Commonwealth v. Peterson , 476 Mass. 163 ( 2017 )

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SJC-12097
COMMONWEALTH vs. MARCUS G. PETERSON.
Suffolk. October 5, 2016. - January 3, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, &
Budd, JJ.
Controlled Substances. "School Zone" Statute. Practice,
Criminal, Dismissal.
Complaint received and sworn to in the Central Division of
the Boston Municipal Court Department on June 23, 2014.
A motion to dismiss was heard by Eleanor C. Sinnott, J.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Matthew T. Sears, Assistant District Attorney (Amanda Read
Cascione, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the
Commonwealth.
J. Scott Lauer, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for
the defendant.
GAZIANO, J. General Laws c. 94C, § 32J, the so-called
school zone statute, punishes individuals who commit certain
enumerated drug offenses within 300 feet of a school or one
2
hundred feet of a public park or playground. In 1992, we
determined that the school zone statute does not violate a
defendant's due process rights, but cautioned that "[t]here may
be extraordinary circumstances shown in some cases which would
make it unfair to find guilt under § 32J." Commonwealth v.
Alvarez, 413 Mass. 224, 228, 230 n.5 (1992). This case tests
the bounds of school zone statute liability. The issue
presented is whether the statute applies to a defendant who is
located momentarily within one hundred feet of a public park
solely because he is a passenger in a motor vehicle that is
driven on a public roadway past the park and, fortuitously,
stops at a red light. We conclude that application of G. L.
c. 94C, § 32J, to the defendant, in the particular facts and
circumstances of this case, would be overreaching. The park
zone charge, therefore, must be dismissed.
Background. The following facts are drawn from the police
report; they are uncontested for purposes of this interlocutory
appeal. On May 12, 2014, at approximately 5:45 P.M., three
police officers assigned to the Boston police department's youth
violence strike force were on patrol in the Dorchester section
of Boston in a police cruiser. Driving down Ceylon Street, they
observed a white Chevrolet Cruze automobile in front of them,
stopped at a red light at the intersection of Ceylon Street and
Columbia Road. Immediately adjacent to Ceylon Street, at that
3
intersection, is a public park called Ceylon Park. While
traveling along Ceylon Street and when stopped at the light, the
Chevrolet was within one hundred feet of the park.
There were four people in the vehicle, including the
defendant, who was the front seat passenger. The three officers
learned through their onboard computer that the vehicle's
inspection sticker had expired. When the light turned green,
the vehicle proceeded through the intersection. The officers
activated their lights and sirens and stopped the vehicle a
short distance away, at the intersection of Columbia Road and
Hamilton Street, at which point the vehicle was no longer within
one hundred feet of Ceylon Park.
When asked for his license and registration, the driver
told police that he did not have a driver's license or
registration for the vehicle. He provided a name and birth date
that the officers later discovered was false. The officers also
obtained names and dates of birth from the passengers, none of
whom was wearing a seat belt. Two of the officers returned to
the police cruiser to verify this information.
The officer who remained at the vehicle noticed the
defendant remove a clear plastic bag from his left front pants
pocket and drop it on the floorboard behind him, in front of a
female passenger's feet. The officer opened the front passenger
door to investigate, and a struggle ensued when the defendant
4
pushed him away. When they saw the door being opened, the other
officers returned from the cruiser and assisted in removing the
defendant from the vehicle. He was handcuffed and seated on the
ground, and the other occupants were ordered to get out of the
vehicle. The officers searched the vehicle and found the clear
plastic bag. It contained forty individually wrapped "bumps" of
what appeared to be "crack" cocaine, and six pills that appeared
to be a prescription drug. The officers arranged to have the
vehicle towed and conducted an inventory search prior to towing.
In a brown leather bag on the front passenger's side floorboard,
they discovered a loaded, semiautomatic handgun. After the
discovery of the weapon, the other occupants of the vehicle were
handcuffed for officer safety. The rear seat passengers were
given warnings about the seat belt violations and released, and
the driver was arrested for unlawful possession of a firearm.
The defendant was arrested and charged with a number of
firearm offenses, resisting arrest, assault and battery on a
police officer, and three narcotics offenses: possession of a
class B controlled substance, in violation of G. L. c. 94C,
§ 34; possession of a class B controlled substance with intent
to distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A; and
committing a drug offense within one hundred feet of a public
park, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. The defendant sought
to dismiss the park zone charge, arguing that G. L. c. 94C,
5
§ 32J, is unconstitutional as applied to him, and that
prosecution in these circumstances would violate his right to
due process, "given that [he] was a passenger in a vehicle
driven by another individual and his presence within [one
hundred] feet of a park zone was entirely fortuitous" and not
the sort of circumstance the Legislature intended to reach in
enacting G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. After a nonevidentiary hearing,
the judge allowed the motion for the reasons argued by the
defendant. The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal,
and we transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own
motion.
Discussion. The Legislature is vested with unquestioned
authority to define crimes and set penalties. See Commonwealth
v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 922 (1976). "The function of the
[L]egislature [in defining crimes and their punishments] is
primary, its exercises fortified by presumptions of right and
legality, and is not to be interfered with lightly, nor by any
judicial conception of their wisdom or propriety." Commonwealth
v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676, 684-685 (2013), quoting Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910). This power includes the
authority to create strict liability criminal offenses whereby
the Commonwealth is relieved of its obligation to prove an
intent to commit a crime. See Commonwealth v. Knap, 412 Mass.
712, 715 (1992).
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General Laws c. 94C, § 32J, comprises, in part, an aspect
of strict liability.1 The only proof of intent required under
§ 32J is the intent required to commit the underlying drug
offense. No additional proof of a defendant's knowledge or
intent with respect to the boundaries of a school zone is
required. See Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647, 650
(1992); Alvarez, 413 Mass. at 229. Indeed, the statute provides
explicitly that "[l]ack of knowledge of school boundaries shall
not be a defense to any person who violates the provisions of
1
General Laws c. 94C, § 32J, provides in relevant part:
"Any person who violates the provisions of [G. L.
c. 94C, §§ 32, 32A-32F, or 32I,] while in or on, or within
300 feet of the real property comprising a public or
private accredited preschool, accredited headstart
facility, elementary, vocational, or secondary school if
the violation occurs between [5 A.M.] and midnight, whether
or not in session, or within one hundred feet of a public
park or playground shall be punished by a term of
imprisonment in the state prison for not less than two and
one-half nor more than fifteen years or by imprisonment in
a jail or house of correction for not less than two nor
more than two and one-half years. No sentence imposed
under the provisions of this section shall be for less than
a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of two years. A
fine of not less than [$1,000] nor more than [$10,000] may
be imposed but not in lieu of the mandatory minimum two
year term of imprisonment as established herein. In
accordance with the provisions of [G. L. c. 279, § 8A,]
such sentence shall begin from and after the expiration of
the sentence for violation of [the predicate offense].
"Lack of knowledge of school boundaries shall not be a
defense to any person who violates the provisions of this
section."
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this section."2 G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. Thus, the penalty applies
regardless of whether a defendant intended to distribute drugs
in a particular school zone or planned to do so elsewhere, and
was present in the school zone only momentarily. See Alvarez,
supra. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 556
(2013) (school zone conviction does not require proof of "any
additional wrongdoing by the defendant; it is enough that the
drug violation occurred within a school zone, regardless whether
the defendant knew he was within a school zone"); Roucoulet,
supra at 650-651, quoting State v. Ivory, 124 N.J. 582, 593
(1991) ("one need only take out the tape measure to see if [the
school zone provision of § 32J] has been violated").
In Alvarez, 413 Mass. at 228-230, we concluded that G. L.
c. 94C, § 32J, does not violate due process of law
notwithstanding that the statute expressly "removes guilty
knowledge as to one element of the offense, namely the school
boundaries element." We noted that the Legislature has "broad
power to define and limit the mens rea element of criminal
offenses" (citation omitted), id. at 229, and permissibly did so
in drafting the school zone statute. We cautioned, however,
2
We assume for purposes of discussion, without deciding,
that this language applies to park and playground boundaries as
well as to school boundaries. Given the result we reach, we
need not resolve the defendant's alternate argument that the
statute imposes strict liability only for school zone
violations, and not for violations near parks or playgrounds.
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that "[t]here may be extraordinary circumstances shown in some
cases which would make it unfair to find guilt under [G. L.
c. 94C,] § 32J."3 Id. at 230 n.5.
At issue in this appeal is the extent of this strict
liability aspect of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. Specifically, we are
asked to determine whether the Legislature possibly could have
intended the school zone statute to apply to someone like the
defendant, who, albeit in possession of drugs with intent to
distribute, does nothing more than simply travel as a passenger
in a motor vehicle on a public roadway past a school, park, or
playground.
"Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is 'to
effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it.'"
Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014), quoting Water
Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass.
740, 744 (2010). "Ordinarily, where the language of a statute
is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative
3
In discussing a hypothetical example of an impermissible,
overbroad application, we pointed to United States v. Coates,
739 F. Supp. 146, 152-153 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In that case, a
United States District Court judge dismissed Federal school zone
charges brought against two defendants who had boarded an
underground train at Penn Station carrying a large quantity of
cocaine. Id. at 153. The defendants were within 1,000 feet of
a school located in an office complex adjoining the train
station. Id. The judge explained, "To charge a schoolyard
count in these circumstances stretches the scope of the statute
beyond logical and acceptable bounds. . . . To posit liability
under [the Federal school zone act] in these fortuitous
circumstances is simply overreaching." Id.
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intent." Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 444 (2008).
That said, we do not adhere blindly to a literal reading of a
statute if doing so would yield an "absurd" or "illogical"
result (citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Parent, 465 Mass.
395, 409-410 (2013). Commonwealth v. Rahim, 441 Mass. 273, 278
(2004). See Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass.
326, 336 (1982) ("We will not adopt a literal construction of a
statute if the consequences of such construction are absurd or
unreasonable"); 2A N.J. Singer & S. Singer, Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 46:7 (7th ed. rev. 2014) ("if the
literal text of an act is inconsistent with legislative meaning
or intent, or leads to an absurd result, a statute is construed
to agree with the legislative intention"). See also Black's Law
Dictionary 11-12 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "absurdity" as "being
grossly unreasonable" and "[a]n interpretation that would lead
to an unconscionable result, esp. one that . . . the drafters
could not have intended").
The Commonwealth argues that the phrase "within one hundred
feet of a public park or playground" must be read and applied
literally, to encompass an individual who is physically present
within one hundred feet of a park in essentially any manner, for
any reason, and for any period of time. We do not agree. A
literal application, as urged by the Commonwealth, could
sometimes "yield an absurd or unworkable result" (citation
10
omitted), Commonwealth v. Perella, 464 Mass. 274, 276 (2013), as
it does here. Under the Commonwealth's reading, for example, a
drug offender traveling on a Massachusetts highway, who sped
past a roadside public park at sixty-five miles per hour for a
matter of seconds, would be subjected to the severe statutory
penalty for a park zone violation.4
We see nothing in the history or purpose of the statute
that justifies such an extreme and excessive result. It is well
settled, through legislative history and two decades of
decisional law examining that history, that the purpose of G. L.
c. 94C, 32J, is to protect children from the harmful impact of
drug dealing. See Commonwealth v. Bell, 442 Mass. 118, 124-125
(2004) (intent of Legislature to provide drug-free school
zones). Then Governor Michael Dukakis proposed the legislation
"[in order to make] every school and surrounding community safe
from the destructive impact of drug trafficking and drug abuse."
Id., quoting Roucoulet, 413 Mass. at 651 n.7. See Bradley, 466
Mass. at 556 (when first enacted in 1989, legislative purpose of
G. L. c. 94C, 32J, was to protect school children from drug
dealers by creating drug-free school zones).
4
The fact that the defendant in this case was traveling on
a local street and not on a highway is not by itself
dispositive. The critical fact is that he was in a vehicle
being driven past the park, which stopped by happenstance at a
red light, and that this was the sole basis alleged by the
Commonwealth for his coming within the scope of the statute.
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More recently, recognizing the statute's uneven impact on
people who live in urban areas, the Legislature amended the
school zone statute to reduce the school zone radius from 1,000
feet to 300 feet, and to limit the time period in which a
violation may occur to between the hours of 5 A.M. and midnight.
See St. 2012, c. 192, §§ 30, 31. The Legislature observed that
the broader 1,000-foot radius created "an unfair disparate
impact on those residing in urban areas and, consequently, on
minority residents, and [that] the broader radius did not better
protect school children from drug dealers." Bradley, 466 Mass.
at 559. The newly created time restriction for violations, of
course, excludes hours of the day (midnight to 5 A.M.) when
there is little practical chance that children will be in or
near schools and parks.
Given the Legislature's stated reasons for enacting the
statute, we do not think the Legislature possibly intended G. L.
c. 94C, § 32J, to apply to an individual who merely passes
momentarily by a school or a park while traveling on a public
roadway in an automobile driven by another person, which would
not have stopped but for a change in a traffic signal. In these
circumstances, the defendant's physical appearance in the park
zone was by chance. There is no suggestion that he engaged,
attempted to engage, or intended to engage in any type of drug
transaction within the protected area, or had any other type of
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connection whatsoever to the protected area; and there is no
evidence that his momentary presence as he passed by the area in
these circumstances posed any real or potential risk to children
or anyone else in the park. Applying the statute literally in
these particular circumstances thus would not serve the
legitimate goals of the statute.
In sum, "[w]e do not believe the . . . Legislature intended
the [school zone] statute to apply to an individual not
apprehended within the school [or park] zone and where
uninterrupted passage in an automobile through the school [or
park] zone was fortuitous. As stated in [United States v.]
Coates, [739 F. Supp. 146, 152–153 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),] a contrary
holding would stretch the statute beyond logical and acceptable
bounds. We will not conclude the [L]egislature intended such an
unreasonable result." State v. Barnes, 275 Kan. 364, 375
(2003).
We emphasize that this ruling is limited to the specific
facts presented here and to the predicate offense of possession
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. It is not
counter to, and does not alter, our decisions in Commonwealth v.
Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647 (1992), and Commonwealth v. Alvarez,
413 Mass. 224 (1992), or the Appeals Court's decision in
Commonwealth v. Labitue, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 913 (2000). Mindful
that the "absurd results doctrine must be used sparingly,"
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2A N.J. Singer & S. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction
§ 46:7 at 279 (7th ed. rev. 2014), we hold only that the
application of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, to this defendant in the
particular facts and circumstances of this case would be
overreaching.
Order allowing motion to
dismiss affirmed.