investigation, and as such, there is nothing to suppress.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 703 provides that a defendant
adversely affected may move to suppress any evidence from use at trial on the
merits on the ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained. First, even if the
identification was suggestive as Lampton contends, and while single photograph
identifications are often viewed with suspicion by the courts, given the totality of
the circumstances, we find, as did the district court, there was no substantial
likelihood of misidentification in this case. Biondolillo testified that the
photograph was shown to the CI only after the CI indicated that he or she knew
Lampton, and that Lampton distributed heroin and fentanyl. See State v. Winding,
00-364 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/11/01), 787 So.2d 385, 390, writ denied, 01-1445 (La.
4/19/02), 813 So.2d 417; State v. Salone, 648 So.2d 494, 495.
6
Second, in its opposition to Lampton’s writ application, the State avers that
it does not intend to introduce the CI’s identification of Lampton at trial.
Consequently, we agree that there is nothing for district court to suppress. The
district court did not err in denying Lampton’s motion to suppress identification.
See State v. Wilson, 432 So.2d 347, 348 (La. App. 1 Cir. App. 1983).9
Motion to Suppress Evidence
Lampton argues Biondolillo’s search warrant intentionally contained
information that he knew was erroneous, vague, and misleading in order to
overcome the “obvious lack of probable cause.” Specifically, Lampton argues that
because there were no wiretaps in this case, nor “firm corroboration” that he lived
at the location under surveillance—either from the CI or an independent
investigation—the warrant must be retested without the offending language.
Lampton also questions the CI’s credibility and points out that, while the CI
identified him through a “single suggestive” photographic identification, no
testimony was provided at the hearing that the CI ever purchased narcotics from
him or that the CI had ever been to his residence. Lampton argues that the portion
of the search warrant relative to the task force’s surveillance of his apartment on
Grandlake should be stricken because it was not corroborated and conclusory
statements are insufficient to establish probable cause. According to Lampton, the
CI provided nothing from which an officer would reasonably determine that the CI
had inside information or special familiarity with his affairs.
Further, Lampton argues that because fentanyl is odorless, Biondolillo’s
statement in the search warrant affidavit that the officers smelled a pungent odor
9
In Wilson, shortly after the defendant’s arrest, the police questioned him and recorded inculpatory
statements. The defendant moved to suppress the statements and, after a hearing, the motion was denied.
On appeal, the defendant assigned as error the denial of his motion to suppress. The First Circuit pointed
out that at the trial, the State did not introduce the statements into evidence, and no reference to them was
made in the State’s opening argument. Consequently, the court held that the defendant was not
prejudiced by the denial of his motion, and the issue became moot when the State did not introduce the
evidence. The court found the assignment of error lacked merit. Wilson, 432 So.2d at 348 (citing State v.
Smith, 339 So.2d 829 (La. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 1685, 52 L.Ed.2d 381 (1977)).
7
consistent with “heroin/fentanyl” was a fabrication. He claims that once the
“offending language” is removed from the warrant, all that is left is a story by the
police without cause or reason.
In response, the State argues the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion to suppress evidence because a review of the four corners of
the search warrant shows that probable cause was clearly established, and that
Lampton’s arguments that the search warrant affidavit contains material
misrepresentations are meritless. Moreover, the State contends that even if the
search warrant was based on insufficient probable cause, suppression is not
appropriate because the officers executed the warrant in good faith.
When evidence is seized pursuant to a search warrant, the defendant bears
the burden of proof at a hearing on his motion to suppress that evidence. See La.
C.Cr.P. art. 703(D); State v. Johnson, 08-265 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/19/08), 994 So.2d
595, 599. The trial court is afforded great discretion when ruling on a motion to
suppress, and its ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v.
Simmons, 22-232 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/6/22), 346 So.3d 349, 354.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 5
of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. State v.
Thomas, 08-390 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/27/09), 8 So.3d 80, 83, writ denied, 09-626 (La.
11/25/09), 22 So.3d 170. If evidence is derived from an unreasonable search or
seizure, the proper remedy is exclusion of the evidence from trial. Id. A search
warrant may issue only upon probable cause established to the satisfaction of a
magistrate, by the affidavit of a credible person, particularly describing the person
or place to be searched and the things to be seized. La. C.Cr.P. art. 162; State v.
Lee, 05-2098 (La. 1/16/08), 976 So.2d 109, 122, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 824, 129
S.Ct. 143, 172 L.Ed.2d 39 (2008). Probable cause sufficient to issue a search
warrant “exists when the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge
8
and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to support a
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that evidence or
contraband may be found at the place to be searched.” Id.Although certainty of knowledge of the commission of a particular crime is
frequently an important factor in the determination of probable cause, probable
cause may exist when the commission of a crime has not been definitely
established, but is reasonably probable under the totality of the circumstances.
State v. Green, 02-1022 (La. 12/4/02), 831 So.2d 962, 969. This determination of
probable cause, although requiring something more than bare suspicion, does not
require evidence to support a conviction. Id. Rather, as the name implies, probable
cause deals with probabilities. As a result, the determination of probable cause,
unlike the determination of guilt at trial, does not require the fine resolution of
conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt, or even a preponderance standard,
demands. Id. at 969-70.
“The process [of determining probable cause] simply requires that enough
information be presented to the issuing magistrate to enable him to determine that
the charges are not capricious and are sufficiently supported to justify bringing into
play the further steps of the criminal justice system.” State v. Mitchell, 15-524 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 12/9/15), 182 So.3d 365, 375. The affidavit must contain, within its
four corners, sufficient facts to establish the existence of probable cause for the
warrant. Id.For a reviewing court, the task is simply to insure that, under the totality of
the circumstances, the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding probable
cause existed. Lee, supra. Thus, “[t]he magistrate’s determination of probable
cause, prior to the issuance of a search warrant, is entitled to significant deference
by the reviewing court and marginal cases should be resolved in favor of finding
the magistrate’s assessment to be reasonable.” Green, 831 So.2d at 969 (quoting
9
State v. Rodrigue, 437 So.2d 830, 833 (La. 1983)). Moreover, if the magistrate
finds the affidavit sufficiently detailed and reliable to show probable cause,
reviewing courts should interpret the affidavit in a realistic and common-sense
fashion, aware that it is normally prepared by non-lawyer police officers in the
midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Id. Within these guidelines, courts
should strive to uphold warrants to encourage their use by police officers. State v.
Every, 19-40 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/23/19), 274 So.3d 770, 781, writ denied, 19-1048
(La. 10/1/19), 280 So.3d 159.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has held that evidence seized
pursuant to a warrant based on less than probable cause need not be suppressed if
the officers who executed the warrant believed it to be validly issued. State v.
Long, 03-2592 (La. 9/9/04), 884 So.2d 1176, 1180, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 977, 125
S.Ct. 1860, 161 L.Ed.2d 728 (2005) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)). In Leon, the Supreme Court reasoned that
the good faith of an officer in the execution of a warrant signed by a neutral
magistrate should be enough for the evidence obtained as a result of the search to
be admissible. Id. The Leon Court expressed a strong preference for warrants over
warrantless searches by allowing evidence seized in constitutionally questionable
searches to be admissible into evidence if the officers were relying on a validly
issued warrant. Id. Additionally, the Court enumerated four exceptions where
suppression is an appropriate remedy for a search conducted pursuant to a warrant:
(1) the affiant misled the magistrate by including in the affidavit misleading
statements which the affiant knew were false, or would know were false but for a
reckless disregard for the truth; (2) the magistrate abandoned his neutral and
detached role; (3) the affiant was so lacking of indicia of probable cause as to
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) the warrant was
10
deficient and could not be presumed valid. Long, 884 So.2d at 1181 (citing Leon,
468 U.S. 914-915, 104 S.Ct. at 3416).
An affidavit supporting a search warrant is presumed to be valid, and the
defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
affidavit contains representations that are false. See State v. Brown, 18-1999 (La.
9/30/21), 330 So.3d 199, 252-53, cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 142 S.Ct. 1702, 212
L.Ed.2d 596 (2022). Once the defendant has shown that the affidavit contains
false statements, the burden shifts to the State to prove the veracity of the
allegations in the affidavit. Id. If it is determined that the affidavit contains
misrepresentations, the court must decide whether they were intentional. Id. For an
affidavit to make a material and intentional misrepresentation to a magistrate
constitutes a fraud upon the court and will result in the invalidation of the warrant
and suppression of the items seized. State v. Byrd, 568 So.2d 554, 559 (La. 1990).
However, if the misrepresentations or omissions were inadvertent, negligent, or
were included without an intent to deceive, the correct procedure is for the warrant
to be retested for probable cause after supplying that which was omitted or striking
that which was misrepresented. State v. Casey, 99-23 (La. 1/26/00), 775 So.2d
1022, 1029, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104, 148 L.Ed.2d 62 (2000).
Here, the affidavit of the search warrant provides, in pertinent part:
THE REASONS AND FACTS FOR THIS REQUEST
OF THIS SEARCH WARRANT ARE:
In June/July 2022, Detective David Biondolillo and
Detective Christopher Cade, Jefferson Parish Narcotics
Division assigned to DEA/HIDT A Task Force, received
information from a cooperating defendant (hereinafter
the CD) regarding Billy LAMPTON, who the CD
positively identified as a multiple ounce to kilogram
quantity fentanyl source of supply. Information
regarding LAMPTON and other subjects provided by the
CD was corroborated through Detective Cade’s and
Biondolillo’s investigation. The investigation included
multiple federal wiretaps.
11
On September 2, 2022, while Detective Cade,
Biondolillo, and Powe were conducting surveillance of
LAMPTON at his apartment located at 3800 Grandlake
Boulevard, Apartment L-104, Kenner, Louisiana. During
the surveillance, at approximately 11:15 a.m., Detective
Powe observed LAMPTON exit apartment L-104 and
walk towards the dumspters [sic]. It should be noted that
at approximately 10:30 a.m., Detective Biondolillo
witnessed IV Waste Management empty the dumspters
[sic] and no one else went to the dumpster area after they
were emptied. Detective Cade then retrieved the only
trash that was in the container, which Detective
Biondolillo positively identified as the trash that
Lampton carried to the dumpster.
Upon searching the trash, within a grocery bag tied up in
the bag Detectives Cade and Biondolillo located three
empty packages used for kilograms. Furthermore, upon
opening the bag, detectives smelled a pungent odor
immediately recognized to be consistent with the odor of
heroin/fentanyl. Based on the information obtained
through the investigation and the evidence recovered via
trash pull[ed] Detectives Biondolillo and Cade are
requesting the issuance of a search warrant for the
residence of 3800 Grandlake Boulevard, Apartment L-
104, Kenner, Louisiana.
It is based on the above probable cause that Affiant
requests that the court will grant a warrant for the
purpose of searching the above-described location
and curtilage for the above-described items. Due to
the fact illegal narcotics are easily and commonly
hidden on someone’s person, Affiant further requests
the court will grant officers the right to search “all
persons” found at or inside the location, curtilage,
and inside any vehicles. Affiant also requests that the
court will grant said warrant to be executed during
the daytime, nighttime, weekends, and/or holidays.
[Emphasis in original.]
After reviewing the affidavit, we find there are sufficient facts within its four
corners to establish probable cause for issuing the warrant to search Lampton’s
residence—even if we were to excise the information referencing the CI’s
identification of Lampton and the statement regarding the federal wiretaps. Even if
the detective’s use of a single photo was “suggestive” as argued by Lampton, there
was no substantial likelihood of misidentification; the CI knew him. Also,
Biondolillo’s investigation corroborated the CI’s identification of Lampton.
12
Although Lampton contends that Biondolillo falsely swore in his affidavit
regarding the federal wiretaps based on his testimony that Lampton’s name was
not heard, nor did he speak, during any of the recordings, we disagree. We find no
fabrication in Biondolillo’s statement or that it was included in the affidavit to
falsely mislead the magistrate. Instead, we find that it was merely a statement
made regarding a broader investigation of criminal activity that included the
wiretaps, not that the investigation of Lampton was based solely on the wiretaps.
Although Lampton argues the search warrant affidavit states the apartment
the officers were surveilling belonged to him without supplying any corroborating
information that he lived there, the affidavit clearly states that the officers observed
Lampton exit the apartment, throw a bag containing drug paraphernalia into a
nearby empty dumpster, and then return to the same apartment. Additionally,
Biondolillo testified at the hearing that, once Lampton was read his Miranda rights
while in the parking lot, he provided officers with a key to the apartment and that
they relocated there. The district court obviously believed Biondolillo’s
testimony.10
As to Lampton’s contention that because fentanyl is odorless, Biondolillo’s
statement in his affidavit regarding the officers recognizing the odor of fentanyl
when they opened the discarded garbage bag is false, we note that what the
affidavit actually provides is that the smell was recognized by officers “to be
consistent with the odor of heroin/fentanyl.” We find this statement does not
constitute a false misrepresentation nor was were made with an intent to mislead
the magistrate.
10
When a trial court makes findings of fact based on the credibility of the witnesses, a reviewing
court owes those findings great deference, and may not overturn those findings unless there is no
evidence to support those findings. State v. Thompson, 11-915 (La. 5/8/12), 93 So.3d 553, 563. See also
State v. Overstreet, 18-380 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/18), 263 So.3d 1241, 1248, writ denied, 19-235 (La.
4/29/19), 268 So.3d 1033.
13
Even if we were to excise the allegedly false statements and were to retest
the affidavit, we find that it establishes probable cause for the search warrant in
this case. Specifically, the affidavit establishes that during surveillance of
Lampton’s residence, officers saw Lampton exit the apartment and throw a trash
bag into a dumpster, which they had just observed being emptied by IV Waste.
Upon retrieving the bag from the dumpster, officers discovered three empty
wrappers used for kilos packaging, and immediately recognized a smell consistent
with the odor of heroin/fentanyl. We find that the information officers obtained
through the task force’s investigation and the surveillance of Lampton’s residence,
as well as the evidence recovered from the bag Lampton threw into the dumpster,
provided sufficient evidence to determine that there was probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant for the search of Lampton’s residence.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Lampton’s motion to suppress evidence that was
seized pursuant to a warrant.
Motion to Produce Impeaching Evidence Regarding the CI
In his writ application, while Lampton asserts as an “issue presented,” that
the trial court failed to order the State to produce statutorily dictated impeachment
information regarding the “non-testifying cooperating defendant,” he fails to brief
the issue. Uniform Rules–Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–12.4(B)(4) provides that a
reviewing court may consider as abandoned any assignment of error or issue for
review which has not been briefed, we consider this issue abandoned. See also
State v. Fink, 20-139 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/1/20), 296 So.3d 1270, 1277 n.6, where
this Court stated:
We recognize that U.R.C.A. Rule 2–12.4 relates to
appeal briefs; however, U.R.C.A. Rule 4–8 specifically
provides: “The rules of the court pertaining to appeals
and not conflicting with Rules specifically pertaining to
application for writs, when applicable and insofar as
14
practicable, shall govern applications and the disposition
thereof.”
Id. As Lampton has failed to brief the issue concerning impeachment information
regarding the CI, we consider this issue abandoned.
For the forgoing reasons, Lampton’s writ application is denied.
Gretna, Louisiana, this 22nd day of October, 2024.
SMC
FHW
TSM
15
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 10/22/2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
24-K-444
E-NOTIFIED
24th Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable June B. Darensburg (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Thomas J. Butler (Respondent) C. Gary Wainwright (Relator)
Darren A. Allemand (Respondent)
MAILED
Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
(Respondent)
District Attorney
Twenty-Fourth Judicial District
200 Derbigny Street
Gretna, LA 70053