Commonwealth v. Sheridan ( 2015 )

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SJC-11543
COMMONWEALTH vs. MATTHEW J. SHERIDAN.
Norfolk. November 6, 2014. - February 27, 2015.
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, &
Hines, JJ.
Controlled Substances. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure,
Probable cause. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle,
Threshold police inquiry, Probable cause, Inevitable
discovery, Plain view, Search incident to lawful arrest.
Threshold Police Inquiry. Probable Cause.
Complaint received and sworn to in the Quincy Division of
the District Court Department on June 21, 2011.
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Robert
P. Ziemian, J.
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory
appeal was allowed by Gants, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to
the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an
application for direct appellate review.
Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for
the defendant.
Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
2
LENK, J. In the early morning hours of June 21, 2011,
police officers stopped the defendant, Matthew J. Sheridan, for
driving a minivan with an unilluminated headlight. During the
stop, the officers saw in the vehicle a portion of what an
officer identified as "about a [one]-ounce bag" of marijuana,
protruding from under a rumpled T-shirt lying on the floor
between the vehicle's two front seats. The officers ordered the
defendant out of the vehicle, handcuffed him, and conducted a
search of the minivan. Lifting the T-shirt, an officer found,
in addition to the bag previously partially seen, another one-
ounce bag of marijuana, and a third, smaller bag of marijuana.
The defendant was arrested and taken to the police station.
After he was booked on charges of possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute, officers seized and searched his cellular
telephone, finding several text messages that they identified as
consistent with sales of marijuana.
The defendant moved to suppress the marijuana seized from
his vehicle and the text messages found on his telephone. In
Massachusetts, "possession of one ounce or less of marihuana
[is] only . . . a civil offense," punishable by a "civil penalty
of one hundred dollars and forfeiture of the marihuana."
G. L. c. 94C, § 32L. Because it is not a crime, police
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observation of one ounce or less of marijuana is insufficient,
by itself, to give rise to the probable cause necessary to
conduct a search. See Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 Mass. 746,
752 (2013) (Daniel). A judge of the District Court nevertheless
denied the defendant's motion to suppress. He concluded the
police were permitted to enter the minivan to effect the
forfeiture of the marijuana that they saw, and that the
discovery of the additional marijuana, the defendant's arrest,
and the subsequent seizure and search of the defendant's
telephone followed from the initial lawful entry into the
defendant's vehicle. We conclude that the search of the
defendant's vehicle and of the cellular telephone violated his
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. Accordingly, the judge's order denying the defendant's
motion to suppress must be reversed.
1. Background. a. Facts. We summarize the relevant
facts as found by the District Court judge, supplemented by
uncontroverted evidence derived from the testimony of witnesses
that the judge explicitly or implicitly credited. See
Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450
Mass. 818 (2008).
4
Sean Glennon, an officer of the Quincy police department,
initiated the stop of the defendant's minivan at approximately
2:50 A.M. Glennon approached the driver's side window and
requested the defendant's driver's license and registration.
Glennon observed that the defendant looked extremely nervous;
his hands shook as he fumbled for his driver's license and
registration, and, although he readily produced his license, he
at first provided an expired registration. He eventually
provided a current valid registration.
Scott Walker, a State police trooper who happened to be
patrolling the area, also had stopped at the scene shortly after
Glennon stopped the defendant's vehicle. As Glennon was
conversing with the defendant, Walker approached the vehicle's
passenger side window. Walker observed, on the floor between
the vehicle's two front seats, the corner of a plastic sandwich
bag that appeared to contain marijuana, protruding from under a
T-shirt. Walker discreetly indicated to Glennon the apparent
presence of marijuana.
Glennon ordered the defendant to step out of the vehicle
and performed a patfrisk, during which he found $285 in cash and
a cellular telephone. After returning the money and the
telephone to the defendant, Glennon asked whether there was
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"anything illegal in the car." The defendant answered, "No."
Glennon requested permission to search the vehicle; the
defendant declined. Glennon then informed the defendant that
Walker had seen a bag of marijuana in the vehicle. The
defendant "slumped forward" and a "dejected type of look"
crossed his face.
Glennon handcuffed the defendant, whose hands by that point
were "shaking uncontrollabl[y]," and began to search the
vehicle. Glennon saw a bag he described as "consistent with
about a [one]-ounce bag" of marijuana, partially visible under a
T-shirt on the floor between the vehicle's front seats. He
lifted the T-shirt, and observed two additional bags of
marijuana, one approximately equal in size to the first bag, and
one smaller. The officers searched the remainder of the
minivan, and also requested a narcotics-trained canine to
perform a sniff search, but located no additional drugs or
contraband and no other evidence of illegal activity. The
defendant was transported to the police station, where he was
booked on charges of possession with intent to distribute
marijuana. During booking, officers again seized the
defendant's money and cellular telephone. Glennon viewed text
messages stored on the telephone, and saw "several text messages
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that appeared to be orders to purchase marijuana."
b. Procedural history. The defendant was charged with
possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, in violation
of G. L. c. 94C, § 32, and a civil motor vehicle infraction
based on the broken headlight. The defendant filed a motion to
suppress all of the physical evidence seized as a result of the
search and the arrest, including the marijuana, the telephone,
and the text messages found on the telephone. The defendant
argued that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that
the minivan contained more than one ounce of marijuana,
rendering the search impermissible. A District Court judge held
an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion, at which both
Glennon and Walker testified.
The judge denied the motion to suppress. He observed that
"[t]he issue of whether the police could ascertain whether the
initial bag of marijuana, because it was partially hidden,
contained more or less than one [ounce] of material was . . .
contested . . . at the hearing." The judge concluded, however,
that "it is irrelevant whether Glennon or Walker could make such
a determination." Stating that, "while possession of less than
[one ounce] of marijuana is not criminal, any quantity is
'contraband,'" the judge determined that "the police are
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entitled to issue an 'exit order' to completely ensure their
safety (and for convenience) while they are in a vulnerable
position reaching into the vehicle to seiz[e] the drugs."
Furthermore, the judge concluded that, "once the police removed
the shirt to seize the initial bundle of marijuana, a second one
ounce bag as well as a smaller bag were revealed," giving rise
to probable cause to arrest the defendant for possession of a
criminal quantity of marijuana. Finally, the judge concluded
that "[t]he seizure of the [tele]phone [was] incident to the
arrest," and that "the information obtained [from the search of
the telephone's contents] [was] allowed as inevitable discovery
during the investigation of whether the more than one [ounce] of
marijuana were possessed with intent to distribute."
The single justice granted the defendant's application for
leave to file an interlocutory appeal to the Appeals Court
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as appearing in 422
Mass. 1501 (1996), and also allowed the defendant to amend his
filing to include a challenge to the search of the cellular
telephone. We allowed the defendant's application for direct
appellate review.
2. Discussion. a. Standard of review. "In reviewing a
ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary
8
findings of fact absent clear error but conduct an independent
review of [the judge's] ultimate findings and conclusions of
law" (quotation omitted). Daniel, 464 Mass. at 748-749.
b. The search of the vehicle. i. The Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution protects the "right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." Article 14 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights similarly protects against
"unreasonable searches, and seizures, of [one's] person, [one's]
houses, [one's] papers, and all [one's] possessions." While
"[g]enerally, a warrant is required" for a search to be
reasonable, "several well-recognized exceptions exist."
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 473 (2011) (Cruz). "Under
the automobile exception, a warrantless search of an automobile
is permitted when police have 'probable cause to believe that a
motor vehicle on a public way contains contraband or evidence of
a crime, and exigent circumstances make obtaining a warrant
impracticable.'" Id. at 473-474, quoting Commonwealth v. Cast,
407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990). "[W]hen an automobile is stopped in
a public place with probable cause, no more exigent
circumstances are required . . . beyond the inherent mobility of
an automobile itself to justify a warrantless search of the
9
vehicle." Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 124 (1997).
In 2008, voters in the Commonwealth approved a ballot
initiative entitled "An Act establishing a sensible State
marihuana policy." See St. 2008, c. 387. The initiative
established that "possession of one ounce or less of marihuana
shall only be a civil offense, subjecting an offender who is
eighteen years of age or older to a civil penalty . . . and
forfeiture of the marihuana, but not to any other form of
criminal or civil punishment or disqualification." G. L.
c. 94C, § 32L.
In Cruz, 459 Mass. at 462, we first confronted the
decriminalization initiative's impact on the automobile
exception. There police officers, while conducting an otherwise
permissible vehicle stop, smelled "a 'faint odor' of burnt
marijuana." Id. Before the enactment of the decriminalization
initiative, we had held "that the odor of burnt marijuana is
sufficient to believe that there is contraband in the car." Id.
at 474, citing Commonwealth v. Garden, 451 Mass. 43, 47 (2008).
The validity of a warrantless search, however, is determined
according to the same standard used by a magistrate in deciding
to issue a search warrant. Cruz, supra at 475, citing Whiteley
v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971). In Massachusetts, the
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standard for the issuance of a search warrant demands probable
cause to believe that a crime is being committed. Cruz, supra
at 475-476. Because the ballot initiative transformed the
possession of one ounce or less of marijuana into a civil
infraction, not a crime, we concluded in Cruz that a warrantless
search of a vehicle is permissible only if police can establish
"probable cause to believe that a criminal amount of contraband
was present in the car." Id. at 476 (emphasis in original).
Similarly, in Daniel, supra at 749, police smelled "the
odor of freshly burnt marijuana" while conducting a traffic
stop. When an officer asked whether the vehicle's occupants had
any marijuana, a passenger gave the officer two small bags,
collectively containing less than one ounce of marijuana. Id.
The officer then ordered the occupants out of the vehicle and
searched it. Id. at 750. During the search, he found an
unlicensed firearm in the glove compartment. Id.
We held that the officer lacked probable cause to search
the vehicle. Id. at 751-752. Possession of the quantity of
marijuana contained in the two small bags "constituted a civil
infraction, not a criminal offense," id. at 751, and the
vehicle's occupants "surrendered [the] bags . . . at the request
of the officer." Id. Consequently, "[a]bsent articulable facts
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supporting a belief that either occupant of the vehicle
possessed a criminal amount of marijuana, the search was not
justified by the need to search for contraband." Id. at 752.
Cruz and Daniel control the outcome of this case. Glennon
testified that the bag that was partially visible under the T-
shirt was "consistent with about a [one]-ounce bag" of
marijuana. Because the ballot initiative decriminalized
"possession of one ounce or less" of marijuana, G. L. c. 94C,
§ 32L, the officer saw evidence of a civil infraction, not a
criminal offense. Absent articulable facts supporting a belief
that the vehicle contained an additional, criminal quantity of
marijuana, the officers lacked probable cause to believe that a
crime was being committed, and the search was impermissible.
ii. The Commonwealth offers two reasons in support of its
argument that the officers had probable cause to believe that a
criminal amount of marijuana was present in the vehicle.
The Commonwealth's first argument hinges on the word
"about." The Commonwealth contends that, because "'[a]bout' an
ounce would include amounts both more and less than an ounce,"
and because possession of more than an ounce of marijuana would
constitute a criminal offense, the officers had probable cause
to search the vehicle.
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The standard for probable cause demands that the officers
know "enough facts and circumstances 'to warrant a person of
reasonable caution in believing'" the vehicle contained a
criminal quantity of marijuana. Commonwealth v. Welch, 420
Mass. 646, 650 (1995), quoting Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass.
at 895. Here Glennon testified that, based on his training and
experience, he identified the amount of marijuana contained in
the bag as "about . . . [one]-ounce," a noncriminal quantity.
The Commonwealth identifies no facts or circumstances within the
officers' knowledge that would have led a reasonable person to
believe that Glennon underestimated the amount of marijuana
contained in the bag. That belief would be particularly
unwarranted because the officers could only see a small portion
of the bag, the remainder being covered by the T-shirt. The
imprecision in Glennon's estimate at best gives rise only to
speculation that the quantity exceeded one ounce. It does not
establish probable cause.
Next, the Commonwealth contends that, even if the
observation of the marijuana alone were not sufficient to give
rise to probable cause, the defendant's nervousness upon being
stopped tipped the scales to probable cause. In Cruz, 459 Mass.
at 467, the Commonwealth similarly contended that the odor of
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burnt marijuana, when coupled with "the stop's location, a high
crime neighborhood; the defendant's nervous demeanor; and the
occupants' sharing of a cigar" allegedly used to cover the odor
of marijuana were sufficient to establish probable cause.
Likewise, in Daniel, 464 Mass. at 749, an officer testified
that, when he approached the stopped vehicle, he observed the
defendant "sitting in the passenger seat" with "his head down
and his shoulders . . . 'rocking back and forth.'" The officer
in Daniel, supra at 750, also testified that he regarded the
defendant's conduct in emptying his pockets and placing the
contents on the dashboard as "significant . . . because it was
not common," and that it suggested to him that the defendant was
"trying to conceal something." In both cases, we determined
that manifestations of allegedly nervous or furtive behavior, in
conjunction with indications that the defendants possessed some
amount of marijuana, were not sufficient to establish probable
cause to believe that the defendants possessed a criminal
quantity. "It is common," we observed, "and not necessarily
indicative of criminality, to appear nervous during even a
mundane encounter with police." Cruz, 459 Mass. at 468.
Because the Commonwealth identifies no additional factors
supporting probable cause beyond the defendant's apparent
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nervousness and the noncriminal quantity of marijuana that the
officers observed, we reach the same conclusion here.
iii. The decriminalization initiative transformed
possession of one ounce or less of marijuana into a civil
offense, subjecting the possessor to "a civil penalty" and
"forfeiture of the marihuana." G. L. c. 94C, § 32L. The
District Court judge determined that the police officers were
permitted to order the defendant out of his vehicle, and then to
enter the vehicle themselves to effect this forfeiture. The
Commonwealth echoes this argument on appeal, asserting that
"[t]he limited entry was reasonable as it effected the
forfeiture as envisioned by G. L. c. 94C, § 32L."
In evaluating this argument, it is important to distinguish
an officer's power to seize the marijuana from the officer's
power to make an entry into the vehicle to effect that seizure.
We agree with the District Court judge's determination that any
quantity of marijuana is "contraband" and is subject to seizure.
We disagree, however, with the judge's conclusion that, to
effect that seizure, the officers were entitled to make an entry
into the vehicle that -- lacking probable cause -- they
otherwise would be prohibited from making.
The Commonwealth contends that the seizure of the marijuana
15
was proper because it was in "plain view." "Under our plain
view doctrine, a police officer may seize objects in plain view
where four requirements are met: (1) the officer is 'lawfully in
a position to view the object'; (2) the officer has 'a lawful
right of access to the object'; (3) with respect to 'contraband,
weapons, or other items illegally possessed, where the
incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent'
or, with respect to 'other types of evidence . . . where the
particular evidence is plausibly related to criminal activity of
which the police are already aware'; and (4) the officer
'come[s] across the object inadvertently.'" Commonwealth v.
White, 469 Mass. 96, 102 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Sliech–
Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 306–307 (2010). There is no dispute
here that the first and fourth requirements are met: the
officers were lawfully in a position to observe the bag of
marijuana, since the bag was visible from outside the vehicle
where the officers were positioned in effecting a permissible,
routine traffic stop; and the officers came across the marijuana
inadvertently, since there is no contention that the officers
effected the traffic stop to search for marijuana.
The Commonwealth, however, cannot satisfy the doctrine's
second requirement, which demands that the officer have "a
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lawful right of access to the object." Commonwealth v. White,
supra. In typical plain view cases, officers see and seize an
object while conducting a permissible search, pursuant either to
a warrant, see Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, supra at 306, or
to an exception to the warrant requirement, see Commonwealth v.
White, supra; Commonwealth v. Stack, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 227, 234-
235 (2000). In those cases, police officers are already in the
process of conducting a permissible search of a certain location
(i.e. a vehicle, a house), and the plain view doctrine operates
to allow officers to seize an object to which, by virtue of the
search, they already have access. In other cases, police
officers see, in plain view from a lawful vantage point outside
a vehicle, an item that itself gives rise to "probable cause to
believe that they would find 'the instrumentality of a crime or
evidence pertaining to a crime' in the vehicle." Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 49 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v.
Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 55 (1974). Because the observation
gives rise to probable cause to conduct a search, the subsequent
entry into the vehicle and seizure of the item is permissible.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra at 50.
Here, although the officers could see the marijuana from
their lawful vantage point outside the minivan, they did not
17
have a "lawful right to access" it from that vantage point. To
seize the marijuana, the police officers had to enter the
minivan. Because the observation of a noncriminal quantity of
marijuana alone did not give rise to probable cause that the
vehicle contained evidence of a crime, the validity of the
officers' seizure of the marijuana turns on the existence of
some other basis, besides probable cause, to justify the
officers' entry into the vehicle.
The Commonwealth characterizes the entry into the minivan
as a "limited intrusion," and likens it to the intrusion
involved in a police officer's request for license and
registration documentation during a routine motor vehicle stop.
The analogy is inapposite. In the context of traffic stops, we
have never held that officers may routinely enter vehicles to
acquire driver's license and registration documents, in the same
way that the officers entered the defendant's vehicle here to
seize the marijuana. On the contrary, we have stated that,
"[g]enerally, the officer may simply direct the driver to
retrieve his identification from the vehicle." Commonwealth v.
Lopes, 455 Mass. 147, 160 (2009). Only when the officers have
"a reasonable basis to believe that [the vehicle's occupants
are] armed and dangerous" are police officers permitted to order
18
the occupants out of the vehicle and then conduct a limited
search for the purposes of recovering the identification and
registration documents. Id. Cf. Commonwealth v. Pagan, 440
Mass. 62, 68 (2003) (police officers permitted to search
"container that they reasonably fear may contain a weapon"
before returning it to defendant to locate his identification
documentation); Commonwealth v. Lantigua, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 526,
528-529 (1995) (concluding that, where circumstances of search
"justifie[d] heightened precautions for the officers' own
safety[,] . . . the officers could properly have entered the
passenger compartment, including the glove compartment, to
retrieve the registration themselves").
Indeed, our jurisprudence has diverged from the United
States Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in that we
have held that art. 14 prohibits automatic exit orders during
routine traffic stops. Compare Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429
Mass. 658, 662-663 (1999), with Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 109-110 (1977). Instead, we have concluded that a police
officer must "have a reasonable suspicion of danger before
compelling a driver to leave his motor vehicle." Commonwealth
v. Gonsalves, supra at 662. Here the District Court judge
acknowledged that, "except for the extreme nervousness of the
19
defendant, there [were] not present any other factors that would
indicate a dangerous situation may exist." The judge never
found that the officers' exit order and the patfrisk of the
defendant that followed were based on any reasonable
apprehension of danger. Rather, the record indicates that these
events were precipitated solely by the officers' observation of
what they believed to be a noncriminal portion of marijuana.
Under these circumstances, the exit order and the patfrisk were
impermissible, and the officers' entry into the vehicle to seize
the marijuana cannot be justified under the logic that enables
police officers to enter a vehicle to recover license and
registration documentation in situations where the officer
reasonably believes that the driver is armed and dangerous.
Finally, the Commonwealth suggests that the officers' entry
into the minivan was permissible under the logic that allows
warrantless administrative inspections to enforce certain
regulatory schemes. Such searches, however, are typically
confined to "commercial premises" that are "utilized in the
context of a 'closely regulated' industry," where "an
individual's expectation of privacy" is "particularly
attenuated." Commonwealth v. Tart, 408 Mass. 249, 253-254
(1990). Where warrantless administrative searches for evidence
20
of suspected regulatory violations have been upheld, moreover,
typically "there is no possibility of criminal action and thus
no necessity to comply with the more stringent standards of
criminal probable cause" (quotations and citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Frodyma, 386 Mass. 434, 442 (1982).
Administrative searches are permissible because they are
"conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance
of an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal
investigation to secure evidence of crime." United States v.
Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled on other
grounds, United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007)
(en banc). They are not permissible, by contrast, where they
serve as a "tool for law enforcement." United States v.
$124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1989).
The facts of this case aptly demonstrate how the type of
intrusion that occurred here could become a tool for law
enforcement to search for evidence of criminal activity despite
the absence of probable cause. Contrary to the Commonwealth's
characterization, the search went beyond a "limited intrusion"
for the "sole purpose of seizing marijuana in [the officers']
plain view." Upon entering the vehicle, the officers did not
merely seize the one bag of marijuana that was partially in
21
plain view under the T-shirt. Instead, they lifted the T-shirt,
discovering and then seizing two additional bags. The judge
made no factual finding that the officers had to lift the T-
shirt to seize the bag, rather than simply grasping the portion
of the bag that was partially visible. And although the
District Court judge found that, "in addition to the visible
one-ounce bag of marijuana, other objects lay underneath the
same t-shirt," the judge never found, and nothing in the
officers' testimony supports a finding, that the officers had
reason to believe that these other objects were other bags of
marijuana, rather than innocuous, noncontraband items.
For these reasons, we reject the Commonwealth's contention
that the officers here were permitted to effect a "limited
intrusion" into the defendant's vehicle to seize the marijuana.
The officers observed a noncriminal quantity of marijuana from a
lawful vantage point, and might well have informed the defendant
that the possession of that marijuana constituted a civil
offense, subjecting the possessor to a fine, and that the
marijuana was subject to forfeiture. They could have requested
that the defendant turn the marijuana over to them.1 They could
1
We leave to another day an examination of the consequences
if the defendant had declined to turn over the marijuana on
22
also have issued a civil citation, see G. L. c. 94C, § 32N, and
pursued the forfeiture of the marijuana, see G. L. c. 94C, § 47.
They did not do so. Instead, they entered the vehicle and
conducted a search that went beyond even what would be necessary
to seize the bag that they had seen. Because they lacked
probable cause to believe that the van contained evidence of a
crime, we conclude that their entry into the minivan was
impermissible.
c. The search of the cellular telephone. Our
determination that the search of the defendant's vehicle was
impermissible resolves any question whether the subsequent
search of the defendant's cellular telephone was permissible.
The District Court judge concluded that the additional bags of
marijuana that the officers discovered as a result of their
entry into the minivan gave rise to probable cause to arrest the
defendant; that the seizure of the cellular telephone was
permissible as a seizure incident to the defendant's arrest; and
that, once the telephone was seized, the search of the text
messages contained on the telephone was permissible under the
inevitable discovery doctrine. In the District Court judge's
analysis, then, the validity of the search of the cellular
request.
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telephone ultimately turned on the validity of the officers'
entry into the minivan. Because we have determined that the
officers' entry into the minivan was impermissible, the thread
leading to the search of the text messages is unwound, and the
text messages must be suppressed. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Pietrass, 392 Mass. 892, 900 (1984).
If there were any doubt about that result, the United
States Supreme Court has set it to rest. After the District
Court judge issued his decision in this case, the United States
Supreme Court decided Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473
(2014). There, the Court held that "the search incident to
arrest exception does not apply to cell phones." Id. at 2494.
For both of those reasons, the text messages obtained as a
result of the search of the defendant's cellular telephone must
be suppressed.
3. Conclusion. The decision denying the defendant's
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the searches
of his vehicle and of the defendant's cellular telephone is
reversed. The matter is remanded to the District Court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.