Johnson-Luster v. Secretary of the Army ( 2022 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA BARBARA JOHNSON-LUSTER CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NUMBER: 19-2235 SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, ET AL. DIVISION (5) ORDER Before the Court is a motion for reconsideration (Rec. doc. 80) filed by Plaintiff pro se on April 18, 2022. The motion was originally filed without exhibits. The Court later granted Plaintiff’s motion to add three exhibits. (Rec. doc. 85). Defendant thereafter filed its opposition memorandum. (Rec. doc. 86). Plaintiff then filed, on May 18, 2022, a “memorandum in support” of her original motion, attaching to it some 18 exhibits comprised of 463 pages. (Rec. doc. 87). Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of this Court’s order (Rec. doc. 74) granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the entering of judgment in Defendant’s favor on March 15, 2022. (Rec. doc. 75). Having reviewed the pleadings and the case law, the Court rules as follows. The Federal Rules oBf asCsi vvi. l U.PSr. oDceepd'tu roef Adgori c.not expressly allow motions for reconsideration of an order. , 211 F.3d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit treats a motion for reconsideration challenging a prior judgment as either a motion “to alter or amend” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5L9a(vee) sopre rae mv.o Ntiioang aforar “Mrealcihe.f &fr oTmoo lj uWdgomrkes,n Itn” cu.nder Federal Rule of Civil Proceduraeb 6ro0g(ba)t.e d on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), , 37 F.3d 1069, 1076 (5th Cir. 1994). The difference in treatment is based on timing. If the motion Lisa fvielesdp ewreithin 28 days of the judgment, then it falls under Rule 59(e). FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e); , 910 F.2d at 173. However, if the motion is filed more than 28 days after the judgment, but not more than onLea yveeaspr earfeter the entry of judgment, it is governed by Rule 60(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c); , 910 F.2d at 173. In the present case, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration was filed April 18, 2022, 35 days after entry of judgment. Accordingly, it must be treated by the Court as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Under Rule 60(b), a party may seek relief from an order for: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) Uanniyt eodt hSetra treesa vso. Pna trhsaete justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); , No. CR 97-81, 2022 WL 74190, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2022). Rule 60(b)(1) allows relief from a judgment or order for mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. Fed. R. Civ. 60(b). “The Supreme Court has explained that the determination of what sorts of neglect will be considered excusable is ‘an equitTarbelvei noon ev,. tCaitkyi nogf aFcocrotu Wnto orft hall relevant circumstances surrounding the partyP'sio onmeeirs sIinovn.. ’S” e rvs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. L, t9d4. 4P 'sFh.3ipd 567, 571 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting , 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). FWiftilhs oCni rvc.u Aitt wporoecde Gdreonutp dictates that relief will be afforded only in “unique circumstances,” , 725 F. 2d 255, 257-58 (5th Cir.) (en banc), and “[g]ross carePlreysosrn ve.s Us .iSs. Pnoostt eanl oSeurgvh.. Ignorance of the rules is not enough, nor is ignorance of the law.” , 769 F.2d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2858 at 170 (footnotes omitted)). Whether or not Etom giiri aHnotl rdeinligesf , pLu.Lr.sCu. avn. Ft itros tR NuBleC 6 B0a(nbk)(1) is left to the sound discretion of the district court. , No. CV 17- 5367, 2021 WL 291307, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 28, 2021). In her motion, Plaintiff fails to cite the case law surrounding Rule 60(b) and does not enumerate any of the six factors that would entitle her to relief. As to Rule 60(b)(1), she points to no mistake, inadvertence, or neglect that would trigger reconsideration under that provision. At most, she implies in her original motion papers that her prior counsel (appointed by this Court to represent her pro bono after granting her motion to appoint counsel (rec. doc. 61)) either failed to follow her directions in opposing the motion for summary judgment or otherwise made decisions with which she disagreed. She cites to no authority (and the Court is aware of none) to support the suggestion that such a grievance can satisfy the requirements of Rule 60(b)(1) in any way. And as for her “memorandum in support,” filed a month after the original motion, that memorandum is no more than a recitation of the facts that were made part of her opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. She makes no allegations of mistake, inadvertence, or neglect, nor does she point to any newly-discovered evidence that she could not have discovered before she opposed that motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff makes no argument that factors (b)(3)-(b)(5) have any application to her case, which they clearly do not, leaving only 60(b)(6) as a possible avenue for relief. That Plaintiff’s motion is essentially a re-litigation of her prior arguments is summed up in her prayer for relief: Plaintiff submits that there are numerous material facts in dispute and that there are many genuine issues of credibility as they apply to the Agency as a whole. That intentional discrimination by the Agency as a whole did occur by a preponderance of direct evidence. And, for these reasons the Court's Order and Judgment in Favor of the Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion on March 14,2022, should be Reconsidered and the Case reopened in the Discovery Phase and a Trail [sic] date set. (Rec. doc. 87 at 20). Plaintiff’s re-litigation of the same arguments she made in opposition to the motion for summary judgment do not satisfy Rule 60(b)(6). Nor does the implication that her court-appointed pro bono counsel did anything wrong in opposing Defendant’s motion for sIIuIm. maCryo njucdlugsmioennt. FITo rI tSh eO fRoDreEgRoEinDg reasons, that Pro se Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration oDf EONrIdEeDr and Judgment Granting Summary Judgme1n3tt ihn Favor of Defendant J(Runece. doc. 80) is . New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2022. MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE