Harry v. Day ( 2022 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA KYLE JAMAR HARRY CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 21-1269 TRAVIS DAY, ET AL. SECTION: “J”(3) ORDER & REASONS Before the Court is a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus (Rec. Doc. 3); the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Rec. Doc. 12); and an objection filed by Petitioner (Rec. Doc. 13). Having considered the petition, the applicable law, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and Petitioner’s objection, the Court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge as its opinion in this matter. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This case arises from Petitioner Kyle Harry’s January 11, 2008 conviction for second degree murder under Louisiana law. The majority of the relevant facts are set forth in Magistrate Judge Douglas’ Report and Recommendation. However, this Court writes separately to address the unique issues raised in Petitioner’s objection. DISCUSSION In his objection, Petitioner argues that his petition for writ of habeas corpus is timely—in contrast to the Magistrate Judge’s finding. Petitioner cites the U.S. Supreme Court case Martinez v. Ryan as an excuse for his procedural default. 566 U.S. 1 (2012). The Martinez Court carved out a narrow exception to a previously established rule—that rule being that an attorney’s negligence is not cause which justifies a procedural default. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). Petitioner cherry-picks language from the Martinez decision to support his argument. (Rec. Doc. 13 at 4). However, the Martinez Court made abundantly clear that the exception it carved out was extremely narrow. The Court wrote: This limited qualification to Coleman does not implicate the usual concerns with upsetting reliance interests protected by stare decisis principles. Coleman held that an attorney's negligence in a postconviction proceeding does not establish cause, and this remains true except as to initial-review collateral proceedings for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. 566 U.S. at *15 (emphasis added). Petitioner seeks to extend Martinez beyond its narrow scope. The heart of Petitioner’s claims involves improper voir dire—and he mentions ineffective assistance of counsel only in passing. This is insufficient to meet the strict standard articulated in Martinez. CONCLUSION Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's objection (Rec. Doc. 13) is OVERRULED, and the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Rec. Doc. 12) is APPROVED and ADOPTED as the Court’s opinion. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus (Rec. Doc. 3) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as untimely. New Orleans, Louisiana, this 17th day of March, 2022. CARL J.B IE 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE