- UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA STEPHON ERIC JAMES CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NUMBER: 22-2877 RANDY SMITH, ET AL. SECTION: “D”(5) ORDER AND REASONS Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (rec. doc. 29) filed by Defendants, St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Randy Smith, St. Tammany Parish Jail Warden Daniel Fleischman, St. Tammany Parish Jail Assistant Warden Rhonda Simmons, and St. Tammany Parish 1 Sheriff’s Office Deputy Aaron Hines (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff, Stephon Eric James opposes the motion. (Rec. doc. 37). Having reviewed the pleadings and the case law, tIh. e CouBrta cruklgerso ausn fdol lows. Pro se Plaintiff Stephon Eric James sued Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding the medical care that he received for his prosthetic eye while he was incarcerated at St. Tammany Parish Jail (“the Jail”). (Rec. docs. 4, 4-1). Taking the allegations in the Complaint as true and construing the allegations in the light most 2 favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff uses a prosthetic eye that requires sanitary cleaning and maintenance to protect his exposed socket from infection. (Rec. doc. 4-1 at 12). Plaintiff’s cIldai.ms relate to the medical treatment that he received from May 8, 2022 to August 2, 2022. ( at 6-12). 1 UThSTe -pMaarmtieiysa c, oInncs.e vn. tTerdu teo S pproorctse,e Idn cb.efore the undersigned under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) onJ &M aJ yS p2o5r,t s2 0P2ro3d. s (.,R Inecc.. dv2.o Lci. v4e3 O).a k Cnty. Post No. 6119 Veterans of Foreign Wars Cent. Lab, o4r4e1r sF' .P Seunpsipo. n3 Fdu 3n8d2 v, .3 I8n7te (gNra.Dte. dT eExl.e 2c.0 S2e0r)v s(.citing , Civ. A. No. C-08-270, 2009 WL 483157, at *3 (S.D. All of Plaintiff’s allegations culminate in his argument that he received delayed treatment and cleanings for his prosthetic eye. He maintains that on MayI d2.8, 2022, a doctor at the Jail ordered wound care twice a week for his prosthetic eye. ( at 6). He believed that his first visit was to occur on June 1, 2022, but when HinesI dc.ame to retrieve him, Hines “refused to let him get up to wash [his] face and left [him].” ( ). He informed each nurse that came to the dorm to deliver mIde.dication that his infection was worsening and “that [he] needed care and cleaning.” ( ). Plaintiff reports that on June 6, 2022, “Nurse Kera noticed that my face waIsd .swollen,” and, thinking the swelling was caused by his mouth, she ordered antibiotics. ( )I. d N. urse Kera only later found out that the swelling was caused by the infection in his eye. ( ). On June 12, 2022, the infection had worsened, Plaintiff hadI dd.epleted his antibiotics, and he still had not seen a doctor or received medical attention. ( ). On July 1, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a grievance that he had notI rde.ceived the medical care that the doctor had ordered, and his situation had worsened. ( at 7). Fleischman determined that the grieIvda. nce was unfounded as Plaintiff had visited the infirmary numerous times in June. ( ). On July 19, 2022, Dr. Samuel Hamm anIdd. Nurse Dee Dee summoned Plaintiff to medical to question him about his grievance. ( ). I dN.urse Dee Dee informed Plaintiff that she had a medical refusal form that he had Isdig. ned. ( ). Dr. Hamm retrieved the form, only to discover that only Hines had signed it. ( ). Dr. Hamm and Nurse Dee Dee apologized to Plaintiff, checked his prosthetic Iedy.e, and promised they would get him to medical as ordered earlier by Dr. Jose Gore. ( at 7-8). For the first time, PIdla.intiff went for wound care on July 25, 2022, and his eye infectionI dh.ad worsened. ( at 10). Dr. Hamm and Nurse Dee Dee ordered antibiotic drops. ( ). He also went for a second asseIsds.ment on July 29, 2022, when Nurse Dee Dee noticed that Ihdi.s infection was still visible. ( ). He still had not received his antibiotics at this timeI.d . ( ). Nurse Dee Dee scheduled him for a doctor’s appointment on August 2, 2022. ( ). On that date, Plaintiff met with the nurse pIrda.ctitioner who examined his infected eye but “tried to downplay it as something else.” ( at 10-11). In any event, the nurse practitioner orIdd.ered Erythromycin ophthalmic ointment with the instruction to use it four times a day. ( at 11). During this entire period, Plaintiff alleges that all parties and non-parties to this lawsuitI dw.ere disappointed with the actions of Hines, supported Plaintiff, and apologized to him. ( at 8-9, 11). He alleges that Simmons conducted her own investigation into the grievance and, after watching the video footage, realizedI dt.hat Plaintiff had never been to medical or left his housing unit for the “entire mIodn. th.” ( at 8). She expressed regret at Hines’s failure to perform his duties properly. ( ). Deputy Rhodes, who replaced Hines, allegedly informeIdd .Plaintiff that Hines had been temporarily suspended from July 25 to AIIu. gust S8t,a 2n0d2a2r. d (: M oatti 1o1n) t. o P Dlaiisnmtififs tsh Peunr ssuueadn ot nt oS eRputleem 1b2e(rb 1)2(6, 2)022. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which reliSeef ec aLno wber egyr avn. tTeedx. . SAu &ch M a mUnoitvi.o Sny sis. viewed with disfavor and is therefore rareKlya igsrearn Ateludm. inum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale, S1h1ip7y Fa.r3dds ,2 I4n2c., 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting , 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)). Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain aA s“hschroorftt av.n Idq bpalalin statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” , 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but itI dd.emands more tBhealnl Aatnl. Cuonrapd. ovr. nTewdo, mthbely-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” at 678 (citing , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] alSle we eTlhl-opmlepasdoend v f.a Ccittsy aosf tWruaec oa,n Tde vxi.ew[s] all facts in the light most favorable to tDhoee p elaxi nrteilf.f .M” agee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex, r7e6l4. K Fe.y3sd 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing , 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). But in deciding whether dismisIdsa. l is warranted theIq Cboaulrt will not accept conclusory allegations in the complaint as true. at 502-03 (citing , 556 U.S. at 678). To survive dismissal, “‘a complaint must contain sufficGioennzta flaeczt uv.a Kl amyatter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relieIfq tbhaalt is plausible on its face.’” , 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting , 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on tThweo amssbulymption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” , 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and footnote omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to Idqrbaawl the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” , 556 U.S. at 678 (“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”). This is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common Id. sense.” at 679. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, iItd .stops short of the line between possibilityT wanodm bpllyausibility of entitlement to relief.” at 678 (internal quotations omitted) (citing , 550 U.S. at 557). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief,’” thus, “requires more than labels andT cwonomclubslyions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” , 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Finally, “[w]hen reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district court ‘must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources ordinarily examined when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporatFeudn ikn tvo. Stthrey kceorm Cpolrapi.nt by reference, and matters of which a court mTealyla tbask, eI njuc.d vic. iMala nkootri cIess.”u es & Rights, Ltd. , 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting , 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)). If the Court considers materials outside of the pleadings, tSheee m Coatuisoeny tvo. dSeiswmeilsl sC amduilslat cb-eC hterevraoteledt , aIsn ca. motion for summary judgment undPehro eRnuilxe o 5n6 b. e half of S.W. v. Lafourche Par. Gov't , 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004); see also , No. CV 19-13004, 2021 WL 184909, at *3-4 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 2021); III. FedL.a Rw. Cainvd. P A. n12a(lyds).i s Estelle v. Gamble In , the Supreme Court held that an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute “an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or to be “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976). Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot state a valid claim under Section 1983 for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs for two independent reasons: (1) Plaintiff’s medical records rebut his allegations; and (2) the allegations against Defendants do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference and constitute no more than negligence. 3 The Court addresses only the second argument. When a plaintiff sues a jail official in his or her individual capacity, that official may only be held Slieaeb lEe uugnendee rv .S eAcliteiof nI n1d9ep8.3 Sicfh .h De isotr. she acted with subjective deliberate indifference. , 65 F.3d 1299, 1Jo3h0n4s o(n5 tvh. CTirre.e n1995). Deliberate indifference “is an extremely high standard to meet[,]” , 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985), and requires facts that demonstrate that Defendants “refused to treat [Plaintiff], ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar Bcroenwdsutcetr vth. Datr ewtkoeuld clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” , 587 F.3d 764, 770 (5th Cir. 2009). Further, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant possessed a culpable state of mind: “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk 3 Defendants attach Plaintiff’s meGdriecearl rve. cCoarrdpse ntote trhse Lira nmdointigo nH tOoA dismiss to support their first argument. This Court cannot consider evidencree psourbt maintdte dr ewcoimthm ae nmdoattiioonn taod odpistemdi sssu bw inthoomu. t Gcroenevr evr.t inCga rtpheen tmeros tiLoann dtoin ga Hmoomtioeonw fonre rssu mAsms'nar, yI njuc.dgment. , No. 4:19-CV-03436, 2020 WL 10051756, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2020), , No. CV H-19-3436, 2020 WL 10051759 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2020) (“However, if in connection with a motion to dismiss the Court considers matters outside the pleadings or attached to the motion to dismiss and referenced in the complaint, the motion muAsllte nb ev . tHreaaytsed instead as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 and each party must be given “‘a reasonable opportunity to present all the Carter v. Gautreaux of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” , No. CV 19-105-SDD-EWD, 2021 WL 2785332, at *2 (M.D. La. July 2, 2021). “Mere nVeagrlnigaednoc ev,. nLyengaleucgt,h or medical malpractice” does not constituFteie lddeelrib ve. rBaotes shinadridfference, , 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991) (cHiteinrnga ndez v. Tex. Dep't o,f 5P9r0ot F. &.2 dR e1g0. 5S,e 1rv0s7. (5th Cir. 1979)), nor does “gross negligence.” , 380 F.3d 872, 882 (5th Cir. 2004). Rather, “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law” is the aFpaprrmoeprr iva. tBe resntannadnard for “deliberate indifferenHceer” naunnddeezr the Fourteenth Amendment. , 511 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1994); , 380 F.3d at 881. The mere delay of medical care can also constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violaEtiaosnte br uvt. oPnowlye “lilf there has been deliberate indifference [thatM] reensduolztsa ivn. sLuybnsatuagnhtial harm.” , 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting , 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993)) The Court first addresses the lack of allegations against Sheriff Smith. Plaintiff’s complaint lacks any allegation that Smith had any personal involvement with Plaintiff’s medical treatment. At best, Plaintiff’s only mention of Smith relates to his review of Plaintiff’s grievance, to which Plaintiff received a response. (Rec. doc. 4-1 at 3). That Smith was not involved in Plaintiff’s medical care is reason enough to dismiss him from this 4 lawsuit. Turner v. Lieutenant Driver 4 th , 848 F.3d 678, 695-96 (5 Cir. 2017M) e(“sTao v .b Per elijaebalne under § 1983, Driver must have beeMnu preprhsyo nv.a lKlye lilnavrolved in the alleged constitutional deprivation or have engaged in wrongful conduct that is causally connected to the constitutional violation.”) (citing , 543 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir. 2008)); , 950 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The court delivered this decision with soBuonnde av.u Sthkionrniteyr for the principle that a plaintiff bringing a section 1983 action mreupsotr t sapnedc irfye cothmem penedrsaotnioanl iandvoopltveedment of each defendant, and dismissed the case as “frivolous” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).”); , No. 4:21-CV-00201, 2022 WL 912100, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2022), , No. 4:21-CV-201, 2022 WL 906191 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2022) (“The absence of any allegation of As to the three other Defendants, Plaintiff generally complains that he received delays inH huaffv vin. Tg hhaisle erye cleaned. Such complaints alone have been dismissed at this stage bafeff'od rseu. b nom. Huff v. ,M Naon. fCreAd Ci -12-043, 2012 WL 2120569, at *13 (S.D. Tex. May 1, 2012), , 504 F. App'x 342 (5th Cir. 2012) (“However, to the extent plaintiff complains medical treatment was delayed, delay alone does not give rise to a constitutional violation unless the deliberate indifference results in substantial harm. Plaintiff was receiving treatment and was being monitored by numerous medical providers. His eye infection, while unfortunate, was not an emergency. Plaintiff's allegations against the security personnel defendants fail to establish that these defendants knew of a serious risk to plaintiff's health, but ignored that risk, and therefore, he fails to state a claim against these individuals.” (citation omitted)). Plaintiff fails to allege in his complaint that any delay in his treatment was on purpose or resulted in substantial harm. Plaintiff does not allege that any Defendant had subjective knowledge of Plaintiff’s worsening condition and intentionally disregarded it by not cleaning his eye. Not one of the three remaining Defendants is a health care provider, and there is no indication that any of them had any involvement with Plaintiff’s treatment. The most generous reading of Plaintiff’s complaint reveals that only Hines – who signed the medical refusal form – had any tangential involvement with Plaintiff’s treatment – by effectively impeding it. But the Court finds that that was a mere oversight on behalf of the medical staff for not having 5 double-checked the form. The “deliberate indifference” standard permits courts to 5 The Court notes that this Court recommended dismissal with prejudice of the only two medical defendants in this lawsuit (rec. doc. 31) before the parties consented to proceed before the undersigned. The District Court did not adopt or reject the Report and Recommendation before it referred this lawsuit to the separate omissions that amount to Saenv eirninte vn. tOiornleaaln cs hPoairc.e C rfirmom. S htehroifsfe O ftfh.at are merely unintentionally negligent oversights. report and recommen,d Natoi.o Cni va.d Ao.p 1te5d- 2su8b3 , n2o0m1.5 SWevLe r6in1 2v8. 6G6u5s, mata n*5 (E.D. La. Oct. 16, 2015), Southard v. Tex. Bd., oNf oC. rCimV. 1Ju5s-t2ic8e3, 2016 WL 195941 (E.D. La. Jan. 15, 2016) (quoting , 114 F.3d 539, 551 (5th Cir. 1997)). Neither does Plaintiff allege that Hines intentionally hid from the medical staff that Plaintiff had not signed the form. Moreover – and more fatal to Plaintiff’s claims – he fails to allege that he suffered substantial harm caused by any delay in medical treatment. Plaintiff alleges only that he suffered discomfort and pain and was denKieidn gp ve.a Kceil goofr emind. This is, in and of itself, insufficient to constitute substantial harm. , 98 F.3d 1338, 1338, 1996 WL 556845 (5th Cir. 1996) (unpublished) (stating that delay in medical care causing pain and discomfort was insufficient to establish substantial harm). Although Plaintiff suffered from an infection in his prosthetic eye, it is equally self-evident that his condition was not life threatening. The case law is repleteS ewei, teh. gc.a, sAetsk imnso rve. Ssheerrioifuf’ss tJhaailn A Pvloayineltliefsf’ sP tahra.t hold that delay is not deliberate indifference. , 278 F. App’x 438, 439 (5th Cir. 2008) (upholding dismissal as frivolous of claim of deliberate indiffeHraelnl cve. wThhoemn atshe plaintiff had not seen a doctor between May 19, 2006 and July 21, 2006); , 190 F.3d 693, 697 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding grant of summary judgment on Eighth Amendment claim that alleged that the medical staff had failed to administer 180 doses of the plaintiff’s seizure medicine over a one-year period, and that such a lapse DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE Callaway v. Smith Cnty. evinced deliberate indifference to a serious medical need); , 991 F. Supp. 801, 809 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (“The fact that Callaway did not see Dr. Stockton until he had been in the jail for 19 days, or Dr. Perkins until he had been in the jail for 56 days, is not proof of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs either.”). In this case law, the courts generally found that such delays only amounted to claims oSfe eu nArtkeainssonableness or negligence, which do not constitute Eighth Amendment violations. , 278 F. App’x at 439. Any other possible allegation against Hines is that Hines refused to let Plaintiff get up to wash his face and left him on June 1, 2022 when he was to escort Plaintiff to medical. (Rec. doc. 4-1 at 6). However, the grievance form attached to Plaintiff’s complaint reveals that Plaintiff did go to medical on June 1, 2022 when Dr. Gore ordered wound care twice a 6 week for the cleaning of Plaintiff’s prosthetic eye. (Rec. doc. 4-1 at 3). The grievance form also indicates that Plaintiff was transported Itdo. medical on June 2, 2022, when he cleaned his eye and reported no pain or discomfort. ( ). Any possible allegation against Fleischman or Simmons only relateIsd t.o the handling of Plaintiff’s grievance. Plaintiff received a response to his grievance. ( ). Resolving a grievance as founded or unfounded or denying a grievance is not a Constitutional basis for liability under Section 1983. A prisoner does not have a Constitutionally protected liberty interest in aBno nandeevqiullae tev . Bgraisesveance procedure or having grievances resolvedG etigoe rh ivs. sJoawtiesfrasction. , 536 F. AppM'xi n5i0x 2v,. 5S0to3k e(r5th Cir. 2013) (citing , 404 FO.3rde l3la7n1a, v3. 7K4y l(e5th Cir. 2005)); , 289 F. App’x 15, 17 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing , 65 F.3d 29 (5th Cir. 1995)). Funk 6 In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that any delay to his medical treatment was purposeful, that he was intentionally treated incorrectly, that any delay resulted in substantial harm, and that any one of the remaining three Defendants had any personal iInVv. olveCmoennctl uwsiitohn his medical care. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims fail. FITo r ItSh eO foRrDeEgoRiEnDg reasons, GRANTED that the Motion to Dismiss (rec. doc. 29) is , and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Randy Smith, St. Tammany Parish Jail Warden Daniel Fleischman, St. Tammany Parish Jail Assistant WardDeInS MRhISoSnEdDa SWimITmHo PnRs,E aJnUdD ISCtE. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office Deputy Aaron Hines are . 20th July New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of ________________________________, 2023. ____________________________________________________ MICHA EL B. N ORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Document Info
Docket Number: 2:22-cv-02877
Filed Date: 7/21/2023
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 6/22/2024