City of Brockton v. Energy Facilities Siting Board (No. 1) ( 2014 )


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    SJC-11406
    CITY OF BROCKTON vs. ENERGY FACILITIES SITING BOARD (No. 1)
    (and two consolidated cases 1).
    Suffolk.    March 4, 2014. - July 31, 2014.
    Present:   Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly,
    & Lenk, JJ. 2
    Energy Facilities Siting Board. Public Utilities, Energy
    company, Electric company. Electric Company.
    Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act. Administrative
    Law, Decision, Judicial review, Substantial evidence.
    Environment, Air pollution, Environmental impact report.
    Municipal Corporations, Electric plant, Water supply.
    Civil actions commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for
    the county of Suffolk on August 24, August 28, and September 2,
    2009.
    After consolidation, the case was reported by Spina, J.
    Lisa C. Goodheart (Phelps T. Turner, Joshua D. Nadreau, &
    Staci Rubin with her) for Frank J. Babbin & others.
    John L. Holgerson for town of West Bridgwater.
    Gregor I. McGregor (Nathaniel Stevens with him) for city of
    Brockton.
    1
    Frank J. Babbin & others vs. Energy Facilities Siting
    Board; Town of West Bridgewater vs. Energy Facilities Siting
    Board.
    2
    Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on
    this case prior to his retirement.
    2
    Sookyoung Shin, Assistant Attorney General, for Energy
    Facilities Siting Board.
    David S. Rosenzweig (Erika J. Hafner & Michael J. Koehler
    with him) for Brockton Power Company LLC.
    The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
    Veronica Eady for Conservation Law Foundation.
    Rahsaan D. Hall, Matthew Cregor, Sasha N. Kopf, Tyler D.
    Crosby, & Priya A. Lane for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
    and Economic Justice.
    Wendy B. Jacobs & Aladdine D. Joroff for Hands Across the
    River Coalition.
    BOTSFORD, J.    Brockton Power Company LLC (Brockton Power,
    or company) filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 164, § 69J¼
    (§ 69J¼), with the Energy Facilities Siting Board (board) to
    construct and operate a 350-megawatt combined-cycle energy
    generating facility (facility) powered by natural gas and ultra-
    low sulfur distillate (ULSD) on a 13.2-acre lot in the city of
    Brockton (city).    After extensive hearings, the board approved
    Brockton Power's petition, with conditions.    The city, the town
    of West Bridgewater (town), and a group of residents of the city
    and the town (residents), all interveners in the proceedings
    before the board (collectively, interveners), filed appeals in
    the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 164, § 69P, and G. L.
    c. 25, § 5. 3   A single justice reserved and reported the case to
    the full court. 4
    3
    The following interveners participated in the proceeding
    before the board: Taunton River Watershed Alliance; the city of
    Brockton (city); the town of West Bridgewater (town); various
    residents of the city and the town who were represented by
    Alternatives for Communities and Environment, Inc.; and New
    England Power Company, Custom Blends, LLC. In addition the
    3
    On appeal the interveners argue 5 that the board (1) failed
    to adopt and apply the 2002 environmental justice policy that is
    a binding environmental protection policy of the Commonwealth;
    (2) improperly relied on the National Ambient Air Quality
    Standards for fine particulate matter; (3) erroneously accepted
    Logan Airport weather data as representative of the proposed
    facility site; (4) erroneously determined that the facility's
    impact on the town's water supply was accurate and complete; and
    following limited participants took part in the proceedings:
    Brockton City Councilor Thomas G. Brophy; State Representative
    Geraldine Creedon; former State Senator Robert S. Creedon, Jr.;
    Linda Balzotti, mayor of the city; State Representative
    Christine E. Caravan; and Susan Nicastro.
    4
    The single justice granted the parties' joint motion to
    consolidate the appeals and proceed on a single record. In
    2011, while the consolidated appeal was pending, Brockton Power
    Company LLC (Brockton Power or company) submitted a project
    change filing (PCF) to the board, seeking approval of
    modifications to its proposal including changing its proposed
    water source from wastewater obtained from the advanced
    wastewater reclamation facility (AWRF) operated by the city to
    the city's municipal potable water supply, eliminating the use
    of ultra-low sulfur distillate (ULSD) as an auxiliary fuel, and
    certain changes to facility structure height. The board denied
    the PCF with respect to the modification of the water source for
    the project, but approved the elimination of the secondary fuel
    source and changes to facility structure. Brockton Power and
    the city appealed; we consider the appeals in Brockton Power Co.
    v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., post     (2014).
    5
    We list here all the claims raised by the interveners,
    some of which are raised by all the interveners and some of
    which are not.
    4
    (5) improperly designated delivery routes to and from the
    facility.   We affirm the decision of the board. 6
    Section 69J¼ requires the board to conduct an evidentiary
    hearing 7 on a petition to construct a generating facility within
    180 days of filing, and to approve a petition within one year of
    filing if it "determines that the petition meets the following
    requirements:   (i) the description of the proposed generating
    facility and its environmental impacts are substantially
    accurate and complete; (ii) the description of the site
    selection process used is accurate; . . . (iii) the plans for
    the construction of the proposed generating facility are
    consistent with current health and environmental protection
    policies of the commonwealth and with such energy policies as
    are adopted by the commonwealth for the specific purpose of
    guiding the decisions of the board; [and] (iv) such plans
    minimize the environmental impacts consistent with the
    minimization of costs associated with the mitigation, control,
    and reduction of the environmental impacts of the proposed
    6
    We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of
    the interveners' appeals by the Conservation Law Foundation,
    Hands Across the River Coalition, and the Lawyers' Committee for
    Civil Rights and Economic Justice.
    7
    Under G. L. c. 164, § 69J¼ (§ 69J¼), fourth par., the
    evidentiary hearing is an adjudicatory proceeding conducted
    pursuant to G. L. c. 30A.
    5
    generating facility."   G. L. c. 164, § 69J¼, fourth & fifth
    pars.
    Pursuant to G. L. c. 164, § 69P, in reviewing a decision of
    the board, we are limited to considering
    "whether the decision of the board is in conformity with
    the constitution of the commonwealth and the constitution
    of the United States, was made in accordance with the
    procedures established under [G. L. c. 164, §§ 69H to 69O,]
    and with the rules and regulations of the board with
    respect to such provisions, was supported by substantial
    evidence of record in the board's proceedings, and was
    arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of the board's discretion
    under the provisions of [§§ 69H to 69O]."
    We give the board's evidentiary rulings great deference, and the
    interveners, as appellants, bear the burden of showing that the
    board's decision is invalid.   G. L. c. 25, § 5, seventh par.
    Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities
    Siting Bd., 
    448 Mass. 45
    , 51 (2006) (Alliance I).
    1.   Environmental justice policy.   The interveners 8 argue
    that the board erred by failing properly to apply the
    Commonwealth's environmental justice (EJ) policy, as promulgated
    by the predecessor to the Executive Office of Energy and
    Environmental Affairs (EOEEA). 9   The resolution of this issue
    8
    The residents principally advance the argument concerning
    the environmental justice (EJ) policy in this case, joined by
    all the other interveners.
    9
    The EJ policy was promulgated in 2002 by the Executive
    Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA), the predecessor to the
    Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (EOEEA).
    At the time the EJ policy was issued, the Energy Facilities
    Siting Board (board) was under the jurisdiction of the Executive
    6
    requires a two-part analysis:   whether the EJ policy is among
    the factors the board must consider under § 69J¼ (and is
    therefore subject to our review); and if so, whether the board
    correctly applied the policy to Brockton Power's petition.
    The EJ policy states:   "Environmental justice is based on
    the principle that all people have a right to be protected from
    environmental pollution and to live in and enjoy a clean and
    healthful environment.   Environmental justice is the equal
    protection and meaningful involvement of all people with respect
    to the development, implementation, and enforcement of
    environmental laws, regulations, and policies and the equitable
    distribution of environmental benefits."   The EJ policy defines
    "[e]qual [p]rotection" to mean "that no group of people, because
    of race, ethnicity, class, gender, or handicap bears an unfair
    share of environmental pollution from industrial, commercial,
    state and municipal operations or have limited access to natural
    resources, including greenspace (open space) and water
    Office of Consumer Affairs. The EJ policy expressly states that
    "[t]his policy is not intended to regulate agencies outside the
    EOEA secretariat. . . . This policy is not intended to
    interfere with, super[s]ede, or create any new obligations on
    the [board], an entity which is not by law or otherwise a part
    of the EOEA secretariat." In April, 2007, the Legislature
    created the EOEEA, and placed the former EOEA and two energy-
    related agencies, the Department of Public Utilities (under
    which the board is organized, see G. L. c. 164, § 69H) and the
    Department of Energy Resources, within the new executive office.
    See St. 2007 c. 19, §§ 12, 28, 53. See also G. L. c. 21A, § 1.
    The board concluded in this case that as of April, 2007, it was
    subject to the EOEEA's EJ policy, and all parties agree with
    this determination.
    7
    resources." 10   An "[e]nvironmental [j]ustice [p]opulation" is
    defined as "a neighborhood whose annual median household income
    is equal to or less than [sixty-five] percent of the statewide
    median or whose population is made up [of twenty-five] percent
    [m]inority, [f]oreign [b]orn, or [l]acking [e]nglish [l]anguage
    [p]roficiency."    Brockton Power's proposed project site was
    within one-half mile of EJ communities to the west, north, and
    northeast.
    The EJ policy directs agencies within the EOEEA to "develop
    their own strategies to proactively promote environmental
    justice in all neighborhoods in ways that are tailored to the
    specific mission of each agency. . . .    [EOEEA] agencies shall
    identify and promote agency-sponsored projects, funding
    decisions, rulemakings or other actions intended to further
    environmental justice in the Commonwealth." 11   The EJ policy also
    10
    "Meaningful [i]nvolvement" is defined in the EJ policy to
    mean "that all neighborhoods have the right to participate in
    partnership with government in environmental decision-making
    including needs assessment, planning, implementation,
    enforcement, and evaluation, and neighborhoods are enabled and
    administratively assisted to participate fully through education
    and training means, and encouraged to develop environmental
    stewardship."
    11
    The board apparently has not yet undertaken any
    "rulemakings" or developed guidelines in order to carry out
    these EJ policy directives, but of course it may establish rules
    and agency policy through adjudication as well as rulemaking.
    See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy
    Facilities Siting Bd., 
    448 Mass. 45
    , 51 (2006), quoting Arthurs
    v. Board of Registration in Med., 
    383 Mass. 299
    , 312–313 (1981).
    8
    mandates specific agency action in two areas:   enhanced public
    participation in EJ communities and, in certain circumstances,
    enhanced substantive review of new projects in EJ communities
    when a proposed generating facility exceeds thresholds
    established by the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, G. L.
    c. 30, §§ 61-62H (MEPA). 12
    With respect to public participation, the EJ policy
    mandates that "all [EOEEA] agencies shall have an inclusive,
    robust public participation program that focuses agency
    resources on outreach activities that enhance public
    participation opportunities for agency activities that
    potentially affect EJ populations."   The policy calls for
    See also Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 
    332 U.S. 194
    , 203 (1947).
    12
    The Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, G. L. c. 30,
    §§ 61-62H (MEPA), and its implementing regulations establish a
    process to ensure that State permitting agencies have adequate
    information on which to base their permitting decisions, and
    that environmental impacts of the project are avoided or
    minimized. See G. L. c. 30, §§ 61 & 62C, fourth par.; 301 Code
    Mass. Regs. § 11.00 (2013). Pursuant to MEPA, a project
    proponent requiring a permit from a State agency files an
    environmental notification form (ENF) with the Secretary of the
    EOEEA (Secretary), who determines whether the project meets the
    review threshold requiring an environmental impact report (EIR).
    See G. L. c. 30, § 62A; 301 Code Mass. Regs. § 11.06. If so,
    and after submission of a final environmental impact report
    (FEIR) and opportunity for review by the public, the Secretary
    certifies whether the FEIR has complied with MEPA. G. L. c. 30,
    § 62C, fourth par. Certification under MEPA, however, "does not
    constitute final approval or disapproval of a particular
    project, which ultimately is left to various permitting
    agencies." Allen v. Boston Redev. Auth., 
    450 Mass. 242
    , 247
    (2007), citing G. L. c. 30, § 62C.
    9
    "enhanced public participation" through "use of alternative
    media outlets such as community or ethnic newspapers . . . and
    translation of materials or interpretation services at public
    meetings" in cases where a project exceeds Environmental
    Notification Form (ENF) thresholds for "air, solid and hazardous
    waste . . . or wastewater and sewage sludge treatment and
    disposal" as determined by the Secretary of EOEEA (Secretary)
    under MEPA and its implementing regulations, and the project
    site is within one mile (or, in the case of air emissions, five
    miles) from an EJ population.
    In addition to these procedural requirements, the EJ policy
    substantively provides for enhanced analysis and review of
    "impacts and mitigation" in relation to projects that meet two
    conditions:   (1) the project exceeds "a mandatory EIR
    [environmental impact report] threshold for air, solid and
    hazardous waste . . . , or wastewater sewage sludge treatment
    and disposal"; and (2) the project is located within one mile of
    an EJ population, or within five miles for projects exceeding
    the EIR threshold for air.   "Enhanced analysis . . . may include
    analysis of multiple air impacts; data on baseline public health
    conditions within affected EJ [p]opulation; analysis of
    technological, site planning, and operational alternatives to
    reduce impacts; and proposed on-site and off-site mitigation
    10
    measures to reduce multiple impacts and increase environmental
    benefits to the affected EJ [p]opulation."
    The project at issue here, construction of Brockton Power's
    facility, was subject to mandatory MEPA review.   In conducting
    that review, the Secretary certified that because the project
    exceeded the ENF threshold for air and is located within five
    miles of an EJ community, it was subject to enhanced public
    participation under the EJ policy.   However, the Secretary also
    certified that the project did not exceed the mandatory EIR
    threshold for air pollutants, and therefore was not subject to
    enhanced review under the EJ policy.
    The board addressed the EJ policy in its decision,
    interpreting it to provide for both "enhanced analysis" and
    additional procedures during a review of a petition filed with
    the board pursuant to § 69J¼.   The board concluded, however,
    that the EJ policy's enhanced analysis provisions applied only
    to § 69J¼ petitions that propose a generating facility that
    would exceed the EIR threshold for air emissions.   Because the
    Secretary's MEPA certification had determined that the
    facility's expected emissions did not exceed this threshold, the
    board found that the policy, as applied to Brockton Power's
    petition, was limited to additional procedures, namely,
    11
    "enhanced outreach and public participation" during the board's
    review process. 13
    Before turning to the interveners' claims, however, we
    first discuss whether the board's interpretation and application
    of the EJ policy in its decision is subject to our review at
    all.    The board, joined by Brockton Power, contends that
    judicial review of this aspect of its decision is not available,
    because the EJ policy states that it "is intended only to
    improve the internal management of [EOEEA] agencies" and
    expressly disclaims the creation of "any right, benefit, or
    trust responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at
    law or equity," as well as "any right to judicial review
    involving compliance or noncompliance" with the policy.
    The board's contention fails.   As the board recognized in
    its decision, § 69J¼, fifth par., requires the board to
    determine whether "plans for the construction of the proposed
    generating facility are consistent with current health and
    environmental protection policies of the commonwealth and with
    13
    The board concluded that Brockton Power had complied with
    the "enhanced outreach and public participation" requirements of
    the EJ policy. As the board noted, the procedures in this case
    "included numerous public meetings, translations of Company-
    issued public information into multiple languages, translation
    [of] material on its website into multiple languages, and the
    posting of meeting notices in multiple languages at many
    locations within the [city]. The record shows both enhanced
    outreach and tremendous public participation through the [board]
    proceedings." The interveners do not argue that the company's
    petition was deficient in this respect.
    12
    such energy policies as are adopted by the commonwealth for the
    specific purpose of guiding the decisions of the board," and
    also that the EJ policy is among the "environmental protection
    policies of the Commonwealth." 14   It follows, therefore, that the
    board's application of the EJ policy is subject to judicial
    review as part of the court's consideration whether the board's
    decision meets the requirements of § 69J¼, fifth par.    Cf.
    Communities Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. Federal Aviation
    Admin., 
    355 F.3d 678
    , 688-689 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (where defendant
    agency included analysis of compliance with Federal EJ executive
    order on environmental justice in its evaluation of compliance
    with National Environmental Policy Act [NEPA], issue of agency's
    compliance with EJ executive order was reviewable by court
    because it arose under NEPA, not executive order, which
    disclaimed right of judicial review).    Accord Allen v. National
    Insts. of Health, 
    974 F. Supp. 2d 18
    , 46-47 (D. Mass. 2013). 15
    The standard of review is that set out in § 69P, namely, whether
    14
    General Laws c. 21A, § 2 (1), provides that "the [EOEEA]
    and its appropriate departments and divisions shall carry out
    the state environmental policy and in doing so . . . shall . . .
    develop policies, plans, and programs for carrying out their
    assigned duties." By placing the board under the authority of
    the EOEEA, the Legislature made it subject to the State
    environmental policies as identified by the EOEEA, including the
    EJ policy.
    15
    But cf. Sur Contra La Contaminacion v. Environmental
    Protection Agency, 
    202 F.3d 443
    , 449 (1st Cir. 2000) (declining
    to review claim that Environmental Protection Agency's decision
    to grant environmental permit was in violation of executive
    order).
    13
    the board's application "was supported by substantial evidence
    of record in the board's proceedings; and was arbitrary,
    capricious or an abuse of discretion."
    The interveners' claims concerning the EJ policy, however,
    fail on the merits.   As mentioned, the Secretary certified that
    the proposed facility did not exceed the mandatory EIR threshold
    under MEPA for air pollutants. 16   Under the express language of
    the EJ policy, therefore, Brockton Power's petition was not
    subject to "enhanced analysis."     The interveners do not
    challenge the Secretary's determination under MEPA, nor do they
    argue that the board failed to meet the EJ policy's procedural
    requirements.   In the context of this case, we cannot accept the
    interveners' contention that, independent of a triggering MEPA
    threshold for enhanced analysis, the EJ policy required the
    16
    As explained, the EJ policy calls for "enhanced analysis
    of impacts and mitigation" when, among other possible triggering
    factors, increased air pollution above the "mandatory EIR
    threshold for air" is likely to be the result of the proposed
    project. With respect to air, the MEPA regulations call for a
    mandatory EIR if the new project, "after construction and the
    imposition of required controls," is likely to produce, inter
    alia, potential emissions of "250 [tons per year (tpy)] of any
    criteria air pollutant; 40 tpy of any [hazardous air pollutant
    (HAP)]; or 100 tpy of any combination of HAPs." 301 Code Mass.
    Regs. § 11.03(8)(a)(1). With respect to Brockton Power's
    proposed project, the Secretary, in conducting his MEPA review,
    determined that it would result in the following increases
    related to air pollution: 85 tpy of particulate matter; 109 tpy
    of carbon monoxide; 7 tpy of sulfur dioxide; 31 tpy of volatile
    organic compounds; 107 tpy of oxides of nitrogen; 1.134 million
    tpy of carbon dioxide; and 7.247 tpy of HAPs. There is no
    argument made here that these projected quantities exceed the
    mandatory EIR threshold for air pollution.
    14
    board to apply unspecified "substantive equal protection"
    principles to its review of Brockton Power's proposed facility
    and that the board's failure to do so rendered its decision
    arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of the board's discretion.
    The interveners do not point to a specific or affirmative
    requirement in the EJ policy to do so, and we have found none. 17
    2.   Air quality standards.   The city and the residents
    object to the board's reliance on the National Ambient Air
    Quality Standards (NAAQS) to review the environmental and
    cumulative health impacts of particulate matter 2.5 micrometers
    or less in diameter (PM2.5).   They argue that the NAAQS for PM2.5
    are insufficiently protective of public health, and that the
    board's reliance on the standards is unsupported by substantial
    evidence.
    17
    The issue of timing is important here -- i.e., the fact
    that the petition in this case was filed within a few months
    after the EJ policy became applicable to the board. The EJ
    policy does impose a general, but affirmative, requirement on
    all agencies covered by it (and therefore the board) to develop
    strategies designed "to proactively promote environmental
    justice in all neighborhoods" in a manner tailored to and
    consistent with that agency's "specific mission"; and to
    promote, inter alia, "rulemakings or other actions intended to
    further environmental justice in the Commonwealth." There may
    be an argument that under this general requirement, the board,
    in connection with issuing "its own list of [petition review]
    guidelines" pursuant to § 69J¼, fourth par., or otherwise, has
    an obligation under the EJ policy to incorporate specific
    environmental justice principles into its consideration of
    petitions to construct generating facilities. We do not reach
    the question, however, because even if the EJ policy did impose
    such an obligation, the board reasonably could not be expected
    to have carried it out in time to apply to its review in this
    case.
    15
    The Clean Air Act, see 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 7408
    , 7409 (2006),
    directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop
    national standards for ambient air quality -- the NAAQS -- that
    are to cover for air pollutants "reasonably . . . anticipated to
    endanger public health or welfare," including particulate
    matter. 18   
    42 U.S.C. § 7408
    (a)(1)(A).   The Clean Air Act charges
    the EPA with promulgating NAAQS that are protective of public
    health with an adequate margin of safety.     See 
    42 U.S.C. § 7409
    (b); 40 C.F.R. Part 50 (2006). 19    In setting the NAAQS, the
    EPA relies on criteria developed by EPA staff that "accurately
    reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the
    kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public health or
    welfare" from the pollutant, 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 7408
    (a)(2), and
    recommendations of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee,
    a seven-member, independent scientific review committee.      42
    18
    No challenge is made to the board's reliance on NAAQS
    standards for other criteria pollutants analyzed by the board:
    sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, and
    particulate matter with diameter up to 10 micrometers in
    diameter.
    19
    The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) are
    expressed as ambient pollutant concentrations, measured in
    micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3), and averaged over a specified
    period of time, usually twenty-four hours or one year. In
    addition to the "primary" standards intended to protect human
    health, 
    42 U.S.C. § 7409
    (b)(1) (2006), the Clean Air Act
    provides for "secondary" NAAQS to "protect the public welfare
    from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with
    the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air." 
    42 U.S.C. § 7409
    (b)(2) (2006). The secondary NAAQS for PM2.5 are
    not at issue in this appeal.
    
    16 U.S.C. § 7409
    (d)(2).   The EPA reviews, and, if necessary
    revises, the NAAQS every five years.    
    42 U.S.C. § 7409
    (d)(1).
    The NAAQS are implemented, maintained, and enforced by the
    States under EPA-approved State implementation plans.    
    42 U.S.C. § 7410
    .   See Reitze, Air Quality Protection Using State
    Implementation Plans -- Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing
    Complexity, 
    15 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 209
    , 210-213 (2004).    In
    Massachusetts, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP),
    in the course of the permitting process for new emission
    sources, enforces NAAQS in part by comparing total level of
    expected criteria pollutant (the sum of the background
    concentration and expected emissions from the new source) with
    the NAAQS.   See, e.g., G. L. c. 111, § 142D; 310 Code Mass.
    Regs. §§ 7.00 (2014). 20   Pursuant to its statutory mandate to
    review siting petitions for new energy facilities, the board
    relied on NAAQS to determine whether Brockton Power's petition
    "minimize[d] the environmental impacts consistent with the
    minimization of costs associated with the mitigation, control,
    20
    General Laws c. 111, § 142D, authorizes the Department of
    Environmental Protection (DEP) to promulgate a State
    implementation plan and comply with Federal Clean Air Act
    requirements. Pursuant to 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.02(3)(j)
    (2005), the DEP will approve a plan for an energy facility
    subject to, inter alia, a requirement that the facility's
    emissions "do not result in air quality exceeding either the
    Massachusetts or National Air Quality Standards." The DEP has
    not promulgated a standard for PM2.5. See 310 Code Mass. Regs.
    § 6.04 (2002). Accordingly, the DEP and the board refer to the
    NAAQS standard for this pollutant.
    17
    and reduction of the environmental impacts of the proposed
    generating facility."    G. L. c. 164, § 69J¼, fifth par.
    At the time of Brockton Power's petition, the annual NAAQS
    for PM2.5 was 15 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3).   40 C.F.R.
    Part 50.   According to Brockton Power's atmospheric dispersion
    modeling (AERMOD) analysis -- a model approved by the EPA, 
    70 Fed. Reg. 68,218
     (2005) -- the relevant background annual
    concentration of PM2.5 for the facility site was 9.9 µg/m3. 21   Upon
    completion, the facility would emit approximately 85 tons per
    year (tpy) of PM2.5 pollutants, resulting in a 0.25 µg/m3 increase
    in the annual PM2.5.    These emissions represent a cumulative
    annual impact of 10.15 µg/m3 PM2.5, or about two-thirds of the
    annual NAAQS standard for this criteria pollutant at the time
    the petition was filed. 22   Considering this evidence, the board
    determined that Brockton Power's description of the health and
    environmental impacts of PM2.5 emissions from the facility was
    substantially accurate and complete, and that such environmental
    impacts would be minimized under the proposal.
    The interveners argue, however, that by relying on the
    NAAQS set by the EPA and DEP, the board failed to comply with
    21
    Brockton Power established background ambient
    concentration levels for PM2.5 from a DEP monitoring site in
    Brockton.
    22
    The board noted that Brockton Power conservatively had
    included all expected emissions of particulate matter over ten
    micrometers in diameter (PM10) in its PM2.5 analysis, which
    necessarily overestimated the PM2.5 emissions.
    18
    its independent duty to analyze the petition under G. L. c. 164,
    § 69J¼, fifth par., and that, moreover, the NAAQS standards for
    PM2.5 are themselves arbitrary, capricious, and not based on
    substantial evidence.   The interveners' arguments fail.   As the
    board explained, it "gives great weight to expected compliance
    with [EPA] and [DEP] air quality regulatory requirements as an
    indicator of whether the potential impacts to air quality of a
    proposed facility would be minimized."   The board's position is
    reasonable in light of the EPA's mandate and expertise under the
    Clean Air Act, 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 7408
    , 7409, as implemented by the
    EPA's regulations and enforced by the DEP in Massachusetts.
    Moreover, the NAAQS methodology, as well as the data used to
    calculate the estimated ambient pollutant concentrations for the
    facility, were fully presented in Brockton Power's petition and
    analyzed in the board's final decision. 23   Although the board
    must ensure that the facility's environmental impacts are
    accurately modeled and described, G. L. c. 164, § 69J¼, fifth
    par., it is not required to establish its own quantitative
    23
    The board expressly addressed the issue whether the
    annual NAAQS standards for PM2.5 are adequate to demonstrate that
    the cumulative health impacts of criteria pollutants are
    minimized, including whether the standards are adequate to
    protect public health; the board was not required in its
    decision specifically to discuss testimony by the residents'
    expert that measurable health effects occur below the NAAQS
    threshold for PM2.5. See Box Pond Ass'n v. Energy Facilities
    Siting Bd., 
    435 Mass. 408
    , 418 (2001) ("An agency need not refer
    to all evidence in its decision").
    19
    values with respect to criteria pollutants (or any other
    environmental impact) to guide its siting decisions.     "The
    legislative scheme contemplates that much of what the board does
    in the area of air pollution will be dependent on decisions of
    the department, which has a significant and independent role in
    the permit process for new generating facilities."     Andover v.
    Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 
    435 Mass. 377
    , 381-82 (2001)
    (Andover).    We conclude that the board's reliance on the NAAQS
    was consistent with its statutory mandate and precedent, and was
    neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion.    See Alliance I,
    448 Mass. at 51.
    The interveners may, of course, challenge the basis of a
    NAAQS standard set by the EPA and relied on by the board in its
    statutory review.    Here, the interveners contend that the NAAQS
    standard for PM2.5 used by the EPA and DEP has been discredited,
    and that, consequently, the board erred by relying on this
    standard.    This argument is also without merit.   In American
    Farm Bur. Fed'n v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
    559 F.3d 512
    (D.C. Cir. 2009) (American Farm), the United States Court of
    Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered the
    EPA's "decision to set the primary annual NAAQS for PM2.5 at 15
    µg/m3" and held that "the EPA failed adequately to explain why
    . . . its annual standard is sufficient 'to protect the public
    health [with] an adequate margin of safety.'"    
    Id. at 519-520
    ,
    20
    quoting 
    42 U.S.C. § 7409
    (b)(1).     Accordingly, the court remanded
    the standard to the EPA for reconsideration or an adequate
    explanation of the NAAQS.     Id. at 528.
    At the time of the board's final decision, the EPA was in
    the process of reconsidering the NAAQS standard for PM2.5, in
    light of the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in American
    Farm.     As the board recognized, during the rulemaking process
    leading up to the adoption of this NAAQS standard, see 
    71 Fed. Reg. 61,144
    , 61,144-61,146 (2006), the EPA staff and the Clean
    Air Scientific Advisory Committee advocated an annual PM2.5 NAAQS
    of between 12 and 14 µg/m3. 24   In its decision, the board
    observed that the total estimated annual PM2.5 of 10.15 µg/m3 "is
    far below the lowest of the possible limits (12 µg/m3) that were
    being considered and recommended during [the EPA] rulemaking."
    Accordingly, the board determined that "the facility meets the
    NAAQS standard that is currently in place, as well as any
    reasonably foreseeable revised standard that may be established
    by [the] EPA on remand."     We note that in January, 2013,
    subsequent to the board's final decision, the EPA adopted an
    annual NAAQS for PM2.5 of 12 µg/m3.   See 
    40 C.F.R. § 50.18
     (2013);
    
    78 Fed. Reg. 3,086
    -01 (2013).     We conclude, therefore, that the
    24
    The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
    Colombia Circuit noted that 15 µg/m3 standard was higher than
    that recommended by the EPA staff and the Clean Air Scientific
    Advisory Committee. American Farm Bur. Fed'n v. Environmental
    Protection Agency, 
    559 F.3d 512
    , 520-521 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
    21
    board did not abuse its discretion by considering the NAAQS for
    PM2.5 in the course of its statutory review.
    3.   Logan Airport data.   The meteorological data that
    Brockton Power used for predicting emissions of criteria
    pollutants under AERMOD, the atmospheric dispersion modeling
    system approved by the EPA, were derived from a National Weather
    Service (NWS) monitoring station at Logan Airport in Boston,
    approximately twenty miles from the proposed site.     The city and
    the residents contend that this modeling did not accurately and
    completely describe the facility's impact, because the Logan
    Airport data were not representative of meteorological
    conditions at the site in Brockton, which lacks the influence of
    ocean breezes at Logan Airport; these interveners suggest that
    Brockton Power should have used meteorological data from a
    different source, or should have gathered data itself
    specifically from the facility site.
    In its decision, the board found that the data at the Logan
    Airport site were adequate for the purposes of its review under
    § 69J¼, fifth par., because "given established wind patterns and
    wind regimes experienced in general over eastern Massachusetts,
    meteorological data for Logan Airport is representative of
    conditions at the proposed Brockton site."     In addition, the
    board noted that the DEP, which ultimately would be responsible
    for approving Brockton Power's air permit, raised no concerns
    22
    with respect to the company's air modeling in its comments on
    the final environmental impact report under MEPA.
    The record shows that no suitable meteorological data for
    the Brockton site were available, and as none of the interveners
    disputes, the data from the Taunton Municipal Airport NWS
    monitoring station, a location closer to the Brockton site that
    the city and the residents contend more closely approximates
    meteorological conditions in Brockton, failed to meet the EPA
    guidelines for air quality modeling data capture 25 in four out of
    five years prior to Brockton Power's petition, making it
    unsuitable for AERMOD dispersal analysis.    In contrast, the
    Logan Airport NWS monitoring site provided five years of off-
    site data fully compliant with the EPA data capture guidelines.
    Despite the inadequacy of the Taunton meteorological data,
    at the city's request, Brockton Power modeled data from 2005
    (the single year for which the Taunton data met the EPA
    guidelines) for both the Taunton and Logan Airport sites.    This
    modeling exercise produced cumulative concentrations for several
    criteria pollutants that were higher than when the Logan Airport
    data were used.    In no instance, however, did the Taunton data
    result in expected cumulative concentrations exceeding the
    25
    See 40 C.F.R. Part 51, App. W § 8.3(a) (2005).
    23
    annual or twenty-four hour thresholds set by the EPA. 26   With
    respect to annual PM2.5, for example, models from both sites
    yielded nearly identical cumulative expected concentrations
    below the NAAQS of 15 µg/m3 (the standard at the time of the
    board's final decision) and 12 µg/m3 (the NAAQS subsequently
    adopted by the EPA after American Farm).
    The city concedes that the Taunton data were not adequate
    for AERMOD analysis, but contends that the estimated differences
    between ambient air pollutants at each site demonstrate that
    "meteorological data may vary significantly from location to
    location, even within eastern Massachusetts" and consequently
    that modeling using Logan Airport data failed accurately and
    completely to describe the facility's air emission impacts as
    required by § 69J¼, fifth par.   Instead, the city and the
    residents suggest the board should have required Brockton Power
    to provide site-specific data -- although it did not exist, as
    the city and residents acknowledge.   Nothing in the statute,
    however, requires the board to use on-site meteorological data
    in its review of a petition for accuracy, completeness, and
    26
    Moreover, the expected cumulative concentrations of
    criteria pollutants using Taunton data were below the NAAQS
    threshold.
    The largest increase for criteria pollutants was for
    twenty-four hour PM2.5, where the modeled facility contribution
    of twenty-four hour PM2.5 is 1.47 µg/m3 using Taunton data, as
    compared with 1.01 µg/m3 using Logan Airport data. The modeled
    cumulative impact using Taunton data, however, was still below
    the NAAQS threshold for twenty-four hour PM10.
    24
    minimization of environmental impacts.    G. L. c. 164, § 69J¼,
    fifth par.   The five years of Logan Airport data, considered in
    combination with the one year of supplemental Taunton data,
    constituted substantial evidence on which the board could base
    its analysis of air emissions under § 69J¼.    Moreover, to the
    extent the interveners argue that the board abdicated its
    statutory duty by referencing the DEP's acceptance of Logan
    Airport data in the course of the MEPA review, we disagree.      The
    board's role "with respect to air emissions is limited to a
    review of the [petitioner's] description of the environmental
    impacts of the proposed generating facility for substantial
    accuracy and completeness, and a determination whether [the]
    construction plans minimize the environmental impacts consistent
    with the minimization of costs associated with the mitigation,
    control, and reduction of the environmental impacts of the
    proposed facility."   Andover, 435 Mass. at 380.   The board's
    conclusion pursuant to § 69J¼, fifth par., that air emission
    estimates using Logan Airport data were substantially accurate
    and complete necessarily referenced the DEP (which uses EPA-
    derived NAAQS thresholds), as the agency responsible for
    evaluating Brockton Power's air dispersal modeling procedures
    and compliance with the air regulations.
    4.   Town drinking water.   The town challenges the board's
    determination that the facility's impact on the town's drinking
    25
    water supply was "substantially accurate and complete" as
    required by § 69J¼.    The town's challenge fails.
    The facility's cooling tower would require an average
    annual volume of 1.6 million gallons per day (mgd) of water (or
    1.9 mgd at peak, during a hot summer day), which Brockton Power
    anticipated would be sourced from discharge from the city's
    advanced water reclamation facility (AWRF).    This would reduce
    the volume of the annual average flow immediately downstream
    from the AWRF, where the treated wastewater is discharged into
    the Salisbury Plain River, from 40.0 mgd to 38.4 mgd, which is
    still above the average annual naturally occurring flow of 20.5
    mgd.    The board noted that the availability of AWRF water for
    use by the facility was uncertain at the time of its final
    decision, and directed the company to submit a project change
    filing to the board in the event that it modified the
    anticipated source for the majority of the project's water
    requirements. 27
    The town obtains its drinking water supply from high
    yielding wells in a Zone II aquifer encompassing a large portion
    27
    As indicated previously, subsequent to the board's
    decision, Brockton Power was unable to secure an agreement with
    the city to use AWRF water, and pursuant to the board's
    directive, submitted a PCF to the board anticipating the use of
    Brockton municipal water. The board denied the project change
    filing based on the change of water source. We consider
    Brockton Power's appeal from that decision in Brockton Power Co.
    v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., supra, also decided today. See
    note 4, supra.
    26
    of northeastern West Bridgewater and a small area of
    southeastern Brockton, totaling more than 740 acres. 28   The
    town's current permit issued pursuant to the Massachusetts Water
    Management Act, G. L. c. 21G, authorizes up to 1.53 mgd of
    withdrawal from wells in the Zone II aquifer, although actual
    use is between 0.60 to 0.77 mgd.     Under extremely conservative
    assumptions (low-flow conditions in the river and peak
    operations at the facility), the estimated effect on river flow,
    below the AWRF, would be fifteen per cent at most, or sufficient
    to maintain a flow of 10.9 mgd. 29   Based on these estimates, the
    board concluded that recharge to the town's wells would not be
    adversely affected by the facility's withdrawals.
    The town raises three primary objections to the board's
    analysis of the facility's impact on the aquifer.     The first
    focuses on the timing of the testimony addressing the facility's
    water use.   The town argues that because the expert testimony
    and the analysis regarding the aquifer were introduced in the
    course of the hearings before the board, rather than in the
    28
    The DEP regulations define "Zone II" as "that area of an
    aquifer that contributes water to a well under the most severe
    pumping and recharge conditions that can be realistically
    anticipated (180 days of pumping at approved yield, with no
    recharge from precipitation)." 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 22.02
    (2009).
    29
    These assumptions include: full permitted use of aquifer
    withdrawal from wells (1.5 mgd), forty per cent of recharged
    water from the Salisbury Plain River; peak project water use
    (10.9 mgd); and extreme low-flow conditions continuing for
    twelve weeks rather than one.
    27
    actual petition that Brockton Power submitted at the start of
    the review process, the description of environmental impacts in
    the petition was not "substantially accurate and complete," as
    required by § 69J¼, fifth par.   However, the language and
    structure of the statute make clear that the term "petition"
    refers to a project proponent's over-all submissions to the
    board, including evidentiary hearings in the course of the
    board's petition review process, and is not limited to the
    initial petition commencing the board's review.   See Andover,
    435 Mass. at 386 (changes in estimates of air impacts during
    proceeding did not violate requirement that petitioner's
    description of proposed project and environmental impacts be
    "substantially accurate and complete").   Our review of the
    record here persuades us that the board properly considered all
    substantial evidence submitted in the course of its review,
    including Brockton Power's submissions and expert testimony
    addressing the facility's impact on the Zone II aquifer.
    The town's second contention -- that the board neglected to
    make required subsidiary findings -- also fails. 30   The board's
    decision contained a "statement of reasons . . . including
    30
    The town complains that the board "failed to make the
    necessary subsidiary findings [1] as to the issues concerning
    the impacts of the proposed project upon the slope of the
    aquifer, the aquifer's saturated thickness, and the expansion of
    the wells laterally within it; and [2] as to [Brockton Power's]
    use of outmoded, [eighteen to twenty-two] year old assumptions,
    information and modeling."
    28
    determination of each issue of fact or law necessary to the
    decision," which is an adequate "'guide to its reasons' so that
    [a] court may 'exercise . . . [its] function of appellate
    review'" as required by G. L. c. 30A, § 11.    Massachusetts Inst.
    of Tech. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 
    425 Mass. 856
    , 868 (1977)
    (citations omitted).   Our review of the extensive record before
    the board assures us that substantial evidence supported the
    board's conclusion that the facility would allow water flows in
    the Salisbury Plain River in excess of the volume necessary to
    ensure recharge of the aquifer. 31   The absent subsidiary findings
    claimed by the town are either unnecessary or implicit in the
    board's decision. 32
    Finally, the town's arguments regarding the reliability and
    admissibility of testimony by Brockton Power's expert witness --
    evidence the town contends was based on hydrology reports that
    are hearsay and otherwise unreliable -- lack merit.    The board
    has broad discretion to weigh and assess the credibility of
    31
    In this regard, the board based its conclusion on a
    number of conservative assumptions regarding both wastewater
    volume and river flows that the town has not rebutted.
    32
    For example, the town contends that the board's
    determination was unsupported because, in its decision, the
    board referred to the impact of the facility's water withdrawals
    on the town's wells and water supply, and did not address
    expressly the impact on the "aquifer." However, a fair reading
    of the decision and the record makes clear that the board
    properly analyzed the project's impact on the Zone II aquifer
    for accuracy and completeness and to ensure that environmental
    impacts were minimized, as required by § 69J¼.
    29
    evidence, including hearsay evidence.     See, e.g., Box Pond Ass'n
    v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 
    435 Mass. 408
    , 418 (2001) (Box
    Pond).    Here, the expert's testimony and submissions referenced
    hydrology reports examining the Zone II aquifer in the context
    of conservative estimates of the wastewater recharge on the
    aquifer.    The board had an opportunity to consider the
    methodology and accuracy of the reports in the course of the
    hearings.    We conclude that Brockton Power's submissions,
    including the evidence presented by its expert, were
    substantially accurate and complete, and that the town has not
    met its burden of showing that the board abused its discretion
    in crediting the company's evidence.     See Alliance to Protect
    Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 
    457 Mass. 663
    , 690 (2010) (Alliance II); Box Pond, supra.
    5.    Traffic impacts.   We address briefly the city's
    contention that the board lacked statutory authority to
    establish traffic routes for deliveries of ULSD and aqueous
    ammonia as a condition of its approval of the petition.       The
    board's final decision directed Brockton Power to require that
    its ULSD and aqueous ammonia vendors use one of two State
    highways (Routes 27 and 123) through the city,     effectively
    precluding deliveries using Route 106, which runs through the
    30
    town, unless the vendor is located in the town. 33   The board
    concluded that, consistent with the company's petition and
    traffic analysis, limiting deliveries to these routes would
    minimize the traffic impacts of the facility.
    Section 69J¼, fourth par., requires the board to review a
    range of environmental impacts including "local and regional
    land use impact, local and regional cumulative health impact
    . . . , and noise impact of the proposed generating facility" as
    a part of its statutory review.    The board has consistently
    interpreted this mandate to include the environmental impacts of
    traffic, and "[w]e accord substantial discretion to an agency to
    interpret the statute it is charged with enforcing."    Alliance
    II, 457 Mass. at 681.    See, e.g., City Council of Agawam v.
    Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 
    437 Mass. 821
    , 830-831 (2002);
    Andover, 435 Mass. at 391.    Here, the effect of deliveries to
    the facility comes under the board's jurisdiction as a "local
    and regional land use impact."    G. L. c. 164, § 69J¼, fourth
    par.    Considering that traffic from construction and regular
    deliveries presents potentially significant environmental
    impacts, the board's interpretation of the statute is entirely
    reasonable.    See, e.g., Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound,
    33
    The company predicted that aqueous ammonia deliveries
    would occur two to three times per month. At most, during the
    coldest days of winter, ULSD deliveries would occur twice per
    hour. The board noted that the company would minimize the
    impact of deliveries by scheduling deliveries during the period
    of lowest traffic.
    31
    Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 
    461 Mass. 166
    , 187 (2011)
    ("agency's powers are shaped by its organic statute taken as a
    whole . . . [and] include those necessarily or reasonably
    implied" [citations omitted]). 34
    6.   Conclusion.   Because the board's procedures and
    conclusions were proper in all respects, and supported by
    substantial evidence, we affirm the board's decision approving,
    with conditions, Brockton Power's petition.
    So ordered.
    34
    The board's conclusion that the designated routes will
    minimize these impacts is supported by substantial evidence.
    G. L. c. 164, § 69P. The town's expert testified that it would
    be difficult for trucks carrying ULSD to make a left-hand turn
    from Route 106 to Route 18, as required to approach the facility
    from the town.