Machado v. System4 LLC ( 2015 )


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    SJC-11681
    EDSON TELES MACHADO & others1   vs.   SYSTEM4 LLC & another.2
    Norfolk.    December 4, 2014. - April 13, 2015.
    Present:   Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, &
    Hines, JJ.
    Massachusetts Wage Act. Contract, Franchise agreement,
    Arbitration. Arbitration, Damages, Arbitrable question.
    Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
    March 24, 2010.
    Following review by this court, 
    465 Mass. 508
     and 
    466 Mass. 1004
     (2013), a motion for a ruling that an arbitration clause
    did not apply to certain claims was heard by Patrick F. Brady,
    J.
    The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
    direct appellate review.
    Eric H. Karp for the defendants.
    Shannon Liss-Riordan for the plaintiffs.
    1
    Jocilene da Silva, Stenio Ferreira, Poliane Santos,
    Glaucea de Oliveira Santos, and Luiz Santos.
    2
    NECCS, Inc., doing business as System4 of Boston, LLC
    (NECCS).
    2
    CORDY, J.   This case was filed in 2010 by a franchisee
    janitorial worker, on behalf of himself and other similarly
    situated individuals, against System4 LLC (System4), a "master
    franchisor," and NECCS, Inc., doing business as System4 of
    Boston, LLC (NECCS), a regional "subfranchisor," originally
    alleging, in relevant part, breach of contract, rescission of
    contract, and misclassification as independent contractors in
    their franchise agreements.3   The franchise agreements are signed
    only by the plaintiffs and NECCS; however, the complaint as
    originally filed, and as subsequently amended, does not
    differentiate NECCS from System4 and alleges that the former is
    "the agent of" and "exists solely to conduct [the] business" of
    the latter.   The agreements govern a franchisee's right to
    customer account referrals and the use of System4's proprietary
    information in operating commercial janitorial cleaning
    businesses.   They also require the franchisee plaintiffs to
    arbitrate virtually all disputes.
    While the plaintiffs raise a number of arguments on appeal,
    of central importance is the question whether System4, a
    nonsignatory, can compel the franchisee plaintiffs to arbitrate
    3
    Edson Teles Machado, Jocilene da Silva, Poliane Santos,
    and Luiz Santos (collectively, franchisee plaintiffs) are
    parties to agreements to operate System4 LLC (System4)
    franchises. Two other plaintiffs, Stenio Ferreira and Glaucea
    de Olivera Santos, have not signed franchise agreements and
    appear to be employees of the franchisee plaintiffs.
    3
    their substantive claims in accord with the arbitration
    provision in the plaintiffs' franchise agreements.    We conclude
    that by reason of equitable estoppel they can do so in the
    circumstances of this case.
    Background.   System4, an Ohio limited liability company,
    contracts with a regional subfranchisor in the Boston area,
    NECCS, who subsequently enters into franchise agreements with
    franchisees, such as the plaintiffs.4   Although System4 is not a
    signatory to these agreements, the agreements provide the
    franchisees with access to System4's marketing expertise,
    business practices, training, and use of trademarks, by way of a
    separate agreement between System4 and NECCS.
    1.   Arbitration clause.   The franchisee plaintiffs are
    parties to agreements to operate System4 franchises (franchise
    agreements).   Under these agreements, NECCS offers its
    franchisees customer accounts to service, which the franchisees
    are free either to accept or refuse.    The agreements purport to
    guarantee gross monthly billings to the franchisees based on the
    value of the customer accounts offered to them.    In addition,
    the agreements authorize the franchisees to use System4's
    proprietary information, including its brand and trademarks.
    4
    The subfranchisor of System4 used to be System4 of Boston,
    LLC (System4 of Boston), but in March, 2008, NECCS purchased
    System4 of Boston and assumed all of its rights under the
    franchise agreements. Consequently, we will refer to NECCS,
    rather than System4 of Boston, throughout this opinion.
    4
    The agreements characterize the franchisees as independent
    contractors, a characterization they contest, and each agreement
    contains an arbitration clause.
    The arbitration clause is broad in scope, requiring
    arbitration of any claims between the franchisee and NECCS and
    its subsidiaries, affiliates, shareholders, officers, directors,
    managers, representatives, and employees, arising out of or
    related to:
    (1) the franchise agreement or any other agreement between
    the   parties, including claims related to the validity of the
    franchise agreement or any other agreement;
    (2) NECCS's relationship with the franchisee; or
    (3) claims relating to the operation of the franchised
    business.
    Accordingly, virtually all claims arising out of the franchise
    relationship are subject to arbitration.5
    2.   Plaintiffs as franchisees.   Machado, the original named
    plaintiff in this action, signed a franchise agreement with
    NECCS on February 14, 2008, initialing each page.     After signing
    his franchise agreement, Machado both rejected and accepted
    offers extended to him by NECCS to service customer accounts.
    In October, 2008, Machado informed NECCS that he wished to sell
    5
    The only types of claims not subject to the arbitration
    clause are those by NECCS involving a threat or danger to public
    health or safety in connection with the operation of a
    franchise, actions by NECCS to protect its trademarks, and
    actions by either NECCS or the franchisee to obtain a temporary
    restraining order or injunction.
    5
    his franchise, and he stopped performing services for his
    accounts.    In November, 2008, Machado spoke with the president
    of NECCS, Jonathan Caffrey, and asked for his franchisee fees
    back.    When Caffrey declined to return the fees, Machado ceased
    communication with NECCS.
    3.      Procedural history.   Machado filed a complaint in the
    Superior Court in March, 2010, on behalf of himself and "other
    similarly situated individuals."     In so doing, Machado named
    both System4 and NECCS as defendants, and claimed that both had
    committed a breach of the franchise agreement by not providing
    him with sufficient customer accounts.      In addition, Machado
    claimed that both defendants misclassified him as an independent
    contractor in the agreement and committed other violations of
    the Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149 §§ 148, 148B, and 150
    (Wage Act).
    In June, 2010, the defendants, citing the arbitration
    clause in Machado's franchise agreement, filed a motion to stay
    the court proceedings pending arbitration.     A judge denied the
    motion, holding that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable
    because it contained waivers of class proceedings and multiple
    damages.    Subsequently, in April, 2011, the United States
    Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
    131 S. Ct. 1740
     (2011) (Concepcion), that the Federal Arbitration
    Act, 
    9 U.S.C. §§ 1
     et seq. (2012) (FAA), prohibits States from
    6
    conditioning the enforceability of arbitration agreements on the
    availability of class action procedures.
    Thereafter, Machado amended his complaint, adding
    additional named plaintiffs as well as a putative class6 of
    individuals who had performed cleaning services for NECCS and
    System4.    The amended complaint again asserted claims against
    both defendants without differentiation, seeking rescission of
    the franchise agreements and damages for misclassification among
    other violations of the Wage Act.7
    In December, 2011, the defendants moved for reconsideration
    of the denial of their motion to compel arbitration in light of
    Concepcion.    The judge denied the defendants' motion, and the
    defendants petitioned for interlocutory review.    A single
    justice of the Appeals Court referred the issue to a full panel
    of the Appeals Court, and we granted the plaintiffs' application
    for direct appellate review.    The appellate filings of both the
    plaintiffs and the defendants in that interlocutory appeal
    addressed the enforceability of the arbitration clause as a
    whole and made no argument as to whether the arbitration clause,
    6
    A motion for class certification has yet to be filed.
    7
    The amended complaint did not contain a breach of contract
    claim, although it alleged that the defendants made numerous
    misrepresentations in connection with the franchise agreements,
    including that they would provide the plaintiffs with business
    leads and make prompt payments as promised in their agreements.
    7
    if enforceable, would require arbitration of the plaintiffs'
    claims only against NECCS and not System4.
    We issued a decision in June, 2013, but stayed issuance of
    the rescript until August, 1, 2013, pending submissions by the
    parties on the effect, if any, of the United States Supreme
    Court's decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
    Restaurant, 
    133 S. Ct. 2304
     (2013).    See Machado v. System4 LLC,
    
    465 Mass. 508
     (2013) (Machado I).     In light of the decisions of
    the United States Supreme Court, we concluded that a class
    action waiver provision was not an adequate ground on which to
    invalidate an agreement to arbitrate.     See Machado v. System4
    LLC, 
    466 Mass. 1004
    , 1004 (2013) (Machado II).     See also Machado
    I, 
    supra at 513-517
    .   We then remanded the case to the Superior
    Court judge for proceedings consistent with our decision.    See
    Machado II, supra.
    Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion, as well as a
    posthearing letter, again asking the judge to deny the
    defendants' motion to compel arbitration on several grounds:
    first, that the arbitration clause could not apply to their Wage
    Act claims because it did not specifically reference the Wage
    Act, an argument that was based on our decision in Crocker v.
    Townsend Oil Co., 
    464 Mass. 1
    , 14 (2012) (holding that release
    of claims must specifically reference Wage Act in order to apply
    8
    to Wage Act claims);8 second, that the arbitration clause was
    unenforceable, as it contained multiple unconscionable
    provisions; and third, that the plaintiffs were not bound to
    arbitrate their claims against System4 because it was not a
    signatory to the franchise agreements.   The judge rejected the
    plaintiffs' Wage Act claim and also held that issues of
    unconscionability of the arbitration clause could be decided by
    an arbitrator.   However, the judge agreed with the plaintiffs
    that, because System4 was not a signatory to the franchise
    agreements, the plaintiffs could proceed to litigate their
    claims against System4 in court.
    System4 appealed the judge's decision regarding the
    enforceability of the arbitration clause as applied to it.     The
    plaintiffs did not file a cross appeal regarding the judge's
    decision denying them relief on their other grounds, but filed
    an application for direct appellate review, which we granted.
    The plaintiffs ask us to affirm the judge's reasoning in
    declining to enforce the arbitration clause with respect to
    System4 or, in the alternative, to affirm the ruling on one of
    the grounds rejected by the judge.
    8
    This argument was first presented to this court by the
    plaintiffs in July, 2013, in a postargument letter after our
    decision in Machado v. System4 LLC, 
    465 Mass. 508
     (2013), was
    released.
    9
    Discussion.    Denials of applications to compel arbitration
    are reviewed de novo.   See Joulé, Inc. v. Simmons, 
    459 Mass. 88
    ,
    92-93 (2011); Feeney v. Dell Inc., 
    454 Mass. 192
    , 199 (2009),
    S.C., 
    465 Mass. 470
    , and 
    466 Mass. 1001
     (2013).   See also
    Warfield v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., Inc., 
    454 Mass. 390
    , 395 (2009) (motion to compel arbitration treated summarily
    and judge's order reviewed de novo).   The Massachusetts
    Arbitration Act, G. L. c. 251, similarly to the FAA, "expresses
    a strong public policy favoring arbitration as an expeditious
    alternative to litigation for settling commercial disputes."
    Miller v. Cotter, 
    448 Mass. 671
    , 676 (2007), quoting Home Gas
    Corp. of Mass., Inc. v. Walter's of Hadley, Inc., 
    403 Mass. 772
    ,
    774 (1989).   "[T]he lack of a written arbitration agreement is
    not an impediment to arbitration."   Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v.
    Sunkist Growers, Inc., 
    10 F.3d 753
    , 757 (11th Cir. 1993), cert.
    denied sub nom. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Del Monte Corp., 
    513 U.S. 869
     (1994).
    1.   Nonsignatory compulsion of signatory to arbitrate.     We
    begin our discussion with a consideration of whether System4, a
    nonsignatory to the franchise agreements, can compel the
    plaintiffs to pursue their substantive claims in arbitration
    based on the agreements they entered into with NECCS.
    In Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 
    465 Mass. 607
    , 622, 624-625 (2013), we recently held that a franchisee,
    10
    much like the plaintiffs in this case, could hold a nonsignatory
    to his franchise agreement liable for misclassifying him as an
    independent contractor in that agreement if the nonsignatory had
    attempted to insulate itself from liability by "causing or
    creating another entity to [enter the agreement]."   This is
    essentially what the plaintiffs allege here, that is, that NECCS
    was created solely to conduct System4's franchising business in
    Massachusetts; that the franchise agreements are System4's
    standard form contracts; and that System4 controls the
    relationships between the parties and between the plaintiffs and
    their clients.   Therefore, they argue, System4 is just as liable
    for the misclassification in their franchise agreements as
    NECCS, even though System4 did not sign them.   Although denying
    liability and an agency relationship with NECCS, System4
    essentially argues that where the plaintiffs contend that
    System4 was effectively the franchisor, the creator of the
    agreements and their terms, the violator of those terms, and the
    beneficiary of the purported misclassification term, any dispute
    arising out of the agreements should be resolved in accord with
    the arbitration clause that provides for such dispute
    resolution.
    While a nonsignatory attempting to bind a signatory to an
    arbitration agreement is distinct from a signatory attempting to
    bind a nonsignatory, courts often consider both scenarios under
    11
    a similar legal framework.   Traditionally, courts have
    recognized six theories for binding nonsignatories to
    arbitration agreements:   (1) incorporation by reference;9 (2)
    assumption;10 (3) agency;11 (4) veil-piercing/alter ego;12 (5)
    equitable estoppel, and (6) third-party beneficiary.13    See J.E.
    Grenig, Alternative Dispute Resolution § 7:4 (3d ed. 2005).      See
    9
    Under the "incorporation by reference" theory, "[a]
    nonsignatory may compel arbitration against a party to an
    arbitration agreement when that party has entered into a
    separate contractual relationship with the nonsignatory which
    incorporates the existing arbitration clause." Thomson-CSF,
    S.A. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 
    64 F.3d 773
    , 777 (2d Cir.
    1995).
    10
    Under an "assumption" theory, "a party may be bound by an
    arbitration clause if its subsequent conduct indicates that it
    is assuming the obligation to arbitrate," despite being a
    nonsignatory. Thomson-CSF, S.A., 
    64 F.3d at 777
    .
    11
    Under an "agency" theory, a nonsignatory who is an agent
    of a signatory may compel arbitration for liability arising
    under the contract in question. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Government
    of Turkmenistan, 
    345 F.3d 347
    , 356-358 (5th Cir. 2003), cert.
    denied, 
    541 U.S. 937
     (2004). Here, while an agency relationship
    arguably might exist between System4 and NECCS, System4 denies
    that it "exercises sufficient control over NECCS" to create such
    a relationship.
    12
    Under a "veil-piercing/alter ego" theory, a party "may be
    bound by an agreement entered into by its subsidiary regardless
    of the agreement's structure or the subsidiary's attempts to
    bind itself alone to its terms, 'when their conduct demonstrates
    a virtual abandonment of separateness.'" Bridas S.A.P.I.C., 
    345 F.3d at 358-359
    , quoting Thomson-CSF, S.A., 
    64 F.3d at 777
    .
    System4 explicitly denies having control over NECCS.
    13
    Under a "third-party beneficiary" theory, "a court must
    look to the intentions of the parties at the time the contract
    was executed" and examine whether the contract displays a clear
    intent to make a nonsignatory a third-party beneficiary. See
    Bridas S.A.P.I.C., 
    345 F.3d at 362
     (citation omitted).
    12
    also Walker v. Collyer, 
    85 Mass. App. Ct. 311
    , 319 (2014);
    Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Government of Turkmenistan, 
    345 F.3d 347
    ,
    356 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
    541 U.S. 937
     (2004).
    Notably, while Federal courts have been "hesitant to estop a
    nonsignatory seeking to avoid arbitration," they generally "have
    been willing to estop a signatory from avoiding arbitration with
    a nonsignatory."   InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 
    344 F.3d 134
    , 145-146
    (1st Cir. 2003), quoting Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. American
    Arbitration Ass'n, 
    64 F.3d 773
    , 779 (2d Cir. 1995).
    The theory with clearest application to the facts of this
    case is equitable estoppel, a doctrine governed by State
    contract law.   See Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 
    556 U.S. 624
    , 632 (2009).   There are no reported Massachusetts appellate
    decisions determining whether this doctrine may be applied to
    extend the reach of an agreement to compel a signatory into
    arbitration with a nonsignatory.   Nevertheless, we are guided in
    our analysis by several circuit courts of the United States
    Court of Appeals that have applied equitable estoppel in this
    precise context.   And while "[t]he [Federal circuit courts] have
    not uniformly articulated the standards for application of
    estoppel, . . . their formulations have contained common
    elements."   Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
    
    449 Fed. Appx. 704
    , 708 (10th Cir. 2011).
    13
    Equitable estoppel typically allows a nonsignatory to
    compel arbitration in either of two circumstances:    (1) when a
    signatory "must rely on the terms of the written agreement in
    asserting its claims against the nonsignatory" or (2) when a
    signatory "raises allegations of substantially interdependent
    and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or
    more of the signatories to the contract."14   Grigson v. Creative
    Artists Agency, L.L.C., 
    210 F.3d 524
    , 527 (5th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    531 U.S. 1013
     (2000), quoting MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v.
    Franklin, 
    177 F.3d 942
    , 947 (11th Cir. 1999).   In such
    situations, a reviewing court may consider all of "the
    relationships of persons, wrongs and issues" in the case.
    Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers v. Optibase, Ltd., 
    337 F.3d 125
    , 131
    (2d Cir. 2003), citing Chocotaw Generation Ltd. Partnership v.
    American Home Assur. Co., 
    271 F.3d 403
    , 406 (2d Cir. 2001).
    a.   Reliance on terms of written agreement.    When the
    signatory's claims against a nonsignatory refer to or presume
    the existence of the written agreement that compels arbitration,
    the signatory’s claims may be considered to arise out of and be
    14
    Not all jurisdictions apply this test. See, e.g., Smith
    v. Mark Dodge, Inc., 
    934 So. 2d 375
    , 380-381 (Ala. 2006),
    quoting Ex parte Napier, 
    723 So. 2d 49
    , 51 (Ala. 1998) (court
    will consider whether arbitration may be compelled under
    equitable estoppel doctrine only if arbitration agreement is
    written in broad language so that it applies, e.g., to "[a]ll
    disputes, claims or controversies arising from or relating to
    this [c]ontract or the relationships which result from this
    [contract]").
    14
    directly intertwined with that agreement, rendering arbitration
    appropriate.   See CD Partners, LLC v. Grizzle, 
    424 F.3d 795
    , 798
    (8th Cir. 2005).   Essentially, if a party's claims are so
    intimately founded in and closely related to an agreement which
    also mandates arbitration, the party opposing arbitration is
    equitably estopped from denying the arbitrability of its claims,
    even against a nonsignatory.15   "The plaintiff's actual
    dependence on the underlying contract in making out the claim
    against the nonsignatory defendant is therefore always the sine
    qua non of an appropriate situation for applying equitable
    estoppel."   Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp., 449 Fed. Appx. at 710
    (citation omitted).
    15
    Not all jurisdictions consider the intertwining nature of
    the claims to be, on its own, a sufficient basis for equitable
    estoppel. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for
    the Second Circuit has said that while this is an essential
    prerequisite, there must also be a relationship among the
    parties of a nature that justifies a conclusion that the
    signatory should be estopped from denying an obligation to
    arbitrate a dispute with a nonsignatory. See Sokol Holdings,
    Inc. v. BMB Munai, Inc., 
    542 F.3d 354
    , 358-359 (2d Cir. 2008).
    See also Ross v. American Express Co., 
    547 F.3d 137
    , 143-144 (2d
    Cir. 2008). Echoing this sentiment, the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp.,
    v. Medtronic, Inc., 
    449 Fed. Appx. 704
    , 710 (10th Cir. 2011),
    held that allegations of collusion alone are insufficient; the
    claims must also be "intimately founded in and intertwined with
    the obligations imposed by the contract containing the
    arbitration clause" (citation omitted). Additionally, one
    Missouri court has held that even if claims are "inextricably
    intertwined," compelling a signatory to arbitrate with a
    nonsignatory is inconsistent with the general principle that
    arbitration is ultimately a matter of agreement between the
    parties. Jones v. Paradies, 
    380 S.W.3d 13
    , 17-18 (Mo. Ct. App.
    2012).
    15
    Courts frequently rule in favor of nonsignatories in such
    circumstances because "it would be unfair to allow the signatory
    to rely on the agreement in formulating its claims but to
    disavow availability of the arbitration clause of that same
    agreement."   PRM Energy Sys., Inc. v. Primenergy, L.L.C., 
    592 F.3d 830
    , 835, 836 (8th Cir. 2010) (permitting arbitration under
    equitable estoppel theory in part because allegations were
    intimately founded in and intertwined with agreement containing
    arbitration clause).   See CD Partners, LLC, 
    424 F.3d at 800-801
    (arbitration compelled where franchisee's claims arose directly
    out of and related to its operation of franchises under
    agreement containing arbitration clause).
    For example, in JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 
    387 F.3d 163
    , 177-178 (2d Cir. 2004), the court held that
    nonsignatory ship owners could compel arbitration when
    charterers alleged that the owners conspired to inflate price
    terms in contracts between the charterers' and the owners'
    subsidiaries, as these claims were "undeniably intertwined" with
    the contracts containing an arbitration clause.   Additionally,
    in Grigson, 
    210 F.3d at 529-531
    , a different court held that
    allegations that nonsignatories tortiously interfered with a
    film distribution agreement containing an arbitration clause
    were sufficiently intertwined with the agreement to compel
    arbitration where the very essence of the claims required a
    16
    determination whether the nonsignatories had fulfilled their
    obligations under the agreement.
    Similarly, here, the plaintiffs assert multiple claims that
    arise out of and relate directly to terms within the franchise
    agreements containing the arbitration clause.   Contrast In re
    Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 
    707 F.3d 917
    , 921-924
    (8th Cir. 2013) (no equitable estoppel where signatory alleged
    no violation of contract terms and signatory's claims existed
    independently of agreement containing arbitration clause).
    Specifically, the plaintiffs allege both that the defendants
    misclassified the plaintiffs as independent contractors in the
    agreements and used unfair and deceptive business practices that
    misrepresented the terms of their contractual relationship.
    Indeed, it is the franchise agreements themselves that the
    plaintiffs allege created the service relationship between them
    and the defendants, mischaracterized the relationship as one of
    independent contractor rather than employee, and "contain[ed]
    numerous provisions that are unfair, unconscionable, [and]
    against public policy."
    These claims are inextricably intertwined with and relate
    directly to the franchise agreements containing the arbitration
    provision.   In particular, the plaintiffs' request for contract
    rescission and allegations of unenforceability necessarily
    depend on an analysis of the terms, provisions, and warranties
    17
    delineated within their agreements.   See Liles v. Ginn-La West
    End, Ltd., 
    631 F.3d 1242
    , 1255-1257 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
    curiam) (nonsignatory defendants could invoke forum-selection
    clause under equitable estoppel theory as plaintiffs' claim of
    rescission depended on contract containing clause); Townsend v.
    Quadrant Corp., 
    173 Wash. 2d 451
    , 461-462 (2012) (nonsignatory
    defendants could compel arbitration under equitable estoppel in
    part because plaintiffs' claim of contract rescission related
    directly to agreement containing arbitration clause).   See also
    Villanueva v. Barcroft, 
    822 F. Supp. 2d 726
    , 738-739 (N.D. Ohio
    2011) (forum selection clause applicable under equitable
    estoppel where plaintiff's claim relied on contract containing
    clause); World Gym, Inc. vs. Pla-Fit Franchise, LLC, U.S. Dist.
    Ct., No. 12-11620-DJC (D. Mass. July 19, 2013) (permitting
    nonsignatory to compel arbitration by way of equitable estoppel
    where plaintiffs' claims depended on provisions of franchise
    agreement that contained arbitration clause).   Contrast InterGen
    N.V., 
    344 F.3d at 138, 140, 145-146
     (no basis for equitable
    estoppel where, inter alia, complaint did not allege breach of
    contract nor sought to enforce any contractual right).16
    16
    Moreover, as both the plaintiffs' rights and the
    responsibilities of NECCS were delineated under the franchise
    agreements, the plaintiffs inevitably rely on the terms
    contained therein when asserting the unenforceability of various
    contractual provisions.
    18
    As for assessing the merits of the plaintiffs' claim
    regarding misclassification, a decision maker would be compelled
    to, among other things, compare the rights and responsibilities
    assigned to the plaintiffs in the franchise agreements to the
    elements of employee status under the Wage Act.     Section 148B,
    commonly referred to as the independent contractor statute,
    requires an entity to demonstrate that a purported independent
    contractor is "free from control and direction in connection
    with the performance of the service, both under his contract for
    the performance of service and in fact" (emphasis added).        G. L.
    c. 149, § 148B (a) (1).     This statutory language directs a look
    both at the worker's agreement, if any, as well as the actual
    working relationship.     See Depianti, 465 Mass. at 622;
    Subcontracting Concepts, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Div. of
    Unemployment Assistance, 
    86 Mass. App. Ct. 644
    , 649 n.7 (2014)
    (addressing similar language in G. L. c. 151A, § 2).        Therefore,
    courts commonly look to contractual language as a starting point
    for assessing how a worker ought to be classified.    See, e.g.,
    Subcontracting Concepts, Inc., supra at 647-648 (looking to
    plain terms of employment contract to assess contention that
    entity was not "employing unit" and did not require worker to
    submit to control or direction); Rogers vs. MIT Lincoln Lab.,
    Mass. Superior Ct., No. 10-04587 (July 5, 2012) (in employment
    discrimination case, under G. L. c. 151B, employment and payment
    19
    structure established by agreement weighed in favor of finding
    that plaintiff was independent contractor); Rainbow Dev., LLC
    vs. Department of Indus. Accs., Mass. Superior Ct., No. 2005-
    00435 (Nov. 17, 2005) (examining written provisions of agreement
    to assess whether entity, despite classifying workers as
    independent contractors, asserted control over worker
    performance by way of contract).
    Here, the agreement is replete with references to the
    plaintiffs' duties and responsibilities as a franchisee, and
    System4's liability, if any, could not be determined without
    reference to it.   See McBro Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle
    Elec. Constr. Co., 
    741 F.2d 342
    , 344 (11th Cir. 1984) (signatory
    equitably estopped from asserting that lack of written agreement
    precluded arbitration where basis of claim was breach of duties
    assigned under agreement that contained arbitration clause).
    While the terms of an employment contract are not, on their own,
    dispositive, see Commissioner of the Div. of Unemployment
    Assistance v. Town Taxi of Cape Cod, Inc., 
    68 Mass. App. Ct. 426
    , 430 n.9 (2007), the language employed may be a significant
    factor in evaluating the merits of a misclassification claim and
    making a "status determination."   Boston Bicycle Couriers, Inc.
    v. Deputy Director of the Div. of Employment & Training, 
    56 Mass. App. Ct. 473
    , 483-484 (2002).   Further, any determination
    as to whether the plaintiffs have satisfied the statutory
    20
    requirements of the Wage Act, and established their status as
    employees, ought to "be based upon a comprehensive analysis of
    the totality of relevant facts and circumstances of the working
    relationship."   Id. at 484.   While "[n]o one factor is outcome-
    determinative," id., it is fair to say that an important element
    of a working relationship is the contract responsible for
    creating it.
    This is not a situation in which the franchise agreement is
    merely factually significant to the plaintiffs' claims or has a
    "but-for" relationship with them.   See Lenox MacLaren Surgical
    Corp., 449 Fed. Appx. at 709.    Contrast VSR Fin. Servs., Inc. v.
    McLendon, 
    409 S.W.3d 817
    , 832-833 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013)
    (plaintiff did not rely on terms of agreement in asserting
    claims where pleading only made reference to or presumed
    existence of agreement).   Rather, the plaintiffs here must rely,
    in part, on the terms of the franchise agreements in asserting
    that the provisions are unenforceable and that they were
    mischaracterized as independent contractors.   The plaintiffs
    cannot avoid arbitration with System4 when the issues System4 is
    seeking to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the
    agreements that the plaintiffs signed.
    b.   Concerted misconduct.   The plaintiffs have consistently
    alleged concerted misconduct by System4 and NECCS.   See Sanders
    v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, LLC, 
    843 F. Supp. 2d 1033
    ,
    21
    1037-1038 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (nonsignatory could compel
    arbitration under equitable estoppel where concerted misconduct
    alleged between signatory and nonsignatory).    In assessing
    whether a plaintiff has advanced sufficient allegations of
    concerted misconduct, courts frequently look to the face of the
    complaint.   See Holden v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 
    390 F. Supp. 2d 752
    , 768 (N.D. Ill. 2005).17
    The plaintiffs have lumped the two defendants together,
    asserting each claim in their complaint against System4 and
    NECCS collectively.   See Amstar Mtge. Corp. v. Indian Gold, LLC,
    
    517 F. Supp. 2d 889
    , 897 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (concerted misconduct
    prong met where action was "averred against all defendants" and
    complaint was "littered with references of substantially
    interdependent and concerted misconduct" by all defendants);
    Hagan vs. GreenPoint Credit Corp., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 07-17-KKC
    (E.D. Ky. Aug. 3, 2007) (allegation of concerted misconduct
    demonstrated where plaintiffs collectively referred to all
    defendants in complaint as "the defendants").    Contrast Bailey
    v. ERG Enters., LP, 
    705 F.3d 1311
    , 1321 n.12 (11th Cir. 2013)
    (where plaintiffs only alleged misconduct against nonsignatory
    and did not name other signatory as party in complaint, second
    17
    Some jurisdictions require allegations of "pre-arranged,
    collusive behavior" between the signatory and nonsignatory
    defendants in order to meet the concerted misconduct test. See
    Donaldson Co. v. Burroughs Diesel, Inc., 
    581 F.3d 726
    , 734-735
    (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
    22
    circumstance of equitable estoppel not implicated).     In
    addition, the plaintiffs have consistently charged both System4
    and NECCS with equal wrongs, failing to distinguish them
    throughout the evolution of this case, thereby effectively
    asserting "interdependent and concerted misconduct" between
    them.   Grigson 
    210 F.3d at 257
    .   See Maldonado vs. Mattress
    Firm, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 13-CV-292-T-33AEP (M.D. Fla.
    June 3, 2013) (equitable estoppel warranted to compel
    arbitration where signatory failed to distinguish among
    defendants in alleging claims).    For example, the plaintiffs
    allege that both defendants, "together," subjected them to
    "numerous misrepresentations" and "misclassified" them as
    independent contractors.   Additionally, the plaintiffs allege
    that "[t]he written contracts between Defendants and the
    plaintiffs . . . are unenforceable" and unconscionable (emphasis
    added).   There is not a single claim alleged against System4 or
    NECCS as a separate entity.   See Brown v. Pacific Life Ins. Co.,
    
    462 F.3d 384
    , 398-399 (5th Cir. 2006) ("[a]s the [plaintiffs]
    fail to allege tortious acts by [nonsignatories] that are
    separate and apart from [signatories], we can only conclude that
    the complaint asserts concerted misconduct by all parties").
    In sum, because a decision maker must analyze the franchise
    agreements in assessing the merits of the plaintiffs' claims,
    and the plaintiffs have pointedly alleged concerted misconduct
    23
    between System4 and NECCS with respect to the agreements and
    their employment status thereunder, System4 can compel
    arbitration.
    2.   Validity of arbitration clause.   a.   Wage Act claims.
    Although System4 can compel arbitration despite being a
    nonsignatory, the plaintiffs further argue that their Wage Act
    claims are not arbitrable.   Specifically, they ask us to extend
    our decision in Crocker, 464 Mass. at 14-15, and hold that the
    arbitration clause does not apply to their Wage Act claims given
    that it makes no explicit mention of such claims.18    We decline
    to do so at this time.
    The Wage Act provides, in relevant part:     "[e]very person
    having employees in his service shall pay weekly or bi-weekly
    each such employee the wages earned by him to within six days of
    the termination of the pay period during which the wages were
    earned if employed for five or six days in a calendar week
    . . . .   No person shall by a special contract with an employee
    or by any other means exempt himself from this section . . ."
    (emphasis added).   G. L. c. 149, § 148.    "We have consistently
    held that the legislative purpose behind the Wage Act (and
    especially the 'special contract' language) is to provide strong
    18
    That the agreement makes no mention of wage claims is of
    little surprise, as it classifies the plaintiffs as independent
    contractors.
    24
    statutory protection for employees and their right to wages."
    Crocker, 464 Mass. at 13.
    In Crocker, we considered whether a general release of
    liability contained in a termination agreement barred Wage Act
    claims.     See id. at 12-15.   We held that, given the Wage Act's
    strong statutory protection for employees and their right to
    wages, as seen through its specific prohibition on exemption
    attempts, general releases fail to waive Wage Act claims unless
    they explicitly and clearly refer to such claims.      Id. at 14-15.
    Crocker, although referencing our decision in Warfield, 454
    Mass. at 398-402 (arbitration clause applies to gender
    discrimination claims only if clause specifically mentions such
    claims), was not a case concerning arbitration.      Rather, our
    overarching concern was that if general releases applied to Wage
    Act claims, employees might find themselves "unwittingly
    waiv[ing] their rights under the Wage Act."      Crocker, 464 Mass.
    at 14-15.    This, of course, was particularly problematic given
    the Wage Act's specific prohibition of contractual waivers of
    its rights and protections.     The "special contract" prohibition
    within the Wage Act was "intended to thwart . . . schemes" to
    avoid compliance.     DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 
    454 Mass. 486
    , 497 (2009).
    The instant case is distinguishable, as arbitration
    agreements are not the equivalent of claim releases.      See, e.g.,
    25
    Barbieri v. K-Sea Transp. Corp., 566 F. Supp. 2d. 187, 192
    (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ("An agreement to arbitrate is not a release of
    any claim . . .").   An arbitration agreement, as opposed to a
    general release, does not permit an employer to thwart or exempt
    itself from Wage Act obligations, but solely dictates the forum
    in which the plaintiffs' right to recovery will be determined.
    Accordingly, here, the plaintiffs did not unwittingly relinquish
    their right to recovery under the Wage Act upon signing the
    franchise agreements.19
    b.   Unconscionable provisions.    The plaintiffs additionally
    argue that the arbitration agreements are permeated with a
    series of unconscionable provisions which render them invalid
    under Massachusetts law.   Specifically, the plaintiffs take
    issue with three aspects of the agreements:     (1) a cost-
    splitting provision, (2) a shortened statute of limitations, and
    (3) a confidentiality provision.    They argue that, taken
    together, these provisions ought to render the entire agreement
    unenforceable.
    As an initial matter, we note that not all of these
    provisions are unconscionable.     "The determination that a
    19
    Even if Massachusetts law did require an arbitration
    clause to specifically mention applicability to claims under the
    Wage Act, "such a principle" might be "preempted by the [Federal
    Arbitration Act]," Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 
    703 F.3d 36
    ,
    45 (1st Cir. 2012), as it could be interpreted to prohibit or
    disproportionately disfavor arbitration. See AT&T Mobility LLC
    v. Concepcion, 
    131 S. Ct. 1740
    , 1747 (2011).
    26
    contract or term is or is not unconscionable is made in the
    light of its setting, purpose and effect" (quotation omitted).
    Miller, 448 Mass. at 679.   Under Massachusetts law, "[t]o prove
    that the terms of a contract are unconscionable, a plaintiff
    must show both substantive unconscionability (that the terms are
    oppressive to one party) and procedural unconscionability (that
    the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract show
    that the aggrieved party had no meaningful choice and was
    subject to unfair surprise)."   Storie vs. Household Int'l, Inc.,
    U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 03-40268 (D. Mass. Sept. 22, 2005), citing
    Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 
    381 Mass. 284
    , 293 n.13 (1980).
    As for cost-splitting,20 we made clear in Machado I that the
    mandates of the Wage Act would override this provision if the
    plaintiffs were successful in arbitration.   See 465 Mass. at
    516-517.   See also Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 791 F. Supp.
    2d. 284, 287-288, 290-291 (D. Mass. 2011) (recognizing award of
    attorney's fees and costs to prevailing plaintiff is mandatory
    under Wage Act and awarding over $37,000 in fees and costs on
    individual arbitration awards of approximately $1,600 and
    $5,700).   Accordingly, given that the arbitrator would be bound
    20
    The agreement mandates that arbitration take place in
    accordance with the commercial arbitration rules of the American
    Arbitration Association (AAA rules). Rule 54 of the AAA rules
    provides that most arbitration costs "shall be borne equally by
    the parties, unless they agree otherwise or unless the
    arbitrator in the award assesses such expenses or any part
    thereof against any specified party or parties."
    27
    to award the plaintiffs, on prevailing, both the costs of their
    action as well as reasonable attorney's fees, this provision of
    the agreement is enforceable.
    The agreement additionally provides for a one year or
    eighteen-month statute of limitations, which is shorter than the
    three-year period provided by G. L. c. 149 § 150.     Massachusetts
    law permits contractually shortened limitations periods so long
    as they are "reasonable" and "not contrary to other statutory
    provisions or to public policy."   Creative Playthings
    Franchising, Corp. v. Reiser, 
    463 Mass. 758
    , 760-761 (2012)
    (holding contractual limitations period shortening time within
    which claims must be brought from six years to one year or
    eighteen months was valid and enforceable under Massachusetts
    law).   "[W]e have long allowed the limitations period within
    which a claim arising from a contract may be brought to be
    shortened by contractual agreement."   Id. at 759.    The
    plaintiffs have presented no evidence to suggest that the
    shortened statute of limitations at issue is unreasonable or
    contrary to public policy.   Accordingly, it remains enforceable.
    Finally, the plaintiff cites to cases in other
    jurisdictions in which confidentiality provisions have been
    deemed unconscionable because they may prevent potential
    plaintiffs from building similar cases against defendants.
    Courts have distinguished their own holdings on this issue based
    28
    on the size of the putative class.   Compare Ting v. AT&T, 
    319 F.3d 1126
    , 1151-1152 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    540 U.S. 811
    (2003) (confidentiality provision held substantively
    unconscionable when applied to large class of customers), with
    Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat'l Ass'n, 
    718 F.3d 1052
    , 1059 n.9 (9th
    Cir. 2013) ("small number of putative class members . . .
    mitigates" confidentiality provision concerns).   Essentially, if
    the subject of arbitration is a contract that affects millions
    of people, the likelihood of future cases is increased.     In such
    a scenario, the unavailability of an arbitral decision will deny
    these potential plaintiffs with access to precedent, thereby
    putting the defendant "in a far superior legal posture."      Ting,
    
    319 F.3d at 1152
    .   Here, while a motion for class certification
    has yet to be filed, the putative class consists of franchisees,
    a relatively small and known quantity of individuals.     Any gains
    System4 might gather from the typical "repeat player" effect are
    therefore diminished.   This factual element is distinct from
    cases involving a large and unknowable class of customers.      Most
    importantly, however, "the enforceability of the confidentiality
    clause is a matter distinct from the enforceability of the
    arbitration clause in general."   Kilgore, 718 F.3d at 1059 n.9.
    The plaintiffs would still be "free to argue during arbitration
    that the confidentiality clause is not enforceable."    Id.
    29
    Nevertheless, even if we were to find any of the discussed
    provisions unconscionable, the franchise agreements contain a
    severability clause, requiring any unenforceable term to be
    severed.    This is not the type of case in which "illegality
    pervades the arbitration agreement," Booker v. Robert Half
    Int'l, Inc., 
    413 F.3d 77
    , 84-85 (D.C. Cir. 2005), nor are the
    arbitration provisions "so one-sided that their only possible
    purpose is to undermine the neutrality of the proceeding"
    (emphasis added; citations omitted).    Nino v. Jewelry Exch.,
    Inc., 
    609 F.3d 191
    , 207-208 (3d Cir. 2010) (arbitration
    agreement unconscionable where employer permitted to strike more
    members of arbitration panel than employee, employee must give
    notice of claims he intends to arbitrate while employer is under
    no such obligation, and employee must file grievance within five
    days of underlying events or lose right to arbitration).     We are
    unconvinced that the contested provisions equate to such a level
    of unconscionability that the arbitration clause should not be
    enforced.   Not only do the franchise agreements contain a
    severability clause, but also the plaintiffs identify only one
    potentially unenforceable provision (confidentiality), which
    "does not infect the arbitration clause as a whole."    Booker,
    
    413 F.3d at 85
    .
    Last, "[f]or agreements governed by the FAA, the statute's
    presumption of arbitrability means that 'in applying general
    30
    state-law principles of contract interpretation to the
    interpretation of an arbitration agreement . . . due regard must
    be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and
    ambiguities . . . resolved in favor of arbitration.'"    Joulé,
    Inc., 459 Mass. at 94, quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v.
    Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 
    489 U.S. 468
    , 475-476
    (1989).   Given this strong public policy in conjunction with our
    holdings on the plaintiffs' Wage Act and unconscionability
    claims, we conclude that the arbitration clause at issue remains
    valid.
    Conclusion.    The denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a
    ruling that System4's arbitration clause is unconscionable and
    cannot apply to wage claims in light of Crocker is affirmed.
    The grant of the plaintiffs' motion for a ruling that the
    arbitration clause cannot be enforced by System4 is reversed.
    The case is hereby remanded to the Superior Court for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    So ordered.