The McLean Hospital Corp. v. Town of Lincoln ( 2019 )


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    SJC-12675
    THE McLEAN HOSPITAL CORPORATION   vs.   TOWN OF LINCOLN & others.1
    Suffolk.     April 2, 2019. - September 23, 2019.
    Present:   Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher,
    & Kafker, JJ.
    Zoning, Educational use. Education, Zoning.    Words,
    "Educational purpose."
    Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on
    November 15, 2016.
    The case was heard by Karyn F. Scheier, J.
    The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
    direct appellate review.
    Diane C. Tillotson (M. Patrick Moore, Jr., also present)
    for the plaintiff.
    Jason R. Talerman for town of Lincoln & others.
    Michael C. Fee, for Arthur Anthony & others, was present
    but did not argue.
    1 Building commissioner of Lincoln, zoning board of appeals
    of Lincoln, Arthur Anthony, Lara Anthony, Edwin David, Nandini
    David, Douglas Elder, Lisa Elder, Jay Gregory, Lisa Gurrie,
    Michael Gurrie, Beverly Peirce, and Daniel Peirce; and Linda
    Kanner, Steven Kanner, Robyn Laukien, Daniel McCarthy, and
    Donald McCarthy, interveners.
    2
    Benjamin Fierro, III, for Association for Behavioral
    Healthcare, Inc., & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
    Felicia H. Ellsworth & Julia Prochazka, for Disability Law
    Center & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
    LENK, J.   The question before us is whether the plaintiff's
    proposed residential program for adolescent males falls within
    the meaning of the Dover Amendment, G. L. c. 40A, § 3, second
    par.   If so, it is exempt from certain zoning restrictions
    because the land and buildings would be used for "educational
    purposes."   The plaintiff, The McLean Hospital Corporation
    (McLean), purchased 5.5 acres of land in the town of Lincoln
    (town), intending to develop a residential life skills program
    for fifteen to twenty-one year old males who exhibit extreme
    "emotional dysregulation."     The program would allow these
    adolescents to develop the emotional and social skills necessary
    to return to their communities to lead useful, productive lives.
    Before purchasing the property, McLean, a nonprofit
    institution, wrote to the town's building commissioner
    explaining the proposed use, and seeking a determination whether
    the project could proceed as of right, pursuant to the Dover
    Amendment, see G. L. c. 40A, § 3, second par., and its local
    analog, section 6.1(i) of the town's bylaw.     The building
    commissioner replied in writing that the proposed use was
    educational, and that McLean could proceed under the Dover
    Amendment and the bylaw.     After the purchase, however, a number
    3
    of nearby residents challenged the decision before the town's
    zoning board of appeals (board).   The board decided that the
    program was medical or therapeutic, as opposed to educational,
    and reversed the building commissioner's determination.       McLean
    initiated an action in the Land Court challenging the board's
    decision.   After a four-day trial, a Land Court judge determined
    that the proposed use was not primarily "for educational
    purposes," under a novel theory that attempted to distinguish
    between life skills that are "focused outward" and those that
    "look inward."   McLean appealed, and we allowed McLean's
    petition for direct appellate review.
    We conclude that, although not a conventional educational
    curriculum offered to high school or college students, the
    proposed facility and its skills-based curriculum fall well
    within the "broad and comprehensive" meaning of "educational
    purposes" under the Dover Amendment.    See Regis College v.
    Weston, 
    462 Mass. 280
    , 286, 291 (2012).    Accordingly, the
    decision of the Land Court judge must be vacated, and the matter
    remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of McLean.2
    2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the
    Disability Law Center and the Mental Health Legal Advisors
    Committee; and by the Association for Behavioral Healthcare,
    Inc., the Association of Developmental Disabilities Providers,
    Inc., the Massachusetts Association of 766 Approved Private
    Schools, Inc., and the Massachusetts Council of Human Service
    Providers, Inc.
    4
    1.   Background.   We recite the essentially undisputed facts
    found by the trial judge, supplemented occasionally with
    uncontroverted facts in the record.    See Vaiarella v. Hanover
    Ins. Co., 
    409 Mass. 523
    , 524 (1991).
    a.   Other programs.   The plaintiff currently operates a
    smaller version of the planned program, known as the "3East
    program," at its campus in Belmont, as well as a similar program
    for girls.   McLean also operates a program for adults with
    emotional disorders, who are transitioning back into the
    community from a hospital setting, at another location in the
    town; that facility is a protected educational facility under
    the Dover Amendment, G. L. c. 40A, § 3, second par.    McLean
    wants to move the 3East program from its already cramped
    quarters in Belmont to the newly purchased land in Lincoln so
    that it can increase the number of adolescents that the program
    serves, from six to twelve at any given time.
    b.   3East program.    The 3East program's curriculum is
    designed to instill fundamental life, social, and emotional
    skills in adolescent males who are deficient in these skills,
    who experience severe emotional dysregulation, and who have been
    unable to succeed in a traditional academic setting.   Many of
    the residents have been diagnosed with borderline personality
    disorder; all have varying degrees of emotional dysregulation.
    Some have a co-occurring condition such as attention deficit
    5
    disorder, anxiety, or depression, and some have no official
    diagnosis.
    Regardless of their diagnosis, all of the residents at
    McLean share difficulties in identifying and regulating their
    emotions, and therefore may react to ordinary, day-to-day
    events, which they perceive as stressful situations, with
    outbursts of fear, anger, or self-loathing.   Overwhelmed by
    emotions they cannot identify or control, these individuals have
    difficulty concentrating in school, following directions,
    responding appropriately to others, and maintaining
    interpersonal relationships.   They tend to view situations as
    juxtapositions of diametrically opposite positions (from
    "opposite sides of the Grand Canyon"), with no middle ground.
    Slight disappointments (i.e., "can we meet at 5:15 rather than
    5:00?") may be viewed as negative statements about themselves,
    and can lead to increased feelings of abandonment, shame,
    "emptiness," anger, and resentment.
    The 3East program uses a highly structured, nationally
    recognized, dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) approach to
    attempt to develop social and emotional skills in students with
    severe deficits in these skills.   To do so, the program teaches
    students to notice and identify their emotions, to slow down and
    consider alternatives rather than simply reacting, and to
    interact constructively with other people.    It teaches
    6
    fundamental behavioral skills so that the students, whose
    difficulties in emotional regulation interfere with an ability
    to learn in a more traditional setting, may acquire skills to
    respond more productively to the challenges that confront them
    in their day-to-day lives.   The goal of the program is to enable
    the students to return to their communities and their families,
    to succeed in traditional educational programs, and to become
    able to lead productive lives.
    Entrance to the 3East program is selective.     The admissions
    process screens out any individual who is unstable or requires
    hospitalization.    Prospective residents also must demonstrate
    that they are ready and willing to devote themselves to learning
    these behavioral and cognitive skills, with the expectation that
    they will be able to function in their respective communities in
    the future.   Once selected, participation in the immersive
    residential program generally lasts for sixty to 120 days;
    residents who complete the program successfully receive a
    graduation certificate.
    During their time at the 3East program, residents receive
    approximately eleven hours per day of instruction and practice
    in social and emotional skills, focused in five well-established
    areas where prior research has shown that training can be very
    effective:    mindfulness and ability to pay attention; emotional
    7
    regulation; development and maintenance of interpersonal
    relationships; distress tolerance; and validation.
    According to Alan Fruzzetti, the director of the program
    and the only individual explicitly credited by the judge,
    mindfulness "in DBT is defined as being able to pay attention on
    purpose in the present moment and without being judgmental."      It
    is considered the "core skill in DBT," and involves emotional
    control and focus, which, the director pointed out, are
    essential "for learning anything."     Emotional regulation teaches
    individuals how to identify the specific emotion "they are
    feeling, so as to enjoy positive emotions and 'reduce their
    reactivity to a whole host of different stimuli in the world.'"
    Distress tolerance is "a set of skills" that helps people "get[]
    through an apparent crisis" without making it "worse."
    Validation skills allow individuals to recognize and accept
    their own feelings and those of others without "judgments [that]
    tend to fuel negative emotion" toward oneself and others.
    A typical day at the 3East program begins at 8:30 A.M.,
    with group mindfulness exercises, followed by classroom
    instruction from 9 A.M until 4 P.M.3    After classroom work is
    over, there are one and one-half hours for structured athletic
    time or family therapy, followed by dinner and a final group
    3 The students have a forty-five minute break for lunch, and
    fifteen minutes of group mindfulness exercises.
    8
    mindfulness exercise.      After a forty-five minute period of
    skills practice and homework worksheets, the students have a
    period of free time until lights out at 10 P.M.
    The curriculum is taught in an experiential manner by
    specialists in clinical education.     Each day, the students learn
    multiple skills in forty-five minute classroom sessions, as well
    as how to apply them to the complex problems in life that they
    may encounter at home, school, or work.      The process involves
    formal training sessions, demonstrations and examples by the
    instructors, group practice, and individualized practice
    sessions for each student, as well as daily worksheets and
    homework.    Although a part-time registered nurse is available to
    treat any medical issues that arise for staff or students, no
    medical interventions are included as part of the program.
    2.     Discussion.   The parties generally accept the judge's
    findings of fact; they dispute only her determination that the
    primary purpose of the proposed facility cannot be characterized
    as "educational" under G. L. c. 40A, § 3, second par.      "The
    central issue in this case," then, "is one of law, not of fact."4
    4 In Fitchburg Hous. Auth. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of
    Fitchburg, 
    380 Mass. 869
    , 873 (1980), the court concluded: "If
    the judge's characterization of the proposed facility as a
    'medical facility' is a conclusion that, as a matter of law, the
    proposed use would not be 'educational,' it must be reversed as
    an error of law." See 
    id., citing New
    England Canteen Serv.,
    Inc. v. Ashley, 
    372 Mass. 671
    , 674 (1977). "To the extent that
    it is a finding of fact, it must be set aside as 'clearly
    9
    See Fitchburg Hous. Auth. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of
    Fitchburg, 
    380 Mass. 869
    , 872 (1980).     We must ascertain, based
    upon the facts found by the trial judge, to which we afford
    appropriate deference absent clear error, whether McLean's
    proposed use of the property qualifies as having "educational
    purposes" within the meaning of the Dover Amendment.    See 
    id. at 872-873.
      See also Kurz v. Board of Appeals of N. Reading, 
    341 Mass. 110
    , 112 (1960) (meaning of "educational use" in local
    bylaw "is a question of law for the court").
    a.     Dover Amendment.   The Dover Amendment exempts from
    local zoning laws those uses of land and structures that are for
    "educational purposes."   See G. L. c. 40A, § 3, second par.     The
    Dover Amendment provides, in relevant part,
    "No zoning ordinance or by-law shall . . . prohibit,
    regulate or restrict the use of land or structures for
    religious purposes or for educational purposes on land
    owned or leased by the commonwealth or any of its
    agencies, subdivisions or bodies politic or by a
    religious sect or denomination, or by a nonprofit
    educational corporation; provided, however, that such
    land or structures may be subject to reasonable
    regulations concerning the bulk and height of
    structures and determining yard sizes, lot area,
    setbacks, open space, parking and building coverage
    requirements" (emphasis added).
    In Regis 
    College, 462 Mass. at 285-291
    , we articulated a
    two-pronged test to determine whether a proposed use falls
    erroneous.'" Fitchburg Hous. 
    Auth., supra
    , quoting Mass. Civ.
    P. 52 (a), 
    365 Mass. 816
    (1974).
    10
    within the protections of the Dover Amendment.     First, the use
    must have as its "bona fide goal something that can reasonably
    be described as 'educationally significant.'"     
    Id. at 285,
    quoting Whitinsville Retirement Soc'y, Inc. v. Northbridge, 
    394 Mass. 757
    , 761 n.3 (1985).    Second, the educationally
    significant goal must be the "'primary or dominant' purpose for
    which the land or structures will be used."     Regis 
    College, supra
    , quoting Whitinsville Retirement Soc'y, 
    Inc., supra
    at
    760.    The primary or dominant purpose requirement "helps ensure
    that a party invoking Dover Amendment protection does so without
    engrafting an educational component onto a project in order to
    obtain favorable treatment under the statute."     Regis 
    College, supra
    at 290.
    b.   Whether the proposed 3East program has an educationally
    significant goal.    The word "educational," as used in the Dover
    Amendment, has been construed on numerous occasions, for more
    than 120 years, as a "broad and comprehensive" term.      See Regis
    
    College, 462 Mass. at 285
    , quoting Mount Hermon Boys' Sch. v.
    Gill, 
    145 Mass. 139
    , 146 (1887).     Over time, we have made clear
    that the protections of the Dover Amendment are not to be
    "limited only to those facilities closely analogous to
    traditional schools and colleges."    See Regis 
    College, supra
    at
    286.    Rather, the term "educational" encompasses that which is
    "the process of developing and training the powers and
    11
    capabilities of human beings."   Mount Hermon Boys' 
    Sch., supra
    .
    Thus, the Dover Amendment embraces fully "the idea that
    education is the process of preparing persons for activity and
    usefulness in life" (quotation and citation omitted).     See
    Fitchburg Hous. 
    Auth., 380 Mass. at 875
    .
    Based on our long-standing jurisprudence, it appears
    relatively undisputed that the 3East program includes an
    educationally significant component.   Indeed, we repeatedly have
    held that a program that instills "a basic understanding of how
    to cope with everyday problems and to maintain oneself in
    society is incontestably an educational process" within the
    meaning of the Dover Amendment (emphasis added).   See Fitchburg
    Hous. 
    Auth., 380 Mass. at 875
    .   See also Gardner-Athol Area
    Mental Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Gardner,
    
    401 Mass. 12
    , 14 (1987) (proposed use educational where program
    taught "daily living, as well as vocational skills, with the
    goal of preparing [its residents] for more independent living").
    That the 3East program encompasses an educationally
    significant component, however, is not sufficient for the
    program to fall within the ambit of the Dover Amendment.    To do
    so, the educationally significant goal of the program also must
    be the predominant purpose for which the land and structures
    will be used.   See Regis 
    College, 462 Mass. at 285
    .
    12
    c.   Whether the primary or dominant purpose is educational.
    The defendants contend that any educational components of the
    3East program merely are ancillary to the predominant purpose
    for which the facility would be established, that is, to provide
    medical treatment for a particular psychological condition.
    McLean responds that the educationally significant goal of the
    3East program is also its dominant or primary purpose, and that
    the Land Court judge erred in determining that the purpose is
    predominantly "therapeutic."
    This court has not held, as the defendants ask us to do,
    that a skills development program loses its primary educational
    purpose when the particular competencies taught also may be
    therapeutic, rehabilitative, or remedial of an underlying
    condition.   To the contrary, courts in the Commonwealth have
    concluded that "'education' and 'rehabilitation' do not denote
    functions so distinct that [a local zoning authority or a court]
    could be required to quantify them relative to each other."
    Harbor Sch., Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Haverhill, 5 Mass. App.
    Ct. 600, 604 (1977).   See Gardner-Athol Area Mental Health
    Ass'n, 
    Inc., 401 Mass. at 15
    ("Rehabilitation surely falls
    within the meaning of education").   Indeed, those concepts "are
    not mutually exclusive."   See Harbor Sch., 
    Inc., supra
    .    Rather,
    education encompasses that which is "particularly directed to
    either the mental, moral, or physical powers and faculties, but
    13
    in its broadest and best sense it relates to them all."
    Whitinsville Retirement Soc'y, 
    Inc., 394 Mass. at 759
    .
    A determination whether the land and structures at issue
    here would be used for a predominantly educational purpose also
    does not, and should not, turn on an assessment of the
    population it serves.   Although "emotional or psychiatric
    programs may determine the character of the training furnished
    to residents of the proposed facility," they certainly "do not
    mark the facility as 'medical' or render it any less
    educational."   See Fitchburg Hous. 
    Auth., 380 Mass. at 873
    , 875
    ("The fact that many of the residents of the facility . . . will
    be taking prescription drugs does not negate its educational
    purpose or make its dominant purpose medical").   Such
    programming, rather, exists to "serve[] nontraditional
    communities of learners in a manner tailored to their individual
    needs and capabilities."   See Regis 
    College, 462 Mass. at 285
    -
    286 (Dover Amendment applies to "facilities for the disabled or
    the infirm"); Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation
    Ass'n, Inc., 
    421 Mass. 106
    , 108, 115-116 (1995) (Dover Amendment
    applies to residential education facility for adults with mental
    disability).
    Thus, although the 3East program's facility and its
    curriculum will be tailored to serve participants who previously
    may have been inpatients at a psychiatric facility, that fact
    14
    alone does not serve to brand the 3East program as a medical
    program.   Nor does having been a patient at a psychiatric
    facility in the past preclude an individual from participating
    in a specialized form of education to learn the complex
    emotional, social, and daily living skills necessary to
    participate actively and succeed in life.
    Indeed, the emotional and behavioral skills that would be
    taught at the 3East program increasingly are becoming a
    component of the educational curriculum in many traditional
    public school settings across the Commonwealth.   See, e.g.,
    G. L. c. 69, § 1P (enacting framework for schools to help
    students "regulate their emotions and behavior" and to integrate
    "social and emotional learning," "children's mental health," and
    "positive behavioral approaches"); Department of Elementary and
    Secondary Education, Strategic Plan, at 1, 9 (rev. Feb. 2019)
    (core strategy of public schools is "supporting the social,
    emotional, and health needs" of students).   See also J.J. Mazza,
    E.T. Dexter-Mazza, A.L. Miller, J.H. Rathus, & H.E. Murphy, DBT
    Skills in Schools:   Skills Training for Emotional Problem
    Solving for Adolescents, at 3-4, 26-33 (2016) (noting use of DBT
    curriculum in both traditional and nontraditional academic
    settings).
    The defendants contend that the 3East program is
    distinguishable from the facility in Fitchburg Hous. Auth.,
    15
    because the 3East program has a psychiatrist on staff, and the
    participants may be a threat to themselves or others, in light
    of some of their histories of thoughts of suicide or self-
    injurious behaviors.   Cf. Fitchburg Hous. 
    Auth., 380 Mass. at 873
    , 875.   Should we conclude that the 3East program has a
    predominantly educational purpose, the defendants caution
    against a slippery slope in which every therapist's or doctor's
    office or hospital could become a facility afforded protection
    under the Dover Amendment.   This, of course, is not the case.
    While the presence or absence of medical personnel on staff
    may be one factor in the calculus, it certainly does not alone
    create the bright-line rule that the defendants suggest and,
    without more, render a program medical and not educational.      As
    McLean points out, ordinary public schools often have registered
    nurses or other medical personnel on staff.   Nor does the
    involvement of an individual therapist assigned to each
    adolescent, for twice-weekly sessions throughout the course of
    the program, transform the program into a medical treatment
    plan.   The students engage in what might equate to an
    individualized therapy appointment for two hours of the roughly
    seventy-hour week of structured skills training and group and
    individual practice.
    Moreover, the structure of the 3East program is distinct
    from a medical appointment or an inpatient placement at a
    16
    psychiatric hospital.    As stated, the full-time program includes
    an admissions process, instruction on social and emotional
    skills development, group and individual sessions, exercises to
    practice the skills learned, structured social and athletic time
    with classmates and peers, and homework and worksheets to
    complete each evening.     Compare Harbor Schools, Inc., 5 Mass.
    App. Ct. at 600, 605 (residential facility for children with
    emotional regulation issues was educational and not medical).
    The teachers and therapists who form the staff at the 3East
    program are not doctors.    They are required to have a Bachelor's
    degree, not unlike the teachers in schools across the
    Commonwealth.   They also have specialized training in areas such
    as education theory, coaching, and DBT.     Notably, the trial
    judge explicitly found that no medical interventions are used in
    the 3East program.
    The defendants' argument that the 3East program exemplifies
    our previously expressed concern that a purely residential
    facility may not add an informal educational component merely as
    a smokescreen in order to obtain favorable protections under the
    Dover Amendment also is unavailing.     See Regis 
    College, 462 Mass. at 287
    (optional coursework cannot be mere "window
    dressing" for luxury condominium complex); Whitinsville
    Retirement Soc'y, 
    Inc., 394 Mass. at 760
    (informal arts and
    crafts program did not render nursing home educational).     The
    17
    3East program includes a full-time, highly structured, mandatory
    curriculum taught by formally and specially trained staff, upon
    graduation from which the students ideally will return to their
    respective high schools, colleges, and communities.
    Finally, in an effort to distinguish the 3East program from
    the programs at issue in Gardner-Athol Area Mental Health Ass'n,
    
    Inc., 401 Mass. at 14
    , and Fitchburg Hous. 
    Auth., 380 Mass. at 871-872
    , the defendants and the Land Court judge rely on a
    purported dichotomy between "outward"-facing skills (i.e., those
    that help assimilate individuals into their respective
    communities) and "inward"-facing skills (i.e., those that help
    address any internal manifestations or symptoms of a mental
    disorder).   We have not previously endorsed such a distinction,
    nor do the parties identify any case law or scientific research
    that would support such a concept.   As the plaintiff indicates,
    inward-facing skills, which presumably would encompass the
    mindfulness, emotional regulation, distress tolerance, and
    validation components of the program, also have an enormous
    impact on an individual's ability to engage in work or study,
    and to interact outwardly with others.   See Fitchburg Hous.
    
    Auth., supra
    at 875 (baseline skills to "cope with everyday
    problems and to maintain oneself in society" deemed
    educational).   Moreover, the "development and maintenance of
    interpersonal relationships," one of the five core program
    18
    components, is explicitly limited to outward-facing skills.       The
    gym activities and group mindfulness activities also incorporate
    mandatory group and interpersonal components.
    Both inward-facing and outward-facing types of skills, even
    assuming they can be meaningfully parsed in this manner, are
    part of "the idea that education is the process of preparing
    persons 'for activity and usefulness in life'" (citation
    omitted), Fitchburg Hous. 
    Auth., 380 Mass. at 875
    , and thus
    protected as a significant educational purpose under the Dover
    Amendment.   While we have made clear that "a basic understanding
    of how to cope with everyday problems and to maintain oneself in
    society is incontestably an educational process" within the
    ambit of the Dover Amendment, 
    id., it also
    would be impossible
    to exclude the acquisition of these skills from serving a
    "therapeutic" purpose.
    We accordingly agree with McLean that, in situations of
    this type, an attempt to sever that which is educational from
    that which is therapeutic is ordinarily a rather futile
    exercise.    Focusing on the "therapeutic" aspects of a program
    such as the one at issue shifts the analysis from the program's
    educational purposes, and whether education is a significant
    part of the program, to the type of student who is participating
    in the program, which is precisely what, as we have said, should
    not be the foundation of an analysis under the Dover Amendment.
    19
    We decline once again to adopt as dispositive a distinction
    between education with a therapeutic purpose -- to teach how to
    live in society, cope with daily tasks, and interact with
    others -- and education with a traditional academic purpose.
    See Regis 
    College, 462 Mass. at 285
    -286, 291.   We also decline
    to adopt the judge's parsing of distinctions between a
    "therapeutic" program to teach inward-facing life skills and an
    "educational" program to teach outward-facing life skills.        See
    Mount Hermon Boys' 
    Sch., 145 Mass. at 146
    ("educational" purpose
    encompasses "the process of developing and training the powers
    and capabilities of human beings").
    In sum, that the curriculum of the 3East program may
    encompass elements of teaching emotional regulation, and allows
    two percent of the weekly program hours to be devoted to
    individual therapy, or that some of the skills are taught by
    clinical professionals, does not negate the fact that the
    predominant purpose of the 3East program is educational.    Cf.
    
    Watros, 421 Mass. at 108
    , 115-116 (residential facility for
    adults with mental disability was educational within meaning of
    Dover Amendment notwithstanding therapeutic aspect).     To the
    contrary, these features indicate that the 3East program is a
    specialized form of education, with therapeutic aspects, that
    ultimately teaches its participants the skills necessary for
    20
    their success, "activity and usefulness in life" (citation
    omitted).5   See Mount Hermon Boys' 
    Sch., 145 Mass. at 146
    .
    3.   Conclusion.   The judgment is vacated and set aside, and
    the case is remanded to the Land Court for entry of judgment in
    favor of McLean.
    So ordered.
    5 Our conclusion in this regard comports with the
    legislative history of the Dover Amendment, which we have had
    considerable occasion to examine in the context of educational
    programs. See, e.g., Regis College v. Weston, 
    462 Mass. 280
    ,
    286 (2012); Trustees of Tufts College v. Medford, 
    415 Mass. 753
    ,
    757-758 (1993). In so doing, we have noted that, although the
    Department of Community Affairs had proposed "that Dover
    Amendment protection be limited to 'school[s]' or analogous
    'place[s] or facilit[ies],'" see 1972 House Doc. No. 5009, at
    84, the Legislature rejected this language. See Regis 
    College, supra
    . It thus opted not to adopt "a statutory test that would
    limit Dover Amendment protection only to projects similar to
    'schools.'" See 
    id. The Dover
    Amendment also exists, in part,
    to protect educational institutions from a municipality's
    exercise of preferences as to what kind of educational
    facilities it will welcome, "the very kind of restrictive
    attitude which the Dover Amendment was intended to foreclose."
    See The Bible Speaks v. Board of Appeals of Lenox, 8 Mass. App.
    Ct. 19, 33 (1979). The use of land for nontraditional
    educational accordingly was anticipated by the drafters of the
    Dover Amendment.