Chitwood v. Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 476 Mass. 667 ( 2017 )


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    SJC-12101
    FRED CHITWOOD   vs.   VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
    Suffolk.      November 9, 2016. - March 20, 2017.
    Present:   Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, &
    Budd, JJ.1
    Corporation, Stockholder, Custodian of corporate records.
    Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
    August 15, 2013.
    The case was heard by Janet L. Sanders, J.
    The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
    transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
    Steven J. Purcell, of New York (Justin Sherman, of New
    York, & Mitchell J. Matorin also present) for the plaintiff.
    R. Todd Cronan (William B. Brady also present) for the
    defendant.
    Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal
    Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
    GANTS, C.J.    Under G. L. c. 156D, § 16.02 (b), of the
    Massachusetts Business Corporation Act (act), a shareholder of a
    1
    Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this
    case prior to her retirement.
    2
    corporation, upon written notice, is entitled to inspect and
    copy various categories of corporate records if the shareholder
    makes the demand "in good faith and for a proper purpose," and
    if the particular records sought to be inspected are "directly
    connected" with that purpose.    The plaintiff, Fred Chitwood, a
    shareholder of the defendant Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
    (Vertex or the corporation), made a demand for corporate records
    pursuant to § 16.02 (b), claiming that inspection of the records
    was needed to investigate his allegation that the board of
    directors had committed a breach of its fiduciary duty of
    oversight with regard to Vertex's financial reporting and
    insider stock sales.   Vertex "rejected" the demand, claiming
    that the demand was "invalid under Massachusetts law" and that
    it was improper because the board, following a reasonable
    inquiry by a special committee of independent directors, had
    rejected his earlier demand to commence derivative litigation
    based on the same allegations of misconduct.     The plaintiff
    commenced an action in the Superior Court, seeking an order
    compelling Vertex to make the requested corporate records
    available to the plaintiff.     After a bench trial, the judge
    dismissed the complaint with prejudice, concluding that the
    plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of showing a proper
    purpose.
    3
    The issue on appeal is whether the judge applied the
    correct standard regarding the proper purpose required to
    inspect corporate records under § 16.02 (b).    We conclude that
    she did not.   Because the judge applied too demanding a standard
    and because the scope of the demand made by the shareholder far
    exceeded the authorized scope of inspection under § 16.02 (b),
    we vacate the judgment dismissing the shareholder's claim for
    inspection and remand the case for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.2
    The right of inspection.    Under § 16.02, a shareholder of a
    Massachusetts corporation is entitled to inspect two categories
    of corporate records.   The first category of records, delineated
    in G. L. c. 156D, § 16.01 (e), includes the corporation's
    articles of organization and bylaws (and all amendments
    thereto); resolutions adopted by the board of directors creating
    one or more classes of shares, and setting the rights,
    preferences, and limitations of those classes of shares (where
    the shares issued are outstanding); the minutes of all
    shareholders' meetings, as well as the records of all actions
    taken by shareholders without a meeting, for the past three
    years; all written communications to shareholders within the
    past three years, including the annual financial statements
    2
    We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the New
    England Legal Foundation.
    4
    provided to shareholders, for the past three years; the names
    and business addresses of the corporation's current directors
    and officers; and the corporation's most recent annual report
    delivered to the Secretary of State.    To inspect the corporate
    records in this first category, a shareholder need only provide
    written notice at least five business days before the
    shareholder wishes to inspect and copy; no showing of good faith
    or proper purpose is required.   G. L. c. 156D, § 16.02 (a).
    The second category of records, delineated in G. L.
    c. 156D, § 16.02 (b), includes records of "excerpts from minutes
    reflecting action taken" by the board of directors or a
    committee acting in place of the board;3 the "accounting records
    of the corporation, but if the financial statements of the
    corporation are audited by a certified public accountant,
    inspection shall be limited to the financial statements and the
    supporting schedules reasonably necessary to verify any line
    item on those statements;" and the list of the names and
    addresses of all corporate shareholders, showing the number and
    class of shares held by each.    See G. L. c. 156D, § 16.01 (c).
    3
    The full text of G. L. c. 156D, § 16.02 (b) (1), provides
    for the inspection and copying of "excerpts from minutes
    reflecting action taken at any meeting of the board of
    directors, records of any action of a committee of the board of
    directors while acting in place of the board of directors on
    behalf of the corporation, minutes of any meeting of the
    shareholders, and records of action taken by the shareholders or
    board of directors without a meeting, to the extent not subject
    to inspection under [§ 16.02 (a)]."
    5
    To inspect this second category of corporate records a
    shareholder not only must provide five days' written notice but
    also must meet the following three requirements:    (1) the
    shareholder must show that the "demand is made in good faith and
    for a proper purpose," (2) the shareholder must describe "with
    reasonable particularity his purpose and the records he desires
    to inspect," and (3) the shareholder must show that "the records
    are directly connected with his purpose."     G. L. c. 156D,
    § 16.02 (c).    In interpreting the meaning of these requirements,
    we are guided by the comments prepared by the task force on the
    revision of the Massachusetts business corporation law that
    drafted the act, "which included more than fifty experienced
    Massachusetts corporate lawyers."    See Halebian v. Berv, 
    457 Mass. 620
    , 625 (2010), citing comment to G. L. c. 156D, 25 Mass.
    Gen. Laws Ann. at 48 (West Supp. 2010).
    "A 'proper purpose' means a purpose that is reasonably
    relevant to the demanding shareholder's interest as a
    shareholder."   Comment to G. L. c. 156D, 25A Mass. Gen. Laws
    Ann. at 46 (West Supp. 2016) (comment).     The drafters also noted
    that the phrase "proper purpose" is "well understood" and that
    the "very substantial case law defining 'proper purpose' will
    continue to be applicable."    
    Id.
       That case law recognizes that
    "[s]tockholders are the beneficial owners of all the assets of
    the corporation, and they are entitled to reliable information
    6
    as to the financial condition of the corporation, the manner in
    which business has been conducted and its affairs have been
    managed, and whether those to whom they have entrusted their
    property have acted faithfully and efficiently in the interests
    of the corporation."   Albee v. Lamson & Hubbard Corp., 
    320 Mass. 421
    , 424 (1946).   A proper purpose is one that protects the
    shareholder's rights as an owner in the corporation and that
    advances the interests of the corporation itself.    
    Id.
        A
    shareholder's purpose is improper where it is driven by "mere
    curiosity," speculation, or vexatious motives (citation
    omitted).   Gavin v. Purdy, 
    335 Mass. 236
    , 239 (1957).     See
    Albee, supra (shareholder has no "right to an examination if his
    purpose be to satisfy his curiosity, to annoy or harass the
    corporation, or to accomplish some object hostile to the
    corporation or detrimental to its interests").
    "Good faith," paired as it is with "proper purpose," means
    that the stated proper purpose also must be the shareholder's
    true purpose.   See Gavin, 
    335 Mass. at 239
     (shareholder must act
    with "an honest purpose, not adverse to the interests of the
    corporation"); Albee, 320 Mass. at 424 (stockholder "who is
    acting in good faith" for proper purpose "is generally entitled
    to examine the corporate records and accounts").    This
    understanding of the meaning of good faith is supported by the
    Uniform Commercial Code's definition of "good faith," which
    7
    requires "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
    commercial standards of fair dealing."   G. L. c. 106, § 1-201
    (20).
    The other requirements -- that the shareholder state his or
    her purpose and the records sought with reasonable
    particularity, and that the records sought be connected with
    that purpose -- allow a fact finder to test whether the
    shareholder's true purpose is a proper purpose.   See comment,
    supra at 46 (eliciting "more meaningful statements of purpose"
    avoids "harassment under the guise of inspection").   Where the
    specific records sought have no relevant connection to the
    shareholder's stated purpose, a fact finder may infer that the
    stated purpose for inspection is not the true purpose, and that
    inspection of those records is sought for another purpose that
    the shareholder chose not to articulate because it would likely
    be found improper.4
    Where a shareholder makes a demand in good faith and for a
    proper purpose, stated with reasonable particularity, for
    records that are relevant to that purpose, the corporation must
    allow the inspection unless it can show that it has "determined
    in good faith that disclosure of the records sought would
    4
    The drafters note that, where a corporation disputes the
    "connection" or relevancy of the requested records, a judge may
    review the records in camera before determining the validity of
    the claim. Comment to G. L. c. 156D, § 16.02, 25A Mass. Gen.
    Laws Ann. at 46 (West Supp. 2016).
    8
    adversely affect the corporation in the conduct of its business
    or, in the case of a public corporation, constitute material
    non-public information at the time when the shareholder's notice
    of demand to inspect and copy is received by the corporation."
    G. L. c. 156D, § 16.02 (c) (4).    Where the corporation for any
    reason does not allow the inspection and copying of the
    requested records within a reasonable time, the shareholder may
    apply to the Superior Court for an order to permit inspection
    and copying, and that application shall be adjudicated "on an
    expedited basis."    G. L. c. 156D, § 16.04 (b).
    The right of inspection under § 16.02 is "an independent
    right of inspection"; it is not intended to substitute for or
    diminish any rights of inspection that may exist under another
    statute, the common law, or the right of discovery in
    shareholder litigation.    See G. L. c. 156D, § 16.02 (e);
    comment, supra at 46.
    Background.     We turn now to the complaint under § 16.04 (b)
    that initiated this litigation.    According to that complaint,
    the defendant corporation develops and manufactures drugs for
    the treatment of serious diseases.   In the spring of 2012, the
    corporation announced in a press release the interim results of
    "phase two" of a study regarding the effectiveness of two of its
    drugs to treat cystic fibrosis.   As a result of that
    announcement, which suggested a medical breakthrough, the
    9
    corporation's stock price "rose precipitously."    Three weeks
    later, the corporation issued a new press release, which
    suggested that the phase two study did not reflect a medical
    breakthrough, and the corporation's stock price declined on this
    news.   Between the first and the second announcement, seven of
    the corporation's officers and directors sold over $37 million
    in corporation stock.
    In November, 2012, the plaintiff5 sent a letter to the
    corporation's board of directors detailing what he characterized
    as the "false and misleading statements" in the first
    announcement and identifying the officers and directors he
    contended had wrongfully engaged in insider trading prior to the
    second announcement.    He demanded that the board initiate
    litigation on behalf of the corporation against the parties
    responsible for issuing the false and misleading statements,
    require the insiders who profited from the insider trading to
    disgorge the profits, and that the board institute meaningful
    corporate reforms.
    In response, the board established a special committee of
    independent directors to investigate the plaintiff's
    allegations, and retained outside counsel to assist in the
    5
    The plaintiff became the interested shareholder and
    replaced the person identified in the November, 2012, letter to
    the corporation's board of directors after it became clear that
    the individual identified in the November letter was not in fact
    a shareholder at the time of the relevant events.
    10
    investigation.   In April, 2013, the board informed the plaintiff
    by letter that the special committee had completed its
    investigation and reported its findings to the board, and that a
    majority of the independent directors had determined that there
    was no breach of fiduciary duty by any officer or director of
    the corporation and that a shareholder derivative action was not
    in the best interests of the corporation.   The letter briefly
    described the conduct of the investigation and provided a
    summary of its principal findings, but did not append the
    written report provided by the special committee to the board.
    On June 19, 2013, the plaintiff shareholder made a written
    demand under § 16.02 to inspect the corporation's books and
    records "to investigate potential wrongdoing, mismanagement, and
    breaches of fiduciary duties by the members of the [b]oard or
    others in connection with the events, circumstances, and
    transactions" described earlier.   The shareholder asserted that
    he did not believe the corporation's investigation "properly or
    adequately responded to the concerns expressed" in the November,
    2012, letter demanding the initiation of shareholder derivative
    litigation.   The shareholder demanded the inspection and copying
    of seven categories of records, including the records and
    minutes of all meetings of the board and the special committee
    regarding these issues, the special committee's final report and
    any drafts of the report, all documents distributed at any
    11
    meeting of the board or the special committee, all documents
    concerning the results of the internal review of the phase two
    study, copies of all policy and procedure manuals and other
    documents describing the corporation's internal control
    practices regarding the selection and oversight of contractors
    to perform drug trials and studies for the corporation, and
    calendars to show the number and duration of meetings of the
    board and the special committee.
    On June 26, the board, through counsel, rejected the June
    19 demand for inspection and identified four reasons for the
    rejection.   First, the board contended that the demand was not
    made for a "proper purpose" because the shareholder sought the
    inspection of the corporation's books and records under § 16.02
    for the purpose of investigating potential wrongdoing but had
    failed to present any credible basis to infer that that were
    legitimate issues that warranted further investigation.
    Second, the board contended that the demand lacked a
    "proper purpose" because it essentially sought discovery in
    support of the shareholder's derivative demand allegations that
    the shareholder would be barred from obtaining had he brought a
    shareholder derivative action under G. L. c. 156D, § 7.44.     The
    board noted that § 7.44 provides that a derivative action
    commenced after rejection of a demand shall be dismissed on
    motion of the corporation where a judge finds that a majority of
    12
    the independent directors present at a meeting of the board of
    directors (where the independent directors constitute a quorum)
    had determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable
    inquiry that a derivative action would not be in the best
    interests of the corporation.     The board also noted that a court
    may stay discovery in a derivative proceeding while the
    corporation's motion to dismiss is pending.     See G. L. c. 156D,
    § 7.43.
    Third, the board claimed that the demand was "overbroad and
    far exceeds the narrow scope of records available for
    inspection" under § 16.02.
    Fourth, the board claimed that it had made a good faith
    determination that disclosure of the records sought would
    adversely affect the corporation in the conduct of its business,
    and that the requests call for the disclosure of non-public
    material information.
    On August 15, 2013, the shareholder filed suit under G. L.
    c. 156D, § 16.04, seeking an order compelling the corporation to
    allow the inspection and copying of the books and records he had
    demanded in his June 19 letter.    The shareholder's complaint,
    which, under § 16.04 (b), was to be resolved on an "expedited
    basis," was not resolved for nearly two years when, on August 4,
    2015, final judgment entered dismissing the complaint with
    prejudice.   During those two years, cross motions for judgment
    13
    on the pleadings were denied, as was the corporation's motion
    for summary judgment, and evidence was taken during a one-day
    bench trial where the plaintiff shareholder and a board member
    of the corporation, who also served as chair of its audit
    committee, testified.
    In her findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial
    judge recognized that the plaintiff shareholder's demand was
    overbroad and that, if he prevailed, his right to inspect
    corporate records under § 16.02 (b) would be limited to
    "excerpts from minutes reflecting any action taken at any
    meeting of the board of directors [and] records of any action
    of" the special committee.   The judge concluded that the
    plaintiff was not entitled to inspect even this narrow swath of
    records because he had failed to meet his burden of showing a
    proper purpose.   The judge noted that the chronology of events
    regarding the sale of stock by corporate insiders after "the
    admittedly erroneous May 7 press release" and before the "May 29
    correction" had prompted a United States Senator to ask the
    Securities and Exchange Commission to examine the matter.     But
    the judge declared that, where a shareholder seeks to inspect
    corporate records under § 16.02 (b) to investigate allegations
    of corporate wrongdoing and mismanagement, the shareholder "must
    present some evidence of wrongdoing; simply relying on the
    timing of certain events is not sufficient" (emphasis in
    14
    original).6   The judge found that the shareholder had offered no
    evidence "calling into question the independence of the
    [s]pecial [c]ommittee or the diligence of its efforts."
    The judge found additional support for her conclusion that
    the plaintiff is not entitled to inspection of the records under
    § 16.02 because she concluded that, if the shareholder were to
    bring a derivative suit under G. L. c. 156D, § 7.44, based on
    the evidence he presented at trial, he would not be entitled to
    any discovery.   The judge noted that a corporation in a
    derivative action is entitled to dismissal if a majority of the
    independent directors present at a board of directors meeting
    (where the independent directors constitute a quorum) determine
    "in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which
    its conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative
    proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation."
    § 7.44 (a).   The judge also noted that, if the corporation were
    to move to dismiss a derivative action, all discovery would be
    stayed pending resolution of the motion unless the judge, on
    6
    The judge found guidance in a Massachusetts Superior Court
    decision which declared that "a purpose to investigate possible
    waste, mismanagement or other wrongdoing is a proper purpose
    under [the Delaware inspection statute, [
    Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220
     (LexisNexis 2011)], provided that the shareholder presents
    some evidence that establishes a credible basis from which a
    court can infer the existence of legitimate issues as to such
    conduct warranting further investigation." Gent vs. Teradyne,
    Inc., Superior Court, No. 07-04676-BLS2 (Oct. 8, 2010), citing
    Seinfeld v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 
    909 A.2d 117
    , 118, 122
    (Del. 2006).
    15
    good cause shown, ordered that specified discovery be conducted.
    § 7.44 (d).   In the absence of good cause, discovery would
    proceed only if the motion to dismiss were denied, and the
    motion would be denied only where the shareholder had alleged
    "with particularity" facts that rebutted the facts presented by
    the corporation showing that a majority of the board of
    directors was independent when the independent directors decided
    not to proceed with the derivative action and that their
    determination was made in good faith after conducting a
    reasonable inquiry.   Id.   The judge concluded that allowing
    inspection under § 16.02 would render those limitations on
    discovery "meaningless."
    Discussion.    Viewed from the perspective of the appellate
    bench, this was an expensive litigation war of attrition that
    was fought over nearly nothing.    The seven categories of records
    that the shareholder demanded under § 16.02 far exceed the scope
    of records that are within the right of inspection under
    § 16.02.   They are precisely the type of records that a
    plaintiff shareholder might seek in discovery in a derivative
    action in an attempt to show that the special committee's
    inquiry into the allegations was not reasonable or that the
    independent directors did not act in good faith.   But, as the
    judge found, within these seven categories of records, the only
    records within the scope of the right of inspection under
    16
    § 16.02 were the excerpts of minutes or comparable records that
    reflected the actions taken at meetings of the board of
    directors or meetings of the special committee.    The drafters'
    comments make clear that they intended "to permit inspection of
    votes or action taken on relevant matters, not of reports,
    discussion or decisions not to act on a matter."   Comment, supra
    at 45.   The drafters added, "Shareholders may have a legitimate
    interest in reviewing whether action was properly taken by the
    board of directors, but giving them a statutory right to examine
    the remainder of the minutes of a board or committee meeting
    could inhibit frank discussion or the disclosure of sensitive
    matters to the directors to enable them to exercise their
    fiduciary responsibilities."   Id.   In short, under § 16.02, a
    shareholder is entitled to inspect the original minutes of a
    board or committee meeting only to learn what action was taken
    at those meetings; it does not provide a right of inspection of
    the documents that were provided to board members for
    consideration of that proposed action or of the minutes
    memorializing the debate at the board or committee meeting as to
    whether to take that action.
    Where, as here, a shareholder demands that the corporation
    initiate a derivative action based on allegations of insider
    trading after an inaccurate public announcement of the results
    of drug testing that suggested an apparent scientific
    17
    breakthrough, and where the corporation declines to do so, a
    shareholder has a proper purpose in asking to inspect the
    excerpts of the original minutes of the meetings of the board of
    directors and the special committee that reflect the actions
    taken at those meetings regarding the requested derivative
    action.7   The minutes may well say nothing different regarding
    these actions from what the corporation's attorney described in
    the letter informing the shareholder of the corporate decision
    to decline to proceed with the derivative action, but the
    shareholder is entitled, as the Russian proverb says, to "trust
    but verify."8   The shareholder need not, as the judge ruled,
    provide evidence of wrongdoing beyond the timing of the press
    releases and the insider trades to obtain these excerpts of the
    original minutes.   The desire to verify the action taken by the
    special committee and the board in response to these allegations
    is a purpose that is "reasonably relevant to the demanding
    shareholder's interest as a shareholder."   See comment, supra at
    46.
    7
    The mere fact that the plaintiff's request was indeed
    overbroad does not alone establish an absence of good faith.
    8
    The Russian proverb "trust, but verify" became famous in
    the United States when former President Ronald W. Reagan quoted
    it with respect to his nuclear disarmament discussions with the
    Soviet government. See e.g., The Signing: 'Universal
    Significance for Mankind,' N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at A21.
    18
    The judge erred in applying a standard derived from
    Delaware law in determining whether the shareholder had a proper
    purpose.   In Delaware, as in Massachusetts, a shareholder's
    desire to investigate corporate wrongdoing or mismanagement is a
    proper purpose.   See Seinfeld v. Verizon Communications, Inc.,
    
    909 A.2d 117
    , 121 (Del. 2006); Varney v. Baker, 
    194 Mass. 239
    ,
    240-241 (1907).   But the scope of corporate records that
    potentially may be inspected to conduct such an investigation
    under the Delaware counterpart of § 16.02 is far greater than
    under § 16.02, because the Delaware statute permits inspection
    of a corporation's "books and records," without specifying which
    books and records.   See 
    Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220
    (b)(1)
    (LexisNexis 2011).   Under Delaware law, a shareholder may
    identify the category of corporate records he or she seeks to
    inspect, and the scope of inspection is left to the sound
    discretion of the judge.   See 
    Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220
    (c)(3)
    ("The Court may, in its discretion, prescribe any limitations or
    conditions with reference to the inspection, or award such other
    or further relief as the Court may deem just and proper");
    United Techs. Corp. v. Treppel, 
    109 A.3d 553
    , 557-558 (Del.
    2014) (court has broad discretion to determine scope of
    inspection and use of information gathered); Security First
    Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 
    687 A.2d 563
    , 569 (Del.
    19
    1997) (judge "has wide latitude in determining the proper scope
    of inspection").
    In Seinfeld, 
    supra at 118-119
    , the shareholder alleged that
    three corporate executives were paid more than authorized in
    their employment contracts, and the shareholder sought to
    inspect the corporate books and records related to their
    compensation.     Where an inspection's purpose is to investigate
    possible corporate wrongdoing or mismanagement, the Delaware
    Supreme Court requires the shareholder to show, "by a
    preponderance of the evidence, a credible basis from which the
    [court] can infer there is possible mismanagement that would
    warrant further investigation."     
    Id. at 123
    .   "That 'threshold
    may be satisfied by a credible showing, through documents,
    logic, testimony or otherwise, that there are legitimate issues
    of wrongdoing."    
    Id.,
     quoting Security First Corp., 
    687 A.2d at 568
    .
    This burden is modest but it is more demanding than is
    appropriate for the more limited scope of books and records
    subject to inspection under § 16.02.     The inverse of the
    Biblical adage that to whom much is given, much is expected is
    that to whom less is given, less is expected.      See Luke 12:48
    (Revised Standard Version).     The corporate records sought in
    Seinfeld might be outside the scope of inspection in
    Massachusetts under § 16.02, as might many investigative
    20
    requests for corporate books and records that may be permissible
    under Delaware law.    Where a shareholder seeks corporate books
    and records under § 16.02 and claims a proper purpose of
    investigating corporate wrongdoing or mismanagement, the
    shareholder demonstrates a proper purpose where he or she
    identifies particular facts or circumstances that permit a
    reasonable inference that the requested books and records could
    possibly reveal information that would tend to indicate the
    existence of corporate wrongdoing or mismanagement.    Such a
    showing, if made in good faith, suffices to show that the
    shareholder's purpose is not driven by "mere curiosity" or
    speculation.   See Gavin, 
    335 Mass. at 239
    .
    The judge also erred in concluding that, where a
    shareholder's derivative demand has been declined by the
    corporation, the shareholder, to show a proper purpose, must
    present some evidence that the majority of the board of
    directors who voted to decline were not independent or that
    their determination was not made in good faith or that the
    inquiry on which they based they determination was not
    reasonable.    Essentially, the judge imposed a burden on the
    shareholder seeking to inspect corporate books and records under
    § 16.02 that was comparable to the burden placed on a plaintiff
    shareholder under § 7.44 (d) to defeat a motion to dismiss
    brought by the corporation that had declined the plaintiff's
    21
    derivative demand.9   Section 16.02, however, provides "an
    independent right of inspection," and its drafters made clear in
    their comments that the right of inspection under § 16.02 is
    available "at any time."   Comment, supra at 45, 46.   A demand
    for inspection under § 16.02 may be made before or after the
    filing of a shareholder derivative action, and the definition of
    "proper purpose" is not altered by its timing.   Indeed, a
    shareholder has a right of inspection under § 16.02 even if the
    shareholder derivative action he or she sought to initiate has
    been dismissed.   To be sure, the dismissal of a related
    shareholder derivative action may be relevant in determining
    whether the demand for inspection under § 16.02 is made in good
    faith or to harass the corporation, but the right of inspection
    under § 16.02 is not restricted by the limits of discovery under
    § 7.44 (d).10
    9
    We understand why the judge believed that the allowance of
    inspection of the plaintiff shareholder's overbroad request for
    books and records would have frustrated the limitations of
    discovery under § 7.44, because the vast majority of those
    documents are outside the scope of § 16.02 and would be
    available only through civil discovery in a shareholder
    derivative suit. But the appropriate course of action is to
    isolate which of the documents in the inspection request fall
    within the scope of § 16.02, and then determine whether there is
    a proper purpose to order inspection of that subset of
    documents.
    10
    Because the shareholder here did not assert a common-law
    right to inspect corporate books and records, we do not address
    whether the common-law right of inspection survives after the
    enactment of G. L. c. 156D, §§ 16.01 and 16.02, or, if it does
    22
    Conclusion.   The judgment of dismissal is vacated, and the
    case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings
    consistent with this decision.
    So ordered.
    survive, whether it provides a shareholder with a greater right
    of inspection than provided under these statutes.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SJC 12101

Citation Numbers: 476 Mass. 667, 71 N.E.3d 492

Judges: Gants, Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Bltdd

Filed Date: 3/20/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024