Commonwealth v. Adonsoto , 475 Mass. 497 ( 2016 )

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SJC-11978
COMMONWEALTH vs. GLENIS A. ADONSOTO.
Norfolk. February 11, 2016. - September 16, 2016.
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, &
Hines, JJ.1
Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence. Constitutional
Law, Self-incrimination, Breathalyzer test, Confrontation
of witnesses. Evidence, Breathalyzer test, Hearsay.
Interpreter. Practice, Criminal, Interpreter, Hearsay,
Confrontation of witnesses, Instructions to jury.
Complaint received and sworn to in the Stoughton Division
of the District Court Department on July 23, 2012.
The case was tried before James H. McGuiness, Jr., J.
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.
Christopher DeMayo for the defendant.
Varsha Kukafka, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
Eric R. Atstupenas, for Massachusetts Chiefs of Police
Association, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
1
Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements.
2
HINES, J. The defendant, Glenis A. AdonSoto, was convicted
by a jury of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1). The
defendant, whose native language is Spanish, was stopped in the
early morning hours of July 22, 2012, by a Stoughton police
officer in response to a telephone call from a concerned driver.
After the defendant was arrested and transported to the police
station, the police secured the services of a telephonic
language interpreter service to read the defendant her rights
and instruct her on how to perform the breathalyzer test. The
defendant did not properly perform the test during three
attempts, producing no usable result. At the trial, the judge
admitted in evidence the defendant's failure to perform the
breathalyzer test.
The defendant appealed, asserting as error (1) the
admission of her failure to produce a usable breathalyzer
result, claiming that it should have been excluded as "refusal"
evidence under G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e); (2) the admission of
the interpreter's English language version of her statements as
hearsay and a violation of her constitutional right of
confrontation; (3) insufficiency of the evidence of impairment;
and (4) prejudicial errors in the instructions to the jury. We
granted the defendant's application for direct appellate review.
3
We affirm the conviction based on our conclusions that the
failure to properly perform a breathalyzer test after giving
consent is not inadmissible as refusal evidence; that the
police-appointed interpreter acted as the defendant's agent in
the circumstances of this case, and thus, the statements were
not hearsay; that the defendant's unpreserved confrontation
claim is unavailing, as there is no showing of a substantial
risk of a miscarriage of justice; that the evidence was
sufficient to establish her impairment; and that the jury
instructions did not create prejudicial error.2
Background. We recite the facts the jury could have found,
reserving certain details for our discussion of the specific
issues raised. At approximately 2:30 A.M. on July 22, 2012, a
Stoughton resident who had just left his home to drive to work
noticed the defendant driving down the middle of a two-lane
road, straddling the solid double-yellow line. A tractor-
trailer truck driving in the opposite direction blew his horn as
a warning signal to the defendant. The resident was driving in
the same direction as the defendant, and he followed behind her
for ten to twelve minutes. There was "extremely light traffic"
at the time. The defendant swerved back and forth in her lane,
and she crossed the fog line approximately twenty times.
2
We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the
Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association, Inc.
4
While following the defendant, the resident called the
Stoughton police. In response, a Stoughton police officer
stopped his police cruiser in the roadway along the route that
the defendant's vehicle was traveling. The officer observed the
defendant drive through a four-way stop intersection without
stopping. He activated his lights and followed her, and she
stopped.
The defendant was alone in the vehicle. The officer
smelled the odor of alcohol through the vehicle's open window
and noticed that the defendant's eyes were glassy. The
defendant responded to the officer's questions in Spanish and,
although he knew only a "little" Spanish, he knew enough to
notice that her speech was slurred. He ordered the defendant
out of the vehicle. She was unsteady on her feet, but the
officer could not perform a field sobriety test because he could
not effectively communicate with her in a language that they
both understood. He arrested the defendant and took her to the
police station.
When they arrived, the officer telephoned a telephonic
language interpreter service to speak to a "registered,
certified interpreter." The telephone was placed on
speakerphone loud enough for the officer and defendant to hear
the conversation. The telephone call was not recorded. The
officer read the defendant the Miranda rights in English, and
5
the interpreter relayed them to the defendant in Spanish. The
defendant nodded her head up and down while the interpreter was
speaking and when asked if she understood, she responded, "Yes,"
in Spanish. The defendant explained to the interpreter that she
had been at a friend's house and because the friend was
intoxicated, she borrowed her friend's vehicle to drive herself
home. The officer, through the interpreter, asked if the
defendant would take a breathalyzer test, and the defendant
agreed. The officer explained the instructions, and the
interpreter relayed them in Spanish. The interpreter asked the
defendant in Spanish if she understood the instructions, and she
verbally responded, "Yes."
The officer explained that "[y]ou have to seal your lip[s]
tightly around the . . . mouthpiece and blow until the machine
tells you to stop" in order for the breathalyzer to read a
result. The defendant did not properly seal her lips during the
first test, and the officer then physically demonstrated the
instructions.3 After the demonstration, the officer asked
through the interpreter if the defendant understood him, and
"she nodded 'Yes' up and down." The defendant did not seal her
lips around the mouthpiece when the officer administered the
3
The police officer described the defendant's actions as
having both sides of her mouth exposed from the mouthpiece that
she was supposed to seal her lips around and blow into, so that
"air was going all over the place."
6
test a second and third time. After the second test, the
officer explained the instructions again and stated that the
breathalyzer machine allowed three attempts so there was only
one more chance to perform the test correctly. There were no
results from any of the three attempts.
Discussion. 1. Evidence of failed breathalyzer test. The
defendant claims that the judge erroneously admitted evidence of
her failure to properly complete the breathalyzer test, arguing
that evidence of a defendant's "failure" or "refusal" to take a
breathalyzer test is inadmissible in a civil or criminal
proceeding as it is excluded under G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e).
The defendant also argues that the evidence should have been
excluded under Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2016), because any
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. The defendant's arguments are unavailing.
Exclusion of refusal evidence is based on a defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination under art. 12 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Commonwealth v. Lopes, 459
Mass. 165, 170 (2011), quoting Opinion of the Justices, 412
Mass. 1201, 1211 (1992). In Opinion of the Justices, supra, we
stated that a person's refusal to take a breathalyzer test is
testimonial in nature because it creates a "'Catch-22'
situation," where a defendant would be forced to "take the test
and perhaps produce potentially incriminating real evidence;
7
refuse and have adverse testimonial evidence used against him at
trial." We explained that a refusal is akin to a defendant
stating, "I have had so much to drink that I know or at least
suspect that I am unable to pass the test," and accordingly, may
not be admitted at trial. Id. at 1209. That rationale for
exclusion of refusal evidence does not apply where, as here, the
defendant initially consented to the test.4
The Appeals Court reached this conclusion in Commonwealth
v. Curley, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 167-168 (2010), on which the
4
As additional support for her argument, the defendant
cites 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.16 (2010), entitled, "Breath Test
Refusal," which instructs officers to mark a failed performance
as a "refusal," and provides:
"If after being advised of his or her rights and the
consequences of refusing to take a breath test, the
arrestee refuses to submit to a breath test, none shall be
given. The Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) shall be
notified of such refusal in a format approved by the
Registrar. If at any time following an arrestee's initial
consent to the breath test and prior to the successful
completion of the test, the arrestee refuses to participate
or declines to cooperate, the test shall be terminated and
it shall be noted as a refusal. If the arrestee fails to
supply the required breath samples upon request, the test
shall be terminated and it shall be noted as a refusal"
(emphasis added).
When the emphasized language is read together with the remainder
of the provision, however, it is clear that the regulation
ensures that failure to properly perform a breathalyzer test
does not allow a person to avoid the automatic 180-day
suspension of his or her driver's license under the so-called
implied consent statute, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (f) (1). We do not
consider a "refusal" under this regulation to be a "refusal" for
constitutional purposes.
8
judge relied in allowing the Commonwealth's motion in limine to
admit the disputed evidence. The Appeals Court analyzed whether
a defendant's failure to properly perform a breathalyzer test
after giving consent was testimonial in nature and thus,
required exclusion as "refusal" evidence. Id. The court
concluded that the evidence was properly admitted because
consent vitiated the defendant's self-incrimination claim, and
the jury could have inferred that the defendant "was trying to
avoid giving a sample while appearing to try to take the test."
Id. at 168. The defendant recognizes that the judge properly
relied on Curley, but she distinguishes it, claiming that in her
case there was a likelihood that she was "simply confused and
flustered by the language barrier and the use of a remote
translator" instead of deliberately trying to frustrate the
breathalyzer machine. The defendant's initial consent to the
breathalyzer test, however, was all that was required for
admissibility. See id. Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass.
at 1211. Any explanation for the failure to complete the test
was properly left to the jury.
Moreover, where the defendant and officer effectively
communicated through physical actions, there was little danger
of unfair prejudice from a potential misunderstanding during the
translation. The interpreter verbally advised the defendant of
translated instructions, the defendant acknowledged her
9
understanding of the verbal instructions by stating "Yes," the
police officer physically demonstrated the instructions, and the
defendant acknowledged her understanding of the physical
instructions by "nodd[ing] 'Yes' up and down."
2. Hearsay and confrontation claim. The defendant next
argues that admission of her statements violated the rule
against hearsay and her right to confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and art. 12. The
defendant's challenge arises from the testimony of the police
officer, who relayed the content of the defendant's statements
at trial, even though the officer only heard and understood the
interpreter's English language version of those statements. A
defendant's own statements are admissible as statements of a
party opponent. Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(A) (2016). The
issue is whether the statements still may be considered those of
the defendant where they are communicated through an interpreter
to a third party and the third party testifies to the statements
at trial.
a. Hearsay. Generally, out-of-court statements offered to
establish the truth of the matter asserted are inadmissible at
trial as hearsay. See Mass. G. Evid. § 802 (2016). Statements
"authorized" by the defendant or made by an "agent" of the
defendant, however, are not hearsay and are admissible as those
of the defendant. Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(C),(D). We
10
previously have considered an interpreter to be a "joint agent"
for persons choosing to speak through an interpreter, and
therefore, admitted the translated statements as those of the
speaker. See Commonwealth v. Vose, 157 Mass. 393, 395 (1892)
(where parties jointly agree to use interpreter, "words of the
interpreter, which are [the] necessary medium of communication,
are adopted by both, and made a part of their conversation as
much as those which fall from their own lips"). See also
O'Brien v. Bernoi, 297 Mass. 271, 273 (1937) (translated
statements of defendant, made by defendant's son, properly
admitted through plaintiff's testimony).
The defendant argues that the interpreter may not be viewed
as her agent because the interpreter was appointed by the
police. Although no appellate court in Massachusetts has
analyzed this specific issue, other jurisdictions have rejected
similar challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Charles, 722
F.3d 1319, 1321, 1326-1327 (11th Cir. 2013) (admission of
government-appointed interpreter's out-of-court translated
statements not hearsay violation because interpreter agent of,
or authorized by, defendant); United States v. Da Silva, 725
F.2d 828, 832 (2d Cir. 1983) (same). See also United States v.
Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2009) (government-
contracted interpreter "language conduit" for speaker); United
States v. Sanchez-Godinez, 444 F.3d 957, 960-961 (8th Cir. 2006)
11
(Federal agent was agent for defendant in "language conduit"
capacity but was not as interrogating officer); United States v.
Beltran, 761 F.2d 1, 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1985) (State-appointed
interpreter agent of, or authorized by, defendant).
We agree with the defendant that a government-appointed
interpreter should not always to be considered an agent for the
speaker, but in the circumstances of this case, we conclude that
the interpreter acted as an agent of the defendant. To
determine whether an interpreter acts as an agent or language
conduit for the speaker, we rely on the factors outlined by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 775 (2012). The relevant factors include
"which party supplied the interpreter, whether the interpreter
had any motive to mislead or distort, the interpreter’s
qualifications and language skill, and whether actions taken
subsequent to the conversation were consistent with the
statements as translated." Id., quoting United States v.
Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 835 (1992).
Although the police supplied the interpreter, and thus, the
first factor weighs in favor of the defendant's claim, on the
specific facts of this case, the remaining factors demonstrate
that the interpreter was acting as an agent of the defendant.
12
First, the defendant's actions were consistent with the
statements as translated. The officer, through the interpreter,
read the defendant her rights and, in response, the defendant
nodded her head "up and down" and verbally stated, "Yes," in
Spanish. Moreover, after the officer's verbal instructions
about how to perform the breathalyzer test, the defendant
performed most of the actions as instructed -- bringing the
mouthpiece to her lips and blowing into the hose. The defendant
failed to properly seal her lips around the mouthpiece, but her
conduct indicated that the translator properly relayed at least
part of the instructions. Also, the interpreter's
qualifications were not in dispute. The officer testified that
the interpreter was "registered" and "certified," and trial
counsel did not challenge these descriptions. Last, there is no
indication that the interpreter, obtained through a third-party
interpreter service, had any motive to distort the translation.
In these circumstances, the interpreter may properly be
considered an agent of the defendant for hearsay purposes,
negating exclusion on hearsay grounds.5 See Mass. G. Evid.
§ 801(d)(2)(D).
5
Generally, a judge must make a preliminary finding of fact
that the agent was authorized to act on the subject or within
the scope of the relationship before statements are admitted
under Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) (2016). See Mass. G.
Evid. § 104(a) (2016). See also Commonwealth v. Irene, 462
13
b. Confrontation clause. The defendant argues that even
if the statements made through the interpreter are not hearsay,
admission of the statements violated her confrontation rights
under the Sixth Amendment and art. 12. The confrontation clause
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees a defendant the opportunity to confront the declarant
of "testimonial" statements to be used against him or her at
trial in the "crucible of cross-examination." Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-52, 59, 61 (2004) (Crawford). The
right to confrontation embodied in art. 12 is "coextensive with
the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment." Commonwealth v.
Zeininger, 459 Mass. 775, 785 n.15, cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 462(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. De Oliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 57n.1
(2006). The defendant did not object to the police officer's
testimony on these grounds. Therefore, we review the
defendant's claim for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of
justice. Commonwealth v. Traylor, 472 Mass. 260, 267 (2015),
Mass. 600, 606 n.13, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 487 (2012). The
judge also must instruct the jury to consider the evidence only
if they find the same. Id. The defendant did not claim any
error in this regard, and we conclude that any error did not
create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice for the
reasons discussed in this decision. Judges considering
admissibility of translated statements through an alleged agent
should analyze the factors discussed in United States v. Orm
Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
775 (2012), as set forth above, in making such a determination.
14
quoting Commonwealth v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 857 (2014),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 317 (2015).
As discussed above, the defendant's statements in this case
are not hearsay because the interpreter was acting as an agent
of the defendant. Nonetheless, confrontation rights are not
governed by common-law hearsay determinations. See Crawford,
541 U.S. at 61. See also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
U.S. 305, 317 (2009) (rejecting "invitation to return to [the
rule] that evidence with 'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness' was admissible notwithstanding the
Confrontation Clause" [citation omitted]). The Sixth Amendment
precludes a mechanical application of the hearsay rule to permit
the admission of the defendant's statements to the interpreter,
particularly where the reliability and trustworthiness concerns
implicit in Crawford are extant.
Federal courts, in the absence of guidance from the United
States Supreme Court post-Crawford, have grappled with the issue
of a defendant's right to confrontation of an interpreter,
reaching different outcomes.6 The defendant relies on United
6
Prior to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the
prevailing view was of an interpreter as a "mere language
conduit" for language and that the confrontation clause did not
apply. United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 528 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 835 (1992). See United States v.
Beltran, 761 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Da
Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 832 (2d Cir. 1983). We question the
15
States v. Charles, 722 F.3d at 1324-1325, in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
the defendant has a right to cross-examine an interpreter where
the interrogating officer testified to the English language
version of the defendant's Creole language statements because
the interpreter was the "declarant" of English language
statements.7 In Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139-1141, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, expressly
recognizing that Crawford may have changed the analysis for the
right of confrontation, nonetheless declined to depart from its
ruling in an earlier case that "a person may testify regarding
statements made by the defendant through an interpreter without
raising either hearsay or Confrontation Clause issues because
the statements are properly viewed as the defendant's own, and
the defendant cannot claim that he was denied the opportunity to
confront himself." Orm Hieng, supra at 1139, citing Nazemian,
948 F.2d at 525-526. The court held that there was no
validity of these earlier decisions inasmuch as they predate
Crawford and rely in large part on the reliability principles
that Crawford and its progeny deemed insufficiently protective
of a defendant's confrontation rights.
7
The court concluded, however, that it was not "plain"
error to admit the testimony without such cross-examination
because, prior to that decision, there was no binding circuit
precedent or "Supreme Court precedent clearly articulating that
the declarant of the statements testified to by the [Customs and
Border Protection] officer is the language interpreter." United
States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013).
16
confrontation clause issue because the analysis was the same for
hearsay and confrontation clause purposes. Orm Hieng, supra at
1140-1141.
We have not previously considered whether, for the purposes
of the confrontation clause, an interpreter is the "declarant,"
in which case the defendant would be entitled to the right of
confrontation, unless the witness is unavailable and the
defendant has had an opportunity for cross-examination.
Although the issue is significant for the development of our
criminal and constitutional jurisprudence, we decline to wade
into this thicket of unsettled constitutional principles where,
at least as concerns the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
not yet provided guidance, and where, in any event, it is
unnecessary to do so because we can decide the issue in this
case on State constitutional grounds. See Commonwealth v.
Raposo, 453 Mass. 739, 743 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v.
Paasche, 391 Mass. 18, 21 (1984) ("We do not decide
constitutional questions unless they must necessarily be
reached").
We are content to bypass the issue in this case because,
even if the defendant's confrontation rights attached to the
statements of the interpreter offered at trial, she has not
demonstrated a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Moreover, the procedure we announce infra, requiring, when
17
practicable, the recording of a defendant's statement for which
an interpreter is employed, would satisfy future concerns about
reliability, such as those asserted by the defendant in this
appeal.
Here, the defendant's statements to the police as reported
by the interpreter were not inculpatory on the central issue at
trial: impairment. The officer testified to the English-
language version of the following statements made by the
defendant through the interpreter: (1) her nodding or saying
"Yes," in response to questions regarding whether the defendant
understood her rights, consented to the breathalyzer test, and
understood the instructions for taking the test; and (2) that
the defendant "was at a friend's house, her friend was
intoxicated so she decided to take the friend's car and drive
herself home. She felt it was the right thing to do."8 The
defendant's explanation about why she was driving is not
relevant to the issue of impairment, nor is the verbal
acknowledgement that she understood her rights or consented to
take the breathalyzer test. The defendant's affirmative
response to whether she understood the instructions regarding
8
When reviewing a challenge based on the confrontation
clause, we look to the statements made by, not the questions
posed to, the declarant. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822
n.1 (2006) ("it is in the final analysis the declarant's
statements, not the interrogator's questions, that the
Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate").
18
the breathalyzer test is potentially relevant to the impairment
issue in that, if the jury believed that the defendant
understood the instructions, they could interpret the
defendant's failure to perform the test correctly either to mean
that the defendant was too impaired to properly follow the
directions or to suggest a consciousness of guilt. In either
event, we conclude that this statement was not likely to affect
the result at trial because it was merely cumulative of properly
admitted evidence. See Commonwealth v. Salcedo, 405 Mass. 346,
350 (1989). The officer testified that the defendant
acknowledged her understanding by nodding her head up and down
after the interpreter verbally instructed her on how to perform
the test and he physically demonstrated the required actions.
3. Electronic recording of language interpreter services.
Although we reject the claim concerning the admission of the
interpreter's statements through testimony of the police
officer, it is appropriate to address the defendant's complaint
that our current procedure lacks a method for assessing the
reliability of an interpreter's translation of a defendant's
statements. We now announce a new protocol to mitigate such
concerns. Going forward, and where practicable, we expect that
all interviews and interrogations using interpreter services
19
will be recorded.9 We have long recognized that recording
interviews and interrogations enhance reliability by providing a
complete version of a defendant's statements. See Commonwealth
v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 441-442 (2004). This new
protocol fits squarely in the line of cases recognizing the
value of recordings to the fairness of criminal proceedings, but
stopping short of requiring recordings for admissibility. See
id. at 449.
This protocol should not impose undue burden on police
departments. We are advised by amicus, the Massachusetts Chief
of Police Association, Inc., that the use of telephonic language
interpreter services is a regular practice in several State
agencies. Telephonic language services rely on interpreters
located in different States and different countries, and these
interpreters may not be always be available to testify at
trial.10 These services provide police officers the ability to
9
The defendant must be advised that the conversation is
being recorded. See Commonwealth v. Boyarsky, 452 Mass. 700,
705 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. Jackson, 370 Mass. 502, 507
(1976) ("A recording that is made with the actual knowledge of
all parties is not an interception, even if they have not
affirmatively authorized or consented to it). Cf. G. L. c. 272,
§ 99 (B) (4), (C) (1) (prohibiting secret recordings). Any
statements made by a defendant after being advised of the
recording are deemed to be made with consent to the recording.
10
Several police departments, including the Stoughton
police department use LanguageLine Solutions. LanguageLine
Solutions advertises available positions for interpreters in ten
20
communicate with speakers of many different foreign languages in
a prompt and efficient manner.11 Police departments record
interviews regularly at station houses and, as here, the use of
these services often takes place at the station. In those
circumstances, all that would be required is for police to
conduct the speakerphone translation in a room equipped for
recording and to engage the recording equipment. Thus, it will
be the rare case where the police will be unable to record the
interview.
The implementation of this protocol will provide
significantly enhanced protections and assurances of reliability
for defendants who speak through an interpreter. Reliability is
an essential factor of due process to the defendant. See
Commonwealth v. Camblin, 471 Mass. 639, 648-649 (2015), quoting
Commonwealth v. Given, 441 Mass. 741, 747 n.9, cert. denied, 543
U.S. 948 (2004) ("due process demands that evidence be reliable
in substance"). A recording allows defendants and judges to
independently evaluate accuracy, and thus, the reliability of
countries. See LanguageLine Solutions, Interpreter Careers,
https://www.languageline.com/careers/interpreters-overview
[https://perma.cc/G8G4-QUUJ].
11
LanguageLine advertises that it employs "professional
interpreters fluent in 240+ languages" and can connect a
telephone caller "within seconds," any time of any day, to an
interpreter. See LanguageLine Solutions, Phone Interpreting,
https://www.languageline.com/interpreting/phone
[https://perma.cc/R73E-QYLK].
21
interpreter services. See Commonwealth v. Portillo, 462 Mass.
324, 332 (2012). That reliability is further enhanced by
application of the rule in Portillo, supra, requiring the
Commonwealth to provide the defendant with a translated
transcript of a recording containing foreign-language statements
that it intends to use as evidence.
Additionally, this protocol will provide a method to
determine whether the confrontation clause applies at all.
"Crawford 'does not bar the use of testimonial statements for
purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
asserted.'" Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 590,
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 166 (2013), quoting Williams v.
Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2235 (2012). If we had not concluded
that the interpreter was acting as the defendant's agent for
hearsay analysis, we would have reviewed the purpose for which
the statements were offered as part of our determination as to
whether the testimony violated the hearsay rules or
confrontation clause. See Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458
Mass. 827, 854 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass.
53, 65 n.12, (2009) (confrontation clause and hearsay analysis
depends on whether statement is "offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted"). Here, the Commonwealth introduced the
officer's testimony of those statements, as translated by the
interpreter, for their truth. Indeed, the relevancy of the
22
officer's testimony in this regard was dependent upon the jury
accepting the accuracy of the translation. See generally
Commonwealth v. Jones, 472 Mass. 707, 714 (2015) (reviewing
relevancy of out-of-court statements). If, however, the
translation was not accurate, the statements would not be
introduced for their truth. Along with providing a method to
gauge reliability, a recording of the translation provides an
independent basis to evaluate the truth of the testimony for
purposes of determining the applicability of the confrontation
clause.
In this appeal, the defendant does not quarrel with the
actual translation provided by the interpreter. Rather, she
claims only that the translation may not be reliable or accurate
because of her asymmetric relationship with the police and the
prosecutor. Although the availability of a recording and a
transcript of the interview in this case would have allowed
defense counsel to address any issues with the accuracy of the
translation in advance of trial, see Portillo, supra, we discern
no basis on this record to conclude that the translation was not
reliable or accurate.
4. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant argues that
the judge erred in denying her motion for a required finding of
not guilty. We review a claim of sufficiency of the evidence
under the oft-repeated Latimore standard, viewing the evidence
23
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth
v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). "[T]he evidence and
the inferences permitted to be drawn therefrom must be 'of
sufficient force to bring minds of ordinary intelligence and
sagacity to the persuasion of [guilt] beyond a reasonable
doubt.'" Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 8 (2010), quoting
Latimore, supra at 677. It is for the jury to assess the weight
and credibility of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Forte, 469
Mass. 469, 481 (2014). There was no error.
To obtain a conviction of operating a vehicle while
intoxicated, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant (1)
physically operated a vehicle; (2) "on a public way or place to
which the public has a right of access; and (3) had a blood
alcohol content percentage of .08 or greater or was impaired by
the influence of intoxicating liquor." Zeininger, 459 Mass. at
778, citing G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1). Only the third
element is in dispute here. To establish that the defendant was
under the influence, the Commonwealth must prove a diminished
capacity to operate safely. Commonwealth v. Jewett, 471 Mass.
624, 635-636 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass.
169, 173 (1985).
The Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence of
diminished capacity. Specifically, a driver who followed the
defendant for ten to twelve minutes testified to her erratic
24
driving: swerving, straddling the solid-double center line, and
crossing the fog lines approximately twenty times. The police
officer testified to the odor of alcohol coming from the
defendant, slurred speech, unsteadiness when standing, and
glassy eyes. These characteristics are evidence supporting a
finding of impaired driving. See Jewett, 471 Mass. at 636. See
also Commonwealth v. Lavendier, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 501, 506-507
(2011) (describing "obvious signs of . . . intoxication [slurred
speech, belligerent demeanor, strong odor of alcohol, poor
balance, and glassy, bloodshot eyes]"); Commonwealth v.
Reynolds, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 218-219 (2006) (swerving in
good road conditions supports finding of diminished capacity).
Although the defendant minimizes the effect of this evidence --
asserting that she was an "inexperienced" driver, but not
impaired -- the assessment of the weight and credibility of the
evidence was properly left to the jury. Forte, 469 Mass. at
481.
5. Jury instructions. Last, the defendant challenges the
omission of certain words during three portions of the jury
instructions. Because the defendant did not object, we review
this claim to determine if it created a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice. Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 15
(1999). "Jury instructions must be construed as a whole to
prevent isolated misstatements or omissions from constituting
25
reversible error where there is little chance that the jury
would have misunderstood the correct import of the charge."
Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 445 Mass. 837, 844 (2006), citing
Commonwealth v. Owens, 414 Mass. 595, 607 (1993).
The record reflects that the judge omitted words from the
model jury instructions in three instances. First, when
instructing on the presumption of innocence, the judge should
have said, "It requires you to find the defendant not guilty
unless," but he omitted "not guilty." See Instruction 2.160 of
the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District
Court (2009). Second, when instructing on credibility of
witnesses, the judge said, "You should give the testimony of
each witness whatever degree you believe and what you judge it
is fairly entitled to receive," where the model instruction
reads, "You should give the testimony of each witness whatever
degree of belief and importance that you judge it is fairly
entitled to receive." See Instruction 2.260 of the Criminal
Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court. Last,
the judge omitted the words "a reasonable" from the following
sentence in the reasonable doubt instruction: "That is what we
mean by proof beyond a reasonable doubt." See Instruction 2.180
of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District
Court.
26
Each of these omissions is properly characterized as a
"slip of the tongue" and was not likely to mislead the jury
where the charge as a whole properly conveyed the instructions.
See Commonwealth v. Grant, 418 Mass. 76, 84 (1994).
Accordingly, the jury instructions did not create a substantial
risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Judgment affirmed.