Commonwealth v. Lawson ( 2016 )

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SJC-11996
COMMONWEALTH vs. RICHARD LAWSON.
Suffolk. March 7, 2016. - October 28, 2016.
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk,
& Hines, JJ.1
Insanity. Mental Health. Evidence, Sanity, Inference,
Presumptions and burden of proof, Argument by prosecutor.
Practice, Criminal, Presumptions and burden of proof,
Required finding, Argument by prosecutor.
Complaint received and sworn to in the Central Division of
the Boston Municipal Court Department on March 12, 2014.
The case was heard by Michael J. Coyne, J.
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.
Christopher DeMayo for the defendant.
John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
1
Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements.
2
GANTS, C.J. The defendant, after being told by Boston
police officers that he had an outstanding warrant, resisted
arrest and assaulted the officers. At a jury-waived trial in
the Boston Municipal Court, the defendant offered a defense of
lack of criminal responsibility, and called a forensic
psychologist who described the defendant's lengthy mental health
history and opined that the defendant was not criminally
responsible at the time of the offense. The Commonwealth did
not present expert evidence on the issue of criminal
responsibility in rebuttal but rather relied on the
circumstances surrounding the offense and cross-examination of
the defendant's expert to establish criminal responsibility.
The judge denied the defendant's motion for required findings of
not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility and
found the defendant guilty on all charges.
On appeal, the defendant contends that the judge must have
relied on the so-called "presumption of sanity" because, without
this presumption, the evidence did not support a finding of
criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude
that the "presumption of sanity" is not truly a presumption but
rather an inference that the defendant is probably criminally
responsible because most people are criminally responsible for
their acts. Where a defendant proffers a defense of lack of
criminal responsibility and there is some evidence that supports
3
it, this inference, standing alone, cannot support a finding
that a defendant is criminally responsible beyond a reasonable
doubt. Although the Commonwealth may not rely on "the
presumption of sanity" to establish criminal responsibility, the
Commonwealth need not offer expert testimony in every case and
may rely instead on the circumstances of the offense and all
that the defendant did and said before, during, and after the
offense to prove the defendant's criminal responsibility.
Applying the proper test, we hold that the evidence here was
sufficient to allow a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that
the defendant was criminally responsible at the time of the
offenses and, therefore, affirm the convictions.
Background. We recite the facts that could have been found
by the judge from the evidence at trial. On March 11, 2014,
Boston police Officers Paul Hayward and John Mullen were on
routine patrol in full uniform in downtown Boston when Officer
Hayward spotted the defendant, whom the officer knew to have
outstanding warrants. The officers got out of their vehicle and
approached the defendant, who was walking, talking, and laughing
with two other men. As the officers approached, the defendant's
eyes widened, and he looked over his shoulder. When Officer
Hayward blocked the defendant's path and told the defendant that
the officer needed to speak with him, the defendant asked the
officer to light his cigarette. The officer declined, told the
4
defendant that he had an outstanding warrant, and asked for
identification. The defendant stepped back and reached his hand
down towards his pants pocket. Officer Hayward put his hand on
the defendant's hand to prevent the defendant from reaching into
the pocket. The defendant pushed Officer Hayward away. Officer
Hayward then "took [the defendant] to the ground," and a
struggle ensued during which both officers attempted to restrain
the defendant and apply handcuffs. During the struggle, Officer
Mullen inadvertently placed both cuffs on the same hand of the
defendant. The defendant kicked Officer Mullen in the head
several times and flailed his handcuffed hand. Eventually, they
were able to restrain the defendant. Officer Hayward described
the defendant as being coherent but "absolutely manic" during
the struggle.
The defendant was arrested and taken to the police station,
where he struggled with several other officers. Later that day,
the defendant was taken to the Massachusetts General Hospital
for a mental status evaluation. At the hospital, he was
described as paranoid, disheveled, and having "flight of ideas."
He was so agitated that he was given emergency antipsychotic
medication.
After his arrest, the defendant appeared in the Quincy
Division of the District Court Department on an unrelated
matter. A judge of that court ordered the defendant to be
5
evaluated for his competency to stand trial, and the defendant
was sent to Bridgewater State Hospital (Bridgewater) for that
evaluation.
At trial, in support of his defense of lack of criminal
responsibility, the defendant called a forensic psychologist at
Bridgewater to testify regarding the defendant's mental health
history and her opinion as to his criminal responsibility on the
day in question. The doctor reported that the defendant has an
"extensive" mental health history, which has involved ten
admissions to Bridgewater, the first in 2000. Some of those
admissions were the result of civil commitments; others resulted
from referrals from correctional institutions. He was civilly
committed at Bridgewater at the time of trial. The defendant
has received mental health diagnoses of a psychotic disorder not
otherwise specified, bipolar disorder, manic episodes with
psychotic features, a mood disorder not otherwise specified, and
schizoaffective disorder. His current diagnosis is
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. In the past, he has
been prescribed a combination of antipsychotic and mood-
stabilizing medications. The defendant also has a history of
substance abuse.
A month before the incident, the defendant had been in
custody at the Nashua Street jail, where he was taking
medications prescribed to manage his mental health symptoms.
6
But on February 21, 2014, the defendant was transferred to the
Norfolk County Correctional Center, where his antipsychotic and
mood-stabilizing medications were discontinued. The mood-
stabilizing medication was later prescribed, but the defendant
did not take it. The defendant was then transferred to the
Middlesex County house of correction, where he was not
prescribed any medication, and from there he apparently was
released from custody. Consequently, there was no record
indicating that the defendant had taken any medication from
February 21 until the incident on March 11.
The doctor testified that when the defendant discontinues
medications, he decompensates quickly, and he would likely
become agitated, aggressive, impulsive, paranoid, and
delusional. He also would likely hear voices, exhibit poor
insight, and exercise poor judgment.
The doctor also described what the defendant had told her
about the incident. He said that he was walking down the street
when someone wearing a yellow suit with a reflective emblem
approached him and asked, "What the fuck is your name?"2 He
thought the person could have been a street cleaner or a
security guard but did not think that the person was a police
2
The defendant recalled only one person approaching him; he
did not recall a second person being involved in the
altercation.
7
officer. He thought that the person was trying to torment him
and was going to take him back to jail.3
The doctor opined that the defendant was likely manifesting
symptoms of schizoaffective disorder on the day of the incident,
including paranoid delusions. She also opined that his actions
were driven by a distorted sense of reality caused by the
symptoms of his mental illness and that he could not conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law on the day of the
offense.
On cross-examination, the doctor stated that her
conversations with the defendant occurred after she provided him
with a Lamb warning, see Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265,
270 (1974), informing him that his statements would not be
confidential and could be used in court.4 She testified that she
3
The defendant's statements to the forensic psychologist
were hearsay and therefore admissible only for the limited
purpose of assessing the credibility of the doctor's opinion
regarding the defendant's criminal responsibility; they were not
admissible for the truth of the matters asserted. See
Commonwealth v. Brown, 449 Mass. 747, 768-769 (2007). See
generally Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2) (2016) (party's out-of-
court statement is hearsay unless offered in evidence by
opposing party). However, neither party sought to limit the
admissibility of these statements, and the judge did not declare
that he would do so. Where otherwise inadmissible hearsay is
admitted without objection or request for a limiting
instruction, it may be considered by the finder of fact for all
purposes. See Commonwealth v. Washington, 449 Mass. 476, 487
(2007).
4
In Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 270 (1974), we
held that communications between an individual and a mental
8
first encountered the defendant three weeks after his arrest;
she did not examine the defendant on the day of the offense.
The doctor reviewed the defendant's records from the
Massachusetts General Hospital regarding his examination there
on March 11 and 12, but did not review any subsequent medical
records before March 31, when the defendant was sent to
Bridgewater. She acknowledged the defendant's history of
substance abuse and testified that he admitted to using cocaine
on the day of the incident. The doctor concluded that the
defendant was not malingering, but she initially did not rule
out that possibility. She also testified that the defendant has
been noncompliant with taking his medication in the past and has
been violent while hospitalized at Bridgewater even when he was
taking his medication.
The prosecution did not offer any expert testimony in
rebuttal. At the close of all the evidence, the defendant moved
for required findings of not guilty by reason of lack of
criminal responsibility, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient as a matter of law to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was criminally responsible at the time
health professional made during a court-ordered examination are
privileged pursuant to G. L. c. 233, § 20B, unless the
individual is informed that the communications would not be
privileged.
9
of the offenses.5 The judge denied the motion and found the
defendant guilty on all counts: two counts of assault and
battery on a public employee, in violation of G. L. c. 265,
§ 13D; one count of assault and battery by means of a dangerous
weapon (shod foot), in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A; one
count of assault by means of a dangerous weapon (handcuffs), in
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15B;6 and one count of resisting
arrest, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 32B. The defendant
appealed, and we allowed his motion for direct appellate review.
Discussion. The defendant argues that the judge erred in
denying his motion for required findings of not guilty by reason
of lack of criminal responsibility. He also contends that the
prosecutor made improper comments to the judge in arguing
against that motion.
1. Criminal responsibility. Where a defendant asserts a
defense of lack of criminal responsibility and there is evidence
at trial that, viewed in the light most favorable to the
5
Although counsel moved for required findings of not
guilty, and did not specify that she was moving for required
findings of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal
responsibility, it is clear from the evidence at trial and the
content of her argument that her motion sought the latter
finding.
6
The complaint charged the defendant with assault and
battery with the handcuffs, but after the prosecution rested,
the judge ordered the complaint amended to allege the lesser
included offense of assault with the handcuffs because the
evidence showed that the defendant "flailed" the handcuffs but
never struck anyone with them.
10
defendant, would permit a reasonable finder of fact to have a
reasonable doubt whether the defendant was criminally
responsible at the time of the offense, the Commonwealth bears
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was criminally responsible. Commonwealth v. Keita,
429 Mass. 843, 849-850 (1999). "In this process, we require the
Commonwealth to prove negatives beyond a reasonable doubt: that
the defendant did not have a mental disease or defect at the
time of the crime and, if that is not disproved beyond a
reasonable doubt, that no mental disease or defect caused the
defendant to lack substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law." Id., citing Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352
Mass. 544, 546-547 (1967).
The defendant contends that, where the Commonwealth offered
no expert evidence that the defendant was criminally responsible
and where there was nothing about the circumstances of the
commission of the crimes or the defendant's conduct after their
commission that would suggest that he was criminally
responsible, it must be inferred that the judge denied the
motion for required findings of not guilty based solely on the
"presumption of sanity," even though the judge made no reference
to such a presumption. The defendant further claims that the
inference arising from this "presumption" alone cannot support a
11
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
criminally responsible.
The Commonwealth contends that a judge may not allow a
motion for a required finding of not guilty based on the
Commonwealth's failure to prove criminal responsibility because
criminal responsibility is not an "element" of any of the
offenses charged. We agree that criminal responsibility is not
an "element" of any crime. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass.
516, 532 (1976). If it were, the United States Supreme Court
would not have upheld the constitutionality of Federal and State
laws that place the burden on a defendant to prove that he or
she was not criminally responsible at the time of the offense,
because the Supreme Court has declared that due process requires
that the prosecution bear the burden of proving every element of
a crime. Id. at 531-532. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970). See also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798-799 (1952)
(due process does not mandate that prosecution bear burden of
proof of criminal responsibility). However, even though
criminal responsibility is not an "element" of a crime, once the
defense of lack of criminal responsibility is proffered and some
evidence is offered in support, a jury must be instructed that
they must find the defendant not guilty by reason of lack of
criminal responsibility if the Commonwealth has failed to meet
its burden of proving criminal responsibility. See Commonwealth
12
v. Goudreau, 422 Mass. 731, 735-737 (1996); id. at 737-739
(Appendix). See also Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 1-2
(2013). Regardless of whether criminal responsibility is an
"element" of a crime or a required "fact" to be proved, a
conviction may not stand where no rational finder of fact could
find the defendant criminally responsible. See Keita, 429 Mass.
at 844 ("if the evidence did not permit a finding of criminal
responsibility, [the defendant's] conviction would create a
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice"). Therefore, a
required finding of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal
responsibility may rest on the failure of proof of criminal
responsibility. The absence of self-defense also is not an
element of any offense, but where self-defense is claimed, we
have considered whether the evidence of its absence is
sufficient to support the denial of a motion for a required
finding of not guilty. See Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430 Mass.
483, 495-496 (1999); Koonce v. Commonwealth, 412 Mass. 71, 73-74
(1992), S.C., 418 Mass. 367 (1994).
The Commonwealth also contends that, if criminal
responsibility is a suitable ground for a defendant to move for
a required finding of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal
responsibility, the inference arising from the "presumption of
sanity" alone is sufficient to defeat such a motion. We agree
that, under current case law, the Commonwealth is correct. In
13
Commonwealth v. Smith, 357 Mass. 168, 178-180 (1970), S.C., 427
Mass. 245 (1998), we declared:
"[A] court cannot direct a jury to return a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity even though the only evidence
on the issue is that the defendant was insane at the time
of the alleged crime, and the evidence is uncontroverted.
[One] reason, as stated in Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass.
409, 415 [1935], is that 'although the burden of proof is
on the Commonwealth to prove the defendant mentally
responsible for crime . . . the fact that a great majority
of men are sane, and the probability that any particular
man is sane, may be deemed by a jury to outweigh, in
evidential value, testimony that he is insane.' . . . It
is for the jury to decide in each case whether they draw
that inference. . . . If they draw that inference, it is
for them to decide what weight they will give to it in the
light of all of the evidence introduced on the issue. They
may deem it to outweigh, in evidential value, psychiatric
or other evidence that the defendant is insane. These are
decisions to be made by the jury, and the court cannot
direct the jury how they shall decide thereon."
See Keita, 429 Mass. at 847. We now revisit the doctrine
arising from that case law.
A presumption in the classic sense is a rule of law where
proof of fact A is sufficient to satisfy a party's burden to
prove fact B, leaving the opposing party with the burden of
production or persuasion to prove the nonexistence of fact B.
2 McCormick on Evidence § 342, at 675-677 (K.S. Broun ed., 7th
ed. 2013). In criminal cases, presumptions have been considered
to be either mandatory or permissive: mandatory presumptions
require the finder of fact to "find the presumed fact upon proof
of the basic fact, 'at least unless the defendant has come
forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection
14
between the two facts,'" whereas permissive presumptions
"allow[], but do[] not require, the trier of fact to infer the
presumed fact from proof of the basic facts." Id. at § 346, at
716, quoting County Court of Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen, 442
U.S. 140, 157 (1979). We have recognized that what has been
called the "presumption of sanity" is "merely an expression we
have used to describe both 'the fact that a great majority of
men are sane,' . . . and 'the probability that any particular
man is sane,' . . . , from which the jury may conclude that the
defendant is sane" (citations omitted). Kostka, 370 Mass. at
530. The "presumption of sanity" is thus not a presumption
under any meaning of the word. It is not premised on the
admission in evidence of any basic fact to prove a presumed
fact, but rather relies on a commonsense understanding regarding
the sanity of the majority of the populace that need not be
admitted in evidence. It is more accurately characterized as an
inference; characterizing it as a presumption is a recipe for
confusion.7
7
We have declared that the "presumption of sanity" has a
procedural characteristic in that it relieves the Commonwealth
of the burden of proving criminal responsibility unless and
until the defendant proffers the lack of criminal responsibility
as a defense and some evidence is admitted in support of that
defense. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 530 (1976).
But this suggests that criminal responsibility is an element of
an offense, which it is not, and that the presumption satisfies
the prosecution's burden of proving that element where no
evidence to the contrary is admitted. Lack of criminal
15
The inference that a defendant is probably sane because
most people are sane is not strong enough alone to permit a
rational finder of fact to conclude that a defendant is
criminally responsible beyond a reasonable doubt. Although it
is probable that an individual selected randomly would be
criminally responsible for his or her acts, that same
probability would not attach to the tiny subset of the
population who are criminal defendants with a long history of
mental illness who proffer a defense of lack of criminal
responsibility. As Justice O'Connor wrote in a dissent in
Commonwealth v. Kappler, 416 Mass. 574, 599-600 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting):
"The fact that a great majority of people are sane says
little, if anything, about whether a particular defendant
was sane when he or she engaged in a type of conduct in
which the great majority of people do not engage. The fact
that a great majority of people are sane says absolutely
nothing about whether the defendant in this case, . . . who
had a long history of 'mental illness and auditory
hallucinations,' . . . was sane on the morning that,
staring straight ahead, he drove his automobile through a
red traffic light on the Alewife Brook Parkway and then
onto an adjacent footpath where he intentionally struck two
people he had no reasonable or understandable motive to
harm, and drove away" (citation omitted).
responsibility is a defense, like self-defense or defense of
another, and, where the defense is not raised, the Commonwealth
has no burden to rebut it. See id. at 532. In this procedural
sense, a "presumption of sanity" is as nonsensical as a
presumption that a person does not kill in self-defense or in
defense of another.
16
See Commonwealth v. Ricard, 355 Mass. 509, 515 (1969) ("The
probability that any particular man is sane may be of slight if
any weight in the face of unanimous psychiatric opinion to the
contrary, where it is plainly apparent from the evidence that
the act committed is not one that a sane person would have
committed, there being no circumstances [anger, revenge,
rejection, jealousy, hatred, insult, intoxication, or the like]
to account for the murderous act by a sane person").
To permit an inference based on the probability that a
person in the general population is criminally responsible,
standing alone, to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt
of criminal responsibility also diminishes the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, especially where there is strong
evidence of the defendant's mental health history and bizarre
behavior. See Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 506, 523
(2000) (Spina, J., concurring) (noting "the obvious analytic
problem of reconciling the reasonable doubt standard with a
'presumption' that permits jurors to 'infer' a particular
defendant's sanity from general probabilities"); Commonwealth v.
Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 815 n.2 (1975) ("it may be questionable
whether the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard and the
'presumption of sanity' can logically coexist in a case where
there has been extensive evidence of insanity with no medical
evidence to the contrary").
17
We therefore conclude that the inference that the defendant
is criminally responsible because the great majority of persons
are criminally responsible is not sufficient alone to warrant a
rational finder of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that a defendant is criminally responsible.8 But this does not
mean that the Commonwealth must offer expert evidence to meet
its burden of proving criminal responsibility in every case
where the issue is raised. See Keita, 429 Mass. at 846 ("The
Commonwealth . . . may prove sanity without presenting expert
testimony"). See also Kostka, 370 Mass. at 535-536. The
Commonwealth may prove criminal responsibility through the
inferences arising from the circumstances of the offense,
including evidence that the defendant planned the offense, acted
8
We also recognize that we earlier declared that "[a] jury
instruction concerning the presumption of sanity should be given
in every case in which the question of the defendant's criminal
responsibility is raised." Commonwealth v. Keita, 429 Mass.
843, 846 (1999). The District Court followed this guidance by
including in its model jury instruction 9.200 the sentence, "In
considering whether or not the defendant was sane, if you feel
it appropriate you may take into account that the great majority
of people are sane, and that there is a resulting likelihood
that any particular person is sane." See Criminal Model Jury
Instructions for Use in the District Court (1999). An earlier
version of the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide contained a
substantially identical instruction. See Model Jury
Instructions on Homicide 51 (1999). We now conclude that, given
the meager weight of this inference and the risk of juror
confusion regarding the burden of proof, judges should not
instruct juries regarding this inference. We note that the
current Model Jury Instructions on Homicide make no reference to
this inference in the instructions regarding criminal
responsibility. See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 1-12
(2013).
18
on a rational motive, made rational decisions in committing the
offense and in avoiding capture, and attempted to conceal the
offense or his or her role in the offense. See Commonwealth v.
Cullen, 395 Mass. 225, 229 (1985) ("the judge was entitled to
infer sanity from the facts underlying the crime"); Ricard, 355
Mass. at 515 (absence of motive for killing supports claim of
lack of criminal responsibility). The Commonwealth also may
prove criminal responsibility through admissible evidence of the
defendant's words and conduct before, during, and after the
offense, including evidence of malingering. See Cullen, supra
at 229-230; Commonwealth v. Lunde, 390 Mass. 42, 47-49 (1983).
In deciding a motion for a required finding of not guilty
by reason of lack of criminal responsibility, the judge must
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth and determine whether "the evidence and the
inferences that reasonably could be drawn from it were 'of
sufficient force'" to permit a rational finder of fact to
conclude that the defendant was criminally responsible beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 Mass. 815, 820
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676–677
(1979). A motion for a required finding of not guilty may be
brought at the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the
close of all the evidence, see Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391
Mass. 279, 283 (1984), but we conclude that a motion for a
19
required finding of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal
responsibility may be brought only at the close of all the
evidence. The reason for the difference is that the
Commonwealth need prove criminal responsibility beyond a
reasonable doubt only after there is evidence presented of lack
of criminal responsibility that is sufficient to warrant a
reasonable doubt, see Commonwealth v. Berry, 457 Mass. 602, 612
& n.5 (2010), S.C., 466 Mass. 763 (2014), quoting Commonwealth
v. Mills, 400 Mass. 626, 627 (1987), and such evidence is often
presented only during the defendant's case. By limiting such
motions for a required finding of not guilty by reason of lack
of criminal responsibility to the close of all the evidence, we
ensure that the Commonwealth has a full opportunity to offer
evidence in rebuttal of any such defense claim.
In deciding such a motion at the close of all the evidence,
a judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth and must disregard contrary evidence presented
by the defendant, including the testimony of a defense expert,
unless the contrary evidence demonstrates that the
Commonwealth's evidence, or any inference drawn from such
evidence, is "conclusively incorrect." See Commonwealth v.
O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 204 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v.
Pike, 430 Mass. 317, 323 (1999). See also O'Laughlin, supra
("the fact that the defendant has presented evidence that he did
20
not [commit the crime] does not affect the sufficiency of the
evidence unless the contrary evidence is so overwhelming that no
rational jury could conclude that the defendant was guilty");
Kater v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 17, 20, S.C., 421 Mass. 1008
(1995), and 432 Mass. 404 (2000).
It will be the rare case where the totality of the evidence
regarding the defendant's conduct and the circumstances
surrounding the offense will not be sufficient to defeat a
defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty by
reason of lack of criminal responsibility. Where, however, this
evidence provides only weak support for a finding of criminal
responsibility, the Commonwealth proceeds at its peril if it
chooses to offer no expert testimony to rebut a defense expert's
opinion of lack of criminal responsibility. Cf. Kostka, 370
Mass. at 540 (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting in part) ("the
Commonwealth runs the very real risk of reversal and the
granting of a new trial if it chooses to rely on the presumption
and the circumstantial evidence of sanity . . . , rather than to
introduce medical evidence of sanity").
Applying the legal standard to the facts of this case, we
conclude that this is not one of those rare cases, and that the
evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support a finding
that the defendant was criminally responsible beyond a
reasonable doubt. Viewed in the light most favorable to the
21
Commonwealth, the evidence would allow a reasonable fact finder
to infer that the defendant (1) told the doctor that he
struggled with the officer because he feared he would be taken
back to jail and therefore understood that the man was a police
officer, with the power to arrest him; (2) attempted to divert
the officers' attention by asking one of the officers to light
his cigarette, because he feared that the officers were going to
arrest him on an outstanding warrant and became violent once he
realized that his ruse had failed; (3) fought the officers
because he wanted to escape rather than be arrested and return
to jail; and (4) was fabricating his claims that the person he
assaulted was wearing a yellow suit with a reflective emblem and
that he did not believe the person to be a police officer.
Although the testimony and opinion of the doctor
"contradicted, and tended to undermine, the potency of the
Commonwealth's case, it falls well short of demonstrating that
the Commonwealth's evidence was 'conclusively incorrect.'"
Pike, 430 Mass. at 323, quoting Kater, 421 Mass. at 20. See
Kater, supra ("Deterioration would occur not because the
defendant contradicted the Commonwealth's evidence . . . , but
because evidence for the Commonwealth necessary to warrant
submission of the case to the jury is later shown to be
incredible or conclusively incorrect" [citation omitted]).
22
2. Argument by prosecutor. The defendant also argues that
the prosecutor made improper assertions to the judge in arguing
against the defendant's motion for required findings of not
guilty. Specifically, the defendant claims that the
prosecutor's argument that the defendant had the capacity to
understand his actions at the time of the offenses and that he
deliberately chose not to take medications were not supported by
the evidence adduced at trial. As to the argument that the
defendant had the substantial capacity to understand the legal
and moral significance of his actions on the day of the
offenses, our conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to
support a finding of criminal responsibility also means that the
prosecutor's argument was a "fair inference[] that might be
drawn from the evidence." See Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 Mass.
307, 330 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Murchison, 418 Mass.
58, 59–60 (1994).
As to the argument that the defendant was deliberately
refusing to take medication, the defendant cannot establish that
he was prejudiced by any misstatement because, shortly after the
prosecutor made that statement, defense counsel brought to the
judge's attention the fact that the defendant was not prescribed
medication at the Middlesex County house of correction before
the incident. Thus, it is unlikely that any misstatement
23
affected the trial judge's findings. See Commonwealth v.
Beaudry, 445 Mass. 577, 584-585 (2005).
Conclusion. The order denying the defendant's motion for
required findings of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal
responsibility is affirmed, and the defendant's convictions are
affirmed.
So ordered.