State Of Louisiana v. Roman Trosclair ( 2019 )


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  •                     NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    2019 KA 0408
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    VERSUS
    ROMAN TROSCLAIR
    TaCA                                        Judgment rendered:      DEC 2 7 2019
    On Appeal from the
    Nineteenth Judicial District Court
    In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
    State of Louisiana
    No. 09- 12- 0701, Sec. III
    The Honorable Michael R. Erwin, Judge Presiding
    Hillar C. Moore, III                           Attorneys for Appellee
    District Attorney                              State of Louisiana
    Dylan C. Alge
    Assistant District Attorney
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana
    Karl J. Koch                                   Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana                         Roman Trosclair
    BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ.
    HOLDRIDGE, J.
    The defendant, Roman Trosclair, was charged by grand jury indictment with
    second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14: 30. 1 ( count 1);            and attempted
    second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14: 27 and 14: 30. 1 ( count 2).           He
    pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged on both
    counts.     The defendant filed a motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal and/or
    new trial,    which was denied.         For the second degree murder conviction, the
    defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation,
    or suspension of sentence; for the attempted second degree murder conviction, he
    was sentenced to fifty years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole,
    probation,     or   suspension   of   sentence.        The   sentences were   ordered to run
    consecutively.      The defendant now appeals, designating one assignment of error.
    We affirm the convictions and sentence on count 2.                We amend the sentence on
    count 1 (    second degree murder) to include that it be served at hard labor, and
    affirm as amended.
    FACTS
    On the night of May 14, 2012, Joshua Mumphrey was at his apartment on
    North Sherwood Forest Drive.           He was getting ready to go to a club with some
    people, including his sister Cassandra and his friend, Dedrick Droze. Dedrick was
    the father of Cassandra' s child.       Dedrick left the apartment alone in Cassandra' s
    car,   a white four -door Oldsmobile Ciera.              Dedrick returned to the apartment
    several hours later with a man he knew, but whom no one else in the apartment
    knew. The unknown man was later identified as the defendant.
    Joshua, Dedrick, and the defendant left the apartment together.               Joshua
    drove, Dedrick was in the front seat, and the defendant was in the passenger -side
    of the back seat.     Before going to the club, they stopped to pick up marijuana at
    0a
    one house and sell it at another house in the Glen Oaks area. They stopped at Z
    Food Mart to buy alcohol. It is not clear, based on Joshua' s testimony at trial,
    whether or not a drug transaction was conducted. According to Joshua, they drove
    to several houses in the Glen Oaks area.             They stopped at one particular house
    where Dedrick picked up a handgun.
    With all three back in the car, the defendant at some point took the gun from
    Dedrick and told Joshua to pull into a yard.              As Joshua tried to put the car in
    reverse, the defendant shot Joshua in the head. Joshua jumped to the back seat and
    began fighting the defendant. The defendant shot Dedrick in the back of the head,
    killing him. The defendant shot Joshua again, in the arm. The defendant got out of
    the car, and Joshua moved to the driver' s seat to try to drive away.              The car drove
    in reverse until it backed into a utility pole (trunk first). Joshua left the car and ran
    to some houses until someone finally helped him.                     He was transported by
    ambulance to Our Lady of the Lake Hospital.                    The shooting likely occurred
    sometime between 10: 00 p. m. and 11: 00 p.m.
    Lieutenant Rob Chambers, with the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff' s
    Office, investigated the case to determine who shot Joshua and Dedrick.                         He
    obtained Dedrick' s phone records and found that a number that had been called on
    Dedrick' s phone the night of the shooting was on the subscriber account of Kendall
    Callaghan.'          Lieutenant Chambers compiled a six -person photographic lineup,
    which contained Kendall' s picture.            Joshua picked out Kendall in the lineup.
    Cassandra,     and a boy who was at the apartment that night ( with Joshua and
    Cassandra), also identified Kendall as the person they had seen in the apartment.
    Lieutenant Chambers arrested Kendall and questioned him. Kendall' s home
    was searched and nothing was found. According to his testimony at trial, Kendall
    1 Kendall is referred to as " Callaghan" throughout most of the record, but occasionally is referred
    to as " Calligan."
    3
    did not know Joshua or Dedrick, had never been to Z Food Mart, and he had never
    been to Joshua' s apartment.    Kendall explained that he had two phones on his
    account, one of which he had given to his ( then) girlfriend; so if she had called
    Dedrick, that call would have shown up on Kendall' s account as the subscriber.
    Kendall also testified that he did not make the call in question and knew nothing
    about it.   Lieutenant Chambers determined he had the wrong suspect and released
    Kendall.
    Having learned that the shooter, Joshua, and Dedrick had all gone to Z Food
    Mart together, Lieutenant Chambers obtained video footage from the store. A still
    photograph of the then -unidentified person was created from the video and shown
    on television.    Two people called in, identifying    the person as the defendant.
    Joshua testified that he recognized the defendant as the person who shot him when
    he saw his picture on television. Joshua identified the defendant as his shooter in
    open court.   Several DNA samples were taken from the white car. The defendant' s
    DNA was found on the exterior rear passenger -door handle.
    The defendant did not testify at trial.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was
    insufficient to support the convictions.    Specifically, the defendant contends that
    his identity as the perpetrator was not established by the State.
    A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due
    Process.    See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2.     The standard of
    review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether or not,
    viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
    trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789,
    El
    
    61 L.Ed.2d 560
     ( 1979).        See La. Code Crim. P. art. 821( B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-
    0207 ( La. 11/ 29/ 06),   
    946 So. 2d 654
    , 660.        The Jackson standard of review,
    incorporated in Article 821,         is an objective standard for testing the overall
    evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt.            When analyzing
    circumstantial     evidence,    La. R. S.   15: 438 provides that the factfinder must be
    satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
    See State v. Patorno, 2001- 2585 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 21/ 02), 
    822 So. 2d 141
    , 144.
    Furthermore,     when the key issue is the defendant' s identity as the perpetrator,
    rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any
    reasonable probability of misidentification.
    Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has
    a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R. S. 14: 30. 1( A)( 1).    Any
    person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the
    purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of
    an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether,
    under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.                   La.
    R.S. 14: 27( A).
    In order for an accused to be guilty of attempted murder, a specific intent to
    kill must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.              Although a specific intent to
    inflict great bodily harm may support a conviction of murder, the specific intent to
    inflict great bodily harm will not support a conviction of attempted murder.              State
    v. Woods, 2000- 2147 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 11/ 01),         
    787 So. 2d 1083
    ,     1095,    writ
    denied, 2001- 2389 ( La. 6/ 14/ 02), 
    817 So. 2d 1153
    .      See State v. Butler, 
    322 So.2d 189
    , 192- 93 ( La. 1975).
    Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances
    indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to
    5
    follow his act or failure to act.     La. R. S. 14: 10( 1).    Such state of mind can be
    formed in an instant.     State v. Cousan, 94- 2503 ( La. 11/ 25/ 96), 
    684 So. 2d 382
    ,
    390.   Specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the
    defendant' s actions and the circumstances of the transaction.           State v. Broaden,
    99- 2124 ( La. 2/ 21/ 01), 
    780 So. 2d 349
    , 362, cert. denied, 
    534 U.S. 884
    , 
    122 S. Ct. 1929
     
    151 L.Ed.2d 135
     ( 2001).      The existence of specific intent is an ultimate legal
    conclusion to be resolved by the trier of fact. State v. Nixon, 2017- 1582 ( La. App.
    1st Cir. 4/ 13/ 18), 
    250 So. 3d 273
    , 290, writ denied, 2018- 0770 ( La. 11/ 14/ 18), 
    256 So. 3d 290
    .    Deliberately pointing and firing a deadly weapon at close range
    indicates specific intent to kill. See State v. Robinson, 2002- 1869 ( La. 4/ 14/ 04),
    
    874 So. 2d 66
    , 74, cert. denied, 
    543 U.S. 1023
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 658
    , 
    160 L.Ed.2d 499
    2004).
    The    defendant   argues   in brief that     Joshua     lacked   credibility   in   his
    identification of him ( the defendant) as the shooter. The defendant points out that
    Joshua initially identified someone other than him as the person who shot Joshua
    and Dedrick.     Joshua, Cassandra,     and a boy who was also at the apartment,
    identified Kendall as the person they saw at Joshua' s apartment the night of the
    shootings before they went out.         Joshua changed his mind, according to the
    defendant, only after he      saw a picture       of the      defendant on television       on
    CrimeStoppers.
    The defendant also avers that the video of Z Food Mart shown to the jury did
    not establish that the three men -      the defendant, Joshua, and Dedrick -            were
    together.    Since the vehicle was not seen in the video, there was nothing to
    establish the three men got out of or into the same white vehicle.
    The defendant notes that Joshua had prior felony convictions for possession
    of cocaine, simple burglary, and aggravated incest.           The defendant further points
    2
    out the inconsistencies in Joshua' s testimony. For example, Joshua testified at one
    point that he ( Joshua) had the marijuana and they were going to make a sale that
    evening.      Later, however, Joshua testified they were driving to a house to pick up
    the marijuana in order to sell it.
    Finally, according to the defendant, the DNA evidence did not prove he was
    in the vehicle at the time of the shooting.            The evidence in fact, the defendant
    suggests,
    tended to prove he was not in the vehicle during the attack.                  The
    defendant      notes   that   despite   Joshua' s   testimony regarding     all     of his ( the
    defendant' s) alleged movement inside the vehicle, his DNA was not found at other
    locations inside the vehicle.
    All    of   the   foregoing     lack   of   forensic   evidence   and/ or    testimonial
    inconsistencies pointed out by the defendant in brief was brought out at trial and
    argued by defense counsel. Despite this, however, the jury chose to believe the
    eyewitness testimony of Joshua.           Positive identification by only one witness is
    sufficient to support a conviction.        It is the factfinder who weighs the respective
    credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will generally not second- guess those
    determinations.        State v. Hughes, 2005- 0992 ( La. 11/ 29/ 06), 
    943 So. 2d 1047
    ,
    1051.   See State v. Davis, 2001- 3033 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 21/ 02), 
    822 So. 2d 161
    ,
    163- 64.
    Moreover, despite the defendant' s assertions, the State presented evidence
    that corroborated that it was the defendant who was with Joshua and Dedrick the
    night they were shot. Joshua testified that he did not know the defendant and had
    never seen him before, prior to Dedrick showing up with the defendant at Joshua' s
    apartment on the night of the shooting.                 Joshua identified Kendall        in the
    photographic lineup he was shown by Lieutenant Chambers.                  This identification
    was done at 2: 41 a. m. in the hospital, two days after Joshua had been shot. Even at
    7
    this time, Joshua was not certain about Kendall as the shooter. Joshua testified that
    after picking him out, he said, " Look, this looks like the dude, but I don' t know if
    that' s him."     Joshua testified that when he saw the defendant' s picture on
    television, he told his girlfriend that that was the guy who shot him.      On direct
    examination,
    Joshua was asked if he was absolutely certain that it was the
    defendant who shot him. Joshua replied, " I' m positive."    When asked on redirect
    examination if he had any doubt whatsoever that the defendant was the person who
    shot him and Dedrick, Joshua replied, " No doubt."
    Joshua also identified the defendant in Z Food Mart video footage.          The
    video was played for the jury, and Joshua pointed out himself, Dedrick, and the
    defendant at that store together on the night of the shooting. Reviewing the video
    footage, Joshua testified that he was wearing a white T-shirt, Dedrick was wearing
    an orange shirt, and the defendant was wearing a black tank top.         Joshua then
    indicated that all three left the store, got back in the vehicle, and drove to a house
    to get marijuana.   Joshua indicated he was certain it was the defendant who was in
    the vehicle with him and Dedrick, and that there was no one else in the vehicle.
    Joshua also testified that when he picked out Kendall in the photo lineup, he had
    told Lieutenant Chambers that the guy who shot him had gone to the store with
    him earlier.
    Lieutenant Chambers testified that after speaking with Kendall, he was able
    to exclude him as a suspect.   After learning from Joshua that he ( Joshua) and the
    defendant had gone to Z Food Mart together, Lieutenant Chambers obtained the
    video footage from the store and provided a still photo for the media to air.
    According to Lieutenant Chambers, after the photo was shown on CrimeStoppers,
    two people, including Joshua, called in. Joshua identified the person in the photo
    as the shooter.     Regarding Cassandra' s identification of Kendall in the photo
    lineup, Lieutenant Chambers testified she was in the bathroom " doing her hair,"
    getting ready to go out that night, and she saw the person pass in the reflection in
    the bathroom mirror.
    Tommy Cummings testified that he knew the defendant and Dedrick, and
    that he grew up with them. According to Cummings, on May 14, 2012 ( the day of
    the shooting), he saw the defendant and Dedrick together in a four -door white car
    near his ( Cummings) house in the Glen Oaks area.           Cummings recalled that
    Dedrick was in the driver' s seat, and he ( Cummings) talked to them for about ten
    minutes, between 9: 00 p.m. and 9: 30 p.m.
    DNA evidence revealed that the defendant had contact with the white four -
    door vehicle that Dedrick and Joshua were in when they were shot. According to
    Jennifer Hornyak, a DNA analyst with Cybergenetics ( a Pittsburgh -based company
    specializing in computer-based DNA interpretation), the defendant' s DNA was
    found on the rear, exterior passenger -door handle of the white vehicle.
    Based on the foregoing evidence, a jury, despite any inconsistencies, could
    have rationally concluded that the defendant was in the same vehicle as Joshua and
    Dedrick and that the defendant shot both of them.     Particularly, the jury chose to
    believe the testimony of Joshua regarding his identification of the defendant as the
    shooter.
    It is the trier of fact who makes credibility determinations and may,
    within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness; thus,
    a reviewing court may impinge on the factfinder' s discretion " only to the extent
    necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law."     State v.
    Tate, 2001- 1658 ( La. 5/ 20/ 03), 
    851 So. 2d 921
    , 929, cert. denied, 
    541 U.S. 905
    ,
    
    124 S. Ct. 1604
    , 
    158 L.Ed.2d 248
     ( 2004).     See State v. Weary, 2003- 3067 ( La.
    4/ 24/ 06), 
    931 So. 2d 297
    , 311- 12, cert. denied, 
    549 U.S. 1062
    , 
    127 S. Ct. 682
    , 
    166 L.Ed.2d 531
     ( 2006).
    0
    The trier of fact' s determination of the weight to be given evidence is not
    subject to appellate review.          An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to
    overturn a factfinder' s determination of guilt. State v. Taylor, 97- 2261 ( La. App.
    1st Cir. 9/ 25/ 98), 
    721 So. 2d 929
    , 932.         We are constitutionally precluded from
    acting as a " thirteenth juror" in assessing what weight to give evidence in criminal
    cases.    See State v. Mitchell, 99- 3342 ( La. 10/ 17/ 00), 
    772 So. 2d 78
    , 83.   The fact
    that the record contains evidence which conflicts with the testimony accepted by a
    trier of fact does not render the evidence accepted by the trier of fact insufficient.
    State v. Quinn, 
    479 So. 2d 592
    , 596 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).          In the absence of
    internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence,         one
    witness' s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a factual
    conclusion.    State v. Higgins, 2003- 1980 ( La. 4/ 1/ 05), 
    898 So. 2d 1219
    , 1226, cert.
    denied, 
    546 U.S. 883
    , 
    126 S. Ct. 182
    , 
    163 L.Ed.2d 187
     ( 2005).
    When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably
    rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls,
    and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a
    reasonable doubt.      State v. Moten, 
    510 So. 2d 55
    , 61 ( La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
    denied, 
    514 So. 2d 126
     ( La. 1987).         The jury heard all of the testimony and viewed
    the evidence presented to it at trial and found the defendant guilty. In finding the
    defendant guilty, the jury clearly rejected the defense' s theory of misidentification.
    See Moten,       510   So. 2d   at    61.   Although there were inconsistencies in the
    testimony, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found the necessary
    elements of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder proved
    beyond a reasonable doubt.           See Weary, 931 So. 2d at 312.
    After a thorough review of the record, we find the evidence negates any
    reasonable probability of misidentification and supports the jury' s unanimous
    10
    guilty verdict.     We are convinced that viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
    reasonable     doubt,    and   to   the   exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis               of
    innocence, that the defendant was guilty of the second degree murder of Dedrick
    Droze and the attempted second degree murder of Joshua Mumphrey. See State v.
    Calloway, 2007- 2306 ( La. 1/ 21/ 09), 
    1 So. 3d 417
    , 418 ( per curiam).
    This assignment of error is without merit.
    SENTENCING ERROR
    Under La. Code Crim. P. art. 920( 2), we are limited in our review to errors
    discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings without
    inspection of the evidence. After a careful review of the record, we have found a
    sentencing error.
    For a conviction of second degree murder, the offender shall be imprisoned
    at hard labor for life without benefit of parole,                probation,    or   suspension   of
    sentence.    La. R. S. 14: 30. 1( B).     According to the sentencing transcript, the trial
    court failed to provide that the life sentence on count 1 was to be served at hard
    labor.2      Louisiana    Code      of    Criminal   Procedure      article   920( 2)   authorizes
    consideration of such an error on appeal.            Further, La. Code Crim. P. art. 882( A)
    authorizes correction by the appellate court.3
    We find that correction of this illegally lenient sentence does not involve the
    exercise of sentencing discretion and, as such, there is no reason why this court
    should not simply amend the sentence.           Accordingly, since a sentence at hard labor
    was the only sentence that could be imposed, we correct the sentence by providing
    2 The minutes indicate the sentence is at hard labor. When there is a discrepancy between the
    minutes and the transcript, the transcript must prevail.   State v. Lynch, 
    441 So. 2d 732
    , 734 ( La.
    1983).
    3 An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by
    an appellate court on review. La. Code Crim. P. art. 882( A).
    11
    that it be served at hard labor.   See State v. McGee, 2008- 1076 ( La. App. 1 st Cir.
    2/ 13/ 09), 
    2009 WL 390809
    , * 4 ( unpublished).     We remand to the trial court for
    correction, if necessary, of the commitment order.
    CONCLUSION
    For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentence on count 2
    and amend sentence on count 1 by providing that it be served at hard labor, and
    affirm    as   amended.   We further remand this matter for the correction of the
    commitment order and for transmission of the amended record to the Department
    of Corrections.
    CONVICTIONS        AND     SENTENCE        ON   COUNT      2   AFFIRMED;
    SENTENCE ON COUNT 1 AMENDED, AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED;
    REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
    12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2019KA0408

Filed Date: 12/27/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024