Commonwealth v. Lopes ( 2018 )


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    SJC-11587
    COMMONWEALTH    vs.   CRISOSTOMO LOPES.
    Suffolk.       September 8, 2017. - January 10, 2018.
    Present:    Gants, C.J., Lenk, Budd, & Kafker, JJ.
    Homicide. Jury and Jurors. Evidence, Relevancy and
    materiality, Prior misconduct, Cross-examination.
    Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Challenge to jurors,
    Argument by prosecutor.
    Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court
    Department on July 1, 2010.
    The case was heard by Patrick F. Brady, J.
    Alan Jay Black for the defendant.
    Janis DiLoreto Smith, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick
    M. Haggan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the
    Commonwealth.
    KAFKER, J.     The defendant, Crisostomo Lopes, pulled the
    fourteen year old victim off a motorized scooter and held him,
    while the codefendant, a juvenile, shot him multiple times at
    close range.   The victim succumbed to a gunshot wound to his
    chest shortly thereafter.     After a jury trial, both the
    2
    defendant and his codefendant were convicted of murder in the
    first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and
    extreme atrocity or cruelty.1
    In his appeal, the defendant claims that reversal of his
    conviction is required because the judge erred by:     (1) failing
    to find that the Commonwealth's peremptory challenges of
    prospective jurors were improper; (2) allowing evidence of the
    defendant's gang affiliation and the victim's brother's
    knowledge of neighborhood gang activity; (3) precluding the
    defendant from cross-examining a police officer witness on prior
    misconduct; and (4) allowing the prosecutor to make improper and
    prejudicial statements during the Commonwealth's closing
    argument.    For the reasons stated below, we conclude that there
    has been no reversible error, and after a thorough review of the
    record, we decline to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278,
    § 33E, to reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first
    degree.     Therefore, we affirm the defendant's conviction.
    Background.     We summarize the facts that the jury could
    have found, reserving certain details for discussion of the
    legal issues.
    The victim was fourteen years old and lived on Norton
    Street in the Dorchester section of Boston.     On May 30, 2010,
    1
    At the time of oral argument, the codefendant had not yet
    filed his brief with this court.
    3
    the victim had been riding a scooter around Dorchester that was
    being driven by his fifteen year old brother.   Each was wearing
    a helmet, but different styles.   They were riding the scooter on
    Inwood Street, approaching Olney Street, when the brother almost
    hit the defendant, who was on a bicycle.   The brother stopped
    the scooter and lifted his helmet.2   No words were exchanged, and
    the defendant continued moving.
    Sometime after the encounter, the victim asked his brother
    if he could ride the scooter by himself.   The brother agreed,
    and the victim put on his brother's helmet because it was the
    better of the two.   The brother saw the victim drive away from
    their home heading toward Ridgefield Street.
    Boston police Officer Anthony Williams, a member of the
    local youth violence strike force, had left work at
    approximately 7:45 P.M. and was driving home.   As Officer
    Williams drove toward the intersection of Bowdoin Street and
    Norton Street, he observed the defendant and his codefendant.
    They appeared to be "on a mission," proceeding hurriedly and
    rapidly.   Officer Williams turned his automobile around to
    further observe them as they approached Bowdoin Street.      He
    pulled his automobile to the side of the road within close
    2
    The victim's brother testified that it was a neighborhood
    rule to lift up one's helmet to prevent being mistaken for
    someone else.
    4
    proximity to the defendant and his codefendant.    From his
    vantage point, Officer Williams testified that he had a clear
    view of the individuals through his rear passenger and driver's
    side windows.
    At this time, the defendant was riding a bicycle and his
    codefendant was, at one point, on the back.    After they
    dismounted the bicycle, Officer Williams observed that the
    codefendant kept his hand stiffly inside his right pocket.     Both
    defendants were looking out toward Olney Street in a crouched
    position.
    As the victim drove the scooter down Olney Street toward
    Bowdoin Street, Officer Williams observed the defendant dart out
    into the street, grab the victim's shoulder, and motion to his
    codefendant.    As the defendant held the victim, his codefendant
    removed a gun from his pocket, ran out into the street, and from
    approximately one foot away fired shots into the victim's chest.
    The codefendant fled on foot and the defendant picked up his
    bicycle and rode away.3
    Officer Williams got back in his vehicle and notified
    Boston police operations.    Officer Williams then continued his
    pursuit of the codefendant and observed that he kept his hand in
    3
    Another eyewitness also observed the shooting and the
    arrest of the two defendants. The eyewitness testified that the
    two males he saw arrested were the same two individuals involved
    in the shooting.
    5
    his right pocket throughout the pursuit.    While the chase was
    ongoing, two other officers arrived, including Officer Joseph
    Singletary, who saw the codefendant reach into his pocket and
    pull out a gun with his right hand.    As the codefendant crossed
    Stonehurst Street, he bent down near a Toyota Camry automobile
    and a pickup truck.   After the codefendant bent down, his hand
    was no longer in his pocket.
    As the officers were securing the codefendant, Officer
    Williams saw the defendant, who had returned to the scene.     He
    drew his firearm and ordered the defendant to get onto the
    ground.   The defendant said, "What are you going to do, shoot
    me? . . . You can catch one, too."    As the defendant was placed
    into custody, Officer Williams heard him yell, "Homes Ave.,
    motherfuckers."   An officer who was another member of the youth
    violence strike force and who had responded to the scene
    testified that as he placed the defendant into a transport
    vehicle, the defendant also twice screamed, "That's right,
    bitches, Homes Ave. on the block."
    Officer Singletary recovered a firearm underneath the tire
    of the Toyota Camry where he had seen the codedendant bend down.
    That firearm, an Armi Tanfoglio .25 caliber semiautomatic
    pistol, was found to match all of the ballistic evidence
    recovered from the scene and from the victim's body.   Swabs
    later taken from the codefendant's hands and the defendant's
    6
    shirt revealed the presence of gunshot residue.
    The defendant and his codefendant were brought to the
    police station for booking following their arrest.     The booking
    officer was a Cape Verdean Creole speaker.     He placed the
    defendant in a cell close to him, and the codefendant in the
    cell that was further away.    On at least three occasions, the
    booking officer heard the defendant yell to his codefendant in
    Cape Verdean Creole, "Take the fault" and "Can you hear me?"
    An autopsy revealed that the victim suffered a gunshot
    wound to his chest, near his left armpit, and another to his
    right thigh.   The bullet to the victim's chest pierced through
    his heart and both lungs, ultimately causing his death minutes
    later.
    Discussion.    1.   Peremptory challenges of prospective
    jurors.   The defendant contends that the trial judge abused his
    discretion by failing to determine that the Commonwealth's
    peremptory challenges were improper.     See Commonwealth v. Jones,
    
    477 Mass. 307
    , 322 (2017).    Although the defendant's particular
    objections to the jury selection process are not always clear,
    we understand him to assert that the Commonwealth improperly
    used race to challenge jurors and that the judge erred in not
    asking for an explanation earlier in the process and then
    accepting the Commonwealth's explanations as adequate and
    genuine when given.     We conclude that there was no error.   As
    7
    explained below, the Commonwealth's challenges were consistently
    based on potential jurors' youth, which was not improper.    The
    judge did not therefore abuse his discretion in not requiring
    explanations for certain earlier peremptory challenges.     Nor did
    the judge abuse his discretion in determining that the
    prosecutor's race-neutral explanation -- based on a juror's
    youth and volunteer service for a youth organization -- was both
    adequate and genuine.
    The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
    and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibit
    a party from exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of
    race or gender.   See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 
    511 U.S. 127
    , 128-129
    (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 
    476 U.S. 79
    , 95 (1986); Commonwealth
    v. Soares, 
    377 Mass. 461
    , 486, cert. denied, 
    444 U.S. 881
    (1979)
    (referencing prohibitions against challenges based on sex, race,
    color, creed, or national origin).   Peremptory challenges have
    not, however, been prohibited based on age, under either the
    United States or Massachusetts Constitution.   Commonwealth v.
    Oberle, 
    476 Mass. 539
    , 545 (2017).
    Accordingly, we have held that young adults are not
    considered a discrete protected group for the purposes of
    Batson-Soares peremptory challenges and may be excluded.
    
    Oberle, 476 Mass. at 545
    ("age is not a discrete grouping
    defined in the constitution, and therefore a peremptory
    8
    challenge [of young women] may permissibly be based on age");
    Commonwealth v. Samuel, 
    398 Mass. 93
    , 95 (1986) ("There is no
    constitutional basis for challenging the exclusion of young
    persons"); Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 
    382 Mass. 86
    , 90, 100
    (1980) (in case involving the claimed underrepresentation of
    jurors between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four,
    "classifications based on age alone do not involve identifiable
    or distinctive groups").   Although the United States Supreme
    Court has not yet opined on the question, every United States
    Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has rejected the
    argument that young adults are a protected group for peremptory
    challenges.   See United States v. Cresta, 
    825 F.2d 538
    , 544-545
    (1st Cir. 1987) (prosecutor's systematic challenge of potential
    jurors aged eighteen to thirty-four did not violate equal
    protection); United States v. Bryce, 
    208 F.3d 346
    , 350 n.3 (2d
    Cir. 2000) (peremptory strike based on youth of juror, where
    other young jurors were also struck, was permissible race-
    neutral justification); United States v. Clemons, 
    843 F.2d 741
    ,
    748-749 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
    488 U.S. 835
    (1988) (Batson did
    not "handcuff a prosecutor's legitimate exercise of peremptory
    strikes," which included striking "young . . . panel members");
    Howard v. Moore, 
    131 F.3d 399
    , 408 (4th Cir. 1997), cert.
    denied, 
    525 U.S. 843
    (1998) (challenge of young juror proper
    where "age is an acceptable race-neutral factor" [citation
    9
    omitted]); United States v. Clemons, 
    941 F.2d 321
    , 325 (5th Cir.
    1991) (age was legitimate race-neutral reason for peremptorily
    striking juror similar in age to twenty-two year old defendant);
    United States v. Maxwell, 
    160 F.3d 1071
    , 1075–1076 (6th Cir.
    1998) (declining to recognize young adults or college students
    as distinctive groups for Batson purposes); United States v.
    Jackson, 
    983 F.2d 757
    , 762 (7th Cir. 1993) (in excluding "young
    adults" from jury, "no court has found a Fourteenth Amendment
    equal protection violation based on the exclusion of a certain
    age group from the jury"); United States v. Feemster, 
    98 F.3d 1089
    , 1092 (8th Cir. 1996) ("relative youth" qualified as
    "potential race-neutral factor justifying the exercise of
    'peremptory' challenges"); United States v. Pichay, 
    986 F.2d 1259
    , 1260 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) ("young adults do not
    constitute a cognizable group for purposes of an equal
    protection challenge to the composition of a petit jury");
    United States v. Helmstetter, 
    479 F.3d 750
    , 754 (10th Cir. 2007)
    (youth acceptable race-neutral justification for exercising
    peremptory strike); Willis v. Kemp, 
    838 F.2d 1510
    , 1518 (11th
    Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Willis v. Zant, 
    489 U.S. 1059
    (1989) ("petitioner failed to establish that young adults aged
    eighteen to twenty-nine constituted a cognizable group"); United
    States v. Greene, 
    489 F.2d 1145
    , 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
    denied, 
    419 U.S. 977
    (1974) ("'young persons' is not a
    10
    cognizable class").
    As a general matter, "[w]e presume that peremptory
    challenges are properly made, but this presumption can be
    rebutted by a prima facie showing of either a pattern of
    challenges of members of the same discrete group, . . . or, in
    certain circumstances, challenge of a single prospective juror
    within a protected class, . . . where there is a likelihood that
    [a prospective juror is] being excluded from the jury solely on
    the basis of . . . group membership" (quotations and citations
    omitted).   Commonwealth v. Issa, 
    466 Mass. 1
    , 8 (2013).     A trial
    judge is strongly encouraged to ask for an explanation as
    questions are raised regarding the appropriateness of the
    challenges.   See 
    id. at 11
    n.14.   A judge has the broad
    discretion to do so "without having to make the determination
    that a pattern of improper exclusion exists."    
    Id., quoting Commonwealth
    v. Scott, 
    463 Mass. 561
    , 571 (2012).
    In determining whether a pattern exists, a judge is to
    consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances.       
    Jones, 477 Mass. at 322
    .     Such factors to consider in determining a
    pattern's existence may include (1) "the number and percentage
    of group members who have been excluded"; (2) "the possibility
    of an objective group-neutral explanation for the strike"; (3)
    "any similarities between excluded jurors and those, not members
    of the allegedly targeted group, who have been struck"; (4)
    11
    "differences among the various members of the allegedly targeted
    group who were struck"; (5) "whether those excluded are members
    of the same protected group as the defendant or the victim"; and
    (6) "the composition of the jurors already seated."     
    Id. See Sanchez
    v. Roden, 
    753 F.3d 279
    , 302 (1st Cir. 2014).
    "Once . . . a pattern is found, the burden shifts to the
    party exercising the challenge to provide a 'group-neutral'
    explanation for it."   
    Oberle, 476 Mass. at 545
    , quoting
    Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 
    439 Mass. 460
    , 463 (2003).      "The
    judge must then determine whether the explanation is both
    'adequate' and 'genuine.'"    
    Oberle, supra
    , quoting Maldonado,
    supra at 464.   We review the judge's decisions on the peremptory
    challenges for abuse of discretion.     
    Jones, 477 Mass. at 320
    .
    a.    Jury empanelment generally.   On appeal, the defendant
    argues that jurors nos. 73, 104, 127, and 129 were improperly
    struck by the Commonwealth.   To provide context for addressing
    this claim, we begin by summarizing the jury selection process,
    including the defendant's objections to challenges to other
    jurors.   Overall, it was clear that the Commonwealth was
    exercising its challenges on younger, college-aged jurors.        The
    Commonwealth used twenty-six of its thirty-two peremptory
    challenges on jurors under the age of thirty years.     The judge
    noted the defendant's (and his codefendant's) age-based
    objections but ruled that age and status as a college student
    12
    were not protected classes.
    The defendant first raised a race-based Soares challenge
    when he objected to the Commonwealth's third peremptory strike,
    targeting an eighteen year old female Asian student.4   The judge
    found no pattern and did not require an explanation.    He also
    pointed out that one of the three excluded was a white male.
    All three of the Commonwealth's peremptory challenges at that
    point had been exercised on jurors under the age of thirty.
    Additionally, the Commonwealth had not objected to the first
    juror seated, a black female.
    Next, the defendant objected to the Commonwealth's eighth
    peremptory strike, a challenge of a twenty-one year old female
    Hispanic student.   Again, the judge found no Soares pattern and
    did not require a race-neutral reason for the challenge from the
    prosecutor.5   At the time of the defendant's challenge, the
    4
    A document showing the race, gender, and age of each
    challenged juror was admitted at trial for identification
    purposes.
    5
    Defense counsel again contended that the Commonwealth was
    striking minority jurors. The judge raised a question whether
    such a general objection, "lumping" together different
    minorities, was appropriate or whether the objection needed to
    be targeted to a particular group. The Commonwealth stated its
    opinion that challenges needed to be specific to a particular
    protected group, but also contested the factual underpinnings of
    the objection. The Commonwealth stated:
    "[T]he Commonwealth skip[ped] a female African-American
    juror, finding her indifferent and being content. Then you
    13
    Commonwealth had exercised seven of eight peremptory strikes on
    jurors under the age of thirty.
    b.   Jurors nos. 73, 127, and 129.    The defendant asserted
    his next race-based Soares challenge to the Commonwealth's
    nineteenth peremptory strike, juror no. 73, who was a twenty
    year old black male college student.      Defense counsel described
    juror no. 73 as the first young black male found impartial.        The
    judge declined to find a Soares pattern.     The judge indicated
    that this was another young juror but saw no pattern as to race
    and required no explanation from the Commonwealth.6     Including
    juror no. 73, at that point, the Commonwealth had used fifteen
    of its nineteen peremptory strikes on jurors under the age of
    have a strike   of one black female, one white male, one
    Asian female,   one white female, one Asian female, two more
    white females   and a Hispanic female. I don't see how that
    is, you know,   with all due respect, anywhere near a
    pattern."
    We note that "[t]he test in Soares and Batson does not apply to
    challenges to members of all minority ethnic or racial groups
    lumped together, but instead applies to challenges to
    'particular, defined groupings in the community.'" Commonwealth
    v. Prunty, 
    462 Mass. 295
    , 307 n.17 (2012), quoting Commonwealth
    v. Soares, 
    377 Mass. 461
    , 486 (1979). See Gray v. Brady, 
    592 F.3d 296
    , 305-306 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
    561 U.S. 1015
    (2010)
    ("minorities," African-American, and Hispanic jurors are not
    part of same "cognizable group" for Batson purposes).
    6
    As explained above, it would have been well within the
    judge's discretion to require an explanation, even without
    finding a pattern. Such questioning could have facilitated our
    task on appeal, but the judge was not required to do so given
    the obvious and consistent pattern of the prosecutor challenging
    young people.
    14
    thirty.   There was no discernable pattern as to race.     The
    Commonwealth exercised challenges on young jurors irrespective
    of their race.   Of the fifteen jurors under thirty years old
    struck, ten were white, two were black, two were Hispanic, and
    one was Asian.   We discern no error on the judge's part.     The
    issue on appeal is not whether the judge was permitted to find
    that the presumption of properly-made peremptory challenges had
    been rebutted, but whether the judge was required to have so
    found.    
    Issa, 466 Mass. at 10
    .   He was not so required for juror
    no. 73.
    The race-neutral explanations for the Commonwealth's
    subsequent challenges of jurors nos. 127 and 129 are also
    evident from the record.    Juror no. 127, the second black male
    challenged, who was over thirty years old, disclosed that his
    cousin had been prosecuted by the Suffolk district attorney's
    office and had been convicted of murder.     The defendant did not
    object to the Commonwealth's challenge to juror no. 127.
    Juror no. 129, the third black male challenged, also was
    over thirty years old and disclosed that his brother had been
    prosecuted by the Suffolk district attorney's office and, at the
    time, was incarcerated for the conviction.     Further, juror no.
    129 stated that, two years prior, he had been arrested in
    another State and had received a probation sentence for
    possession of cocaine.     The defendant did not object.   The judge
    15
    did not err in determining that there was no pattern and in
    requiring no race-neutral reason; juror no. 129's two
    significant experiences with the law provided a sufficient and
    obvious basis for the prosecutor's peremptory challenge.
    c.   Juror no. 104.   The judge did not find a prima facie
    pattern until the third day of empanelment, when the
    Commonwealth exercised a challenge to juror no. 104, another
    twenty year old black male college student.   Defense counsel
    claimed that this was the fourth black male out of six jurors in
    the venire that had been challenged.   At that point, the judge
    required the prosecutor to provide an adequate and genuine race-
    neutral reason for the decision to strike.
    The prosecutor provided two explanations.    First, the
    prospective juror was twenty years old.   The Commonwealth
    further explained that individuals of that age have
    "difficulties in deciding what classes to take, never mind
    whether or not somebody is guilty of first-degree murder."
    Second, the prosecutor stated that this individual should be
    challenged because, as counsel for the codefendant "point[ed]
    out, [the juror] works with intercity youth who are
    underprivileged."   Although recognizing that the potential juror
    was engaged in "absolutely honorable" work, the prosecutor was
    concerned that the juror would be overly sympathetic to the
    16
    codefendant's counsel's juvenile brain development argument7 and
    consequently "not follow the law but instead . . . follow his
    heart."     The prosecutor compared the potential juror to a "white
    woman psychologist" who was rejected earlier for opining that
    "[sixteen] year olds make impulsive decisions."     See
    Commonwealth v. 
    Jones, 477 Mass. at 322
    (one factor to consider
    in determining whether prima facie case of discrimination has
    been made is "similarities between excluded jurors and those,
    not members of the allegedly targeted group, who have been
    struck").    This argument was responsive to defense counsel's
    motions to suppress and motion in limine, all of which had
    argued that juvenile brain development was a mitigating factor.
    The judge accepted the two reasons given by the prosecutor as
    separately both adequate and genuine and denied the defendant's
    request to disallow the Commonwealth's challenge.
    We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in
    determining that the prosecutor's reasons for challenging juror
    no. 104 were adequate and genuine.    See 
    Maldonado, 439 Mass. at 464-466
    .    Although the judge deemed it a close call, and we
    7
    The prosecutor contended that counsel for the codefendant
    would be presenting evidence supporting the argument that
    "because of [the codefendant's] extreme youth, him being only
    [sixteen] years of age, that in some way . . . mitigates his
    conduct and that he should be found guilty perhaps of something
    less than first degree murder, or perhaps even an outright
    acquittal based upon some belief that his mind is not formed
    enough."
    17
    agree that it was a close question given the number and
    percentage of qualified black jurors excluded, we discern no
    abuse of discretion.     See generally, 
    Jones, 477 Mass. at 319
    -
    320.   First, the Commonwealth made no secret of the fact that it
    was exercising its challenges on younger, college-aged jurors
    irrespective of race, and it did so consistently.     See 
    id. at 322.
      Second, the prospective juror's work with youth, given the
    defense's expected emphasis on the age of the codefendant as an
    exculpatory factor, provided an additional permissible objective
    group-neutral explanation.     See 
    id. Others, including
    a juror
    who worked with high school students and another who worked with
    "juvenile delinquents" outside the targeted group, had been
    excluded by the judge on this ground.     Third, at the time of the
    challenge to juror no. 104, the record reflects that five of the
    fourteen jurors already seated were black (three black women and
    two black men).   See 
    id. In sum,
    the judge reasonably could have found that the
    common denominator for the Commonwealth's peremptory challenges
    was not race, but age.      During three days of empanelment, the
    judge carefully observed the composition of the jury, the
    composition of the jury venire, and the prosecutor's consistent
    use of peremptory challenges to exclude young jurors,
    particularly college students.     The judge determined that there
    had not been a prohibited pattern of excluding black jurors from
    18
    the jury, and we discern no abuse of discretion in any of his
    decisions on the defendant's objections to the Commonwealth's
    peremptory challenges.
    2.   Gang evidence.     The defendant contends that the judge
    erred in admitting evidence concerning his purported affiliation
    with the "Homes Ave." gang.    The defendant objected to the
    admission of this evidence, and we review for prejudicial error.
    Commonwealth v. Alphas, 
    430 Mass. 8
    , 23 (1999).    We conclude
    that there was no error.    The defendant's own statements at the
    scene of the crime placed the meaning and significance of Homes
    Avenue at issue.   The defendant yelled out:   "Homes Ave.,
    motherfuckers," and twice screamed, "That's right, bitches,
    Homes Ave. on the block".    Testimony from a police officer and
    the victim's brother provided necessary context and explanation.
    The background testimony was provided by Officer Anthony J.
    Serra, a member of the youth violence strike force, who was
    responsible for monitoring potential gang involvement in
    Dorchester from 2008 through 2010, and who occasionally
    patrolled Homes Avenue.     Serra testified that, in 2008, "[W]e
    were at the beginning stages of gathering intelligence . . .
    about this group that seemed to be emerging in the Homes Ave.,
    Topliff Street area . . .[and] seemed to be identifying
    themselves with this street, Homes Ave.," and who were wearing
    clothes with an insignia beginning with the letter "H."
    19
    Relatedly, Serra also testified that, in 2008, he saw the
    defendant wearing a Harvard University athletic jacket.8
    The victim's brother also was permitted to testify about
    his own interactions and firsthand knowledge of a group that had
    formed on Norton Street.   He testified, based on his knowledge
    from the neighborhood, that there was a long-standing and
    ongoing dispute between the Norton Street group and two
    neighboring groups, Homes Ave. and the Cape Verde Outlaws.
    Additionally, the victim's brother testified that, approximately
    one year before the murder, in 2009, he had had an altercation
    with some individuals whom he had previously seen in the
    8
    Officer Anthony Serra also testified that he had a
    conversation with the defendant on January 16, 2008, while the
    defendant was being held for a burglary charge. On a couple of
    occasions during the conversation, the defendant referred to
    himself as "Homes Ave." and said that his "boys" were also Homes
    Ave. The defendant contends that the judge erred in denying his
    motion to suppress these statements because he was not issued
    his Miranda warnings and was not afforded prompt arraignment as
    required by Commonwealth v. Rosario, 
    422 Mass. 48
    , 56-57 (1996).
    The Commonwealth contends that Miranda warnings were not
    required and the Rosario requirements were satisfied. As the
    2008 statements about his gang membership are clearly
    duplicative of other evidence, we need not resolve these issues.
    Even if admitted in error, the statements were harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 
    447 Mass. 546
    ,
    552-553 (2006). As explained here, the Commonwealth introduced
    substantial evidence at trial independent of the January 16,
    2008, interview that demonstrated the defendant's gang
    affiliation. That evidence included the specific statements
    made by the defendant at the scene of the murder, the testimony
    that the defendant wore clothing with the "Homes Ave." insignia,
    and the background information about gangs in the neighborhood,
    including the Homes Ave. gang.
    20
    Dorchester neighborhood of Fields Corner and on Homes Avenue.
    The individuals attempted to rob him but were unsuccessful.
    During the altercation, the individuals asked the brother, "Are
    you from Norton?," to which he responded, "No, I live on
    Norton," to indicate that he was not affiliated with the group
    from Norton Street.
    Evidence of gang affiliation may be admissible to show
    motive.   Commonwealth v. Swafford, 
    441 Mass. 329
    , 332 (2004).
    We have, however, urged caution in admitting gang-related
    evidence because of the risk of suggesting that the defendant
    may have a propensity for criminality or violence.   Commonwealth
    v. Akara, 
    465 Mass. 245
    , 267 (2013).
    In this case, the gang evidence was properly admitted
    because it was relevant to the defendant's motive and intent,
    particularly in light of the "Homes Ave." statements the
    defendant made at the time of his arrest for the killing in
    2010.   See 
    Swafford, 441 Mass. at 332
    (testimony about gang
    affiliation allowed to establish defendants' retributive
    motive); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 429 Mass, 502, 504-505
    (1999) (allowing evidence of gang affiliation relevant to
    defendant's motive and state of mind).   Here, the Commonwealth's
    theory was that the defendant and his codefendant engaged in a
    joint venture and killed the victim because they believed that
    the victim was his older brother, an alleged member of a group
    21
    from Norton Street, who earlier had almost hit the defendant
    with his scooter.     Thus, the brother's testimony regarding the
    ongoing feud between Homes Ave. and the Norton Street group and
    Officer Serra's testimony that the defendant had been seen
    wearing clothing that bore an "H" (signifying Homes Ave. gang
    membership) was relevant in proving the defendant's motive.
    The judge took proper steps to minimize any potentially
    unfair prejudicial impact of the testimony.        
    Akara, 465 Mass. at 268-269
    .     During voir dire, he asked whether evidence of gang
    membership would affect potential jurors' impartiality.9       
    Id. at 268;
    Commonwealth v. Correa, 
    437 Mass. 197
    , 201 (2002).
    Additionally, the judge instructed the jury that evidence of
    gang affiliation could not be considered as evidence of the
    defendant's character or propensity to commit the crimes
    charged.10    
    Id. 9 The
    judge asked members of the venire:
    "There may be evidence in this case that some of the
    people involved were or may have been involved or
    affiliated with a gang or gangs. Whether such evidence is
    introduced and, of course, if it is, the credibility of
    such evidence and the importance of any such evidence is
    completely up to the jury to decide. But there may be some
    evidence of that subject. Would such evidence interfere
    with your ability to fairly and impartially judge this
    case?"
    10
    The judge instructed the jury:
    22
    We therefore conclude that the judge did not abuse his
    discretion in admitting evidence of the defendant's gang
    affiliation because the gang evidence admitted was limited and
    properly went to the issue of motive.    See 
    Swafford, 441 Mass. at 332
    .   Further, the gang evidence admitted explained the
    defendant's statements about "Homes Ave." at the scene of the
    crime.    Finally, the risk of unfair prejudice did not outweigh
    the probative value of this evidence given the judge's limiting
    instruction.   See 
    id. 3. Cross-examination
    of police witness.   The defendant
    contends that the judge erred in not allowing the defense to
    cross-examine Officer Williams, one of the prosecution's key
    eyewitnesses, about an internal affairs investigation.
    "There was evidence in the case that [the defendant]
    was affiliated with a gang or a group known as Homes
    Avenue. Like all evidence, it's up to you to determine if
    it is true, and if it is, how much weight to give it in
    your deliberations on the charges in this case. But you
    should keep in mind the following. [The defendant] is not
    on trial for being a member of the Homes Avenue group or
    gang. He is on trial for the murder of [the victim] on May
    30, 2010. The evidence concerning his possible affiliation
    with the Homes Avenue gang or group may provide you with
    background information relevant to a possible motive in the
    case, but it would be improper for you to conclude that
    [the defendant] committed the crime for which he is charged
    . . . merely because he was a member of Homes Avenue. You
    may consider the evidence of [the defendant's] possible
    gang affiliation as bearing upon the motive for the murder
    of [the victim], but you may not consider it for the
    purpose of showing [that the defendant] is or was a bad
    person or has a propensity for criminality or violence."
    23
    Specifically, the defendant sought to impeach Williams with
    information that the Boston police department had suspended him
    five years earlier for, among other things, lying in an internal
    affairs investigation on a personal matter.     We conclude that
    there was no error, as the judge was well within his discretion
    to exclude this five-year-old evidence of lying.
    "In general, specific instances of misconduct showing the
    witness to be untruthful are not admissible for the purpose of
    attacking . . . the witness's credibility."     Mass. G. Evid.
    § 608(b) (2017).     See Commonwealth v. Hightower, 
    400 Mass. 267
    ,
    271 (1987), and cases cited.11    Here, Officer Williams's alleged
    conduct from an internal affairs investigation five years before
    the murder was not material to the May 30, 2010, homicide
    investigation.     That investigation did not result in a criminal
    conviction or even a criminal charge.     It was also not related
    to how he conducted police investigations.     Thus, it was well
    within the judge's discretion to conclude that any probative
    weight of such five-year-old evidence was far outweighed by the
    risk of distracting the jury with the details of an unrelated
    11
    We have carved out narrow exceptions, allowing evidence
    of prior false accusations of rape to impeach a witness's
    credibility in rape and sexual assault cases. See, e.g.,
    Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 
    414 Mass. 146
    , 151–152 (1993),
    discussing Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 
    376 Mass. 90
    , 94–96 (1978),
    S.C., 
    385 Mass. 733
    (1982).
    24
    incident.12   Accordingly, we discern no error in the judge's
    exclusion of this evidence.
    4.   Prosecutor's closing argument.    Last, the defendant
    contends that the prosecutor made improper remarks during the
    Commonwealth's closing arguments.    Specifically, the defendant
    claims that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's
    characterization of the version of events set forth by
    codefendant's counsel as an "insult to your intelligence," a
    "farce of a defense," and a "distraction."
    Prosecutors are "entitled to argue forcefully for the
    defendant's conviction" based on the evidence.     See Commonwealth
    v. Wilson, 
    427 Mass. 336
    , 350 (1998).     "[E]nthusiastic rhetoric,
    strong advocacy, and excusable hyperbole are not grounds for
    reversal" (quotations and citation omitted).     
    Id. To determine
    whether an improper argument was made, the prosecutor's remarks
    are "considered in the context of the whole argument, the
    evidence admitted at trial, and the judge's instructions to the
    jury" (citation omitted).     Commonwealth v. Nelson, 
    468 Mass. 1
    ,
    12
    The judge also properly allowed wide-ranging cross-
    examination of Officer Williams to demonstrate bias or lying on
    his part. 
    LaVelle, 414 Mass. at 153
    ("in contrast to prior bad
    acts, evidence of bias is almost never a collateral matter").
    In this case, the record demonstrates that, at trial, defense
    counsel extensively cross-examined Officer Williams on his trial
    and grand jury testimonies, contemporary reports, and the
    forensic evidence. Further, defense counsel repeatedly asserted
    during closing arguments that Officer Williams was lying. The
    defendant's confrontation rights were not violated.
    25
    10 (2014).
    In the Commonwealth's closing argument, the prosecutor
    critiqued the theory of counsel for the codefendant that there
    was a third party who was the actual killer.     The prosecutor
    urged the jury to disbelieve the notion that, if there was
    further investigation, the evidence may have been different.
    During closing argument, the prosecutor properly marshaled the
    evidence admitted at trial, including statements of witnesses,
    surveillance videotape, and forensic evidence.     It was in this
    context that the prosecutor, over defendant's objection, used
    the words "insult," "farce," and "distraction."     As a specific
    curative instruction, the judge reiterated to the jury that
    arguments were not evidence and admonished the jury not to get
    "carried away by words like 'insult' or 'distraction' or 'farce'
    or anything like that . . . [and to] treat that as rhetoric."
    Placed in context, the prosecutor's statements constituted
    an overly aggressive response to the argument by the
    codefendant's counsel but not grounds for reversal.     Even when
    understandably provoked, a prosecutor must not "fight fire with
    fire."   Commonwealth v. Dargon, 
    457 Mass. 387
    , 402 (2010).       Most
    importantly, the judge's curative instruction specifically and
    appropriately eliminated any concern of prejudice.     Commonwealth
    v. Kater, 
    432 Mass. 404
    , 424 (2000).   Accordingly, we conclude
    that there was no reversible error arising from the prosecutor's
    26
    closing argument.
    5.   Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.   We have reviewed the
    record in accordance with G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and discern no
    basis to set aside or reduce the verdict of murder in the first
    degree or to order a new trial.   Accordingly, we decline to
    exercise our authority.
    Judgment affirmed.