Gordon R. Sibley and wife, Carolyn A. Sibley, and Katelyn D. Sibley, a minor by and through, Gordon R. Sibley, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Katelyn D. Sibley v. Heather D. Granger and Progressive Insurance Agency ( 2020 )

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2019 CA 0411
GORDON R. SIBLEY AND WIFE, CAROLYN A. SIBLEY, AND
ATELYN D. SIBLEY, A MINOR BY AND THROUGH, GORDON R.
SIBLEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE ESTATE OF KATELYN D. SIBLEY
VERSUS
HEATHER D. GRANGER AND PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE
AGENCY
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
AN 0 7 2020
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NUMBER 110174, DIVISION B, PARISH OF LIVINGSTON
STATE OF LOUISIANA
HONORABLE CHARLOTTE HUGHES FOSTER, JUDGE
Patrick H. Hufft Counsel for Plaintiffs -Appellants
New Orleans, Louisiana Gordon R. Sibley and wife, Carolyn A.
Sibley, and their daughters, Randelyn
Aub A. Ward Sibley Nelson and Kately D. Sibley
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
William C. Helm Counsel for Defendant -Appellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Heather D. Granger and Progressive
Security Insurance Company
Stephen F. Butterfield
New Orleans, Louisiana
Valerie Theng Matherne Counsel for Defendant -Appellee
James Matthew Matherne Herbert Benjamin Corkern, III
Colin F. Lozes
New Orleans, Louisiana
Roy C. Beard Counsel for Defendant -Appellee
Lynda Albano Tafaro Wal- Mart Louisiana, LLC
Katherine L. Swartout
New Orleans, Louisiana
BEFORE: McDONALD, THERIOT, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
Disposition: MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL DENIED; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
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Chutz, J.
Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their personal injury claims on the
defendants' motions for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At approximately 2: 05 p.m. on December 23, 2004, Heather D. Granger was
driving her vehicle in Livingston Parish when she went off the road while going
around a curve, overcorrected by steering sharply to the left, and entered into the
opposing lane oftraffic. Ms. Granger' s vehicle collided head on with a vehicle being
driven by Gordon R. Sibley, causing his vehicle to flip and roll over. As a result of
the collision, Mr. Sibley suffered severe physical injuries. At the time of the
accident, Ms. Granger was driving under the influence of alcohol and prescription
medications for which she did not have prescriptions. She was arrested and
ultimately pleaded guilty to a charge of first degree vehicular negligent injuring, and
was sentenced to serve four years imprisonment at hard labor, with two years of the
sentence suspended.
On December 9, 2005, Mr. Sibley, his wife, Carolyn A. Sibley, and their
minor child, Katelyn D. Sibley (by and through Mr. Sibley), filed suit against Ms.
Granger and her automobile insurer, Progressive Security Insurance Company. In
subsequent discovery dispositions, Ms. Granger testified that on the day of the
accident, prior to leaving her workplace at the Wal-Mart in Walker, Louisiana and
while she was on the clock during the day, she consumed alcohol and took
prescription drugs ( Lortabs and Xanax) supplied to her by her supervisor, Herbert
B. Corkern, III. Ms. Granger, who was over the age of twenty-one, indicated she
had been in a sexual relationship with Mr. Corkern for several months before the
accident. At the time, Ms. Granger worked in the meat department at Wal- Mart
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department, and Mr. Corkern was the manager of the deli, seafood and meat
departments.
Ms. Granger testified Mr. Corkern frequently clocked her in for work early
when she was not actually present, approved her arriving to work tardy, and/ or
authorized her to clock out of work early so that she could meet him off premises to
drink alcohol, take prescription drugs ( Lortab and Xanax) he provided, and have
sexual relations.
According to Ms. Granger, she also frequently drank alcohol, took
Lortabs and Xanaxs supplied by Mr. Corkern, and had sexual relations with him on
Wal- Mart premises when they were both at work.
Ms. Granger claimed she was on her way to meet Mr. Corkern when the
accident at issue occurred. She testified that after Mr. Corkern left Wal- Mart that
day, he called her on her cell phone and told her to make an excuse to leave early
and come meet him at a local grocery store. She told her immediate supervisor she
had a family emergency, clocked out, then left Wal- Mart to meet Mr. Corkern off
premises.
The accident occurred shortly thereafter.
In his deposition testimony, Mr. Corkern denied ever having a sexual
relationship with Ms. Granger or calling her to come meet him on the day of the
accident. He testified he had completed his work duties for the day and was at home
preparing for a hunting trip at the time the accident occurred. Mr. Corkern also
denied supplying Ms. Granger with any alcohol or drugs.
On June 23, 2014, plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Sibley, together with their
daughters, Katelyn Sibley and Randelyn Sibley Nelson, both of whom were minors
at the time of the accident but had since become majors, filed an amended petition.
The petition named Wal- Mart Louisiana, LLC, Mr. Corkern, and ABC Insurance
Company, Mr. Corkern' s homeowners and liability insurer, as additional defendants.
Plaintiffs alleged Wal-Mart was vicariously liable for the actions of its employees,
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Ms. Granger and Mr. Corkern, under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Additionally, plaintiffs alleged Wal-Mart was independently negligent in failing to
properly supervise and monitor its employees and in failing to enforce its
prohibitions against a supervisor having a sexual relationship with a subordinate and
against the consumption of alcohol and other intoxicating substances by employees
while on premises. Plaintiffs alleged Mr. Corkern was negligent because: ( 1) he
supplied Ms. Granger with alcohol and other intoxicating substances under coercive
circumstances causing her to feel compelled to consume them in order to avoid
adverse job consequences; and ( 2) he instructed Ms. Granger to leave Wal -Mart' s
premises on the date of the accident in order to meet him when he knew or should
have known that it was dangerous for her to operate a motor vehicle in her condition.
After various proceedings, Wal- Mart and Mr. Corkern each filed a motion for
summary judgment and a peremptory exception
raising the objection of
prescription.'
Following a hearing, the district court granted both motions for
summary judgment. The district court pretermitted ruling on the exceptions of
prescription in view of the granting of Wal-Mart and Mr. Corkern' s motions for
summary judgment. On November 21, 2018, the district court signed a judgment
dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Wal- Mart and Mr. Corkern. Plaintiffs have now
appealed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. The district court erred in granting Wal -Mart' s motion for summary
judgment when there were issues of fact as to Wal -Mart' s independent and
vicarious liability.
2. The district court erred in finding no causal connection between Mr.
Corkern' s conduct and the accident at issue.
3. The district court erred in finding Wal -Mart' s exception of prescription to
be moot rather than denying it outright.
Wal-Mart also raised the objection of no cause of action, which the district court pretermitted on
the grounds of mootness. Plaintiffs have assigned no error to this ruling.
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT LAW
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted only if the motion,
memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to
material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.
C. C. P. art. 966( A)(3). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate,
appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the
district court' s determination of whether summary judgment is
appropriate. Alvarado v Lodge at the Bluffs, LLC, 16- 0624 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
3/ 29/ 17), 217 So. 3d 429, 432, writ denied, 17- 0697 ( La. 6/ 16/ 17), 219 So. 3d 340.
The burden of proof rests on the mover. See La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1).
However, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is
before the court on the motion, the mover's burden does not require that all essential
elements of the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense be negated. Instead, the
mover must point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one
or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense.
Thereafter, the adverse party must produce factual evidence sufficient to establish
that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. If the adverse
party fails to meet this burden, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and
the mover is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. La. C. C. P. art.
966( D)( 1); Alvarado, 217 So. 3d at 432.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court' s role is not to evaluate
the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to
determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Factual inferences
reasonably drawn from the evidence must be construed in favor of the party opposing
the motion, and all doubt must be resolved in the opponent' s favor. Alvarado, 217
So. 3d at 432- 33.
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LIABILITY OF WAL-MART
Assignment of Error Number One)
In their first assignment of error, plaintiffs argue summary judgment was
improper due to the existence of issues of material fact concerning Wal -Mart' s
vicarious liability for the tortious actions of its employers, Ms. Granger and Mr.
Corkern, as well as Wal -Mart' s own independent negligence. We disagree. Based
on our de novo review, we find the district court properly granted summary judgment
dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Wal- Mart.
Vicarious Liabilitv:
Plaintiffs assert that, because Mr. Corker was a salaried supervisor who did
not have to clock in or out of work or keep upper management apprised of his
location, he " was ostensibly still working in the course and scope of his managerial
position" when he demanded that Ms. Granger meet him off Wal -Mart' s premises
on the day of the accident. They further argue Ms. Granger believed she was
required to comply with Mr. Corkern' s " demands" in order not to jeopardize her
employment at Wal- Mart. According to plaintiffs, Wal-Mart is vicariously liable
for the actions of Ms. Granger and Mr. Corkern because " Mr. Corkern used his
position in Wal-Mart management to actualize his sexual desires by creating a
hostile work environment for Ms. Granger."
Under La. C. C. art. 2320, an employer is answerable for the damage
occasioned by its servant " in the exercise of the functions in which [ the servant is]
employed."
Specifically, an employer is vicarious liable for a tort committed by its
employee if, at the time, the employee was acting within the course and scope of his
employment.
Holt v. Torino, 12- 1579 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 26/ 13), 117 So. 3d 182,
184- 85, writ denied, 13- 1161 ( La. 8/ 30/ 13), 120 So. 3d 267. An employee is acting
within the course and scope of his employment when the employee' s action is of the
kind that he is employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits
of time and space, and is activated at least in part by a purpose to serve the employer.
Orgeron on Behalf of Orgeron v. McDonald, 93- 1353 ( La. 7/ 5/ 94), 639 So. 2d 224,
226- 27; Holt, 117 So. 3d at 185.
Generally, courts consider four factors when assessing vicarious liability,
including whether the tortious act: ( 1) was primarily employment rooted; ( 2) was
reasonably incidental to performance of employment duties; ( 3) occurred during
working hours; and (4) occurred on the employer' s premises. It is not necessary that
each factor is present in each case, and each case must be decided on its own merits.
Holt, 117 So. 3d at 185. The determinative question is whether the employee' s
tortious conduct was so closely connected in time, place, and causation to his
employment duties as to be regarded as a risk of harm fairly attributable to the
employer' s business, as compared with conduct motivated by purely personal
considerations entirely extraneous to the employer' s interest. Holt, 117 So. 3d at
185.
If the purpose of serving the master' s business actuates the servant to any
appreciable extent, the master is subject to liability if the act is otherwise within the
service. The scope of risk attributable to an employer increases with the amount of
authority and freedom of action granted to the servant in performing his assigned
tasks. Holt, 117 So. 3d at 185- 86. Further, an employer is not ordinarily liable for
an employee' s torts committed while going to and from work. Holt, 117 So. 3d at
IBM
The accident in this case did not occur either during Ms. Granger' s work hours
or on Wal -Mart' s premises. The accident happened approximately twenty minutes
after Ms. Granger clocked out of work and left Wal -Mart' s premises in her personal
vehicle. Ms. Granger' s job in the meat department did not require her to perform
tasks off premises, and she was not on a mission for Wal- Mart at the time of the
accident. Further, Ms. Granger' s consumption of alcohol and drugs was not a
function of her employment, specifically being in violation of Wal -Mart' s policies
a fact she was aware of), and did not benefit Wal- Mart in any way. Plaintiffs have
presented no evidence showing Ms. Granger' s tortious conduct of driving while
impaired by intoxicating substances in order to meet Mr. Corkern was either
employment rooted or incidental to the performance ofher j ob duties. Ms. Granger' s
actions were motivated purely by personal considerations. Despite plaintiffs'
contentions that Ms. Granger was coerced into having an intimate relationship with
Mr. Corkern out of fear of losing her job, Ms. Granger admitted that she continued
her affair with Mr. Corkern for over a year after she left her job at Wal-Mart.
Considering the circumstances, it is clear Ms. Granger' s conduct of driving
while under the influence of alcohol and drugs, allegedly in order to meet Mr.
Corkern, was not so closely connected in time, place, and causation to her
employment duties in Wal -Mart' s meat department as to be regarded as a risk of
harm fairly attributable to Wal -Mart' s retail business. Ms. Granger' s conduct was
motivated by personal considerations entirely extraneous to Wal -Mart' s interests.
We find no genuine issue of material fact that would support a finding that Ms.
Granger was acting in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the
accident.
We also reach the same conclusion with regard to Mr. Corkern, who denied
engaging in any sexual relationship with Ms. Granger or supplying her with alcohol
or drugs. Even if Mr. Corkern did engage in such conduct, he was aware of Wal -
Mart' s policies prohibiting him from having a sexual relationship with a subordinate
employee or providing her with alcohol or unauthorized prescription drugs. Any
such prohibited conduct by Mr. Corkern was not related to the performance of his
job duties or in furtherance of Wal -Mart' s interests. Moreover, it is undisputed that
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both at the time that Mr. Corkern allegedly called Ms. Granger and told her to meet
him off premises and at the time of the accident, Mr. Corkern was not on Wal -Mart' s
premises. Mr. Corkern testified in his deposition that, although he had worked
earlier in the day, he was at home preparing to go hunting at the time of the accident.
We find no merit in plaintiffs' contention that because Mr. Corkern was a
salaried supervisor who was not required to punch a time clock or report to anyone
when he left Wal -Mart' s premises, he was still acting within the course and scope of
his employment when he allegedly called Ms. Granger shortly before the accident
and " demanded" she meet him off premises. Plaintiffs have cited no authority for
such a proposition.
At the time the call was allegedly made, Mr. Corkern was off
premises, was not on a mission for Wal- Mart, and was not performing any act
reasonably incidental to his employment duties. Rather than being employment
based, Mr. Corkern' s alleged conduct was motivated solely by personal
considerations related to his alleged intimate relationship with Ms. Granger. His
actions were entirely extraneous to his job duties and did not benefit Wal- Mart in
any way.
Independent Nealikence:
Plaintiffs contend that in addition to being vicariously liable for its employers'
actions, Wal- Mart is also liable for its own independent negligence in failing to
properly supervise its managers and employees. They argue the accident would not
have happened if Wal- Mart had properly supervised and monitored workplace
conditions so that Mr. Corkern could not have engaged in an inappropriate sexual
relationship with Ms. Granger, manipulated her time cards to cover up the
relationship, or provided her with alcohol and drugs on Wal -Mart' s premises during
work hours. According to plaintiffs, the frequent, approved deviations Ms. Granger
10
was allowed from her scheduled work hours should have been a red flag to Wal-
Mart that something irregular was occurring and led to an investigation.
Louisiana courts have adopted a duty -risk analysis in determining whether to
impose liability under the general negligence principles of La. C. C. art. 2315. For
liability to attach under a duty -risk analysis, a plaintiff must prove five separate
elements: (
1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard
of care; ( 2) the defendant failed to conform his conduct to the appropriate standard;
3) the defendant' s substandard conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiffs injuries;
4) the substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff' s injuries; and ( 5) actual
damages. A negative answer to any of these inquiries results in a determination of
no liability. Bellanger v. Webre, 10- 0720 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 6/ 11), 65 So. 3d 201,
207, writ denied, 11- 1171 ( La. 9/ 16/ 11), 69 So. 3d 1149.
Thus, one of the threshold issues in any negligence action is whether the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 08- 1163 ( La.
5/ 22/ 09), 16 So. 3d 1065, 1086. In Lemann v. Essen Lane Daiquiris, Inc., 05- 1095
La. 3/ 10/ 06), 923 So. 2d 627, 633, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
Whether a duty is owed is a question of law. In deciding whether to
impose a duty in a particular case, the court must make a policy decision
in light of the unique facts and circumstances presented. The inquiry is
whether the plaintiff has any law ( statutory, jurisprudential, or arising
from general principles of fault) to support the claim that the defendant
owed him a duty. [ Citations omitted.]
There is an almost universal duty on the part of a defendant in a negligence
action to use reasonable care to avoid injury to another. Rando, 16 So. 3d 1086.
Further, the owner or operator of a facility generally has a duty to exercise reasonable
care for the safety of persons on his premises and the duty of not exposing such
persons to unreasonable risks of injury or harm. While a business establishment is
under a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of its patrons, it is not the insurer
11
of their safety. Peterson v. Gibraltar Savings and Loan, 98- 1601 ( La. 5/ 18/ 99), 733
So. 2d 1198, 1204.
Plaintiffs have presented no authority establishing Wal-Mart owed a duty to
third persons who were not patrons or on Wal -Mart' s premises to supervise its
managers and employees to prevent inappropriate conduct or to monitor their time
cards for irregularities. Any duty Wal-Mart may have had in this respect was owed
for the protection of Wal -Mart' s patrons and other persons on its premises. See
Peterson, 733 So. 2d at 1204. Even assuming arguendo that Wal-Mart owed a duty
to plaintiffs, such duty did not encompass within its protection the risk that impaired
driving by a Wal-Mart employee who had secretly consumed alcohol and
prescription drugs supplied by her supervisor during work hours would cause injury
to a third person off premises after the employee had clocked out and departed Wal-
Mart. A risk may not be within the scope of a duty when the circumstances of the
plaintiff' s particular injury could not be reasonably foreseen or anticipated because
there is no ease of association between the risk and the legal duty. Rando, 16 So.3d
at 1092. No ease of association exists herein between plaintiffs' injuries and any
duty Wal-Mart may have had to supervise its supervisors and employees or to
monitor their time cards.
Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment
dismissing plaintiffs' negligence and vicarious liability claims against Wal-Mart.
LIABILITY OF MR. CORKERN
Assignment of Error Number Two)
Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in dismissing their claims against Mr.
Corkern based on the court' s finding that no causal connection existed between Mr.
Corkern' s conduct and the accident caused by Ms. Granger' s impaired driving. They
contend the district court erred because without the influence and coercion Mr.
Corkern exerted upon Ms. Granger, she would not have consumed alcohol and drugs
12
supplied by Mr. Corkern and then left work early to drive across town to meet him.
Plaintiffs argues genuine issues of material facts exist regarding Mr. Corkern' s
comparative fault under La. C. C. art. 2323 for his part in causing the foreseeable
accident that occurred as a result of his supplying alcohol and drugs to Ms. Granger
and then " demanding" she drive across town to meet him.
Based on our de novo review, we find no merit in plaintiffs' contentions. Even
if Mr. Corkern' s alleged actions were a cause -in -fact of plaintiffs' damages, there is
no genuine issue of material fact that his actions were not a legal or proximate cause
of those damages. In enacting La. R.S. 9: 2800. 1, the legislature expressed in the
strongest possible way a public policy ofholding adults who consume alcohol, rather
than the person who furnishes or supplied the alcohol, personally responsible for any
consequences arising out of the consumption of alcohol. Bell v. Hurstell, 99- 1333
La. App. 4th Cir. 6/ 16/ 99), 743 So. 2d 720, 721, writ denied, 99- 2021 ( La.
10/ 29/ 99), 748 So. 2d 1165; see also Vaughan v. Hair, 94- 86 ( La. App. 3d Cir.
10/ 5/ 94), 645 So. 2d 1177, 1182, writ denied, 95- 0123 ( La. 3/ 10/ 95), 650 So. 2d
1186. Specifically, La. R.S. 9: 2800. 1( A) states:
The legislature finds and declares that the consumption of intoxicating
beverages, rather than the sale or serving or furnishing of such
beverages, is the proximate cause of any injury, including death and
property damage, inflicted by an intoxicated person upon himself or
upon another person.
At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs argued La. R.S.
9: 2800. 1 did not apply in cases such as this one where the intoxicated person is
encouraged by another to drink alcoholic beverages. However, the only statutory
exceptions provided by La. R.S. 9: 2800. 1 are when the intoxicated person was
forced to consume alcoholic beverages or it was falsely represented to him that the
beverage had no alcohol, or if a minor was provided with or sold alcoholic
13
beverages. La. R.S. 9: 2800. 1( E); Aucoin v. Rochel, 08- 1180 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
12/ 23/ 08), 5 So -3d 197, 201, writ denied, 09- 0122 ( La. 3/ 27/ 09), 5 So. 3d 143.
Ms. Granger admitted in her deposition that Mr. Granger did not force her to
consume alcohol or the drugs he provided. Nor was there any allegation Mr. Corkern
falsely represented to Ms. Granger that there was no alcohol in the beverages he
provided to her.
In any event, even if La. R.S. 9: 2800. 1 is not applicable, we find the summary
judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Mr. Corkern was proper for the
additional reasons expressed by the learned district court in its written reasons for
judgment, as follows:
Corkern argue[ s] a lack of legal causation under the fourth prong of
Louisiana' s duty -risk analysis. Under this analysis, even when a duty
exists, the scope of this duty must extend to the risk at hand. This
portion of the duty risk analysis asks whether the rule extends to or is
intended to protect this plaintiff from this type of harm arising in this
manner. The Louisiana Supreme Court has provided:
In determining the limitation to be placed on liability for a
defendant' s substandard conduct— i. e., whether there is a
duty -risk relationship— we have found the proper inquiry
to be how easily the risk of injury to plaintiff can be
associated with the duty sought to be enforced. Restated,
the ease of association inquiry is simply: " How easily does
one associate the plaintiff' s complained -of harm with the
defendant' s conduct?"... Although ease of association
encompasses the idea of foreseeability, it is not based on
foreseeability alone. Absent an ease of association
between the duty breached and the damages sustained, we
have found legal fault lacking.
In this case, even accepting Granger' s testimony as true, the
Court does not find Corkern' s actions to be the legal cause of the
accident.
In employing the duty -risk analysis the required ease of
association is absent in this matter. Corkern' s actions were not
concurrent with Granger' s act of colliding with Plaintiff' s vehicle. It
was Granger' s decision to drive under the influence of drugs and
alcohol. Her independent decision to drive intoxicated was an
intervening cause, making Corkern' s actions too attenuated under the
duty -risk analysis.
Citations omitted.)
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EXCEPTION OF PRESCRIPTION
Assignment of Error Number Three)
Plaintiffs contend the district court erred in finding the exceptions of
prescription filed in this matter were moot. They argue the district court should
instead have denied the exceptions outright.
A court is not required to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or
to declare, for the government of future cases, principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In re E. W., 09-
1589 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 7/ 10), 38 So. 3d 1033, 1037; also see Central Properties v
Fairway Gardenhomes, LLC, 16- 0111 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 16/ 16), 204 So. 3d 240,
249; reversed on other grounds, 16- 1855 ( La. 6/ 27/ 17), 225 So. 3d 441. Because the
district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims against Wal-Mart and Mr. Corkern, with
prejudice, pursuant to their motions for summary judgment, we find no error in the
district court pretermitting a ruling on the exceptions of prescription filed by Wal-
Mart and Mr. Corkern on the grounds of mootness.
MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL
After the record was lodged in this matter, Mr. Corkern filed a motion in this
court to seal all appellate briefs filed by the parties. Mr. Corkern asserted his privacy
interests outweighed the public' s interest in this matter. This court provisionally
granted the motion, but reserved " the final determination as to whether these briefs
should remain under seal" to the panel to which the appeal was assigned. Gordon
R. Sibley et al. v. Heather D. Granger and Progressive Insurance Agency, 19- 0411
La. App. 1st Cir. 8/ 5/ 19) ( unpublished).
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that individuals involved in
civil litigation may be compelled to produce documents of a confidential nature.
Louisiana has no specific statute providing authority to a court to seal its record of a
civil case from public inspection. See Dipaola v. Municipal Police Employees'
15
Retirement System, 14- 0037 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 25/ 14), 155 So. 3d 49, 51 n. I, writ
denied, 14- 2575 ( La. 2/ 27/ 15), 159 So. 3d 1071. Thus, we conclude there is no valid
reason to extend the district court's order sealing portions of the record. Without
making any ruling as to the sound discretion of the district court's original
order sealing portions of the trial court record, we hereby deny the motion
to seal the appellate briefs filed in this matter. See Dipaola, 155 So. 3d at 51.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons assigned, the November 21, 2018 judgment of the district
court dismissing, with prejudice, the claims of plaintiffs, Gordon Sibley, Carolyn A.
Sibley, Katelyn D. Sibley, and Randelyn S. Nelson, against defendants, Wal- Mart
Louisiana, LLC and Benjamin B. Corkern, III, is affirmed. Additionally, we deny
the motion to file the appellate briefs under seal. All costs of this appeal are to be
paid by plaintiffs.
MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL DENIED; JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.
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