Commonwealth v. Dorvil , 472 Mass. 1 ( 2015 )

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SJC-11738
COMMONWEALTH vs. JEAN G. DORVIL.
Plymouth. February 5, 2015. - June 25, 2015.
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly,
& Lenk, JJ.
Assault and Battery. Parent and Child, Discipline. Child
Abuse.
Complaint received and sworn to in the Brockton Division of
the District Court Department on May 16, 2011.
The case was heard by Julie J. Bernard, J.
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.
Jacob B. Stone for the defendant.
Audrey Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted
a brief.
LENK, J. We are called upon in this case, where the
defendant stands convicted of assault and battery for spanking
his minor child, to examine the contours of a parental privilege
2
defense. On appeal, the defendant contends that the use of
force to control and discipline his child in the circumstances
was justified, excusing him from liability for conduct that
otherwise would constitute a crime. Although we have on several
prior occasions assumed that such a common-law privilege exists,
we have neither expressly recognized it nor considered its
proper scope. We do so today, deeply mindful of the dual
important interests implicated in the defense: the welfare of
children requiring protection against abuse, on the one hand,
and, on the other, the avoidance of unnecessary State
interference in parental autonomy as it concerns child rearing.1
1. Background. a. Overview. After a jury-waived trial,
the defendant was convicted of assault and battery for spanking
his daughter, then almost three years old. He also was
convicted of threatening to commit a crime, based on his conduct
while he was held at the police station following his arrest.
He was acquitted of two other charges stemming from the same
series of events.
In his appeal to the Appeals Court, the defendant argued,
among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain a conviction of assault and battery in light of the
parental privilege to use force in disciplining a minor child.
1
We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee
for Public Counsel Services on behalf of the defendant.
3
The Appeals Court, in an unpublished memorandum and order issued
pursuant to its rule 1:28, determined that the defendant's
conduct fell outside of the parental privilege defense and
affirmed the defendant's convictions. See Commonwealth v.
Dorvil, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1117 (2014). We granted further
appellate review, limited to the assault and battery conviction,
to clarify the scope of the parental privilege defense. We now
reverse that conviction.2
b. Facts. We recite the facts based on the evidence
introduced at trial. We construe the evidence offered to
support the defendant's conviction of assault and battery in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v.
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). We note conflicting
testimony where relevant in light of the defendant's acquittal
of certain charges.
The Brockton police station sits across the street from the
Brockton Area Transit bus terminal. At shortly before 4 P.M. on
May 13, 2011, Detective Ernest S. Bell of the Brockton police
department was arriving at the police station at the end of his
eight-hour shift; at the same time, Lieutenant Mark Porcaro was
arriving to begin his eight-hour shift. Both officers observed
2
As stated in the Appeals Court's memorandum and order, the
judgment on the count of the complaint charging threatening to
commit a crime is affirmed.
4
a commotion at the bus terminal, although their accounts of the
incident at trial differ somewhat.
Bell testified that he observed the defendant yelling,
"[S]hut up, shut up," at a young child and a woman while walking
on the sidewalk near the bus station. Bell then saw the
defendant kick the child in the backside. He described the kick
as "kind of like a football kick," and indicated that the
defendant was wearing sneakers at the time. The defendant then
shouted, "[S]hut up," again before bending over and "smack[ing]
the child on the buttocks." Right after the kick and the smack,
Bell observed the woman bend down and pick up the child; Bell
testified that he regarded this as an effort "to shield" the
child from the defendant. Throughout the incident, according to
Bell, the defendant appeared "very upset" and "angry," and he
was shouting sufficiently loudly to be audible at the police
station, approximately thirty-five yards away. Bell indicated
that the child was crying and "looked frightened."
Porcaro also observed the defendant yelling at the woman
and child, and saw the defendant kick the child. Porcaro,
however, testified that the kick "wasn't like a full blown,
swift kick"; instead, he said, "it was . . . slow and there was
almost like a hesitation to it, but he eventually came . . . up
and made contact with the girl." Additionally, although the
police report that Porcaro completed following the arrest
5
indicated that he saw the defendant hit the child, he testified
at trial that he did not have any memory of the child being hit.
The police officers approached the trio and separated the
defendant from the woman and the child. The defendant, the
child's father, denied kicking the child, instead saying that he
was "just playing around with her." With respect to the
spanking, the defendant indicated that he was "disciplining his
child." The child's mother, Crystal Steele, likewise stated
that the defendant and the child were "horseplaying," but that
the defendant then became upset when the child was disobedient.
The defendant was arrested, brought to the police station
for booking, and placed in a holding cell. Six hours later, at
approximately 10 P.M. that evening, Porcaro had another
encounter with the defendant; their accounts of the encounter
again differ. Porcaro testified that, while he was
administering to a prisoner with a medical emergency in a nearby
holding cell, the defendant began talking, yelling at him and
another officer, and spitting on the plexiglass. According to
Porcaro, the defendant claimed that Porcaro was "lying about
seeing him kick the girl," called Porcaro various insulting
names, and indicated that "he wanted to box" Porcaro.
The defendant testified in his own defense at trial, along
with Steele. The defendant denied calling Porcaro names, and
denied yelling or spitting at the officers. The defendant did
6
testify, however, that he told Porcaro, "[I]f you know where
there's a ring around here, . . . we can go box it out." The
defendant insisted that this was not meant as a threat.
As to the initial incident at the bus terminal, the
defendant and Steele offered accounts at trial that were
essentially similar to one another and to the accounts that they
gave to the police officers at the scene. The defendant stated
that, after the trio got off the bus, he was playing a game
where he chased his daughter and lifted her up with his legs,
"like [he] was playing soccer." He continued in that manner for
a period, chasing his daughter and yelling loudly at her. He
indicated that at the time she was "happy," explaining, "[S]he
likes when I play like that with her."
The defendant then told his daughter to go to her mother.
She responded, "[N]o," telling him, "[Y]ou go to your mother."
He chastised her for talking back to him. He cautioned that he
would spank her if she continued talking back, saying, "[D]addy
will pow pow, if you don't stop." He then "tapped her" on "her
butt" in an effort to make her "calm down." The defendant
testified that the child never fell down or began crying, either
when they were playing or when he spanked her. He also denied
ever telling his daughter to "shut up."
Steele similarly testified that, after the defendant and
the child got off the bus, they were "playing . . . very
7
loudly," and that she had seen the defendant and their daughter
"play together in a similar manner in the past." The defendant
then told the child to go to her mother; Steele explained that
the child "was running around," and speculated that the
defendant "didn't want her to run into . . . the street or
anything." The defendant then told his daughter, "[W]e're not
playing anymore," and "gave her a little tap on her behind."
Steele indicated that the child was not crying and did not
appear fearful when she picked up the child after the spanking.
c. Proceedings. The defendant was charged with assault
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (a shod foot), based
on the kick; assault and battery, based on the spanking; and
witness intimidation and threatening to commit a crime, based on
the defendant's statements indicating his desire to "box"
Porcaro at the police station. Defense counsel argued in
closing that there had been no kick, and, as the defendant and
Steele testified, the defendant simply had been playing with the
child. As to the second count, counsel conceded that the "pat
on the butt" did occur, but asserted that the pat was
permissible because the defendant had "a right to use reasonable
force in disciplining [his] child." As to the third and fourth
counts, counsel argued that there was no evidence that the
defendant "had a specific intent to try to influence the outcome
of an investigation or a criminal action or prosecution," and
8
that the evidence failed to show that the defendant "intended to
harm and place . . . Porcaro in fear."
After closing arguments, the judge denied the defendant's
renewed motion for a required finding of not guilty. The judge
found the defendant guilty of assault and battery and
threatening to commit a crime, and not guilty of assault and
battery by means of a dangerous weapon and witness intimidation.
The judge issued no written findings of fact or conclusions of
law. Her remarks at sentencing, however, provide some
indication of her thinking.
The judge acknowledged that "it's not easy being a parent."
She indicated that the defendant had not been convicted for the
kick, noting that, in light of the inconsistency between the
police officers' testimony, the defendant "could've been playing
around with [his] daughter." The judge explained her decision
to convict the defendant of assault and battery, however, by
observing that, while she did not "think [the defendant]
intended to kick [his] daughter, . . . [he] did hit her." In
apparent response to the defendant's argument that the spanking
was permissible in light of his parental privilege to use
reasonable force in disciplining the child, the judge concluded
that, "[i]f you're in public with your kids, it's not
appropriate to discipline in this fashion."
The defendant appealed. He challenged the sufficiency of
9
the evidence to support each conviction, argued in particular
that the evidence to support the conviction of assault and
battery was insufficient in light of the parental privilege
defense, and contended that certain statements in the
Commonwealth's closing argument were not supported by the
evidence. The Appeals Court affirmed. With respect to the
assault and battery conviction, the Appeals Court acknowledged
that it previously had held that a parent may use reasonable
force to discipline his or her minor child. The court
determined, however, that the evidence indicated that the child
lacked the capacity to understand the discipline, and that the
"defendant spanked his child when he was upset and angry and not
in a calm and controlled manner, as required for parental
discipline to fall within the reasonable force defense." We
granted further appellate review, limited to the question of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction of assault
and battery.
2. Discussion. "The punishments for the crimes of assault
and assault and battery . . . are established by statute, but
the elements necessary to convict a person of these crimes are
determined by the common law." Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass.
526, 529 (2010). "An assault and battery is the intentional and
unjustified use of force upon the person of another, however
slight . . . ." Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 203
10
(1931). In accordance with the crime's common-law character, we
have turned to the common law to articulate defenses to a charge
of assault and battery, such as the justification of self-
defense, see Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 367 Mass. 508, 511 (1975),
or defense of another, see Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass.
640, 646-647 (1976).
This court has not expressly recognized a parental
privilege defense to use force in disciplining a child, nor have
we articulated the scope of any such privilege. We have,
however, alluded to the privilege on several occasions. See
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 445 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2005), cert.
denied, 548 U.S. 924 (2006) (observing that court has "not
addressed the issue [of the parental privilege defense] one way
or the other," and determining that defendant's request for jury
instruction on that defense "[would] be best addressed on
remand"); Commonwealth v. Torres, 442 Mass. 554, 568 n.11 (2004)
(rejecting defendant's contention that trial judge erred in
failing to give instruction regarding parental privilege
defense; "[o]n any view of the evidence, [the] frequent beating
of . . . very young children . . . would not come within that
privilege"); Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 664, 667,
669 (1990) (where defendant was convicted of assault and battery
on fourteen year old daughter of his girl friend, observing that
"[n]o Massachusetts decision or statute grants parents or others
11
a right to use reasonable force in disciplining a child," and
concluding that defendant could not avail himself of such
privilege in any event because he did not stand "in loco
parentis to the victim"); Commonwealth v. Coffey, 121 Mass. 66,
68-69 (1876) (noting defense of "father's parental right and
authority," but concluding that evidence supported jury's
finding that force used was "excessive and unjustifiable," or
that "acts were not done in the exercise or support of the
rightful authority of the father, but in the execution of a
scheme of" another).
The Appeals Court, by contrast, has expressly recognized a
parental privilege defense, although the court confronted the
issue in an ancillary context, and its treatment of the
privilege was consequently not exhaustive. In Commonwealth v.
Rubeck, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 396, 396-397 (2005), the defendant was
convicted of assault and battery for her conduct towards her two
year old son in the waiting room of a medical center. The
defendant argued that her attorney had provided ineffective
assistance in failing to request a jury instruction stating that
a "parent, or one acting in the position of a parent and who has
assumed the responsibilities of a parent, may use reasonable
force to discipline (his/her) minor child. However, a parent
may not use excessive force as a means of discipline or
chastisement." Id. at 399-400, quoting Massachusetts Superior
12
Court Criminal Practice Jury Instructions § 3.15 (Mass. Cont.
Legal Educ. 1st Supp. 2003). The Appeals Court concluded that
"the instruction was warranted," although the court affirmed the
defendant's conviction because it determined that the omission
of the jury instruction did not produce a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice. Commonwealth v. Rubeck, supra at 400-
401.
Despite the lack of express recognition by this court, a
privilege to use reasonable force in disciplining a minor child
has long been recognized at common law. Blackstone, for
instance, remarked that "battery is, in some cases, justifiable,
or lawful; as where one who hath authority, a parent or a
master, gives moderate correction to his child, his scholar, or
his apprentice." 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *120. A mid-
Nineteenth Century commentator similarly observed that parents
have a duty "to maintain and educate their children," and
possess the concomitant "right to the exercise of such
discipline as may be requisite for the discharge of their sacred
trust." J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 203 (O.W. Holmes,
Jr., ed., 12th ed. 1873).
In a number of States, the parental privilege defense has
been codified by statute; in others, it remains a common-law
doctrine. See Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental
Corporal Punishment Defense -- Reasonable and Necessary, or
13
Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 413, 440-446 (Johnson). In
either instance, "[a]ll American jurisdictions allow parents to
use at least moderate or reasonable physical force when they
reasonably believe that such force is necessary to control their
children." State v. Wilder, 748 A.2d 444, 455 (Me. 2000).
Neither the Commonwealth nor the Committee for Public Counsel
Services, appearing before the court in this case as amicus
curiae, has argued that the court should not recognize a
parental privilege defense at all.
The widespread recognition of a parental privilege defense
accords with important constitutional values. The United States
Supreme Court has long held that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
"the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control." Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925). See Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). Indeed, "the interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by [the United States Supreme] Court."
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion).
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (recognizing
"[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the
care, custody, and management of their child"); Quilloin v.
14
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (observing, "[w]e have
recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between
parent and child is constitutionally protected"); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (indicating, "[i]t is plain
that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children 'come[s] to this
Court with a momentum for respect' . . ." [citation omitted]).
The use of moderate corporal punishment to discipline one's
children is viewed by many in our country as an integral aspect
of parental autonomy that furthers the welfare of those
children. Indeed, while surveys suggest that support for
corporal punishment has declined in the United States over the
past one-half century, substantial majorities of parents
continue to say that spanking is sometimes necessary to
discipline children. See Hanes, To Spank or Not to Spank,
Corporal Punishment in the U.S., Christian Sci. Monitor (Oct.
19, 2014); Reeves & Cuddy, Hitting Kids: American Parenting and
Physical Punishment, Brookings Inst. Long Memos No. 4 (Nov. 6,
2014), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-
memos/posts/2014/11/06-parenting-hitting-mobility-reeves
[http://perma.cc/2H8A-W6JX]. Of course, others "believe that
parents should not use physical force to control their
children"; indeed, "[a]t least nine countries ban corporal
punishment of children." State v. Wilder, 748 A.2d at 457 n.13.
15
Notwithstanding these contrary views and disputes as to the
efficacy of such parenting techniques, the long-standing and
widespread acceptance of such punishment remains firmly woven
into our nation's social fabric. It follows that we must guard
against the imposition of criminal sanctions for the use of
parenting techniques still widely regarded as permissible and
warranted.
The parental right to direct the care and upbringing of
children, however, is far from absolute. Although a "child is
not the mere creature of the [S]tate," Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. at 535, our law has long rejected "the notion
that children [are] the property of their parents." Custody of
Kali, 439 Mass. 834, 840 (2003). Accordingly, this court has
recognized that a parent's right to direct the care and
upbringing of minor children may be limited in light of the
State's "compelling interest [in] protect[ing] children from
actual or potential harm." Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 656
(2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003). This interest is
particularly powerful in the context of corporal punishment,
given the risk that the parental privilege defense will be used
as a cover for instances of child abuse.
In the absence of legislation delineating the scope of the
parental privilege defense, therefore, we must articulate a
framework that respects a parent's primary responsibility to
16
direct the care and upbringing of a child, while protecting the
child against abuse and endangerment. Otherwise put, the
parental privilege defense must strike a balance between
protecting children from punishment that is excessive in nature,
while at the same time permitting parents to use limited
physical force in disciplining their children without incurring
criminal sanction. A survey of other jurisdictions'
articulations of the parental privilege defense reveals three
types of approaches to this balance. See Johnson, supra at 440-
446. The first type of approach requires that the force "be
judged by an objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 442,
and typically provides that a "parent is privileged to apply
such reasonable force . . . as he [or she] reasonably believes
to be necessary for [the child's] proper control, training, or
education." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 147 (1965).3 The
3
For examples of this approach, see Ala. Code. § 13A-3-24
(permitting "reasonable and appropriate physical force"); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 13-403(1) (same); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-605 (same);
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-703 (same); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-18
(permitting "reasonable physical force"); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-
20 (permitting "the reasonable discipline of a minor by his
parent or a person in loco parentis"); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
14:18(4) (permitting "reasonable discipline of minors by their
parents, tutors or teachers"); Mich. Comp. Laws. § 750.136b(9)
(in child abuse statute, providing that "[t]his section does not
prohibit a parent or guardian, or other person permitted by law
or authorized by the parent or guardian, from taking steps to
reasonably discipline a child, including the use of reasonable
force"); Minn. Stat. § 609.06 (permitting "reasonable force");
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-107 (permitting "the use of force that is
reasonable and necessary to restrain or correct the person's
17
child, ward, apprentice, or pupil"); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 643(permitting parental "use of force or violence" provided it "is
reasonable in manner and moderate in degree"); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 161.205 (permitting "reasonable physical force . . . to the
extent the person reasonably believes it necessary to maintain
discipline or to promote the welfare of the minor or incompetent
person"); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-18-5 (permitting force
provided it is "reasonable in manner and moderate in degree").
See also Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233, 1241 (D.C. 2002)
(recognizing "parent's privilege to use reasonable force to
discipline her minor child without being subjected to criminal
liability"); Raford v. State, 828 So. 2d 1012, 1020 (Fla. 2002)
("a parent may assert as an affirmative defense his or her
parental right to administer 'reasonable' or 'nonexcessive'
corporal punishment"); People v. Ball, 58 Ill. 2d 36, 40 (1974)
(determining that use of force by parents and teachers is to be
analyzed under "a reasonableness standard"); Willis v. State,
888 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ind. 2008) ("A parent is privileged to
apply such reasonable force . . . upon his [or her] child as he
[or she] reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper
control, training, or education" [citation omitted]); State v.
Arnold, 543 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Iowa 1996) (holding that "parents
have a right to inflict corporal punishment on their child, but
that right is restricted by moderation and reasonableness");
Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 126 (1978) (adopting "well-
recognized precept of Anglo-American jurisprudence that the
parent of a minor child or one standing in Loco parentis was
justified in using a reasonable amount of force upon a child for
the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the child's welfare");
State v. Suchomski, 58 Ohio St. 3d 74, 75 (1991) (holding that
"[a] child does not have any legally protected interest which is
invaded by proper and reasonable parental discipline"); Newman
v. State, 298 P.3d 1171, 1179 (Nev. 2013) ("The parental
privilege defense comes down to punishment -- was it cruel or
abusive -- or did it amount to a parent's use of reasonable and
moderate force to correct his child?" [citations, quotations,
and alterations omitted]); State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785, 788
(R.I. 1981) (recognizing that "a parent has a right to use
reasonable and timely punishment as may be necessary to correct
faults in his/her growing children"); Harbaugh v. Commonwealth,
209 Va. 695, 697-698 (1969) (holding that "parents or persons
standing in loco parentis may administer such reasonable and
timely punishment as may be necessary to correct faults in a
growing child"); Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 270 (Wyo. 1985)
(recognizing parental privilege defense where "a parent in
punishing his children . . . act[s] in good faith with parental
18
second type of approach omits the reasonableness requirement,
instead granting a general privilege to use force while defining
specific types of force as impermissible. Johnson, supra at
442-443.4
Finally, some jurisdictions employ a third approach that
combines features of the first two. See Johnson, supra at 443-
444. These jurisdictions follow the first approach in requiring
that the force used be objectively reasonable, while following
the second in identifying certain types of force as invariably
unreasonable. Some jurisdictions adopting this approach only
identify "deadly force" as inherently unreasonable.5 Others,
borrowing from the Model Penal Code, specifically prohibit force
that "create[s] a substantial risk of death, serious bodily
affection, [does] not exceed the bounds of moderation, and [is]
not . . . cruel or merciless" [citation omitted]).
4
See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 503.110 (exempting force
"designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk of
causing death, serious physical injury, disfigurement, extreme
pain, or extreme mental distress"); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1413(exempting force "designed to cause or known to create a
substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily harm,
disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress, or gross
degradation"); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:3-8 (exempting "[d]eadly
force"); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 509 (exempting force "designed to
cause or known to create a substantial risk of causing death,
serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental
distress or gross degradation").
5
See Alaska Stat. § 11.81.430; N.Y. Penal Law § 35.10; Tex.
Penal Code § 9.61.
19
injury, disfigurement, or gross degradation."6 Still others
provide an extensive list of impermissible forms of corporal
punishment,7 or provide that "the physical force applied to the
child may result in no more than transient discomfort or minor
temporary marks on that child."8
We conclude that a combined approach best balances the
6
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-05. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11
§ 468; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.061 (exempting force "designed to
cause or believed to create a substantial risk of causing death,
serious physical injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or extreme
emotional distress"); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:6 (excluding
"the malicious or reckless use of force that creates a risk of
death, serious bodily injury, or substantial pain"); Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-401 (prohibiting the parental privilege defense "if
the offense charged involves causing serious bodily
injury, . . . serious physical injury, . . . or the death of the
minor"); Wis. Stat. § 939.45 (exempting "force which is intended
to cause great bodily harm or death or creates an unreasonable
risk of great bodily harm or death"). See also Model Penal Code
§ 3.08.
7
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 468 (specifically
prohibiting "[t]hrowing the child, kicking, burning, cutting,
striking with a closed fist, interfering with breathing, use of
or threatened use of a deadly weapon, prolonged deprivation of
sustenance or medication"; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 703-309(prohibiting "throwing, kicking, burning, biting, cutting,
striking with a closed fist, shaking a minor under three years
of age, interfering with breathing, or threatening with a deadly
weapon"); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.100 (permitting force "when it
is reasonable and moderate," while identifying certain forms of
force as "presumed unreasonable . . . : (1) Throwing, kicking,
burning, or cutting a child; (2) striking a child with a closed
fist; (3) shaking a child under age three; (4) interfering with
a child's breathing; (5) threatening a child with a deadly
weapon; or (6) doing any other act that is likely to cause and
which does cause bodily harm greater than transient pain or
minor temporary marks").
8
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 106. See Wash. Rev. Code
§ 9A.16.100.
20
parental right to direct the care and upbringing of a child with
the Commonwealth's interest in protecting children from abuse.
Accordingly, we hold that a parent or guardian may not be
subjected to criminal liability for the use of force against a
minor child under the care and supervision of the parent or
guardian, provided that (1) the force used against the minor
child is reasonable; (2) the force is reasonably related to the
purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor,
including the prevention or punishment of the minor's
misconduct; and (3) the force used neither causes, nor creates a
substantial risk of causing, physical harm (beyond fleeting pain
or minor, transient marks), gross degradation, or severe mental
distress. By requiring that the force be reasonable and
reasonably related to a legitimate purpose, this approach
effectively balances respect for parental decisions regarding
the care and upbringing of minor children with the
Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting children
against abuse. By additionally specifying certain types of
force that are invariably unreasonable, this approach clarifies
the meaning of the reasonableness standard and provides guidance
to courts and parents.
In applying the framework, each of the three prongs
constitutes a question for the trier of fact. In evaluating the
reasonableness of the force used, and of the relation of that
21
force to a permissible parental purpose (the first two prongs of
the test), the trier of fact may consider, among other factors,
the child's "age, the "physical and mental condition of the
child," and "the nature of [the child's] offense." See
Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra at § 150. In evaluating
the third of the three, the trier of fact must decide whether
the force used or the risk of injury it created was, in context,
sufficiently "extreme" as to be inherently impermissible. See
Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 3.08 commentary, at 140
(1985). As with other affirmative defenses, where the parental
privilege defense is properly before the trier of fact, the
Commonwealth bears the burden of disproving at least one prong
of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Commonwealth v.
Glacken, 451 Mass. 163, 167 (2008); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez,
370 Mass. 684, 687-688 (1976); Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177,
182 (Ind. 2008).
Having articulated this framework, we conclude that the
evidence adduced at the defendant's trial was insufficient to
sustain a conviction of assault and battery. Bell testified
that he witnessed the defendant "smack[]" the child once on her
clothed bottom. The defendant and the child's mother testified
that he administered the spanking because the child disobeyed
his direction to go to her mother, and continued playing on the
sidewalk near the street. The Commonwealth offered no evidence
22
that this "smack" resulted in any injury to the child. Under
these circumstances, the Commonwealth failed to offer evidence
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant's use of force was unreasonable or not reasonably
related to a permissible parental purpose.
The Commonwealth offers two arguments in support of the
contrary conclusion. First, the Commonwealth asserts that the
judge could have found "that the defendant in his angry state
was not disciplining the child at all, but struck her out of
anger and frustration." That remark finds support in
Commonwealth v. Rubeck, 64 Mass. App. Ct. at 400-401, where the
Appeals Court, in affirming the defendant's conviction of
assault and battery on her two year old son, observed that
"there was evidence that [the defendant] did not use reasonable
force in a calm, nonviolent and controlled manner to train or
educate her two year old child, but rather that she screamed,
yelled and used unreasonable force, that she was frustrated and
out of control, and that the use of force escalated and
continued as [the defendant] grew more angry and frustrated."
It is true that certain older decisions from other
jurisdictions granted wide leeway to parental authority, so long
as parents did not act with "malice." See, e.g., State v.
Jones, 95 N.C. 588, 592 (1886) ("The test, then, of criminal
responsibility is the infliction of permanent injury by means of
23
the administered punishment, or that it proceeded from malice,
and was not in the exercise of a corrective authority"). See
also Johnson, supra at 435. The view under which the
availability of the parental privilege defense hinges on a
parent's subjective state, however, finds scant support in
modern law, and we reject it. Model Penal Code and Commentaries
§ 3.08 commentary, at 140 ("Older decisions tended to treat the
motive of the actors as decisive . . . . Modern authority has
tended towards a more objective test of moderation").
As a means of balancing parents' right to direct the
upbringing of their children against the State's compelling
interest in protecting children from abuse, a focus on a
parent's emotional state is at once over- and underinclusive.
It is understandable that parents would be angry at a child
whose misbehavior necessitates punishment, and we see no reason
why such anger should render otherwise reasonable uses of force
impermissible. Conversely, we see no reason why the
Commonwealth should be barred from protecting children against
unreasonable methods of discipline -- methods that, for
instance, threaten serious physical or emotional injury --
simply because it lacks evidence that a parent acted from anger.
As the facts of this case aptly demonstrate, moreover,
interactions between parents and children may appear ambiguous
to outside observers and are susceptible to misinterpretation,
24
leading to significant difficulties of proof at trial and
heightened risk of wrongful convictions.
Second, the Commonwealth notes that the child at issue here
was two years old at the time of the spanking, and cites dicta
from Commonwealth v. Rubeck, 64 Mass. App. Ct. at 400,
indicating that "physical chastisement for preservation of
discipline might never be justified in the case of a child of
two years." While we agree that a child's age is one among a
number of factors to be considered in assessing the
reasonableness of corporal punishment, we reject a bright-line
cutoff age below which any corporal punishment is impermissible.
The child here was approximately one and one-half months away
from her third birthday at the time of the incident. According
to her mother's uncontroverted testimony, she spoke "very well,"
communicated "in full sentences," and was "very advanced for her
age." Indeed, her response to her father's direction that she
go to her mother -- "[N]o, you go to your mother" -- evinces a
well-developed verbal acuity. According to the defendant's
testimony, moreover, he warned the child of the impending
punishment before administering it, stating that "daddy will pow
pow, if you don't stop." Under these circumstances, the
Commonwealth failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove that
the defendant's use of force was impermissible because the child
lacked the capacity to understand or appreciate the reason for
25
the punishment. Accordingly, we reverse the defendant's
conviction of assault and battery.
3. Conclusion. We recognize that the balance we strike
with the parental privilege defense may well be imperfect and
that absolute equipoise between the goals of protecting the
welfare of children and safeguarding the legitimate exercise of
parental autonomy is likely unattainable. To the extent that
that is so, the balance will tip in favor of the protection of
children from abuse inflicted in the guise of discipline.
Judgment reversed.