In the Matter of E.C. ( 2018 )

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SJC-12230
IN THE MATTER OF E.C.
Plymouth. November 9, 2017. - March 15, 2018.
Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.
Incompetent Person, Commitment. Practice, Civil, Civil
commitment.
Petition for civil commitment filed in the Brockton
Division of the District Court Department on March 4, 2013.
The case was heard by Beverly J. Cannone, J., and a motion
for reconsideration was also heard by her.
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.
Beth L. Eisenberg for E.C.
Edward J. O'Donnell for Bridgewater State Hospital.
Lester D. Blumberg, for Department of Mental Health, amicus
curiae, submitted a brief.
GAZIANO, J. In this appeal, we consider whether the
dismissal of the criminal charge pending against the respondent,
E.C., required his release from commitment to Bridgewater State
Hospital (Bridgewater), where the charge was dismissed after the
2
period of commitment had expired, and a petition to extend the
commitment had yet to be decided.
E.C. was charged in the Boston Municipal Court Department
with malicious destruction of property. Following a hearing
pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b), a judge of that court found
E.C. not competent to stand trial and ordered him committed to
Bridgewater for a period of six months. After that period had
expired, Bridgewater filed a petition in the District Court
Department to extend the commitment for an additional period of
one year, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c). While the
petition for an extension was pending, the criminal charge
against E.C. was dismissed. Bridgewater moved to file an
amended petition to modify its pending G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c),
petition to a petition for civil commitment pursuant to G. L.
c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. E.C. opposed the motion and argued that
Bridgewater was required to release him because the criminal
charge had been dismissed. A District Court judge concluded
that Bridgewater had no authority to hold E.C. pursuant to G. L.
c. 123, § 16 (c), after the criminal charge had been dismissed
and his original commitment had expired; denied Bridgewater's
petition to amend; and ordered E.C. discharged.1 The Appellate
1 Although the issues in this case are moot as to E.C., who
was released before this case was argued, we consider the matter
because the case involves an important question of statutory
3
Division of the District Court affirmed that judgment, and the
Appeals Court reversed. See Matter of E.C., 89 Mass. App. Ct.
813 (2016). We allowed E.C.'s application for further appellate
review.
We conclude that the dismissal of criminal charges does not
require the immediate release from commitment of an incompetent
defendant, and that Bridgewater retained the statutory authority
to hold E.C. while the G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition was
pending. See G. L. c. 123, § 6.2 We conclude also that the
District Court judge abused her discretion in denying
Bridgewater's request to amend its pending petition for an
extension under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), to a petition for civil
commitment under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8.
interpretation and is "capable of repetition, yet evading
review." See Guardianship of Doe, 391 Mass. 614, 618 (1984)
("issues which involve the rights of the mentally ill are
classic examples of issues that are capable of repetition, yet
evading review" [quotations omitted]); Hashimi v. Kalil, 388
Mass. 607, 609 (1983).
2 "No person shall be retained at a facility or at the
Bridgewater [S]tate [H]ospital except under the provisions of
[G. L. c. 123, §§ 10 (a), 12 (a), (b), and (c), 13, 16 (e), and
35,] or except under a court order or except during the pendency
of a petition for commitment or to the pendency of a request
under section fourteen. A court order of commitment to a
facility or to the Bridgewater [S]tate [H]ospital shall be valid
for the period stipulated in this chapter or, if no such period
is so stipulated, for one year. A petition for the commitment
of a person may not be issued except as authorized under the
provisions of this chapter." G. L. c. 123, § 6 (a).
4
1. Background. The following facts are not disputed. In
May, 2012, E.C. was arraigned in the Boston Municipal Court on
one count of malicious destruction of property over $250.00. In
July, 2012, a psychologist testified that E.C. was not competent
to stand trial. A Boston Municipal Court judge ordered E.C.
transferred to Bridgewater for further evaluation of his
competency, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b). In August,
2012, Bridgewater reported that E.C. was not competent to stand
trial; the Commonwealth stipulated to his incompetency. The
judge ordered E.C. returned to Bridgewater for a thirty-five day
hospitalization, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (a).
Bridgewater then petitioned the court to commit E.C. for a
period of six months, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b). The
petition was allowed, and E.C.'s commitment to Bridgewater was
authorized until March, 2013.
Shortly prior to the expiration of the six-month commitment
period, Bridgewater filed a petition in the Brockton Division of
the District Court Department to extend E.C.'s involuntary
commitment for a period of one year, under G. L. c. 123,
§ 16 (c).3 A hearing on that petition was scheduled for March,
3 The Brockton Division of the District Court Department is
designated to hear all civil commitment proceedings involving a
commitment to Bridgewater State Hospital (Bridgewater). See
G. L. c. 123, § 5; G. L. c. 218, § 43. See also G. L. c. 123,
§§ 8 (f), 13.
5
2013. At a hearing in the Boston Municipal Court one week
before the hearing scheduled on Bridgewater's petition for a
renewed commitment, E.C. filed a motion to dismiss the criminal
charge. The Boston Municipal Court judge continued the hearing
until the following day, and E.C. waived his right to be
present. The next day, the judge allowed E.C.'s motion to
dismiss, over the Commonwealth's objection.
One week later, the scheduled hearing was held in the
District Court on Bridgewater's petition pursuant to G. L.
c. 123, § 16 (c), to continue the commitment. A judge of that
court allowed E.C.'s motion for funds for an independent medical
examiner and continued the hearing for approximately three
weeks. The day after the hearing, immediately after learning
that E.C.'s criminal charge had been dismissed, Bridgewater
filed a motion to amend the petition for an extension of
commitment from a G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition to a petition
for civil commitment under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8.4
Bridgewater told the District Court judge that it had not been
informed that E.C.'s criminal charge had been dismissed until
six days after the dismissal. Bridgewater argued that the
4 Bridgewater also filed a new petition for commitment under
G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, but withdrew that petition after its
motion for amendment was denied.
6
amendment was authorized by G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c),5 which allows
for a civil commitment proceeding after criminal charges have
been dismissed. E.C. opposed Bridgewater's motion, arguing that
the dismissal of the criminal charge terminated his commitment
under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b). The judge denied Bridgewater's
motion, finding that G. L. c. 123, § 16, no longer served as a
valid basis for detaining E.C. after the criminal charge had
been dismissed and, therefore, that E.C. was not a "patient" of
Bridgewater for purposes of a commitment petition under G. L.
c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. A few days later, still in March, 2013,
E.C. was discharged.
Bridgewater filed a motion for reconsideration of the
denial of its motion to amend; the motion was denied in March,
2013. The Appellate Division of the District Court affirmed
that decision in November, 2014. In August, 2016, the Appeals
5 "After the expiration of a commitment under paragraph (b)
of this section, a person may be committed for additional one
year periods under the provisions of [§§ 7 and 8] of this
chapter, but no untried defendant shall be so committed unless
in addition to the findings required by [§§ 7 and 8] the court
also finds said defendant is incompetent to stand trial. If the
person is not found incompetent, the court shall notify the
court with jurisdiction of the criminal charges, which court
shall thereupon order the defendant returned to its custody for
the resumption of criminal proceedings. All subsequent
proceedings for the further commitment of a person committed
under this section shall be in the court which has jurisdiction
of the facility or hospital." G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c).
7
Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division. We
allowed E.C.'s petition for further appellate review.
2. Discussion. a. Statutory background. When a criminal
defendant is suspected of being incompetent to stand trial, a
court may order the defendant to be evaluated by a court-
appointed medical professional for an initial determination of
competency. See G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a). If the initial
determination is that the defendant appears to be incompetent
and further examination is necessary, a judge may order the
defendant committed to a mental health facility6 for a period of
observation not to exceed twenty days. See G. L. c. 123,
§ 15 (b). If he requires strict security, a male defendant may
be hospitalized at Bridgewater for this twenty-day period. See
id.
During the period of observation, or within sixty days of a
determination that a defendant is not competent to stand trial,
the district attorney or the medical director of Bridgewater may
petition for the individual to be committed to Bridgewater for
an initial treatment period of six months. See G. L. c. 123,
§ 16 (b). The petition will be granted if the judge finds that
6General Laws c. 123, § 1, defines "[f]acility," for
purposes of G. L. c. 123, §§ 2 to 37, as "a public or private
facility for the care and treatment of mentally ill persons,
except for the Bridgewater State Hospital".
8
the standard for involuntary civil commitment under G. L.
c. 123, § 8 (b), has been met: "(1) such person is mentally
ill; (2) such person is not a proper subject for commitment to
any facility of the department; and (3) the failure to retain
such person in strict custody would create a likelihood of
serious harm." If the criminal charges are dismissed after
commitment, an untried defendant may continue to be held under
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b).
At the end of the six-month period, the medical director of
Bridgewater may file a petition under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c),
seeking to have the individual committed for an additional
period of one year under the procedures of G. L. c. 123, § 7; as
with the petition for an initial treatment period, the petition
for this additional period may be allowed where there is a
finding under G. L. c. 123, § 8 (b), that "(1) such person is
mentally ill; (2) such person is not a proper subject for
commitment to any facility of the department; and (3) the
failure to retain such person in strict custody would create a
likelihood of serious harm."
b. Analysis. E.C. argues that, upon dismissal of the
criminal charges, a petition for an extension of commitment
under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), must be dismissed immediately,
because the predicate for holding a former defendant -- to
determine if the defendant may be returned to competency and
9
stand trial -- has evaporated. Bridgewater contends that the
over-all statutory scheme of G. L. c. 123 supports a conclusion
that the authority to hold an untried former defendant, who has
been found incompetent, does not evaporate when criminal charges
are dismissed, and that it should have been allowed to amend its
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition to a petition for commitment
under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8.
"Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is 'to
effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it.'"
Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014), quoting Water
Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass.
740, 744 (2010). "We construe statutes according to the
Legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute
and read in light of the ordinary and approved usage of the
language. . . . At the same time, a statute should be read as a
whole to produce an internal consistency" (citations and
quotations omitted). Felix F. v. Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 513,
516 (2015).
We begin with the statutory language. "Ordinarily, where
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is
conclusive as to legislative intent." Malloch v. Hanover, 472
Mass. 783, 788 (2015), quoting Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452
Mass. 436, 444 (2008). If the words used are not otherwise
defined in the statute, we afford them their plain and ordinary
10
meaning. Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 511 (2012).
"To the extent there is any ambiguity in the statutory language,
we turn to the legislative history" as a guide to legislative
intent. Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 478 Mass. 169, 182 (2017).
Where, as here, the statutory language is ambiguous or "faulty
or lacks precision, it is our duty to give the statute a
reasonable construction." Keefner, supra, quoting Capone v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Fitchburg, 389 Mass. 617, 622 (1983).
To determine the Legislature's intent with respect to the
specific provisions of G. L. c. 123, 16 (c), we consider more
generally the legislative history of G. L. c. 123, which was
enacted to protect individuals with mental illness. "Prior to
[c. 123's] enactment, it was not uncommon for incompetent
defendants charged with minor crimes to be confined in maximum
security facilities, such as Bridgewater . . . , for anywhere
from a decade to a lifetime." Foss v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass.
584, 587-588 (2002). See Kirk v. Commonwealth, 459 Mass. 67,
70–71 (2011). The reform of the Commonwealth's mental health
system addressed the then often-lengthy pretrial commitment of
incompetent defendants. See Kirk, supra; Foss, supra at 587-
589. General Laws c. 123, § 16 (b) and (c), "effectively
eliminated the problem of the indefinite commitment of
incompetent defendants, providing that '[a]n order of
commitment . . . shall be valid for six months' and '[a]fter the
11
expiration of a commitment under [G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b)], a
person may be committed for additional one year periods . . .
but no untried defendant shall be so committed unless . . . the
court also finds said defendant is incompetent to stand trial.'"
Foss, supra at 589.
An individual who is committed to Bridgewater as an
incompetent defendant is guaranteed regular review of his
status, "with the presumption favoring competence." Id. In the
case of an incompetent defendant, the government has a
compelling interest in determining whether an individual may be
returned to competency and thereafter be tried as competent, and
the individual, too, has a compelling interest in not being
tried if incompetent. When criminal charges are dismissed, the
government's interest in protecting the individual and the
public remains, but the calculus is different. The provisions
of G. L. c. 123 balance the rights of and protections for
incompetent persons with the Commonwealth's interest in
"protecting the public from potentially dangerous persons" who
may be unable to control their actions because of their mental
condition. See Commonwealth v. Calvaire, 476 Mass. 242, 246
(2017). "[L]aws in derogation of liberty," however, must be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling and legitimate
government interest, and must be strictly construed, in order to
comply with the requirements of substantive due process
12
(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Libby, 472 Mass. 93, 96
(2015). "The right of an individual to be free from physical
restraint is a paradigmatic fundamental right." Commonwealth v.
Knapp, 441 Mass. 157, 164 (2004). We evaluate E.C.'s claims
against this backdrop, therefore, to ensure that the
Commonwealth's actions are narrowly construed to protect both
the individual and the public interest.
We turn, first, to the denial of Bridgewater's motion to
amend its petition for an extension of commitment, filed under
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), to a petition for civil commitment under
G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. The judge's decision to deny
Bridgewater's motion to amend is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. See Castellucci v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., 372 Mass. 288, 291 (1977). The rules of civil
procedure "eliminated the once broad discretionary authority of
a judge to deny a motion to amend." Id. at 289. A judge abuses
his or her discretion in denying a motion to amend where the
denial reveals an error of law. See Channel Fish Co. v. Boston
Fish Mkt. Corp., 359 Mass. 185, 188 (1971).
We conclude that, here, the judge abused her discretion in
declining to allow Bridgewater to amend its petition for an
extension of commitment to a petition under G. L. c. 123,
§§ 7 and 8, a motion that Bridgewater filed immediately upon
13
learning that E.C.'s criminal charge had been dismissed.7 The
judge denied the motion to amend because she concluded that the
petition for an extension of commitment under G. L. c. 123,
§ 16 (c), was void after the criminal charge had been dismissed,
and thus that no motion to amend a petition that itself was void
could be allowed. The determination that the dismissal of the
criminal charge against E.C. necessarily ended Bridgewater's
authority to hold him under G. L. c. 123, § 6, and required both
dismissal of a void petition for an extension of that commitment
and E.C.'s immediate release, however, was an error of law.
Once Bridgewater had filed its petition for an extension of
commitment under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), Bridgewater had the
statutory authority to hold E.C. under G. L. c. 123, § 6, which
provides: "No person shall be retained at a facility or at
[Bridgewater] . . . except under a court order or except during
the pendency of a petition for commitment . . ." (emphasis
supplied). In light of the entirety of the statutory scheme for
commitment of untried defendants, we conclude that the dismissal
of criminal charges does not require immediate release from
commitment under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c). Therefore, Bridgewater
7 Had Bridgewater delayed in filing its motion to amend, due
process might require a different result; we leave that question
for another day, when the situation is before us.
14
retained authority to hold E.C. under G. L. c. 123, § 6, while
its G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition was pending.
General Laws c. 123, § 7 (b), grants the medical director
of Bridgewater the authority to "petition the [D]istrict
[C]ourt . . . for the commitment to [Bridgewater] of any male
patient at said . . . hospital when it is determined that the
failure to hospitalize in strict security would create a
likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness."
Therefore, following the dismissal of the criminal charge
against him, Bridgewater had the authority to hold E.C. under
G. L. c. 123, § 6, while the G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition
was pending. The medical director's authority to petition for
E.C.'s commitment under G. L. c. 123, § 7, remained intact
following the dismissal of the criminal charge.
Another provision of G. L. c. 123, § 16, supports our
reading that Bridgewater had authority to hold E.C. pending a
hearing on its petition under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. General
Laws c. 123, § 16 (f), requires that criminal charges against a
committed person who is incompetent to stand trial be dismissed
after the date when a competent defendant would have been
eligible for parole; it does not state, however, that the person
immediately must be released from commitment. Similarly, G. L.
c. 123, § 16 (e), envisions continuing commitment at a facility
following the dismissal of criminal charges. See id. ("Any
15
person committed to a facility under the provisions of this
section may be restricted in his movements to the buildings and
grounds of the facility at which he is committed by the court
which ordered the commitment . . . . This paragraph shall not
apply to persons originally committed after a finding of
incompetence to stand trial whose criminal charges have been
dismissed").
This continuing authority of Bridgewater to hold E.C.
briefly pending a hearing on its motion to amend did not, as
E.C. contends, constitute a violation of due process.
Significantly, the procedures that Bridgewater would be required
to follow in pursuing a petition under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c),
to extend an incompetent defendant's commitment are the same as
those that must be followed in pursuing a petition under G. L.
c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. Due process and the statutory provisions
would require Bridgewater to provide an incompetent individual
with notice and a hearing on a G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition,
just as it would for a petition under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8,
and all of the same rights, such as the rights to an attorney,
to cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence, are
applicable at each of those hearings. Cf. Coffin v.
Superintendent, Mass. Treatment Ctr., 458 Mass. 186, 189 (2010).
E.C. is correct that, in contrast to a petition for an
extension of commitment under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c),
16
incompetency to stand trial would no longer be an issue, or a
necessary preliminary finding, in a petition pursuant to G. L.
c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. While the statutory protections of G. L.
c. 123, § 16 (c), are not applicable where no criminal charges
are pending, an individual's due process rights also are
protected at a hearing under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. The
Commonwealth is required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that (1) the individual has a mental disorder that grossly
impairs the individual's "ability to meet the ordinary demands
of life"; (2) failure to retain the individual in strict
security at Bridgewater would create a likelihood of serious
harm to the person or others; and (3) no less restrictive
alternative than confinement at Bridgewater would be sufficient
to protect the individual and others. Commonwealth v. Nassar,
380 Mass. 908, 912-913 & n.6, 916 (1980). See, e.g., Hashimi v.
Kalil, 388 Mass. 609, 609-610 (1983). Cf. Coffin, 458 Mass. at
189.
None of the due process protections that G. L. c. 123 was
adopted to protect is offended by Bridgewater's authority to
pursue a petition for commitment under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8,
of an individual who formerly had been committed under G. L.
c. 123, §§ 15 and 16. Here, E.C. was committed properly under
G. L. c. 123, §§ 15 and 16 (a), his hospitalization was extended
properly under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b), and he was held
17
appropriately under G. L. c. 123, § 6 (a), after the criminal
charge had been dismissed. He could not have been held
indefinitely; G. L. c. 123, § 7 (c), requires a hearing to be
conducted within fourteen days of a petition being filed,8 and,
as noted, the procedural protections of G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and
8, would apply at that hearing.
E.C.'s argument that the dismissal of the criminal charge
terminated Bridgewater's authority to hold him under G. L.
c. 123, § 16, is unavailing. Because G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c),
does not address the procedure to follow if criminal charges are
dismissed while a petition for recommitment is pending, we look
to other provisions in the statute for guidance. See Phillips
v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 443 Mass. 110, 116-117 (2004).
General Laws c. 123, § 16 (b), which governs the initial
commitment to Bridgewater that a G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c),
petition seeks to extend, provides that "the petition for the
commitment of an untried defendant shall be heard only if the
8 We note that both G. L. c. 123, § 16, and G. L. c. 123,
§ 7, impose strict limits on the time during which a petition
may be pending before a hearing must be conducted, and any
violation of those limits would risk running afoul of due
process protections. Here, Bridgewater timely filed its motion
to amend within one day of receiving notice of dismissal of the
charge. Any delay in filing a motion to amend, regardless
whether due to a delay of "notification" of the dismissal, would
risk due process violations; Bridgewater, as custodian of an
incompetent individual, bears the burden of prompt filing of a
motion to amend a G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition, or a motion
for civil commitment.
18
defendant is found incompetent to stand trial, or if the
criminal charges are dismissed after commitment" (emphasis
added).
Given this, E.C.'s suggestion that immediate release from
commitment is mandated if criminal charges are dismissed during
the pendency of a G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition would be
inconsistent with the Legislature's stated understanding, as
evidenced in G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b), that untried criminal
defendants whose charges are dismissed may require further
treatment because they present a danger to the community.
Moreover, E.C.'s proposed reading of the statute would create an
absurd and inconsistent result; reading the statute under his
view, if charges against a defendant are dismissed while the
defendant is committed on a G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b), petition,
Bridgewater could petition for an extended commitment under
G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, while, if the charges were dismissed
during a commitment pursuant to a G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c),
petition, a defendant would have to be released immediately.
Nothing in the structure or purposes of G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b)
and (c), supports this conclusion; to the contrary, both
provisions allow for commitment of incompetent defendants, under
specific circumstances.
Allowing amendment of a pending G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c),
petition to a petition under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, does not
19
offend an individual's fundamental right to due process. Where
a petition under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), is pending, that
individual necessarily has been found incompetent to stand trial
at a proceeding under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (a), where due process
protections were provided.
3. Conclusion. The judgment of the District Court judge
is reversed, and the matter is remanded for entry of an order
consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.