Douglas Robins v. Mohammad Zohair Pirzadah, M.D. ( 2019 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NO. 2019 CA 0523
DOUGLAS ROBINS AND KATHERINE ROBINS
VERSUS
MOHAMMA ZOHAIR PIRZADAH, M.D. AND CHARLES LANE PEARSON,
JR., M.D.
v
Judgment Rendered: DEC 2 7
Appealed from the 19' Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Suit No. 642149
The Honorable William A. Morvant, Judge Presiding
John L. Hammons Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
William W. Murray, Jr. Douglas and Katherine Robins
Lafayette, Louisiana
Janie Languirand Coles Counsel for Defendants/ Appellees
Jonathan E. Thomas Mohammad Z. Pirzadah, M.D. and
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Charles L. Pearson, Jr., M.D.
BEFO HIGGINBOTHAM, PENZATO AND LANIER, JJ.
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LANIER, J.
Plaintiffs/ appellants, Douglas and Katherine Robins, seek review of a
judgment rendered by the Nineteenth Judicial District Court in favor of the
defendants/ appellees, Mohammad Z. Pirzadah, M.D. and Charles L. Pearson, Jr.,
M.D., in which the trial court found the plaintiffs failed to prove their case of
medical malpractice against the defendants. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 20, 2012, Douglas Robins presented to the emergency room
ER) at Our Lady of the Lake Hospital ( OLOL) in Baton Rouge with complaints of
chest tightness, shortness of breath, and coughing yellow sputum. Mr. Robins was
first examined by Dr. Gerard Broussard in the ER, who ordered a chest x-ray. The
x-ray revealed findings consistent with congestive heart failure ( CHF).
Based on his examination and the x-ray, Dr. Broussard admitted Mr. Robins
to the intensive care unit ( ICU) under Dr. Pirzadah' s care. Mr. Robins alleged that
Dr. Pirzadah discontinued treatment for CHF as ordered by Dr. Broussard and
diverted Mr. Robins from the ICU to a telemetry bed. Mr. Robins remained at
OLOL overnight, and on the following day was seen by Dr. Pearson. Mr. Robins
alleged that Dr. Pearson did not timely review the x-ray or electrocardiogram
performed on Mr. Robins which indicated CHF, and thus misdiagnosed Mr.
Robins with pneumonia.
During the afternoon of February 21, 2012, Dr. Pearson noted that Mr.
Robins' s condition was worsening. He transferred Mr. Robins to critical care after
he was placed on a ventilator for being hypoxic. Mr. Robins' s cardiac rhythm
deteriorated, and he was resuscitated. It was at this point that Dr. Pearson reported
to Mr. Robins' s family that he had a poor prognosis. Dr. Carl Luikart was then
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consulted for Mr. Robins' s cardiac arrest. Dr. Luikart' s impression included
congestive cardiomyopathy, acute respiratory failure, and acute cardiac arrest.
On February 24, 2012, Mr. Robins was examined by Dr. Dariusz
Gawronski, who found that Mr. Robins had sustained a hypoxic brain injury that
left Mr. Robins in a vegetative state. On March 2, 2012, Mr. Robins was examined
by Dr. Stephen Gordon, who noted that he was in a deep coma with intermittent
twitching. In this permanent vegetative state, Mr. Robins required assistance with
breathing and eating. When Mr. Robins was released from OLOL on March 8,
20121 he was diagnosed with anoxic brain damage, acute ventilator dependent
respiratory failure, status post -cardiac arrest, acute respiratory distress syndrome,
and candida in sputum. His prognosis for a functional recovery was poor.
The plaintiffs filed a request for a Medical Review Panel ( MRP). The MRP
rendered an opinion, which was mailed to plaintiffs on June 15, 2015. Two of the
three panel physicians concluded that:
T] here was a deviation by Dr. Pirzadah and Dr. Pearson. Upon
hospitalization a deviation occurred as the patient was no longer
treated for [ CHF] and that treatment should have continued.... [ T] he
patient suffered a worsening pulmonary edema that led to respiratory
failure, but cannot say whether this led to cardiac arrest.
The plaintiffs filed a petition for damages on September 10, 2015, in which
they claimed that Dr. Pirzadah breached the applicable standards of care by failing
to follow and continue Dr. Broussard' s treatment plans for CHF, and by cancelling
Dr. Broussard' s plan for admitting Mr. Robins to the ICU, thereby reducing the
level of acute care he required. The plaintiffs also claimed that Dr. Pearson
breached the applicable standards of care by failing to review and interpret the
chest x- ray and echocardiogram results, and by not diagnosing Mr. Robins' s
worsening CHF until it resulted in cardiac arrest and hypoxia.
3
Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants on
September 26, 2018, finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof
on their claims. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit with prejudice, and
plaintiffs appealed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The plaintiffs allege the following errors by the trial court:
1. The trial court committed manifest error in holding that Dr. Michael Walton,
cardiologist and MRP member, testified that both he and the panel were
wrong" in concluding that the defendants violated applicable medical
standards of care if Mr. Robins was diagnosed with either pneumonia or
Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome ( ARDS).
2. The trial court made an error of law in refusing to apply an " adverse
presumption" against the defendant, Dr. Pirzadah, even though Dr. Pirzadah
not only did not testify but also did not appear at the trial.
3. The trial court committed manifest error by holding that the defendants had
no duty to treat Mr. Robins' s CHF that was diagnosed by four cardiologists,
by three critical care physicians, by two emergency physicians, and by one
radiologist,and which was objectively confirmed by an echocardiogram
ordered by Dr. Pirzadah but not reviewed by either defendant.
DISCUSSION
The manifest error standard of review is applicable in medical malpractice
cases.
See Landry v. Leonard J. Chabert Medical Center, 2002- 1559 ( La. App. 1
Cir. 5/ 14/ 03), 858 So. 2d 454, 462, writs denied, 2003- 1748, 1752 ( La. 10/ 17/ 03),
855 So. 2d 761. Under the manifest error standard of review, a court of appeal may
not set aside a trial court' s or a jury' s finding of fact in the absence of manifest
error or unless it is clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840, 844 ( La. 1989).
When there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and
reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the
appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable.
Touchard v. Slemco Elec. Foundation, 99- 3577 ( La. 10/ 17/ 00), 769 So. 2d 1200,
4
1204. Therefore, the issue for the reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact
was wrong, but whether the factfinder' s conclusions were reasonable under the
evidence presented. When a factfinder' s determination is based on its decision to
credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually
never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Touchard, 769 So. 2d at 1204.
Plaintiffs' first and third assignments of error essentially challenge the trial
court' s ruling. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the trial court' s findings of fact
were manifestly erroneous. The trial court' s ruling in the instant case was
accompanied by extensive oral reasons. The trial court stated it gave much
deference to the testimony of Dr. Michael Walton, who was a member of the MRP,
and was board certified in internal medicine, cardiology and interventional
cardiology. The trial court found Dr. Walton to be a thoroughly prepared witness,
and his testimony to be highly credible.
As a panelist on the MRP, Dr. Walton found that the defendants did not
meet the required standard of care in treating Mr. Robins, and that these breaches
in care were substantial contributing factors in Mr. Robins' s brain injury.
However, Dr. Walton and the other two panel members did find that Dr. Broussard
had complied with the appropriate standards of care regarding his diagnosis and
treatment of CHF.
During trial, Dr. Walton elaborated on the defendants' breach of their
applicable standards of care in that they failed to treat all of Dr. Broussard' s
diagnoses, specifically disregarding the diagnosis of CHF. He stated that a patient
can have CHF and pneumonia simultaneously, and the applicable standards of care
would require both to be treated. He confirmed that on the day after Mr. Robins
was admitted to OLOL, he suffered prolonged cardiac arrest while under the care
of the defendants.
5
From his review of Mr. Robins' s medical records, Dr. Walton could not find
any indication that Dr. Pirzadah treated Mr. Robins for CHF, despite his having
access to objective tests, lab results, a chest x-ray, an EKG, Dr. Broussard' s notes,
and nursing notes that indicated CHF. Dr. Walton referred specifically to the
echocardiogram results, which he believed revealed significant findings of an
enlarged heart that was having difficulty with pumping.
Likewise, Dr. Walton did not find any notations from Dr. Pearson that he
recognized CHF in Mr. Robins. Dr. Walton stated that CHF is a buildup of fluid
around the heart, and that proper treatment requires an attempt to reduce fluid
buildup around the heart. In treating Mr. Robins for pneumonia, the defendants
gave Mr. Robins antibiotics and intravenous fluids, which led to a buildup of fluid
in Mr. Robins' s system. Based on his review of the medical records, Dr. Walton
was of the opinion that had cardiology been called on the first day, the outcome for
Mr. Robins could have been " far different."
On cross- examination, Dr. Walton stated that Mr. Robins exhibited
symptoms that were not consistent with CHF, such as coughing and the production
of yellow sputum. He also stated that some of Mr. Robins' s symptoms, which
could have been indicative of CHF, could also have indicated a viral infection. He
also noted from the records that Dr. Broussard was not only treating Mr. Robins
for CHF, but for pneumonia as well, and considered the possibility of pneumonia
serious enough to consult a pulmonary critical care doctor before a cardiologist.
Dr. Walton acknowledged that the MRP was of the opinion that Mr. Robins
suffered a worsening pulmonary edema leading to respiratory failure, but the MRP
could not say whether this caused Mr. Robins' s cardiac arrest. Dr. Walton further
explained that while the chest x-ray was consistent with CHF, he could not say if it
was in fact CHF.
T
The plaintiffs allege that the trial court committed manifest error in stating
that Dr. Walton testified that both he and the panel were " wrong" in concluding
that the defendants violated applicable medical standards of care if Mr. Robins was
diagnosed with either pneumonia or ARDS. The defendants are clearly referring to
the following statement by the trial court:
And one of the last things Dr. Walton said that I had in my notes that I
thought was very telling: If Mr. Robins had pneumonia or ARDS,
then the medical opinion— the [ MRP] opinion is wrong.
We cannot find in Dr. Walton' s testimony a claim that the opinion of the
MRP would be " wrong" if Mr. Robins had pneumonia or ARDS; therefore, if the
trial court' s above words are taken in their natural context, such an assertion would
be incorrect. On cross- examination, the following exchange took place:
Q: But if, in fact, what [ Mr. Robins] had was pneumonia and
ARDS, then [ the MRP' s] opinions would be incorrect; wouldn' t they?
A: I think a person can have more than one medical condition. I
think a person can have an underlying cardio— a pulmonary issue like
pneumonia but also have concomitant [ CHF]. I don' t think it' s a
either/or. And I think critical care experts would agree with me, you
can have a condition where someone' s is [ sic] in full pulmonary
edema, [ CHF], and that direct damage to the lungs can cause
secondary ARDS. So, it' s not [ an] either/or. It can be a both/ and.
This testimony of Dr. Walton indicates that the MRP' s opinion would not be
wrong if Mr. Robins had pneumonia or ARDS, because he could also have had
CHF at the same time. However, when we review the full breadth of Dr. Walton' s
testimony with respect to the trial court' s factual findings, we still cannot say the
trial court was clearly wrong. Dr. Walton also admitted that Mr. Robins was
exhibiting symptoms of both CHF and pneumonia/ARDS, but could not say which
condition, if either, directly caused Mr. Robins' s cardiac arrest which led directly
to his hypoxic brain injury.
VA
The trial court also heard testimony from Dr. Phillip Dellinger, who is board
certified in internal medicine, pulmonary disease, and critical care. Dellinger also
reviewed Mr. Robins' s medical records, and he concluded that the defendants did
not breach their standard of care. His findings on the chest x-ray was that it was
not compatible with heart failure, noting the apparent symptoms of a pulmonary
infection. Dr. Dellinger also stated that while treatment for pneumonia was
continued, Mr. Robins' s cardiac conditions were still monitored to detect any
complications. He also noted that Mr. Robins' s oxygen requirements had
decreased.
Dr. Pearson testified at trial that he continued the treatment plan started by
Dr. Pirzadah. Upon his examination of Mr. Robins, his condition had improved
from the condition presented in the chest x-ray. He had also found that the chest x-
ray showed less of a chance of heart failure. He stated that since the x-ray showed
no pleural fluid developing, Mr. Robins' s diagnosis was more likely pulmonary
edema, ARDS, or extensive pneumonia. Also, Dr. Pearson testified that Mr.
Robins was receiving treatment to improve his oxygenation, and that if Mr. Robins
had CHF, his condition should have improved under that treatment. Due to Mr.
Robins' s condition stabilizing, Dr. Pearson initially did not see a reason to move
him to the ICU.
Malpractice claims are subject to the general rules of proof applicable to any
negligence action: the plaintiff must prove a standard of care, a breach of that
standard, causation, and damages. Richard v. Parish Anesthesia Associates, Ltd.,
2012- 0513 ( La. App. 4 Cir. 12/ 14/ 12), 106 So. 3d 730, 734, writ denied, 2013- 0116
La. 3/ 1/ 13), 108 So. 3d 1179. In the instant case, the trial court determined that the
plaintiffs established the applicable standard of care that the defendants had to
g
follow, but that they did not prove that the defendants had breached the standard of
care.
Reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact
should not be disturbed upon review, even though the court of appeal is convinced
that had it been the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.
Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., 2003- 1734 ( La. 4/ 14/ 04), 874 So. 2d 90, 99. Where two
permissible views of the evidence exist, the factfinder' s choice between them
cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Stobart v. State through Dept. of
Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 883 ( La. 1993). In the instant case, we
find that the record contains sufficient evidence and testimony to support the trial
court' s conclusion that the defendants did not breach their standard of care, and we
therefore find the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in its verdict.
In their second assignment of error, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court
erred by not applying the " adverse presumption" rule against Dr. Pirzadah, who
did not appear for the trial.
On the first day of the trial, counsel for the defendants informed the trial
court that Dr. Pirzadah was absent due to his son being in a severe automobile
accident in St. Louis. Neither the plaintiffs nor the trial court commented on the
matter. At the end of the second day of the trial, counsel for the defendants stated
that she was unsure if Dr. Pirzadah would be available for the next day, and again
neither the plaintiffs nor the trial court offered any comment. On the third day of
the trial, the defendants rested without calling Dr. Pirzadah. In their closing
argument, the plaintiffs first raised the issue of adverse presumption with regard to
Dr. Pirzadah' s absence, stating they had received information that Dr. Pirzadah
was not in St. Louis tending to his son, but was working at OLOL. The plaintiffs
argued that since Dr. Pirzadah was actually available for trial but refused to appear,
0
it could be presumed that the testimony he would have given would have been
adverse to his position.
In its oral reasons, the trial court stated that it had received " real"
information at the start of the trial that Dr. Pirzadah' s son had been involved in an
accident, which was the reason for Dr. Pirzadah' s absence.' The trial court noted
that the defendants chose not to file a motion for a continuance, and instead
proceeded with the trial. The trial court then distinguished this information from
the contention in the plaintiffs' closing argument that, through a phone call, the
plaintiffs discovered that Dr. Pirzadah was at OLOL. The trial court stated it had
no way of verifying the plaintiffs' contention. Further, the trial court noted that
neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants made an effort to subpoena Dr. Pirzadah if
they felt his testimony would have been essential.
The appellate standard of review for a trial court' s decision of whether an
adverse presumption should be imposed is whether the trial court abused its
discretion. BancorpSouth Bank v. Kleinpeter Trace, L.L. C., 2013- 1396 ( La. App.
1 Cir. 10/ 1/ 14), 155 So. 3d 614, 640, writ denied, 2014- 2470 ( La. 2/ 27/ 15), 159
So. 3d 1067. An adverse presumption exists when a party having control of a
favorable witness fails to call him or her to testify, even though the presumption is
rebuttable and is tempered by the fact that a party need only put on enough
evidence to prove the case. Driscoll v. Stucker, 2004- 0589 ( La. 1/ 19/ 05), 893
So. 2d 32, 47.
The evidentiary doctrine of " adverse presumption" was applied by the
Louisiana Supreme Court as early as 1910 in Varnado v. Banner Cotton Oil Co.,
126 La. 590, 590- 592, 52 So. 777, 777- 778 ( 1910), wherein the Court applied the
maxim " omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem," holding that the refusal of the
The trial court erroneously stated that Dr. Pirzadah' s daughter had been in an accident.
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managers of a corporation to produce the corporate books to interested
stockholders justified a court and jury to draw " the most unfavorable inference,
consistent with reason and probability, as to the nature and effect of the evidence
which the opposite party has been precluded from using and examining as a means
for the discovery of the truth."
Thus, as previously recognized by this court, when a litigant fails to produce
evidence within his reach, a presumption that the evidence would have been
detrimental to his case is applied, unless the failure to produce the evidence is
adequately explained. BancorpSouth Bank, 155 So. 3d at 639- 40. Such a
circumstance is not present in the instant case. Regardless of where Dr. Pirzadah
was at the time of the trial, he was duly accessible prior to the trial, and the failure
of his being deposed or subpoenaed to testify is attributable equally to the plaintiffs
and defendants.' Moreover, the trial court was satisfied with the defendants'
explanation for Dr. Pirzadah' s absence, and we find no abuse in the trial court' s
discretion to deny the imposition of the theory of adverse presumption against Dr.
Pirzadah.
DECREE
The judgment of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court in favor of the
defendants/ appellees, Mohammad Z. Pirzadah, M.D. and Charles L. Pearson, Jr.,
M.D., dismissing with prejudice the petition for damages filed by the
plaintiffs/appellants, Douglas and Katherine Robins, is affirmed. All costs for this
appeal are assessed to the plaintiffs/ appellants.
AFFIRMED.
2 The defendants noted in their brief that Dr. Pirzadah had never been deposed prior to the trial.
Likewise, we find no evidence of any such deposition in the record.