State of Louisiana Versus Lamonte Loggins ( 2024 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 23-KA-519
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
LAMONTE LOGGINS COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 21-2748, DIVISION "K"
HONORABLE ELLEN SHIRER KOVACH, JUDGE PRESIDING
October 30, 2024
MARC E. JOHNSON
JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Marc E. Johnson, and Stephen J. Windhorst
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED;
COUNT ONE SENTENCE AFFIRMED;
COUNT TWO SENTENCE VACATED;
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING;
REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF
THE UNIFORM COMMITMENT ORDER
MEJ
SMC
SJW
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Thomas J. Butler
Andrea F. Long
Brittany Beckner
Carolyn Chkautovich
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
LAMONTE E. LOGGINS
Jane C. Hogan
JOHNSON, J.
Defendant, Lamonte Loggins, appeals his convictions and sentences for first
degree murder and obstruction of justice in the 24th Judicial District Court,
Division “K”. For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant’s convictions,
affirm Defendant’s life sentence for first degree murder, vacate Defendant’s
sentence for obstruction of justice, and remand the matter with instructions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 12, 2021, a Jefferson Parish Grand Jury returned a bill of
indictment charging Defendant with the first degree murder of Abdel Sylla, in
violation of La. R.S. 14:30 (count one), and obstruction of justice by removing the
murder weapon from the scene and disposing of it, in violation of La. R.S.
14:130.1 (count two). Defendant was arraigned on August 18, 2021, and pleaded
not guilty.
On June 29, 2023, the State filed a motion for discovery, demand for notice
of alibi and/or mental condition defenses and a notice of intent to introduce
evidence of other offenses. On July 19, 2023, the State’s notice of intent to
introduce evidence as res gestae or in the alternative under La. C.E. Article 404(B)
was filed. On July 23, 2023, Defendant filed an opposition to the State’s intent to
introduce evidence as res gestae or in the alternative under La. C.E. Article
404(B). On July 24, 2023, the judge granted the State’s notice of intent to
introduce evidence as res gestae or in the alternative under La. C.E. Article
404(B). On the same date, a 12-person jury was selected.
At trial, Erica Winford testified that she lived with her boyfriend, Eric
Rodgers, at 4337 Loire Drive, Apartment D, in Kenner in November 2020. At the
time, she owned a Hyundai Sonata that she shared with Rodgers. She spent
Thanksgiving of 2020 with Rodgers in New Orleans. She recalled that Rodgers’
brother, Lamonte Loggins, arrived in New Orleans the Saturday after
23-KA-519 1
Thanksgiving. On the evening of November 30, 2020, Rodgers and Defendant
were home with Ms. Winford, and the brothers left sometime after 9:00 p.m. in
Ms. Winford’s Hyundai.1
Rodgers2 testified that he and his brother, Defendant, robbed a Shell gas
station on West Esplanade and Williams Boulevard in Kenner on November 30,
2020. He stated their plan was to get money from the cash register because of the
pandemic.3 He recalled that in preparation for the robbery, they went to the gas
station earlier in the day to determine who worked there and how many people
would be there. Rodgers testified that during the first visit, he purchased cigars,
and he and Defendant went back to his house at 4337 Loire Drive, where he lived
with Ms. Winford. Later that evening, Defendant and Rodgers drove near the gas
station and parked on a back street. Rodgers and Defendant walked to the gas
station.
Rodgers stated that he viewed surveillance video from the store and
identified himself in the video. A compiled and condensed version of the
surveillance video was played for the jury. In that video, a man in dark clothes
entered the store. He walked to a drink cooler and appeared to be on the phone.
Rodgers testified that when he entered the store, he was on the phone, and he
walked to the back of the store. He identified himself in the surveillance footage
as he walked through the door. Rodgers stated he was supposed to act as the
1
Ms. Winford acknowledged that November 2020 was during the height of COVID, and she kept
latex gloves, masks, and sanitizer in her car.
2
He acknowledged that he was previously convicted of “criminal attempt, aggravated burglary,”
aggravated robbery, having contraband in jail, manslaughter, armed robbery, and obstruction of justice.
He acknowledged that he signed a plea agreement related to this incident.
3
Rodgers recalled that due to the pandemic, he and Ms. Winford had financial problems. He
agreed that he was receiving notices from creditors.
Ms. Winford denied that she and Rodgers were behind on their bills in late November 2020.
When presented with a delinquency notice addressed to Rodgers, she indicated that she was unaware of it
or their financial situation. She recalled that neither she nor Rodgers were working at the time and that
they had three children.
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lookout during the robbery. The video then showed a man in a white hat enter the
store. While viewing the surveillance footage, Rodgers identified Defendant as the
man entering the store wearing a white hat.
In the video, Defendant (the man in the white hat) looked around, appeared
to acknowledge the clerk, and proceeded to get a cup of coffee. The clerk stepped
from behind the counter to help with the coffee and then returned behind the
counter. Rodgers (the person in dark clothes) left the store, and Defendant walked
to the counter. He interacted with the clerk and pointed to an item behind the
clerk. The clerk retrieved the item. After the clerk returned to the counter,
Defendant pulled a gun from the pocket of his jacket and pointed it at the clerk.
He fired a shot near the clerk as the clerk fell on the ground. Rodgers re-entered
the store while still on the phone. He walked behind the counter and took two
packs of Newport cigarettes as the clerk appeared to try to get the cash register to
open. While viewing the video, Rodgers identified himself walking behind the
counter and taking two packs of Newport cigarettes.
The video showed Rodgers exit from behind the counter as the register
opened. The clerk put the cash drawer on the counter, and Defendant removed all
of the bills. The clerk knelt on the ground with his hands in the air. Rodgers
opened the store door and stood there. Defendant walked behind the counter and
appeared to hit the clerk with the gun. He then shot the clerk.4 Defendant and
Rodgers left the store as the clerk laid on the ground behind the counter. The clerk
managed to reach his cell phone and make a call.5 The video showed the police
arrive and enter the store with their weapons drawn. The officers located the clerk,
4
Rodgers stated that he believed Defendant only fired the gun once.
5
Rodgers explained that the store clerk never said he was going to call the police. Rodgers
acknowledged that the store clerk knew him and could identify him by his face tattoos. He denied telling
Defendant to kill the clerk because he could identify him.
It appeared the clerk called 9-1-1. In a 9-1-1 call played for the jury, the caller stated that he was
robbed and shot.
23-KA-519 3
and an officer attempted to render aid. EMS ultimately entered the store. EMS
assessed the clerk, who was still alive at that time, and took him away.
Rodgers stated he did not have a gun with him at the gas station, and he did
not know anyone would get hurt during the robbery. Rodgers testified that
Defendant told him that he got the gun from their sister, April Rodgers, around
Thanksgiving. Defendant showed him the gun when he returned to New Orleans
from Memphis. The parties entered a stipulation that, if called to testify, Memphis
Police Officer Dustin Maglisco would testify that he met with April relative to a
firearm that was reported stolen on November 27, 2020 as part of his investigation.
The stipulation reflected that Officer Maglisco met with April, and she provided
him with the box belonging to her stolen firearm, which was a Taurus 9 mm gun.
Rodgers testified that, after leaving the gas station, he and Defendant went
through the parking lot of the bank behind the gas station to get to their car.
During that time, Rodgers asked Defendant why he shot the man, but Defendant
did not answer him. They drove back to the house on Loire Drive. Ms. Winford
recalled that Rodgers and Defendant returned home after 2:00 a.m., and she was in
bed. Rodgers explained that Defendant told him to give him his clothes, which
Defendant then put in a trash bag into which he poured bleach. Rodgers recalled
that Defendant threw the bullets in the creek behind the house on Loire Drive.
Rodgers explained that they put the money on the table,6 and he laid down with
Ms. Winford. He recalled that she asked him what was wrong. He told her that he
thought he messed up, and that she would find out what he meant. Ms. Winford
stated that Rodgers looked nervous and took a shower. Ms. Winford testified that
he was acting different and was upset. He did not say anything about where he had
been. Rodgers eventually went to sleep.
6
Rodgers testified that he did not know how much money they took from the gas station. He
recalled that Defendant later gave him half of the money.
23-KA-519 4
Ms. Winford woke up early the next morning and saw a news alerts about a
robbery at a Kenner gas station on her phone. She mentioned the news to Rodgers,
who then told her that he thought Defendant shot a man when they were at the gas
station. She recalled that Rodgers told her that he was there and he ran. She
described Rodgers as acting nervous and smoking heavily that day.
Officer Billy Hingle with the Kenner Police Department responded to a call
for service regarding an armed robbery on November 30, 2020, at a Shell gas
station at West Esplanade and Williams. He recalled that he was informed that the
armed suspect may have still been present, and he waited for backup to arrive.
Once Officer Eric Hill and other officers arrived, they approached the gas station
and saw someone behind the counter. Upon entering, the officers looked for
suspects inside and cleared the building. Officer Hingle saw the victim, but it was
not immediately apparent that he was shot because there was no blood on the
ground. He observed signs of blunt force trauma to the victim’s head. Officer
Hingle testified that the victim said he could not breathe, and he thought the victim
was confused. Officer Hingle stated that Officer Hill rendered aid and located a
gunshot wound to the victim’s chest. EMS then entered the building, rendered aid,
and ultimately transported the victim to the hospital, where he later died.
Officer Hingle reviewed and described several photographs of the scene.
The gas station had damage to a floor tile, and a possible bullet hole was observed
on a box on the ground behind the counter. Two projectiles—one found on the
floor on the customer side of the counter and another one inside a box—were
23-KA-519 5
recovered. Three fired 9 mm casings and four fragments were found.7 A coffee
cup from the counter was seized.8
Satishkumar Patel, the owner of the gas station, was contacted by the police
and went to the scene. He provided the police with surveillance footage. After
watching surveillance video, latex gloves on the counter were identified as having
fallen out of Defendant’s pocket as he brandished a firearm.
Detective Aaron Savoie with the Kenner Police Department served as the
lead investigator of the robbery-homicide at the Shell gas station on November 30,
2020. When Detective Savoie arrived at the scene, he spoke to the responding
officer and then went in the store. Detective Savoie explained that items were
seized and sent to the crime lab. Dr. Marcella Zozaya, a forensic DNA analyst
with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”), analyzed swabs from several
items in this case.9 A Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) search matched
Defendant’s DNA to the DNA on the latex gloves, and Dr. Zozaya testified there
was support that Defendant was a contributor to the DNA on the gloves.10
Detective Savoie directed responding officers to canvas the area for
additional surveillance video and to conduct an automated license plate recognition
(“ALPR”) system query to determine vehicles in the immediate area of the scene.11
7
Alexis Riviera, previously a JPSO firearm and tool mark analyst, assisted in this investigation
and authored a report. She examined three 9 mm cartridge casings recovered from the scene and
determined that they were fired from the same 9 mm pistol. She agreed that a Taurus pistol could have
fired the ammunition collected from the scene but that without the weapon, she could not say so
definitively. Ms. Riviera also examined a copper jacketed projectile and a jacket fragment which were
fired from the same weapon. Additionally, she examined a lead-like projectile and three fragments, but
she was unable to obtain information from them.
8
The cup, casings, and bullet strikes on the floor had already been identified by the time
Detective Aaron Savoie arrived at the scene.
9
As to the coffee cup swabs, Ms. Winford was a contributor to the DNA on the cup, and Rodgers
and Defendant were excluded as contributors to the DNA mixture.
10
Detective Savoie similarly testified that there was a DNA match to Defendant on the latex
gloves.
11
Sergeant Bryan Weiter with the Kenner Police Department assisted in investigating a potential
lead into Malik Chester. He explained that license plate cameras and surveillance cameras near the Shell
gas station captured a white Honda connected to Mr. Chester near the gas station around the time of the
incident. Mr. Chester was arrested by another jurisdiction several hours after the incident. Sergeant
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A large amount of surveillance footage was collected from residences and
businesses. Based on the surveillance footage, the police created a map of the
suspects’ route. The footage was played for the jury as Detective Savoie narrated.
He explained that the two suspects parked and walked together until they split up.
The detective stated one suspect wearing a white beanie jumped a fence to get to
the gas station.
Detective Savoie created a similar map of the suspects’ route leaving the
scene after the crime. That map was described by the detective as it was published
to the jury. Detective Savoie explained that two suspects are seen running and that
the second one is wearing a white beanie. The suspects returned to their vehicle
and drove to 4337 Loire Drive. Detective Savoie testified that initially the license
plate of the suspects’ vehicle could not be seen, and it was unclear if there even
was a license plate.
On December 1, 2020, Rodgers asked Ms. Winford to drive him and
Defendant to Biloxi, Mississippi. Ms. Winford recalled that she agreed because
she was scared and wanted them out of the house. Rodgers, Defendant, and Ms.
Winford drove the Hyundai Sonata to Biloxi, Mississippi, where Rodgers and
Defendant would take a bus to Memphis to work for their uncle. Rodgers
explained that they did not take a bus from New Orleans because he assumed the
police would look for them there. On the way, they stopped to drop off Ms.
Winford’s children at Rodgers’ parents’ home in Hollygrove. When Rodgers came
out of the house, Defendant said he put the clothes from the bag containing bleach
in the neighbor’s trash can.
Once in Biloxi, they went to a Shell gas station. Rodgers and Ms. Winford
went in the store while Defendant stayed in the car. Rodgers testified that
Weiter interviewed him and determined that he was not connected to the incident. He stated that other
leads were also explored but were not successful.
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Defendant later told him that he threw his gun in a trash can at the Shell gas station
in Biloxi. There were no buses to Memphis that day, so Ms. Winford obtained a
hotel room. She walked with Defendant and Rodgers to the room. She spoke to
Rodgers, who was crying, and then she drove home. The next morning, Rodgers
and Defendant took a bus to Memphis.
Sergeant Weiter testified that he was sent to a hotel, a gas station, and a bus
station in Biloxi. He identified surveillance footage from those locations, which
was played for the jury. Sergeant Weiter testified that the gas station footage
showed Rodgers and Ms. Winford walk into the store as Defendant walked to the
dumpster area before going in the store.12 Surveillance video from the hotel
showed Ms. Winford obtain a hotel room.13 Sergeant Weiter stated that Ms.
Winford did not stay the night at the hotel. Footage from the bus terminal was
played for the jury. Sergeant Weiter testified that the video showed that Defendant
was wearing black rubberized shoes. Defendant and Rodgers bought bus tickets
for December 2, 2020 from Biloxi to Memphis.14
A Hyundai Sonata belonging to Ms. Winford was identified as a lead in the
investigation. On December 2, 2020, Detective Kevin Treigle with the Kenner
12
The footage shows a gray vehicle stop at a gas pump. Two people, identified by Detective
Weiter as Rodgers and Ms. Winford, get out of the car first and walk away. The video showed Defendant
exit the driver’s seat of the car and retrieve something from the trunk. Footage from a different camera
showed a man and woman, whom Detective Weiter identified as Rodgers and Ms. Winford, enter the gas
station at approximately 19:47, according to the video timestamp. Defendant entered the store
approximately two minutes later. A different camera angle showed a parking area with a dumpster.
Detective Weiter identified Defendant in the video as the person approaching the dumpster.
13
The surveillance footage from the hotel showed a gray vehicle, which was the same grey
Hyundai Sonata Detective Weiter described in his testimony. Defendant exited the driver’s seat, and
Rodgers exited the back passenger seat. They appeared to look at the back of the vehicle before
Defendant walked out of view of that camera. Defendant returned to the vehicle. Rodgers and Ms.
Winford then exited the vehicle and walked out of view. Footage from inside the hotel lobby showed
Defendant enter, speak with the front desk clerk, and exit. Later, Ms. Winford and Rodgers entered the
hotel and spoke to the clerk.
14
Video from the bus station terminal showed Defendant pay cash for bus tickets, while Rodgers
stood nearby talking on the phone.
Sergeant Weiter explained that on the tickets, Defendant’s last name was spelled with a “G” at
the end, and Rodger’s first name was misspelled with an additional “K.” He acknowledged that these
may have been intentionally misspelled to disguise the names or had been an entry error.
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Police Department assisted in tracking and locating a grey 2012 Hyundai Sonata.
The vehicle was parked at 4337 Loire Drive in the driveway behind a Lincoln
Town Car associated with Rodgers and Defendant.15 Detective Treigle requested
assistance surveilling the Hyundai. When the Hyundai left the residence, Detective
Treigle maintained surveillance of the residence, while other officers followed the
vehicle and conducted a traffic stop. A tracker was placed on the Hyundai, which
belonged to Ms. Winford, at some point after it returned from Biloxi. The tracker
revealed that the vehicle traveled from 4337 Loire Drive to an address in New
Orleans.
Ms. Winford’s vehicle was seized. Sergeant Vincent Moranti with the
Kenner Police Department assisted in searching the Hyundai. Paperwork with
Rodgers’ name and paperwork addressed to Ms. Winford were found in the
vehicle. An Apple cell phone and a black rubber slip-on shoe were also found in
the vehicle.
Detective Savoie testified that 4337 Loire Drive, Apartment D, was
searched. Two boxes of Newport cigarettes were found—one on the sidewalk
leading to the apartment and another in a trash can inside the apartment.16
Household cleaners containing bleach were found in the apartment. Detective
Savoie explained that the cleaners were significant because, when he and another
detective entered the apartment, they noticed a strong odor of bleach. He stated
that he later learned from Rodgers that bleach was used on the clothing worn
during the incident prior to the clothes being discarded. An iPhone box and
15
Detective Treigle ran the license plate of the Lincoln and learned that it was registered to
Courtney Loggins. He found three queries involving that vehicle and two individuals.
16
Dr. Zozaya could not obtain sufficient DNA from one of the cigarette boxes. There was very
strong support that Rodgers and Ms. Winford were contributors to the DNA on the other cigarette box,
and Defendant was excluded as a contributor.
23-KA-519 9
various paperwork addressed to Rodgers and Ms. Winford were found in the
apartment.
Detective Savoie explained that, by the time the car was located and
connected to Rodgers and Defendant, he had already spoken to the gas station
owner, who recognized one of the suspects as a customer who bought Newport
cigarettes. The owner described the suspect as “covered in tattoos,” and the
suspect had a tattoo between his eyes.17 The driver’s license for Rodgers showed
the tattoo. The detective also connected Rodgers to the apartment on Loire Drive.
Based on the suspects association with the Lincoln Town Car, the information
from Mr. Patel, and the DNA match on the latex glove, Rodgers and Defendant
were identified as suspects by the police, and an arrest warrant for Defendant was
obtained.
On December 8, 2020, after having already spoken to Ms. Winford,18
Detective Savoie received an anonymous call. The caller provided information
about the incident that was not released to the media. The caller, later determined
to be Rodgers, stated that his brother shot the man, the gun was in a dumpster at a
Shell gas station in Biloxi, and the gun would not be found because it was in a
landfill.19 Detective Savoie said Rodgers showed no remorse and provided an
17
Mr. Patel, the gas station owner, testified that when he watched the surveillance footage, he
recognized one of the suspects by a tattoo of numbers on his forehead. He recalled that the person had
frequently bought Newport cigarettes from his store. The police showed him photographs, and he
recognized the tattooed customer.
18
Detective Savoie spoke to Ms. Winford sometime after he obtained the arrest warrant for
Defendant. She informed him that on November 30, 2020, Rodgers and Defendant went to the store, and
Rodgers appeared to be frazzled when they returned. Ms. Winford told the detective that Defendant and
Rodgers took her Hyundai Sonata to the store. Detective Savoie testified that she told him that the next
morning, she saw reports of the homicide and photographs of the two suspects. She recognized the
suspects as Defendant and Rodgers. Upon speaking to Rodgers about it, he confessed to her that it was
him and that Defendant shot the man. Ms. Winford also told the detective that she wanted Defendant and
Rodgers out of the house and that Rodgers initially wanted to go to Memphis without Defendant. The
detective corroborated Ms. Winford’s statements about bringing Defendant and Rodgers to Biloxi, where
they took a bus to Memphis.
19
Rodgers testified that at some point while he was in Memphis, he called the police in Kenner.
He indicated that he called twice and that he spoke to a detective the second time. Rodgers recalled that
he told the detective what happened, Defendant was the shooter, and where Defendant was located.
23-KA-519 10
address to Defendant’s location. Detective Savoie corroborated everything said on
the call, and Rodgers was arrested the next day in Memphis.
Defendant was arrested in Memphis at the location Rodgers provided.
While in the Memphis jail, Defendant made a recorded phone call on December
22, 2020. That call was played for the jury. In the call, Defendant stated that he
will either get “life or death,” he does not expect leniency, and he deserves what he
gets. He said, “I did what I did. Nobody forced me to do it. I did that. Nobody
put a gun in my hand.” Defendant continued, “I wasn’t high. I wasn’t drunk. I
was sober-minded. I did what I did. I got to live with that. It just sucks that I got
my brother involved in it.” Defendant voiced that he was considering pleading
guilty.
A phone was seized from Defendant when he was arrested.20 Search
warrants were obtained for cell phone records. Detective Savoie obtained call
records associated with Defendant’s phone number, which were GPS plotted by
the state police. The detective said that the coordinates in the call records
corroborated Rodgers’ statement that he and Defendant committed the armed
robbery and murder of Mr. Sylla in Kenner, traveled to the Biloxi area, and then
traveled to Memphis, Tennessee. The phone had connected to the Greyhound bus
wi-fi and to the hotel wi-fi.
Rodgers was extradited to Kenner and provided a statement.21 Detective
Savoie testified that in the statement, Rodgers said Defendant threw the rounds
20
Lieutenant Ed Rhode, then with the digital forensic unit of the Kenner Police Department,
conducted a phone extraction on an LG cell phone related to this case. The parties stipulated that when
Defendant was arrested on December 8, 2020, in Memphis, he was in possession of an LG phone that was
later transferred to the custody of the Kenner Police Department.
21
Rodgers acknowledged that he told the police then that he did not know why Defendant parked
where he did that night, he did not see a gun on Defendant, and he did not know there was going to be a
robbery. Rodgers stated he lied at the time to try to save himself and Defendant. A detective agreed that
in Rodgers’ plea agreement, he indicated that he served as a lookout during this incident, that he did not
know there would be a robbery and that he did not see a gun on Defendant.
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from the firearm behind a creek behind the apartment complex before they left.22
Rodgers also told him that Defendant had asked him for his clothing from the
incident, which Defendant put in a bag and poured bleach on before discarding the
bag in a garbage can on Loire Drive. The detective stated that Rodgers said he and
Defendant went to the Shell gas station before the incident and that at that time, he
bought cigars, and Defendant bought a drink.23 Based on information provided by
Rodgers, on December 16, 2020, Detective Savoie contacted senior district
management for Waste Management in Biloxi and was told that it was highly
unlikely that the discarded firearm could be located.
Erica Loggins Tullison, the mother of Rodgers and Defendant, recalled that
in November or December of 2020, a co-worker mentioned the robbery-homicide
at the Shell gas station. She then looked at an article and said a photo in the article
looked familiar. At some point, the Kenner Police went to her house. She
identified Rodgers and Defendant in still photographs of surveillance footage. Ms.
Tullison called “Crime Stoppers” at some point because she was concerned that
Rodgers and Defendant were involved.
Forensic pathologist Dr. Dana Troxclair conducted an autopsy on Mr. Sylla.
He sustained a gunshot wound that entered his left upper chest and exited his right
mid-back area. She explained that lifesaving measures were performed while Mr.
Sylla was at the hospital, and he died there. Dr. Troxclair stated his cause of death
was a gunshot wound to the chest and his death was classified as a homicide.24
22
Detective Savoie explained that he contacted Captain Todd Vignes with the JPSO about the
ammunition but was told that based off of the information provided, there was no way to retrieve the
discarded rounds.
23
This was corroborated by surveillance video, which was played for the jury. Further,
Defendant’s phone records showed a transaction on November 30, 2020, at the Shell gas station.
24
Dr. Troxclair stated Mr. Sylla had a pattern abrasion with a laceration on his forehead and a
few pattern abrasions on his back. She explained that the exit wound was a shored exit, meaning when
the bullet exited the body, the skin was against a surface such as the floor. She testified that there was not
a lot of blood at the scene because it was building up in Mr. Sylla’s body.
23-KA-519 12
At the conclusion of trial, on July 26, 2023, the jury found Defendant guilty
as charged on both counts of first degree murder and obstruction of justice by
removing the murder weapon from the scene and disposing of it. On August 9,
2023, Defendant filed a motion for post verdict judgment of acquittal and for new
trial. The judge denied the motion on August 10, 2023, and the State presented a
victim impact statement. The judge then sentenced Defendant to life in prison
without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as to count one
and to 40 years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation,
or suspension of sentence as to count two. The judge ordered the sentences to run
consecutively. During the sentencing hearing, Defendant objected to the sentence
for obstruction of justice and the consecutive nature of the sentences and filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence. The judge denied the motion to
reconsider. A motion for appeal was also filed and granted on August 10, 2023.
The instant appeal followed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
On appeal, Defendant alleges: 1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction for obstruction of justice; 2) the trial court erred when it allowed the
State to introduce evidence that he had allegedly stolen a firearm four days prior to
the robbery; and 3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him to the maximum
penalty for obstruction of justice and ordered the sentence to run consecutive to his
life sentence.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Sufficiency of Evidence
Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his
obstruction of justice conviction. He posits that the State did not offer any direct
evidence that he intentionally tampered with or removed evidence to thwart the
criminal investigation. He provides that the only circumstantial evidence was
23-KA-519 13
surveillance video showing him walk toward a dumpster at a gas station in Biloxi
and Rodgers’ testimony. Defendant argues that Rodgers did not testify that he saw
Defendant dispose of the gun but rather claimed that Defendant told him that he
did so. He concludes that his conviction for obstruction of justice should be
vacated because the evidence fails to rebut every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence.
The State avers that there was ample support for the obstruction of justice
conviction. It provides that the evidence established that Defendant possessed and
discharged a firearm during the commission of a first degree murder, and that he
fled the scene with the weapon. The State explains that Rodgers’ testimony was
corroborated by other evidence. It also argues that Defendant’s intentional
bleaching and disposal of the clothing worn during the murder and his disposal of
ammunition provided additional evidence that in discarding the firearm, he
specifically intended to distort the results of the criminal investigation. The State
concludes that Defendant knew that his actions would result in a criminal
investigation that would focus on the murder weapon and the identity of the
shooter, and that he fled the scene with the gun and disposed of it with the intent of
avoiding detection as the shooter.
The question of sufficiency of the evidence is properly raised in the trial
court by a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art.
821. State v. Nguyen, 22-286 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/27/23), 359 So.3d 108, 118.
Defendant filed a motion for post verdict judgment of acquittal and for new trial on
August 9, 2023. In that motion, he contended that the verdict was contrary to the
law and the evidence. He also alleged that Dr. Troxclair could not opine to a
reasonable degree that the victim’s death was or was not caused by any act or
failure to act on the part of the hospital and that the State failed to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant argued that the judge erroneously ruled on
23-KA-519 14
the defense’s use of a hypothetical situation pertaining to reasonable doubt.
Finally, Defendant contended that a phone call admitted at trial was not voluntarily
made, and it should not have been admitted into evidence.
The judge explained that this was one of the strongest cases she has presided
over as a judge, and the jury was correct in its verdict. The judge stated that the
life-saving measures were not the cause of death but rather the cause was the
“gunshot that was cold-bloodedly delivered by the [D]efendant.” The judge also
addressed the sustained objection regarding the hypothetical and said that it was
not a fair comparison or description of the required burden of proof. She further
provided that Defendant was warned that the jail calls were being monitored. The
judge denied the motion.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must
determine if the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a mixture of both,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a
rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Johnson, 23-273 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/28/24), 382 So.3d
1129, 1133.
The directive that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution requires the reviewing court to defer to the actual trier of fact’s rational
credibility calls, evidence weighing, and inference drawing. State v. Aguilar, 23-
34 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/23), 376 So.3d 1105, 1108. The resolution of conflicting
testimony rests solely with the trier of fact, who may accept or reject, in whole or
in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Woods, 23-41 (La. App. 5 Cir.
11/15/23), 376 So.3d 1144, 1157, writ denied, 23-1615 (La. 5/29/24), 385 So.3d
700. Thus, in the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflicts with
physical evidence, the testimony of one witness, if believed by the trier of fact, is
23-KA-519 15
sufficient to support a conviction. State v. Sly, 23-60 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/2/23),
376 So.3d 1047, 1072, writ denied, 23-1588 (La. 4/23/24), 383 So.3d 608.
This deference to the fact-finder does not permit a reviewing court to decide
whether it believes a witness or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of
the evidence. State v. Gassenberger, 23-148 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/20/23), 378 So.3d
820, 829. As a result, under the Jackson standard, a review of the record for
sufficiency of the evidence does not require the reviewing court to determine
whether the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but
whether, upon review of the whole record, any rational trier of fact would have
found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Circumstantial evidence
consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of
the main fact can be inferred according to reason and common experience. State v.
Romero, 23-376 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/28/24), 383 So.3d 1045, 1053. When
circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of an offense, La. R.S.
15:438 provides that “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to
prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence.” Woods, 376 So.3d at 1155. This is not a separate test from the
Jackson standard but rather provides a helpful basis for determining the existence
of reasonable doubt. All evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be
sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. Evidence of flight, concealment, and attempt to avoid
apprehension is relevant and admissible to prove consciousness of guilt from
which the trier-of-fact may infer guilt. State v. Davis, 18-485 (La. App. 5 Cir.
4/10/19), 269 So.3d 1123, 1132, writ denied, 19-716 (La. 11/12/19), 282 So.3d
229.
Encompassed within proving the elements of an offense is the necessity of
23-KA-519 16
proving the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator. Where the key issue is
identification, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of
misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof. State v. Key, 23-167 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 12/27/23), 379 So.3d 96, 113.
La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1) provides that the crime of obstruction of justice,
when committed with the knowledge that such act may affect a criminal
proceeding, includes “[t]ampering with evidence with the specific intent of
distorting the results of any criminal investigation or proceeding which may
reasonably prove relevant to a criminal investigation or proceeding.” This
provision further states that “[t]ampering with evidence shall include the
intentional alteration, movement, removal, or addition of any object or substance”
at the location of any incident which the perpetrator knows or has good reason to
believe will be the subject of any law enforcement investigation. Here, the
indictment specified that Defendant obstructed justice by tampering with evidence
with the specific intent to distort the results of a first degree or second degree
murder investigation by “removing from the scene of the shooting incident and
subsequently disposing of the murder weapon, knowing that such action or actions
has affected, reasonably may affect, or will affect an actual or potential present,
past or future criminal proceeding.”
The knowledge requirement of obstruction of justice is met if the perpetrator
merely knows that an act “reasonably may” affect a criminal proceeding. The
statute does not require the criminal proceeding actually be affected; the
perpetrator just must know and understand that the act reasonably may affect the
proceeding. State v. Nicholas, 10-866 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/24/11), 67 So.3d 610,
615. To support a conviction, the State must prove more than the mere removal of
evidence from a crime scene; the State must also prove that such removal was done
with “the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation or
23-KA-519 17
proceeding which may reasonably prove relevant to a criminal investigation or
proceeding.” La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1).
The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 07-1052 (La. 6/3/08), 983
So.2d 95, 101-02, outlined four elements of obstruction of justice that must be met.
First, the obstruction must be committed with the knowledge that such act has,
reasonably may, or will affect an actual or potential, past, or future criminal
proceeding. Id. at 101. Second, the defendant must tamper with evidence with the
specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation or proceeding
which may reasonably prove relevant to a criminal investigation or proceeding. Id.
at 102. Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the
circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal
consequences to follow his act or failure to act and may be inferred from the
circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant. La. R.S.
14:10(1); State v. Holliday, 17-1921 (La. 1/29/20), 340 So.3d 648, 666, cert.
denied, --- U.S.---, 141 S.Ct. 1271, 209 L.Ed.2d 10 (2021). Third, the statute
provides that the tampering be either by the intentional alteration, movement,
removal, or addition of any object or substance. Nothing beyond movement of the
evidence is required by the statute if accompanied by the requisite intent and
knowledge. Jones, 983 So.2d at 102; State v. Tatum, 09-1004 (La. App. 5 Cir.
5/25/10), 40 So.3d 1082, 1090. Fourth, the tampering must be done at the location
of any incident which the perpetrator knows or has good reason to believe will be
the subject of any investigation by law enforcement officers. Jones, supra.We find that there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of
obstruction of justice based on his removal of and disposal of the gun. In State v.
Bethley, 22-849 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/21/23), 368 So.3d 1148, 1155, writ denied, 23-
965 (La. 1/17/24), 377 So.3d 242, the defendant argued that there was insufficient
evidence to convict him of obstruction of justice because the State could not
23-KA-519 18
definitively prove that he removed the firearm from the crime scene. The Fourth
Circuit explained that the argument was unpersuasive as the defendant testified that
he left the scene of the crime with the firearm used in the commission of the crime.
Additionally, the evidence established that a firearm was not located at the scene of
the crime and was never recovered by law enforcement. The court explained that
during his testimony, when questioned about the whereabouts of the firearm, the
defendant evasively responded to the question and never provided a direct answer.
The court concluded that it was reasonable to infer that the defendant left the scene
with the firearm that he knew would be the subject of a criminal investigation. Id.
at 1156.
Similarly, in State v. Harvey, 21-730 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/25/22), 345 So.3d
1043, writ denied, 22-953 (La. 9/20/22), 346 So.3d 803, the defendant averred that
there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for obstruction of justice.
The Fourth Circuit explained that in the defendant’s statement, he admitted to
fleeing the scene with the gun he used to shoot the victims, then later disposing of
the gun, stating that he gave it to someone. The court stated that the defendant’s
action in this regard was significant as it showed that the defendant tampered with
evidence with the specific intent of distorting a murder investigation. The court
explained that viewing the evidence, specifically the undisputed fact that the
defendant fled the scene with his weapon and later disposed of it, in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, it was clear that a rational trier of fact could have
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant obstructed justice by
tampering with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results of the
pertinent criminal investigation. Id. at 1050.
Further, in State v. Manuel, 21-273 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/6/22), 337 So.3d 967,
974, at trial, the defendant admitted that he was involved in the shooting and that,
rather than remaining on scene, he fled the area, returning to Lafayette, instead of
23-KA-519 19
staying on scene to assert his claim of firing shots in self-defense. Thereafter, the
defendant learned that authorities were looking for him, but he did not turn himself
in. At trial, he asserted that he put the gun back where he always kept it; however,
he admitted to lying to investigators about having a gun, its whereabouts, and his
involvement in the shooting. Moreover, the jury heard the jail calls between the
defendant and his girlfriend in which he stated he would “beat this s**t” and
agreed with her that he “played it smart.” The Fourth Circuit found that the
defendant’s actions of fleeing the scene of the shooting, concealing the weapon in
his mother’s house underneath a bed, and lying to investigators about his
involvement in the shooting as well as the gun he used, all indicated his specific
intent to distort the results of the criminal investigation. Id.In State v. Jones, 18-973 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/27/19), 314 So.3d 1, 14-15, cert.
granted, judgment vacated, --- U.S. ---, 141 S.Ct. 1041, 208 L.Ed.2d 513 (2021),25
the court found sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant’s conviction
for obstruction of justice. The court explained that the defendant admitted to
discarding the gun, which established that he secluded a piece of evidence with the
intent to distort the results of an investigation. The court stated that because the
defendant disposed of the gun and the police were unable to recover it, he was able
to assert at trial that the weapon was a water gun. Also, the defendant insisted to
an officer that it would be “dumb” to carry a firearm based on a prior conviction,
which further showed that the defendant knew possession of a gun could affect
potential criminal proceedings against him. The court found that a reasonable juror
could conclude that by disposing of the gun in the canal, the defendant was
attempting to avoid future criminal proceedings. Id.In State v. Powell, 15-218 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/28/15), 179 So.3d 721, writ
25
The judgment was vacated, and the matter was remanded in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 590
U.S. 83, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020).
23-KA-519 20
denied, 15-2166 (La. 11/7/16), 208 So.3d 897, the defendant argued that there was
insufficient evidence, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s obstruction
of justice conviction. There, the police responded to a call about a shooting and
spoke to the defendant. The defendant admitted that he was involved in a
confrontation, but he denied firing a gun, instead alleging that he had fired a
paintball gun during the dispute. The defendant then showed the officers a
paintball gun. None of the officers found spent bullets or observed any bullet
holes/strike marks on the scene. However, three spent shell casings were
recovered within feet of the defendant’s property. Id. at 724. The court explained
that the defendant’s conviction was based on his removal of the weapon from the
scene of the shooting—that is, the hiding of the weapon in a jacket in the back of
his closet. Id. at 728. Addressing the knowledge requirement, the court stated that
the defendant was previously convicted of a felony and that a prior conviction
alone, was sufficient to find that the defendant had the knowledge required by the
statute. The court provided that, by offering his paintball gun as an explanation for
the allegations, the defendant explicitly demonstrated his intent to distort the
investigation. The Fourth Circuit stated that when accompanied by the requisite
knowledge and intent, all that is required to obstruct justice is movement of
evidence. The court found that the information provided in a jail house call,
insinuating that his sister retrieve the gun provided a reasonable basis for the
conclusion that the defendant moved the weapon from his possession and
concealed it in his bedroom closet. Id.
In the instant matter, we find that the State sufficiently established that
Defendant obstructed justice. The surveillance video from the Shell gas station in
Kenner showed Defendant leave with the murder weapon in his hand. His brother,
Rodgers, testified that Defendant told him that he threw his gun in a trash can at
the Shell gas station in Biloxi. Surveillance video from that gas station reflected
23-KA-519 21
that Defendant walked to the dumpster. Detective Savoie contacted Waste
Management in Biloxi and was told that it was highly unlikely that the discarded
firearm could be located. The firearm was never recovered. We find that a
reasonable juror could conclude that, by disposing of the gun in a dumpster in
another state, Defendant was attempting to distort the results of any criminal
investigation or proceeding and avoid future criminal proceedings.
Additionally, we find that several other actions by Defendant support an
inference of his specific intent to obstruct justice. Shortly after the crime,
Defendant separated the bullets from the gun and disposed of them. Rodgers
testified that Defendant took his clothing, poured bleach on it, and discarded it in
someone else’s trash can in another parish. Defendant then fled the state, first
going to Mississippi and then to Tennessee. Rodgers explained that they went to
Tennessee by way of Mississippi to avoid the police. For those reasons, based on
the evidence presented, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support a
finding that Defendant removed and disposed of the gun, thereby supporting
Defendant’s conviction for obstruction of justice.
Admission of Stolen Firearm
On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erroneously permitted the
introduction of evidence that Defendant stole a firearm from his sister, April, in
Memphis. He says that Rodgers did not testify that Defendant stole the gun from
April. He contends that the allegation was too attenuated to be admissible as res
gestae. Defendant argues that the evidence was not relevant, that its exclusion
would not have deprived the State of presenting a complete story, and that there
was no immediate connection between the theft and the robbery. He avers that
there was no evidence that the gun stolen in Memphis was the gun used in the
robbery or that he stole the gun. Further, Defendant asserts that the evidence was
inadmissible under La. C.E. art. 404(B) because it was not necessary to prove any
23-KA-519 22
material fact genuinely at issue and that there was insufficient evidence that he
stole the gun.
The State disagrees that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
evidence. It argues that, because Defendant raises for the first time on appeal the
argument that there was insufficient evidence that he stole the firearm, the
argument is not properly before this Court. The State avers that the purpose of the
evidence was to complete the story of the crime by proving its immediate context
in time and place, which was integral to show the progression of Defendant’s
criminal activity and accompanying intent. It contends that it was entitled to
present its case with narrative momentum and cohesiveness. The State asserts that
the evidence was also admissible under La. C.E. art. 404(B) as it was
independently relevant to the issues of identity, preparation, and plan. It also
provides that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed
by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, or waste of time. The State concludes that even if
the trial court erred, it was harmless.
On June 29, 2023, the State filed a motion for discovery, demand for notice
of alibi and/or mental condition defenses, and a notice of intent to introduce
evidence of other offenses. In that motion, the State provided that it intended to
introduce evidence admissible under La. C.E. arts. 404 and 412.2 as described in
the discovery. On July 19, 2023, the State filed a notice of intent to introduce
evidence as res gestae or in the alternative under La. C.E. Article 404(B).26 In the
notice, the State explained that it intended to introduce as res gestae or Article
404(B) evidence that Defendant possessed a firearm stolen from April in Memphis,
which he used three days later to commit the charged homicide. It provided that it
26
The State filed a Motion to Seal its notice of intent because it was “sensitive in nature and its
release could endanger the witness[.]”
23-KA-519 23
expected Rodgers to testify that Defendant showed him a 9 mm Taurus firearm that
he got from April. The State argued that the evidence was related and intertwined
with the charged offense to such an extent that it could not accurately present its
case without it. The State further argued that even if not admissible as res gestae
evidence, it was admissible under the general provisions of La. C.E. art. 404(B).
On July 23, 2023, Defendant filed an opposition to the State’s intent to
introduce evidence as res gestae or in the alternative under La. C.E. Article
404(B). Defendant argued that the charged offense was remote and independent
from the alleged taking of April’s gun. He contended that the evidence was not
indispensable to the State’s case and did not serve a legitimate purpose. Defendant
asserted that the State could not prove that the gun was not taken from April’s
home for some other reason. He opined that the State would not be hindered in
presenting its case without the evidence. Defendant also provided that possession
of a stolen firearm is a separate and distinct unrelated offense. He argued that the
evidence is highly prejudicial and not relevant. Defendant concluded that the
evidence should not be admitted.
On July 24, 2023, a hearing on the State’s notice of intent was held.
Defense counsel argued that the evidence at issue was not res gestae and not
necessary for narrative completeness. He suggested that the firearm was not more
or less lethal because it was allegedly stolen and that the victim was not more or
less dead because the gun was allegedly stolen. Counsel argued that Article
404(B) is an assault on the presumption of innocence. Counsel next argued that
the evidence was remote in that it was allegedly stolen in Memphis. He contended
that the evidence lacked probative value. Defense counsel requested that if the
evidence was admitted, that there be a cautionary charge at the time the evidence
was introduced and in the final jury charge.
23-KA-519 24
The prosecutor replied that the evidence was necessary for narrative
completeness and went to identity. She provided that the charged offense occurred
days after the firearm was stolen. The prosecutor explained that the State intended
to introduce evidence that the gun was reported stolen and that Defendant admitted
that the gun was taken from his cousin who reported it stolen. She explained that
the State would allege that the stolen firearm was the weapon used in the homicide.
Defense counsel responded that the firearm was never recovered and
reiterated that the firearm was allegedly stolen in Memphis several days before the
murder. He argued that this was an attempt to paint Defendant as a bad person.
The judge then granted the State’s notice of intent to introduce evidence as res
gestae or in the alternative under La. C.E. Article 404(B).
A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Thomas, 19-582 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/29/20), 300 So.3d
517, 526, writ denied, 20-1503 (La. 3/2/21), 311 So.3d 1053. The fundamental
rule in Louisiana governing the use of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
that such evidence is not admissible to prove that the accused committed the
charged crime because the defendant has committed other such crimes in the past.
Id. See also La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1). Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
committed by the defendant is generally inadmissible because of the “substantial
risk of grave prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Ard, 20-221 (La. App. 5 Cir.
4/28/21), 347 So.3d 1046, 1055 (citing State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La. 1973)).
However, while the State may not admit evidence of other crimes to prove
the defendant is a person of bad character, evidence of prior crimes may be
admitted if the State establishes an independent relevance aside from proving the
defendant’s criminal character. State v. Frickey, 22-261 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/1/23),
360 So.3d 19, 49, writ denied, 23-468 (La. 11/8/23), 373 So.3d 59. Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is allowed to prove motive, opportunity, intent,
23-KA-519 25
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or when it
relates to conduct, formerly referred to as res gestae, that constitutes an integral
part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding. Id. See
also La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1).
Res gestae events constituting other crimes are deemed admissible because
they are so nearly connected to the charged offense that the State could not
accurately present its case without reference to them. State v. Rodney, 19-195 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 10/23/19), 282 So.3d 395, 403. The res gestae doctrine is designed to
allow the story of the crime to be told in its entirety by proving its immediate
context of happenings in time and place. Id. Close connexity in time and location
is required between the charged and uncharged conduct to ensure that “the purpose
served by admission of the other crimes evidence is not to depict the defendant as a
bad man, but rather to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its
immediate context of happenings near in time and place.” State v. Smith, 23-263
(La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/23), 379 So.3d 206, 212. The fact the other crimes occurred
in different locations with different victims is not dispositive of the issue. As long
as the other crimes “constitute an integral part of the act or transaction that is the
subject of the present proceeding,” they are admissible as res gestae evidence.
State v. Taylor, 01-1638 (La. 1/14/03), 838 So.2d 729, 743, cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1103, 124 S. Ct. 1036, 157 L.Ed.2d 886 (2004).
The test of whether res gestae evidence is admissible is not simply whether
the State might somehow structure its case to avoid any mention of the uncharged
act or conduct, but whether doing so would deprive its case of narrative
momentum and cohesiveness, with power not only to support conclusions, but to
sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be,
necessary to reach an honest verdict. Smith, supra. Close proximity in time and
location is required between the charged offense and the other crimes evidence to
23-KA-519 26
insure that the purpose served by admission of other crimes evidence is not to
depict defendant as a bad man, or that the defendant acted in conformity with the
other crime, but rather to complete the story of the crime for which he is on trial by
proving its immediate context of happenings near in time and place. State v.
Brown, 17-348 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/20/17), 235 So.3d 1314, 1326, writ denied, 18-
158 (La. 11/5/18), 256 So.3d 276, cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 139 S.Ct. 2033, 204
L.Ed.2d 233 (2019).
The State must provide the defendant with notice and move for a hearing
before trial if it intends to offer other crimes evidence. Frickey, 360 So.3d at 49.
However, the State is not required to provide the defendant with notice before
introducing res gestae evidence. Id. Even when the other crimes evidence is
offered for a purpose allowed under Article 404(B)(1), the evidence is not
admissible unless it tends to prove a material fact at issue or to rebut a defendant’s
defense. Id. at 50.
Additionally, the probative value of the extraneous evidence must outweigh
its prejudicial effect. La. C.E. art. 403; State v. Shorter, 23-128 (La. App. 5 Cir.
11/29/23), 377 So.3d 421, 436, writ denied, 23-1669 (La. 5/29/24), 385 So.3d 704.
Any inculpatory evidence, however, is “prejudicial” to a defendant, especially
when it is “probative” to a high degree. Gassenberger, 378 So.3d at 839. As used
in the balancing test, prejudice limits the introduction of probative evidence of
prior misconduct only when it is unduly and unfairly prejudicial. State v. Johnson,
22-383 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/9/23), 370 So.3d 150, 160. The term “unfair prejudice,”
as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant
evidence to lure the fact-finder into declaring guilt on a ground different from
proof specific to the offense charged. Ard, 347 So.3d at 1057. The burden is on
the defendant to show that he was prejudiced by the admission of other crimes
evidence. Id.
23-KA-519 27
In State v. Pourciau, 16-521 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/16), 2016 WL 7409382,
writ denied, 17-166 (La. 11/6/17), 229 So.3d 471, the defendant argued that other
crimes evidence was improperly allowed at trial. Among other things, he took
issue with evidence that he possessed a stolen gun, which he used to kill the victim.
When arrested, the defendant had a collector’s item firearm. The defendant’s
stepfather testified that he was the owner of that firearm and that the defendant
stayed with him from “time to time” from February to April of 2013. The charged
murder occurred in April of 2013. When the defendant’s stepfather realized his
gun was missing, he filed a report with the police. He informed the police officer
that there was no forced entry at his residence. The First Circuit found that the
evidence was relevant to show the defendant’s state of mind and had independent
relevance to the issues of preparation, plan, and absence of mistake or accident.
Further, the court stated that it helped explain and complete the story by proving
the defendant’s state of mind and the immediate context of events near in time and
place to the offense.
Here, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
other crimes evidence that the firearm was stolen from Defendant’s sister in
Memphis. As stated, the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of other crimes
evidence will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. We find that the
evidence is res gestae evidence as it completes the story of the crime. The
introduction of the evidence was relevant as to Defendant’s opportunity, plan, and
absence of mistake or accident and it provided narrative momentum and
cohesiveness.
Even if the trial court erred in admitting the evidence at trial, the erroneous
admission of other crimes evidence is subject to harmless error analysis. Frickey,
360 So.3d at 50. In determining harmless error, it is “not whether, in a trial that
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but
23-KA-519 28
whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in the trial was surely unattributable to
the error.” Id. An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it is unimportant
in relation to the whole. State v. Brown, 16-998 (La. 1/28/22), 347 So.3d 745, 791,
reh’g denied, 16-998 (La. 3/25/22), 338 So.3d 1138, and cert. denied, --- U.S. ---,
143 S.Ct. 886, 215 L.Ed.2d 404 (2023).
In this matter, we find that, even if there was an error in admitting the
evidence, it was harmless. Evidence of Defendant’s guilt for the crimes of first
degree murder and obstruction of justice was not “enhanced” by admitting
evidence that he stole the firearm. See State v. Kimble, 22-373 (La. App. 5 Cir.
5/8/24), 2024 WL 2037528. Rodgers testified to robbing the gas station with his
Defendant, and Defendant shot the victim and disposed of the gun. Additionally,
the robbery/shooting was captured from various angles by security cameras. The
footage shows a latex glove fall out of the shooter’s pocket and onto the counter
when he removed the firearm. Defendant’s DNA was found on that glove.
Surveillance footage from the gas station in Biloxi shows Defendant go to the
dumpster alone. During a recorded phone call, Defendant indicated that he
committed the offenses. He further said that he was not high or drunk and that no
one put the gun in his hand. Defendant’s mother identified Defendant in still
photographs of surveillance footage. The jury was given a limiting instruction as
to the other crimes evidence after the State’s opening statement, after Rodgers
testified about the evidence, and during the jury instructions. Based on the
foregoing, we find that the verdicts were surely unattributable to admission of the
other crimes evidence.
Errors Patent Review
The record was reviewed for errors patent according to La. C.Cr.P. art.
23-KA-519 29
920;27 State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556
So.2d 175 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
La. C.Cr.P. art. 873 states in part, “If a motion for a new trial, or in arrest of
judgment, is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least twenty-four hours
after the motion is overruled.” When a defendant challenges the penalty imposed
and the imposed sentence is not mandatory, the failure to observe the twenty-four-
hour delay mandated in La. C.Cr.P. art. 873 cannot be considered harmless error.
State v. Kelson, 23-274 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/23), 379 So.3d 779, 786. Generally,
when a defendant challenges a non-mandatory sentence and the delay is not
waived, the defendant’s sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for
resentencing. Id.The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Kisack, 16-797 (La. 10/18/17), 236
So.3d 1201, 1205-06, cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1160, 138 S.Ct. 1175, 200 L.Ed.2d
322 (2018), stated that a defendant’s pronouncement of his readiness for
sentencing may operate as an express waiver of the twenty-four-hour sentencing
delay, but a defendant’s mere participation in the sentencing hearing is insufficient
to constitute an express waiver as required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 873.
In the present case, Defendant filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of
acquittal and for a new trial on August 9, 2023. The trial court denied the motion
on August 10, 2023, and imposed Defendant’s sentences thereafter on the same
day after a victim impact statement was read. At the hearing, after the trial court
denied the motion and heard the victim impact statement, the trial court asked the
defense if there was anything further, and the defense answered negatively. We
find that this was not an express waiver of the requisite sentencing delay.
Defendant’s life sentence for the first degree murder conviction is mandatory, and
27
La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2) states that an error patent is “[a]n error that is discoverable by a mere
inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.”
23-KA-519 30
he does not challenge it. However, Defendant challenges his sentence as to the
count of obstruction of justice, which does not carry a mandatory sentence.28
Therefore, we vacate the sentence imposed for the obstruction of justice conviction
(count two) and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing. (See State v.
Francis, 19-227 (La. 4/29/19), 268 So.3d 289, finding that the defendant did not
waive the delay, and the error in failing to observe the delay was not harmless
because the defendant challenged his manslaughter sentence, thereby vacating the
sentence and remanding the matter.). In light of this error patent and corrective
action, we pretermit discussion of Defendant’s consecutive sentence assignment of
error.
Additionally, the UCO incorrectly reflects the date of the offense on count
two as November 30, 2020. The indictment reflects that the offense occurred
between November 30, 2020 and December 2, 2020. The evidence presented at
trial suggested that the firearm at issue was removed from the scene of the offense
on November 30, 2020, and repeatedly was manipulated until it was ultimately
disposed of on December 1, 2020. This Court has previously remanded a case for
correction of the UCO regarding the date of the offense in its errors patent review.
See State v. Doucet, 17-200 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/17), 237 So.3d 598, writs
denied, 18-77 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So.3d 789, and 18-196 (La. 11/5/18), 255 So.3d
1052, cert. denied, ---U.S. ---, 139 S.Ct. 2676, 204 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2019). See also
State v. Harrell, 18-63 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/18), 258 So.3d 1007; State v. Lyons,
13-564 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/31/14), 134 So.3d 36, writ denied, 14-481 (La. 11/7/14),
152 So.3d 170. Accordingly, we remand the matter for correction of the UCO to
accurately reflect the date range of the offense for count two. We also direct the
Clerk of Court for the 24th Judicial District Court to transmit the original of the
28
Additionally, Defendant challenges the consecutive nature of his sentences.
23-KA-519 31
corrected UCO to the appropriate authorities in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art.
892(B)(2) and the Department of Corrections’ legal department. See Harrell,
supra.DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s convictions for first degree
murder and obstruction of justice. We affirm Defendant’s first degree murder
sentence. We vacate Defendant’s obstruction of justice sentence and remand the
matter to the trial court for resentencing. We also remand this matter to the trial
court for correction of the uniform commitment order.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED;
COUNT ONE SENTENCE AFFIRMED;
COUNT TWO SENTENCE VACATED;
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING;
REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF
THE UNIFORM COMMITMENT ORDER
23-KA-519 32
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
OCTOBER 30, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
23-KA-519
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE ELLEN SHIRER KOVACH (DISTRICT JUDGE)
ANDREA F. LONG (APPELLEE) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE) JANE C. HOGAN (APPELLANT)
MAILED
BRITTANY BECKNER (APPELLEE)
CAROLYN CHKAUTOVICH (APPELLEE)
HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
(APPELLEE)
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 DERBIGNY STREET
GRETNA, LA 70053