Cohen v. Cohen ( 2015 )

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision
and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the
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SJC-11594
M. DAVID COHEN vs. SHELLEY COHEN.
Middlesex. October 9, 2014. - February 23, 2015.
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, &
Hines, JJ.
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. Contempt. Divorce and
Separation, Foreign judgment, Child support, Attorney's fees.
Probate Court, Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, Child support,
Probate Court. Parent and Child, Child support.
Registration for enforcement of a foreign order of support filed
in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department
on March 31, 2004.
A complaint for contempt was heard by Randy J. Kaplan, J.
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court
granted leave to obtain further appellate review.
Anna S. Richardson for the father.
DUFFLY, J. This case requires that we resolve the extent to
which the Probate and Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction
to enforce or modify a support order issued by a California court
in connection with proceedings dissolving the marriage of M. David
2
Cohen (father) and Shelley Cohen (mother). After the parties
separated in 1999, a Los Angeles County Superior Court entered a
judgment establishing monthly child and spousal support payments
payable by the father to the mother. The father moved to
Massachusetts in 2002. In 2004, the California support order was
registered in the Probate and Family Court, upon request of the Los
Angeles County Department of Child Services (California CSSD).
Pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), which
has been adopted by both California and Massachusetts, Massachusetts
courts thus acquired jurisdiction to enforce the support order. See
Cal. Fam. Code, §§ 4900, 4950, 4951 (West 2013); G. L. c. 209D,
§§ 6-601, 6-602. The child support division of the Massachusetts
Department of Revenue (DOR), acting on behalf of the mother,
initiated contempt proceedings against the father in the Probate and
Family Court, and a Probate and Family Court judge subsequently
issued multiple orders that sought to enforce the California support
order. The orders incorporated the parties' stipulated agreements,
which, inter alia, obligated the father to pay the child's uninsured
medical expenses and to contribute to her college education costs;
neither of these items had been included in the order of the
California court. In 2010, a Probate and Family Court judge found
the father in contempt for having failed to make payments in the
amounts agreed toward support arrears, to pay the agreed share of
3
the child's college costs and her uninsured medical expenses, and
to pay previously-awarded attorney's fees and costs incurred by the
mother in seeking enforcement. The father challenges the
jurisdiction of the court to enter this judgment.
We conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, the
jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court was limited to
enforcement of the California support order, and that the parties'
stipulated agreements did not extend the jurisdiction of the Probate
and Family Court to modify the California support order. To the
extent the Probate and Family Court orders modify the California
support order, they are therefore void, and the court accordingly
had no authority to enforce these orders or to find the father in
contempt for failing to comply with them. The Probate and Family
Court nonetheless retained jurisdiction to continue to enforce the
California child support and spousal support order, at least until
the father returned to live in California and California resumed
enforcement. The Probate and Family Court judge therefore had
authority to hold the father in contempt for failing to comply with
orders that he pay the mother's attorney's fees and costs incurred
in connection with enforcement of the California order.
Background and prior proceedings. 1. California
proceedings. The father and the mother lived in Los Angeles with
their daughter. After a lengthy marriage, the parties separated in
4
1999, and a Los Angeles County Superior Court ordered the father to
pay the mother monthly payments for child and spousal support.1 The
father relocated to the Boston area in January, 2002, while the mother
and child remained in California. Arrearages accumulated, and, in
February, 2003, the California CSSD transmitted to the child support
enforcement division of the DOR the first of two requests for
registration of the California support order. This transmittal
sought enforcement in Massachusetts through income withholding,
pursuant to G. L. c. 209D, § 6-602 (a).2 In June, 2003, a "judgment
of dissolution of marriage" entered in the Los Angeles County
Superior Court that increased the father's monthly child support
obligation to $1,035, and his spousal support to $600; the judgment
also reserved jurisdiction over arrearages.
In March, 2004, on request of the California CSSD, the 2003
California support order was registered in the Probate and Family
Court, giving the Massachusetts court authority to enforce the
1
The order obligated David Cohen (father) to pay monthly to
Shelley Cohen (mother) $178 in child support, $280 for the child's
special education therapy, and $477 in spousal support.
2
The record does not indicate whether the father's wages were
attached. The record on appeal includes a copy of an "audit" created
by the Los Angeles County Department of Child Services (California
CSSD), setting forth the monthly support obligation and the amounts
paid toward that obligation. This document reflects that no
payments for child support or spousal support were made for the period
from February, 2001, through July, 2004, and that payments were made
only sporadically prior to and after that period.
5
California support order. See G. L. c. 209D, §§ 6-601 to 6-603. The
child support enforcement transmittal document stated that
registration was "for enforcement only" and for "collection of
arrears."
2. Massachusetts proceedings. On March 31, 2004, the DOR
initiated contempt proceedings on behalf of the mother against the
father in the Probate and Family Court. Each represented by counsel,
the parties reached an agreement and, in June, 2005, a Probate and
Family Court judge issued a stipulated order reflecting that
agreement. The stipulated order required the father to make a lump
sum payment and further weekly payments to reduce all spousal and
child support arrears; to pay one-third of the child's college costs;
and to pay the mother's attorney's fees.3 The stipulation included
the father's "acknowledge[ment] that he is earning less than he is
capable [of] and will forthwith commence a job search to obtain
employment commensurate with his education and experience."
In October, 2006, the mother filed another complaint for
contempt.4 In December, 2006, the father was found in contempt for,
3
The record does not indicate the method used to determine the
amount in arrears, but the amount appears to include arrears
accumulated after the father relocated to Massachusetts.
4
According to the Probate and Family Court docket sheet, the
mother also had filed a complaint for contempt in September, 2005;
the parties entered into stipulations on that complaint in November
and December, 2005; and a judgment of contempt entered in April, 2006.
6
among other things, his failure to pay his agreed contribution to
the child's college expenses and uninsured medical expenses.5
Another order issued in May, 2007, incorporating a four-page written
stipulation of the parties. In that stipulation, the father agreed
that he was guilty of contempt for having failed to pay "child
support." The order required, among other things, that the father
"continue to pay $150 per week toward the child support arrears,"
and that he reimburse the mother for attorney's fees and costs,
"including travel incurred as a result of the hearing" that day.6 The
written stipulation provided that the father would "focus his efforts
on his new employment," and resign from involvement in all but one
specific nonprofit organization.
In February, 2009, the DOR informed the father that the
Copies of these documents are not included in the record submitted
by the father, and the mother neither submitted a brief nor appeared
at argument before us. The Probate and Family Court judge's
decisions, however, provide detail concerning the facts at issue,
including the judge's findings on the amounts of arrears and the
father's ability to make the stipulated payments to reduce those
arrears.
5
The December, 2006, order finds the father in contempt for
having failed to pay $26,230 for the child's medical expenses
incurred in 2006. While the record does not include an order
requiring the father to pay health care costs, in a memorandum in
support of the father's motion for relief from judgment, the father's
attorney states that "healthcare costs were added to the agreement
by stipulation of the parties."
6
The costs were $1,750. The amount of attorney's fees was to
be established at a later hearing.
7
California CSSD had requested that the DOR close its case against
him, because the California CSSD was then garnishing the father's
Social Security payments.7 In June, 2009, the mother filed another
complaint for contempt. Nothing in the record suggests that, prior
to the filing of the mother's complaint in 2009, the Probate and
Family Court was notified of the request by the California CSSD to
DOR, or asked by any party, agency, or California court to cease
enforcement efforts.8 A Probate and Family Court judge found the
father in contempt for failure to pay $26,940.60 in child support,
$54,432 in spousal support, $24,000 towards the child's college
education, the child's uninsured medical expenses in the amount of
7
In a February, 2009, letter to the father, the Massachusetts
Department of Revenue (DOR) stated that it had "end-dated [his]
support obligation" and "purged [his] arrears balance." The letter
noted, "For as long as you live in the Commonwealth, there is always
the possibility that we may become involved in your CCS case in the
future." In a September, 2009, letter responding to an inquiry from
the father, the DOR explained that, although it had closed the
father's child support case, "[a]ny and all existing court orders
remained in place . . . . Closing our case just meant that DOR was
no longer taking action to enforce or collect the debt."
8
Indeed, in June, 2011, a Los Angeles County Superior Court
judge ruled:
"[The father] has twice been found guilty of contempt for
failure to pay spousal and child support [in Massachusetts]
. . . , substantial arrears still exist and, therefore, . . .
the convicted defendant cannot seek modification of the spousal
support award until the contempt is purged. . . . California's
assumption of jurisdiction regarding spousal support is not
intended to and does not deprive Massachusetts of ongoing
jurisdiction to enforce its own orders."
8
$26,230, and the mother's legal fees and costs incurred in connection
with prior and then-pending enforcement proceedings. A judgment of
contempt entered on September 22, 2010, dated May 26, 2010,9
established a schedule of monthly payments to be made toward these
arrears. In August, 2010, the father sought relief from that
judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (4), 365 Mass. 828
(1974).10 The motion was denied later that month. In December,
2010, the father returned to California.
Discussion. We note as a preliminary matter that the father
did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court
concerning the support orders, nor its authority to hold him in
contempt for violation of those orders, prior to this appeal.
Nonetheless, "a party has the right to raise subject matter
9
The father also was found in contempt for his continued
involvement in nonprofit organizations and was ordered to resign from
his membership in several of those organizations. The father makes
no claim that this portion of the judgment was not within the
jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court, and we do not address
his other claim, raised for the first time on appeal, regarding this
portion of the order.
10
Also in June, 2010, the Los Angeles County Superior Court
notified the parties that it would hold a hearing for a "determination
of arrears." The parties informed the Probate and Family Court judge
who had issued the judgment of that pending hearing, and on August
23, 2010, the judge issued an order stating that "Massachusetts will
assume sole jurisdiction over this matter." In June, 2011, a Los
Angeles County Superior Court judge ruled, "As both the initiating
[S]tate and now both parties' [S]tate of residence, California has
jurisdiction to issue spousal support orders. The Massachusetts
court cannot preclude otherwise appropriate jurisdiction by court
order."
9
jurisdiction at any time." ROPT, Ltd. Partnership v. Katin, 431
Mass. 601, 607 (2000). A claim that a court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived. See Harker v. Holyoke, 390 Mass. 555,
559 (1983), quoting Litton Business Sys. v. Commissioner of Revenue,
383 Mass. 619, 622 (1981) ("Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
conferred by consent, conduct or waiver"); Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b)
(4).
1. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. "UIFSA aims to cure
the problem of conflicting support orders entered by multiple courts,
and provides for the exercise of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
by one tribunal over support orders." Child Support Enforcement
Div. of Alaska v. Brenckle, 424 Mass. 214, 218 (1997) (Brenckle).
UIFSA establishes continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the State
issuing a support order, so as to ensure that the issuing State is
the only State with jurisdiction to modify its order absent
specified, narrow circumstances. G. L. c. 209D, § 6-611 (a)
(1)-(2). Every State appears to have adopted some version of UIFSA.
See Annot., Construction and Application of Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act, 90 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2001). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 666(f)
(2012) (requiring States to adopt UIFSA in order to access Federal
funding for child support enforcement).
"Under UIFSA, once one court enters a support order, no other
court may modify that order for as long as the obligee, obligor, or
10
child for whose benefit the order is entered continues to reside
within the jurisdiction of that court unless each party consents in
writing to another jurisdiction." Brenckle, supra at 218. See
G. L. c. 209D, §§ 2-205 (a),11 6-611 (a) (1)-(2).12 See also Draper
11
General Laws c. 209D, § 2-205 (a), provides that the issuing
State retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction:
"(1) as long as [the State issuing the order] remains the
residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child
for whose benefit the support order is issued; or
"(2) until [each party has] filed written consents . . .
with the tribunal of [the issuing State] for a tribunal of
another [S]tate to modify the order and assume continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction."
See Cal. Fam. Code § 4909 (West 2013), which contains virtually
identical language.
12
General Laws c. 209D, § 6-611 (a) (1)-(2), provides:
"After a child support order issued in another [S]tate has
been registered in the [C]ommonwealth, the responding tribunal
of the [C]ommonwealth may modify that order only if . . . it
finds that . . .
"(i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor
do not reside in the issuing [S]tate;
"(ii) a petitioner who is a nonresident of the
[C]ommonwealth seeks modification; and
"(iii) the respondent is subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the tribunal of the [C]ommonwealth; or
". . . each of the parties who are individuals has filed
a written consent in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of the
[C]ommonwealth to modify the support order and assume
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over such order."
11
v. Burke, 450 Mass. 676, 679 (2008); Peddar v. Peddar, 43 Mass. App.
Ct. 192, 194-195 (1997); C.P. Kindregan, M. McBrien, & P.A.
Kindregan, Family Law and Practice, § 30.6, at 255 (4th ed. 2013).
The written consent must be filed in the issuing tribunal. G. L.
c. 209D, § 6-611 (a) (1)-(2).
Here, California issued the original support order. The mother
and child remained residents of California throughout the
Massachusetts proceedings, and there is no indication that the
parents filed with the California court their written consent to
grant a Massachusetts court authority to modify the order issued by
the California court. In these circumstances, California remains
the State of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and accordingly is
the only State with jurisdiction to modify its support order. See
Klingel v. Reill, 446 Mass. 80, 84 (2006), citing G. L. c. 209D,
§ 2-205 (c) (responding tribunal can modify support order only if
issuing State "has, for some reason, lost its exclusive
jurisdiction"); C.P. Kindregan & P.A. Kindregan, Massachusetts
Domestic Relations Rules and Statutes Annot., § 7.6(11), Comment to
G. L. c. 209D, § 6-611 (2014) (discussing "UIFSA philosophy that no
other [S]tate should modify an order of another [S]tate which has
See Cal. Fam. Code § 4960 (West 2013), which contains virtually
identical language.
12
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction").13
a. Enforcement of California's order. To enforce judgments
against a party who has moved from an issuing State that has
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to a second State, an issuing
State may register an order for enforcement in the second State. See
G. L. c. 209D, § 6-601. Once such an order is registered in the
Probate and Family Court, that court becomes the "responding
tribunal," and is "limited to recognizing and enforcing the order
of the other [S]tate [because] under UIFSA[,] conceptually, the
responding [S]tate is enforcing the law of another [S]tate"
(quotations and citation omitted). C.P. Kindregan & P.A. Kindregan,
Massachusetts Domestic Relations Rules and Statutes Annotated,
13
The Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1738B(e) (2012), likewise does not extend the
jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court to modification of a
California court's support order. In relevant part, that statute
provides:
"A court of a State may modify a child support order issued
by a court of another State if --
"(1) the court has jurisdiction to make such a child
support order pursuant to subsection (i); and
"(2)(A) the court of the other State no longer has
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the child support order
because that State no longer is the child's State or the
residence of any individual contestant; or
"(B) each individual contestant has filed written consent
with the State of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction for a court
of another State to modify the order and assume continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction over the order."
13
§ 7.6(3), Comment to G. L. c. 209D, § 6-603 (2014).
Thus, although the Probate and Family Court did not have
jurisdiction to modify the California court's support order, it did
retain jurisdiction to enforce that order.14 California's support
order was registered for enforcement in the Commonwealth when the
California CSSD transmitted a request to the DOR that was then entered
on the Probate and Family Court docket. The transmittal specified
that the Probate and Family Court could exercise jurisdiction over
the California court's order "for enforcement only." See G. L.
c. 209D, § 6-602.
b. Modification of California's order. The judgment entered
on September 22, 2010, dated May 26, 2010, held the father in contempt
for his failure to comply with earlier orders and judgments that had
entered in the Probate and Family Court beginning in 2009. The
father contends that portions of the orders constituted
modifications of the California order, and that the Probate and
Family Court did not have jurisdiction to modify the California
14
Although the Probate and Family Court judge could, in the
absence of any motion to dismiss brought during the proceedings,
exercise jurisdiction as the judge did here, we note that where orders
of the Probate and Family Court and a California court conflict, the
California court's orders control. G. L. c. 209D, § 2-207 (b) ("If
a proceeding is brought under this chapter and two or more child
support orders have been issued by tribunals of the [C]ommonwealth
or another [S]tate . . . [1] if only one of the tribunals would have
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, the order of
such tribunal shall control and be so recognized").
14
support order. UIFSA does not define "modification," but, "where
UIFSA is silent, the [Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2012),] may help fill any gaps." Spencer
v. Spencer, 10 N.Y.3d 60, 66 (2008). Section 1738B(b) of that
statute defines modification as "a change in a child support order
that affects the amount, scope, or duration of the order and modifies,
replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to the child
support order."
In this case, the California support order provided that the
father's child support obligations would end essentially when the
child completed twelfth grade or attained the age of nineteen,15 and
was silent on the issue of the costs of the child's college education
and her uninsured medical expenses. The California Legislature,
however, has expressly limited child support to minor children, or
through the completion of high school for a child under age nineteen
who is residing with a parent and attending school full-time.16 The
15
The order stated that child support payments were to continue
"until the minor child reaches majority, dies, marries, becomes
self-supported, emancipates or until further order of Court,
whichever first occurs."
16
The California legislature "expressly contemplated that
Civil Code [§] 196 would only apply to minors and that to the extent
that an obligation devolves upon a parent to provide education to
an adult child, it is limited to the completion of a high school
education." Jones v. Jones, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 1017 (1986). The
California support order provides that, "Pursuant to Civil Code
[§] 196.5, child support shall continue as set forth above and extend
15
Probate and Family Court judgment of contempt appears to have
required the father to continue to pay child support beyond the
child's attaining the age of nineteen, thereby affecting the duration
of child support. The judgment also required the father to pay
$24,000 toward the child's college education costs and $26,230 toward
the child's uninsured medical expenses; these obligations constitute
modifications of the California court's support order because they
affected the amount, scope, and duration of support and were made
subsequent to the order. These impermissible modifications of the
California order exceeded the jurisdiction of the Probate and Family
Court.
c. Effect of impermissible modification. As stated, prior to
this appeal, the father had not challenged the jurisdiction of the
Probate and Family Court to issue such orders, nor its authority to
hold him in contempt for violation of those orders. Nonetheless,
"[w]here a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the judgment is
void and time limitations for raising the issue are inapplicable."
ROPT, Ltd. Partnership v. Katin, 431 Mass. at 605. See Mass. R. Civ.
P. 60 (b) (4).
as to any unmarried child who has attained the age of [eighteen],
is a full-time high-school student, and resides with a parent until
such time as he or she completes the [twelfth] grade or attains the
age of [nineteen,] whichever first occurs." Although California
Civil Code § 196.5 has been repealed, essentially the same language
appears in Cal. Fam. Code § 3901 (West 2013).
16
Rule 60 (b) "strikes a balance between serving the ends of
justice and preserving the finality of judgments," and "may not be
used as a substitute for a timely appeal" (citation omitted). Harris
v. Sannella, 400 Mass. 392, 395 (1987). See Harker v. Holyoke, 390
Mass. at 558 ("If we were to permit such an attack as a general rule,
the finality of judgments would be substantially impaired").
Therefore, "when a court has rendered final judgment in a contested
action, a party may not litigate that court's subject matter
jurisdiction except in certain circumstances." Matter of Dugan, 418
Mass. 185, 186 (1994). One such circumstance is when "[a]llowing
the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of
another tribunal or agency of government." Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 12 (1982).
Permitting enforcement of those portions of the Probate and
Family Court's orders that modify the California order not only would
infringe on the authority of the California courts, which have
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, but also would upset a carefully
constructed uniform set of laws adopted in all fifty States. See
Scanlon v. Witrak, 110 Wash. App. 682, 686 (2002) (allowing rule 60
[b] motion where Georgia had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
under UIFSA and Washington State court had modified Georgia child
support order). Cf. In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169,
174-176 (1998) (erroneous order that expressed child support
17
payments as percentage of income was in violation of statute, but
was voidable, not void, in part because it was purely State matter
and did not "implicate the authority of another tribunal" [citation
omitted]).
Because the Probate and Family Court had no jurisdiction to
modify the California support order, the portions of the orders that
required the father to pay child support for a period beyond that
established by the California court, part of the child's college
education costs, and the child's uninsured medical expenses were
void. The father, therefore, could not be found in contempt for
violating the void portions of those orders. Cf. Kendall v. Kendall,
340 S.W.3d 483, 501, 503-504 (Tex. App. 2011) (when reviewing
collateral attack, court will limit "review to determining whether
the record affirmatively and conclusively negates existence of
jurisdiction" to modify support order of State that had continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction, and will not consider "whether court
otherwise erred in rendering its judgment"). The judgment of
contempt is enforceable insofar as it concerns portions of the orders
that enforced the terms of the California support order.
2. Attorney's fees and costs. The father also was adjudged
in contempt for his failure to pay attorney's fees of $6,930 that
had been awarded to the mother, and costs of $2,370 that had been
incurred in connection with the mother's travel to Massachusetts to
18
attend court proceedings. The father apparently has not paid these
fees and costs. The judgment also ordered the father to pay
additional attorney's fees and costs incurred by the mother in
pursuing the 2009 complaint for contempt.
Under UIFSA, the responding tribunal may award attorney's fees
and costs against an obligor if "an obligee prevails." See G. L.
c. 209D, § 3-313 (b).17 Cf. Arnell v. Arnell, 416 S.W.3d 188, 201
(Tex. App. 2013) (affirming award of attorney's fees to obligee under
UIFSA where court registered and enforced foreign judgment). The
imposition of attorney's fees and costs is an appropriate mechanism
for enforcement of the California order, and part of the enforcement
power of the Probate and Family Court as the responding tribunal.
The father does not argue that the Probate and Family Court
lacked jurisdiction to award attorney's fees, but only that the Court
erred in awarding fees in this case. The father contends, without
record support and, indeed, without pointing to any purportedly
improper fee, that the attorney's fees and costs awarded were
17
An order registered in the Commonwealth that issued in another
State "is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same
procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of the [C]ommonwealth."
G. L. c. 209D, § 6-603 (b). Because the father did not contest the
validity or enforcement of California's order, as he was entitled
to do under G. L. c. 209D, § 6-607 (a), the registered order could
"be enforced by all remedies available under the laws of the
[C]ommonwealth." G. L. c. 209D, § 6-607 (b). See also G. L.
c. 209D, § 3-305 (a)-(e) (setting forth duties and powers of
responding tribunal including power to award reasonable attorney's
fees as well as other fees and costs).
19
incurred in connection with improper efforts to modify the California
support order. We analyze this claim pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P.
60 (b) (6), which permits granting relief from a judgment for "any
other reason justifying relief." Relief under this provision is
available only in "extraordinary circumstances." Sahin v. Sahin,
435 Mass. 396, 406 (2001). Because the Probate and Family Court's
enforcement powers under UIFSA include the authority to award
attorney's fees and costs, and because the father has not included
in the record anything that indicates how the judge arrived at the
fee award, the components of that award, or that any portion of the
fee award pertains to fees incurred in conjunction with efforts
directed toward the impermissible modifications, the father has not
established the extraordinary circumstances that would justify such
relief.18
Conclusion. The judgment of contempt is vacated. The matter
is remanded for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion,
holding the father in contempt and obligating payment only for his
failure to comply with such portions of the Probate and Family Court's
orders that enforced the California child and spousal support order,
18
We note that the extensive litigation in this case arose as
a result of the father's chronic nonpayment of his support
obligations, and that, in her efforts to obtain child and spousal
support payments owed, the mother apparently was required to expend
significant amounts on private investigators and travel to
Massachusetts.
20
and the fees and costs associated with such enforcement.
So ordered.