Weiler v. PortfolioScope, Inc. , 469 Mass. 75 ( 2014 )


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    SJC-11476
    MILTON C. WEILER, JR.    vs.   PORTFOLIOSCOPE, INC., & others. 1
    Suffolk.      March 3, 2014. - July 11, 2014.
    Present:    Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly,
    & Lenk, JJ.
    Secured Transactions. Uniform Commercial Code, Secured
    creditor, Secured transaction, Good faith. Corporation,
    Stock. Contract, Performance and breach, Implied covenant
    of good faith and fair dealing, Interference with
    contractual relations. Conversion. Consumer Protection
    Act, Unfair or deceptive act. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
    Act.
    Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
    February 17, 2009.
    The case was heard by Margaret R. Hinkle, J.
    After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial
    Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.
    Curtis C. Pfunder for the plaintiff.
    Andrew N. Nathanson (Keith P. Carroll with him) for the
    defendants.
    1
    Kevin B. Kimberlin and Joseph T. Whelihan.
    2
    BOTSFORD, J.   The disputes in this case arise from a
    complex web of relationships between various individual and
    corporate entities.     The plaintiff, Milton C. Weiler, Jr., the
    former president and chief operating officer of the defendant
    corporation, PortfolioScope, Inc. (PortfolioScope), brought suit
    against the defendants raising various claims, including breach
    of contract, violation of G. L. c. 93A, and fraudulent transfers
    pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA).     After a
    jury-waived trial, Weiler prevailed, and a judgment entered in
    his favor.   The Appeals Court reversed the judgment in part, and
    we granted Weiler's application for further appellate review.
    For the reasons discussed hereafter, we affirm the judgment of
    the Superior Court in almost all respects.
    1.   Background.   We summarize the pertinent facts as found
    by the trial judge; additional facts are discussed in connection
    with the issues raised.     In 1981 and 1998, respectively, Weiler
    cofounded Computer Aided Decisions and CAD Research, Inc. (CAD
    entities), companies that developed and marketed software to
    help manage investment portfolios.     In early 2000, Spencer Trask
    & Co. (Spencer Trask), a venture capital firm effectively
    controlled by the defendant Kevin Kimberlin, 2 acquired the CAD
    2
    Kevin Kimberlin owns approximately ninety-five per cent of
    Spencer Trask & Co. (Spencer Trask). The principal
    beneficiaries of Spencer Trask are trusts and partnerships in
    the names of Kimberlin's wife and children. Kimberlin served as
    3
    entities from Weiler and the cofounder.   After the purchase, the
    CAD entities were merged into a new company that became the
    defendant PortfolioScope.   Weiler received cash as well as stock
    and stock options in the new company at the time of the sale and
    served at that time as its president and chief operating
    officer.
    In 2001, PortfolioScope began experiencing financial
    difficulty, and it received a series of loans from Wachovia
    Bank, N.A. (Wachovia), beginning on February 20, 2001. 3   Kevin
    Kimberlin Partners, L.P. (KKP), guaranteed these Wachovia loans,
    and in that connection, on February 20, 2001, PortfolioScope
    executed a security agreement granting KKP a security interest
    in all of PortfolioScope's property, including its deposit
    accounts and cash.   On July 25, 2001, PortfolioScope executed a
    demand note in favor of Wachovia in the amount of $4.01 million. 4
    On July 10, 2002, KKP paid off PortfolioScope's debt to
    Wachovia, and thereafter received an assignment of all of
    Wachovia's rights and interests in PortfolioScope.   The
    the chairman of the board and the sole director of Spencer
    Trask.
    3
    The initial loan from Wachovia Bank, N.A. (Wachovia), to
    PortfolioScope was for $3.01 million.
    4
    All of the loans Wachovia made to PortfolioScope were
    covered by the February 20, 2001, security agreement between
    Kevin Kimberlin Partners, L.P. (KKP), and PortfolioScope.
    4
    assignment agreement incorporated the security agreement that
    PortfolioScope previously had executed in favor of KKP.    Between
    2003 and 2008, PortfolioScope received additional loans from KKP
    directly. 5
    Weiler served as PortfolioScope's president and chief
    operating officer from January, 2000, to May, 2002.    Kimberlin
    hired the defendant, Joseph T. Whelihan, in January, 2002, to
    become PortfolioScope's chief executive officer.    On February
    13, 2002, Weiler entered into a stock option purchase and sale
    agreement with PortfolioScope (five per cent agreement), in
    which Weiler agreed to sell back to PortfolioScope 666,667
    vested and unvested stock options in the company, and in
    exchange would be paid a contingent purchase price.    On October
    21, 2002, the parties amended the five per cent agreement (five
    per cent amendment) to include a provision that PortfolioScope
    would pay Weiler five per cent of the net proceeds received in
    connection with a pending lawsuit between PortfolioScope and
    iFlex Solutions Limited (iFlex litigation). 6   Whelihan, as
    5
    These loans were made between October 1, 2003, and
    October 9, 2008, totaled $1.272 million, and were evidenced by
    senior secured promissory notes executed by PortfolioScope.
    6
    The amendment to the five per cent agreement (five per
    cent amendment) provides in pertinent part that, "[i]n addition
    to payments to be made by the Company as described in the [five
    per cent agreement]," PortfolioScope would pay Weiler:
    5
    Portfolioscope's chief executive officer, signed both the five
    per cent agreement and the five per cent amendment on behalf of
    the company; the five per cent agreement also was initialed by
    Kimberlin.
    Between May, 2002, and October 21, 2008, Weiler consulted
    with PortfolioScope, principally in connection with the then
    pending iFlex litigation. 7   On October 21, 2008, the iFlex
    litigation settled for $10 million.    The law firm serving as
    PortfolioScope's counsel in that litigation received the $10
    million settlement funds on November 7, and, after deducting the
    amount claimed by the firm as legal fees, transferred
    approximately $8.2 million to PortfolioScope on November 12.
    That same day, Kimberlin directed Whelihan to wire $5.2 million
    of the proceeds to a Spencer Trask brokerage account because he
    wanted to gain immediate access to the settlement proceeds.      On
    "Five (5) percent of the net proceeds (or net recovery) to
    the Company [PortfolioScope] in connection with any claims
    by the Company against Citicorp (and its affiliates)
    related to copyright infringement and/or theft of
    confidential information and trade secrets. The term net
    proceeds or net recovery as used in this Section shall mean
    gross proceeds less legal fees of the Company's counsel."
    The parties do not dispute that the litigation with iFlex
    Solutions Limited (iFlex litigation) is covered by the five per
    cent amendment.
    7
    Weiler and PortfolioScope also entered into various
    consulting agreements between 2002 and 2008, of which the trial
    judge found PortfolioScope had committed a breach.
    6
    November 17, again at Kimberlin's direction, Whelihan wired
    another $1.296 million to the Spencer Trask account and,
    separately, another $1,231,186.13, also to Spencer Trask. 8   Also
    on November 17, at Kimberlin's direction, Whelihan wired
    $500,000 to an account in Whelihan's wife's name.     Finally, on
    November 25, Whelihan paid himself $15,000 from the iFlex
    litigation settlement proceeds, a transaction authorized by
    Kimberlin. 9   Taken together, these transfers accounted for almost
    all of the iFlex litigation settlement proceeds. 10
    After the iFlex litigation settled, beginning on
    November 10, 2008, Weiler initiated a series of "increasingly
    frustrated" inquiries directed at Whelihan, Kimberlin, and
    others connected to PortfolioScope and Spencer Trask as to when
    he was to be paid his entitlement under the five per cent
    amendment.     On December 2, 2008 -- after the iFlex litigation
    proceeds were essentially depleted -- Whelihan sent a message
    via electronic mail (e-mail) to Weiler, with a copy to
    8
    This second transfer on November 17, 2008, appears to have
    been intended to satisfy an escrow order entered by a Superior
    Court judge in a then-pending lawsuit between PortfolioScope and
    Charles Hunt, Weiler's former business partner.
    9
    For ease of reference, we refer to the transfer to
    Whelihan's wife and the transfer to Whelihan collectively as
    transfers to Whelihan.
    10
    After these transfers, approximately $36,000 remained
    from the iFlex litigation settlement funds.
    7
    Kimberlin, asking whether Weiler would settle for an amount less
    than that he was otherwise entitled to under the five per cent
    amendment.    On December 4, Weiler responded that he would accept
    $406,000 as payment in full.    When no transfer of funds was
    made, Weiler sent an e-mail to Whelihan on December 8, asking
    when he should expect payment; Whelihan asked Weiler to "hold on
    a little longer."    Weiler made a subsequent inquiry on
    December 17, to which Whelihan indicated that Weiler was "[his]
    first priority tomorrow.    Promise." 11   Weiler never received
    payment from PortfolioScope.
    On March 23, 2009, Whelihan sent an e-mail to Weiler
    informing him that he was sending Weiler a $20,000 check as part
    of an instalment plan as an incentive to help with the pending
    litigation between PortfolioScope and Charles Hunt. 12     See note
    8, supra.    Shortly thereafter, Weiler served his complaint in
    this action, alleging various claims against PortfolioScope,
    Whelihan, and Kimberlin (collectively, defendants). 13     Only after
    11
    The trial judge found that "[a]t this point . . .
    Whelihan was simply stringing Weiler along."
    12
    Weiler subsequently received and cashed the $20,000
    check.
    13
    Weiler asserted the following claims in his amended
    complaint: (1) breach of contract against PortfolioScope; (2)
    breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
    against PortfolioScope; (3) tortious interference with
    contractual relations against Kimberlin; (4) violation of G. L.
    c. 93A, § 11, against PortfolioScope, Whelihan, and Kimberlin
    8
    the lawsuit was filed did Weiler learn that:   (1) Whelihan had
    transferred $515,000 to himself; and (2) the defendants were
    asserting that Weiler was not being paid because KKP was a
    secured creditor of PortfolioScope and had a priority interest
    in the settlement proceeds that trumped Weiler's contractual
    rights.
    After a bench trial, the judge issued a written decision in
    which she made detailed findings and concluded that:   (1)
    PortfolioScope committed a breach of the five per cent amendment
    and the consulting agreements with Weiler as well as the
    covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 14 (2) Kimberlin
    tortiously interfered with Weiler's contractual rights vis-à-vis
    Portfolioscope; (3) the defendants converted funds belonging to
    Weiler; (4) the defendants knowingly and wilfully engaged in
    unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of G. L.
    c. 93A, § 11; (5) the defendants violated UFTA; and (6) the
    (collectively, defendants); (5) fraudulent transfers in
    violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) against
    the defendants; (6) misrepresentation against the defendants;
    (7) violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act against the
    defendants; (8) quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and equitable
    estoppel against the defendants; (9) detrimental reliance
    against Kimberlin and Whelihan; (10) conversion against the
    defendants; (11) civil conspiracy against the defendants; (12)
    piercing the corporate veil against Kimberlin; and (13) a claim
    for an accounting against the defendants.
    14
    The defendants do not challenge the judge's finding of
    breach of contract (the five per cent amendment or the
    consulting agreements) against Portfolio, or the judgment of
    $471,122.97 on this count.
    9
    defendants conspired against Weiler. 15   The defendants appealed
    to the Appeals Court, which affirmed the judgment against
    Portfolioscope for breach of contract, but otherwise reversed,
    concluding that judgment should enter in favor of the defendants
    on all other counts in Weiler's amended complaint.    Weiler v.
    PortfolioScope, Inc., 
    83 Mass. App. Ct. 216
    , 233 (2013).    We
    affirm the judgment of the Superior Court with the exception of
    Weiler's claim for conversion.
    2.   Discussion.   The defendants argue that the judge erred
    in certain fundamental respects in her interpretation of the
    five per cent agreement and five per cent amendment, as well as
    in her analysis of secured transaction principles as applied to
    this case; in the defendants' view, these errors infected almost
    every part of the disposition of the case.    As to the five per
    cent agreement and amendment, the defendants contend that the
    judge misinterpreted the five per cent amendment as giving
    Weiler a right to five per cent of the actual settlement
    proceeds of the iFlex litigation (less legal fees), rather than
    a right to five per cent of the value of the settlement (less
    legal fees).   With respect to secured transaction principles,
    15
    Judgment entered awarding damages against the defendants,
    jointly and severally where applicable, with respect to each
    count of the amended complaint on which one or more of the
    defendants were found liable, including double damages and
    attorney's fees in connection with the violation of G. L.
    c. 93A, and additional remedies in connection with the violation
    of UFTA.
    10
    the defendants contend that the judge failed to accord proper
    legal significance to the fact that the $515,000 in transfers
    from the iFlex litigation settlement proceeds to Whelihan and
    the approximately $6.5 million in transfers from the proceeds to
    Spencer Trask in substance and legal effect were transfers to
    PortfolioScope's secured creditor, KKP, an entity that as a
    matter of law had priority over Weiler. 16   The Appeals Court
    agreed with the defendants.   See Weiler, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at
    218, 223-226.   We also agree that the five per cent amendment
    did not give Weiler a right to recover from the actual
    settlement proceeds, but in the factual circumstances of this
    case, conclude that any error in the judge's interpretation of
    the five per cent amendment affects only Weiler's claim for
    conversion.   On the law of secured transactions, the judge's
    factual findings in this case persuade us that no legal error
    16
    There is a question whether KKP's February 20, 2001,
    security agreement actually covered the iFlex litigation
    settlement proceeds. To have a security interest in commercial
    tort claims, they must be named expressly in the security
    agreement and must be in existence at the time the security
    agreement is created. See G. L. c. 106, § 9-108 (e) (1)
    (description by type insufficient for commercial tort claims);
    G. L. c. 106, § 9-204 (b) (2) (after-acquired property clause
    ineffective against commercial tort claims). At all relevant
    times in this case, however, the iFlex litigation settlement had
    been reduced to cash and placed in PortfolioScope's account, and
    KKP had a security interest in PortfolioScope's cash and deposit
    accounts. For the purposes of our discussion, we assume,
    without deciding, that KKP's security interest in
    PortfolioScope's assets extended to the settlement proceeds of
    the iFlex litigation.
    11
    infected the judge's consideration of KKP's security interest in
    the iFlex litigation settlement proceeds.
    a.    Standard of review.    "We accept the judge's findings of
    fact in a bench trial unless they are clearly erroneous,"
    Makrigiannis v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 
    442 Mass. 675
    , 677
    (2004), and the credibility of the witnesses rests within the
    purview of the trial judge.      See Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), as
    amended, 
    423 Mass. 1402
     (1996).
    b.    Breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing by PortfolioScope.    The judge found that Portfolioscope
    committed a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing when it paid $515,000, which constituted more than five
    per cent of the net proceeds of the iFlex litigation, to
    Whelihan.    She explained that there was "simply no tenable
    argument that the [five per cent] [a]greement[17] permitted
    PortfolioScope to make any payment to Whelihan before paying
    Weiler."    PortfolioScope takes the position that it did not
    commit a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
    because its payment to Whelihan was directed by KKP --
    PortfolioScope's secured creditor.      Its argument is that
    PortfolioScope was required to comply with KKP's instructions to
    17
    It is clear from the context that the trial judge was
    focusing on the five per cent amendment.
    12
    pay Whelihan directly. 18   See G. L. c. 106, § 9-405 (a).   We
    affirm the judge's finding.
    "The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in
    every contract," Uno Restaurants, Inc. v. Boston Kenmore Realty
    Corp., 
    441 Mass. 376
    , 385 (2004), citing Kerrigan v. Boston, 
    361 Mass. 24
    , 33 (1972), including contracts between sophisticated
    business people.   See Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs.,
    
    411 Mass. 451
    , 473 (1991).    The implied covenant provides "that
    neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of
    destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive
    the fruits of the contract . . . ."    Drucker v. Roland Wm.
    Jutras Assocs., Inc., 
    370 Mass. 383
    , 385 (1976), quoting Uproar
    Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 
    81 F.2d 373
    , 377 (1st Cir.
    1934), cert. denied, 
    298 U.S. 670
     (1936), and "exists so that
    the objectives of the contract may be realized," Ayash v. Dana-
    Farber Cancer Inst., 
    443 Mass. 367
    , 385, cert. denied sub nom.
    Globe Newspaper Co. v. Ayash, 
    546 U.S. 927
     (2005).    "A breach
    occurs when one party violates the reasonable expectations of
    the other."   Chokel v. Genzyme Corp., 
    449 Mass. 272
    , 276 (2007),
    and cases cited.
    "In determining whether a party violated the implied
    covenant of good faith and fair dealing, we look to the
    18
    The Appeals Court essentially adopted this rationale in
    reversing the breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing claim against PortfolioScope. See Weiler, 
    83 Mass. App. Ct. 216
    , 226-227 (2013).
    13
    party's manner of performance. . . . There is no
    requirement that bad faith be shown; instead, the plaintiff
    has the burden of proving a lack of good faith. . . . The
    lack of good faith can be inferred from the totality of the
    circumstances." (Citations omitted.)
    T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 
    456 Mass. 562
    , 570
    (2010).
    PortfolioScope's argument, that the payment to Whelihan was
    actually a payment ordered by its secured creditor KKP, is at
    odds with the trial judge's findings concerning the transfers
    made to Whelihan from the iFlex litigation proceeds.   The judge
    found that the $500,000 transfer was made "at Kimberlin's
    direction," and the $15,000 transfer was "authorized by
    Kimberlin."   What is absent from these findings -- and what is
    necessary for Portfolioscope's secured creditor argument -- is
    that Kimberlin authorized or directed these payments on behalf
    of KKP.   The defendants apparently assume that Kimberlin did so,
    but do not identify the basis for this assumption; the mere fact
    that Kimberlin controlled KKP is not a sufficient one. 19
    19
    Moreover, a finding that Kimberlin acted on behalf of KKP
    in directing Whelihan to pay himself from the iFlex litigation
    proceeds logically would seem to require a corollary finding
    that KKP credited the $515,000 transferred to Whelihan against
    PortfolioScope's debt to KKP. We do not read the judge's
    decision as including such a finding. The judge stated, "KKP,
    L.P. allegedly gave PortfolioScope a $500,000 credit on
    Portfolioscope's secured debt obligation for the $500,000
    Whelihan payment" (emphasis added). This was the only fact
    included in the judge's decision that she qualified with
    "allegedly," and the judge also stated at a different point in
    her decision, when discussing Weiler's UFTA claim, that
    14
    What the judge's findings do indicate is that
    PortfolioScope, at Kimberlin's direction, transferred $515,000
    to Whelihan, who was neither a secured creditor of
    PortfolioScope nor otherwise entitled to the funds; 20 and that
    PortfolioScope's $515,000 payment to Whelihan represented more
    than five per cent of the net proceeds from the iFlex
    litigation, which was the amount to which Weiler was entitled
    under the five per cent amendment. 21   Moreover, the judge found
    "PortfolioScope received no value in exchange for" the transfers
    of $515,000 to Whelihan. Moreover, the only evidence that
    PortfolioScope did receive credit was the testimony of
    Kimberlin, a witness the judge discredited in several respects.
    The defendants did not introduce any financial or other business
    records of either PortfolioScope or KKP reflecting this alleged
    credit. Cf. Automobile Insurers Bur. of Mass. v. Commissioner
    of Ins., 
    430 Mass. 285
    , 291 (1999) (commissioner could properly
    draw adverse inference from insurers' failure to produce
    complete information on subject "peculiarly within their
    control"). Given that the judge's findings quoted here indicate
    she did not believe Kimberlin's testimony, the factual premise
    on which the defendants' argument is built does not exist.
    At oral argument before this court, counsel for the
    defendants agreed that, if PortfolioScope had not credited the
    $515,000 payment to Whelihan against the amount it owed to KKP,
    the failure to have done so would undermine the defendants'
    contention that PortfsolioScope's payment to Whelihan
    constituted a payment to the secured creditor.
    20
    The judge expressly discredited Whelihan's testimony that
    he was "owed" $500,000 for past services rendered to
    PortfolioScope and various other entities connected to
    Kimberlin.
    21
    The judge's discussion of the implied covenant claim may
    be read to indicate that she interpreted the five per cent
    amendment as giving Weiler a right to recover five per cent of
    the actual iFlex litigation settlement proceeds. As previously
    15
    that these transfers were motivated by a desire to enrich
    Whelihan at the expense of Weiler who had provided substantial
    services in order to make the iFlex litigation settlement
    possible -- a finding which is supported by the evidence.    See
    T.W. Nickerson, Inc., 
    456 Mass. at 574
     (looking to whether
    defendant's motivation was "to affect negatively the plaintiff's
    rights" under the contract to determine whether breach of
    implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing occurred).    See
    also Chokel, 449 Mass. at 278 n.5; Anthony's Pier Four, Inc.,
    
    411 Mass. at 472-473
    .   PortfolioScope's argument fails.
    c.   Tortious interference with contractual relations by
    Kimberlin.   "To prevail on a claim of tortious interference with
    a contract, a plaintiff must establish that '(1) he had a
    contract with a third party; (2) the defendant knowingly induced
    the third party to break that contract; (3) the defendant's
    stated, we agree with the defendants and the Appeals Court that
    such an interpretation is not correct, but the error has no
    significance because the settlement proceeds represented
    essentially all of PortfolioScope's assets. In other words, the
    company would have been required to transfer a portion of the
    settlement proceeds in order to meet its contractual obligation
    to Weiler.
    Although it is true that approximately $1.231 million of
    the iFlex litigation settlement funds, which represented more
    than five per cent of the net proceeds, purportedly went to
    satisfy an escrow order for then pending litigation between
    PortfolioScope and Charles Hunt, during the time period involved
    in this case, PortfolioScope had no ability to reach that money
    to pay Weiler, and there was no guarantee that that sum would
    ever be returned to PortfolioScope.
    16
    interference, in addition to being intentional, was improper in
    motive or means; and (4) the plaintiff was harmed by the
    defendant's actions.'"    Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 
    459 Mass. 697
    ,
    715-716 (2011), quoting G.S. Enters., Inc. v. Falmouth Marine,
    Inc., 
    410 Mass. 262
    , 272 (1991).    Accord Blackstone v. Cashman,
    
    448 Mass. 255
    , 260 (2007).    However, "[w]here the defendant is a
    corporate official acting in the scope of his corporate
    responsibilities, a plaintiff has a heightened burden of showing
    the improper motive or means constituted 'actual malice,' that
    is, 'a spiteful, malignant purpose, unrelated to the legitimate
    corporate interest.'"    Psy-Ed Corp., 
    supra at 716
    , quoting
    Blackstone, supra at 260-261.
    The judge concluded that Kimberlin intentionally interfered
    with Weiler's right to be paid from the iFlex litigation
    proceeds under the five per cent amendment by authorizing
    Whelihan to pay $515,000 to himself, and that Kimberlin did so
    with improper motive or means; the judge did not apply the
    "actual malice" standard in reaching this result, or even
    discuss the standard -- presumably because the defendants did
    not mention this standard or suggest that the standard had any
    application to this case.    The Appeals Court reversed,
    concluding that because Kimberlin served as chair of the board
    and sole director of Spencer Trask, which owned ninety per cent
    of PortfolioScope, he qualified as a "corporate official" of
    17
    Portfolioscope to whom the actual malice standard applied, and
    Weiler failed to meet the "heightened burden" that the standard
    imposes.   Weiler, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 228.   Before this court,
    Kimberlin embraces the Appeals Court's theory and argues that he
    is entitled to the actual malice standard because, as the
    Appeals Court concluded, he was a Portfolioscope "corporate
    official."
    We have stated that "[t]he 'actual malice' standard for
    proving improper motive or means on the part of a corporate
    official is a burden placed on the plaintiff, not a defense that
    must be proved by the defendant."   Blackstone, 448 Mass. at 261.
    See id. at 261 n.10.   That the plaintiff must prove a corporate
    official acted with actual malice, however, does not absolve the
    defendant from bringing to the attention of the plaintiff and
    the court in some fashion that he claims to qualify as a
    "corporate official" of the relevant corporation and therefore
    is entitled to have the actual malice standard apply.     See id.
    at 256, 259, 268 (defendant, one of two directors of close
    corporation employing plaintiff, requested actual malice jury
    instruction at trial; error not to give it).   Cf. Teller v.
    Schepens, 
    381 Mass. 621
    , 623 (1980) (once defendant raises
    statute of limitations issue, plaintiff bears burden of proving
    claims are not time barred).   Cf. also Commonwealth v.
    Humphries, 
    465 Mass. 762
    , 771 (2013) (where defendant was
    18
    charged with joint venture possession of firearm, his claim that
    coventurer possessed license to carry firearm would be defense
    to charge; defendant not required to produce evidence of
    coventurer's license, but only bears burden of raising issue of
    license; once issue raised, burden on Commonwealth to prove
    coventurer was not licensed).   The need to identify the
    "corporate official" issue is especially pronounced in a case
    like the present one, where the complexities of the corporate
    and individual relationships raise, at best, a possibility that
    the defendant qualifies as a corporate official. 22
    To summarize:   only where a defendant raises a claim that
    he qualifies as a corporate official does the plaintiff then
    bear the burden of proving either that the defendant does not so
    qualify and is not entitled to the actual malice standard, or
    22
    Contrast Weber v. Community Teamwork, Inc., 
    434 Mass. 761
    , 762, 781 (2001) (executive director constituted corporate
    official); King v. Driscoll, 
    418 Mass. 576
    , 578, 587 (1994),
    S.C., 
    424 Mass. 1
     (1996) (shareholder-directors actively
    involved in management as corporate officials); Gram v. Liberty
    Mut. Ins. Co., 
    384 Mass. 659
    , 660, 663-664 (1981), S.C., 
    391 Mass. 333
     (1984) (direct supervisors entitled to actual malice
    standard). In Blackstone v. Cashman, 
    448 Mass. 255
    , 267 (2007),
    this court concluded that a director of a close corporation,
    even if not involved in the day-to-day operations of the
    company, still "has an important interest in and responsibility
    for the conduct of business" because of his status as director,
    and qualifies as a corporate official to whom the actual malice
    standard would apply. The court left open whether the same
    would be true for a person who was simply a shareholder of a
    close corporation. See 
    id.
     at 267 n.16. Although, as the judge
    found, Kimberlin may have exerted practical control over
    PortfolioScope, he was not an employee, officer, director, or
    even shareholder of the company.
    19
    that the defendant did act with actual malice.      Here, Kimberlin
    did not argue or suggest at trial (or before the Appeals Court)
    that he was a "corporate official" of PortfolioScope and thereby
    was entitled to the actual malice standard. 23    Rather, he
    advances it for the first time before this court.      Having failed
    to raise the issue below, he has waived it.      See Canton v.
    Commissioner of Mass. Highway Dep't, 
    455 Mass. 783
    , 795 n.18
    (2010), and cases cited; Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 
    389 Mass. 47
    , 63 (1983), citing Royal Indem. Co. v. Blakeley, 
    372 Mass. 86
    , 88 (1977) (issues not raised below are usually not
    considered on appeal unless "the questions presented are of some
    public importance and the result we reach is not changed by our
    consideration of them").
    The defendants claim also that even if Kimberlin was not
    entitled to the benefit of the actual malice standard, Weiler
    failed to establish that Kimberlin used improper motive or means
    in interfering with the five per cent amendment because
    Kimberlin, acting on behalf of the secured creditor KKP, was
    privileged to interfere with Weiler's contract in order to
    23
    In fact, at trial, Kimberlin emphasized his limited
    involvement with PortfolioScope for the purposes of defending
    against Weiler's claim to pierce the corporate veil and hold
    Kimberlin personally liable for Weiler's claims against
    PortfolioScope. Advancing a corporate official claim would run
    counter to this stance.
    20
    further KKP's own legitimate economic interest. 24   As discussed,
    the judge did not find that in directing or authorizing Whelihan
    to transfer $515,000 from PortfolioScope to himself (Whelihan),
    Kimberlin was acting on behalf of KKP in its capacity as
    PortfolioScope's secured creditor. 25,26
    d.   Conversion.   To be liable for conversion, a defendant
    must wrongfully "exercise dominion or control over the personal
    property of" the plaintiff.    See Third Nat'l Bank of Hampden
    24
    The Appeals Court adopted this reasoning in concluding
    that, even if Kimberlin was not a corporate official, reversal
    of the tortious interference claim against him was required.
    See Weiler, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 228-229.
    25
    There was ample evidence to support the judge's
    conclusion that Kimberlin acted with improper motive or means in
    directing that $515,000 be paid to Whelihan, leaving
    PortfolioScope with insufficient funds to meet its contractual
    commitment to Weiler. As to improper means, Kimberlin, who was
    not an employee, officer, or director of PortfolioScope,
    nonetheless personally assumed the right and authority to direct
    the transfer of a portion of PortfolioScope's assets –- the
    iFlex litigation settlement proceeds –- to Whelihan and
    assiduously concealed the transfer from Weiler for months,
    impeding Weiler's ability to recover what was due to him. As to
    improper motive, the judge in substance found that Kimberlin
    directed the transfer in an effort to benefit Whelihan, his
    consultant for Spencer Trask who otherwise was not entitled to
    the $515,000, to the detriment of Weiler, who had a legitimate
    contractual claim to the money.
    26
    The defendants' sole argument as to why Weiler's claim
    for civil conspiracy cannot stand is that there was no
    underlying tort to which they could conspire. The argument
    fails in light of our affirmance of the claim of tortious
    interference with contractual relations against Kimberlin.
    Moreover, the finding that the defendants conspired to
    tortiously interfere with Weiler's contractual relations is
    amply supported by the record.
    21
    County v. Continental Ins. Co., 
    388 Mass. 240
    , 244 (1983).
    Accord Spooner v. Holmes, 
    102 Mass. 503
    , 506 (1869).    The
    defendants argue that the conversion claim cannot stand because
    the iFlex litigation proceeds never constituted Weiler's
    property.    Weiler counters that money can be the subject of
    conversion, and, therefore, the judge correctly held the
    defendants liable for converting Weiler's five per cent share of
    the iFlex litigation net proceeds pursuant to the five per cent
    amendment.    Weiler is correct that conversion may lie if an
    individual wrongly exercises dominion or control over the money
    of another.    Matter of Hilson, 
    448 Mass. 603
    , 611 (2007), citing
    Morrin v. Manning, 
    205 Mass. 205
    , 211 (1910).    However, as
    previously stated, we agree with the defendants and the Appeals
    Court, see Weiler, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 223, that under the
    terms of the five per cent agreement and five per cent
    amendment, Weiler was entitled to the value of five per cent of
    the net proceeds of the iFlex litigation; the contractual
    documents did not give him a right to five per cent of the iFlex
    litigation funds themselves.      Contrast Matter of Hilson, supra.
    Therefore, the judgment for Weiler on his conversion claim must
    be reversed.
    e.   Fraudulent transfers.   Under UFTA, a transfer made by a
    debtor before or after the creditor's claim arose is fraudulent
    if made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud, see
    22
    G. L. c. 109A, § 5 (a) (1), or if made without receiving the
    reasonably equivalent value of the property in exchange and
    after the transfer, the debtor would not have enough assets to
    carry on its business or pay expected creditors.    See G. L.
    c. 109A, § 5 (a) (2). 27   The judge concluded that the defendants
    violated UFTA, based on her finding that the transfers were made
    with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Weiler.      See
    G. L. c. 109A, § 5 (a) (1).    With respect to the $515,000
    transferred by PortfolioScope to Whelihan, the judge pointed to
    the following:    (1) at the time of the transfers, Whelihan was
    not a secured or even an unsecured creditor of PortfolioScope,
    and Portfolioscope received no value in exchange for the
    27
    General Laws c. 109A, § 5 (a), provides in pertinent
    part:
    "A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is
    fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim
    arose before or after the transfer was made or the
    obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or
    incurred the obligation:
    "(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
    creditor of the debtor; or
    "(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
    exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:
    "(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a
    transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor
    were unreasonably small in relation to the business or
    transaction; or
    "(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should
    have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability
    to pay as they became due."
    23
    transfers; 28 (2) Whelihan was an "insider," see G. L. c. 109A,
    § 2; (3) the settlement proceeds as a whole represented
    substantially all of PortfolioScope's assets; and (4) Whelihan
    and Kimberlin attempted to conceal the transfers while
    simultaneously delaying response to Weiler's requests to be
    paid.     As to the $6.496 million 29 transferred by PortfolioScope
    to the Spencer Trask brokerage account, the judge observed that:
    (1) the transfers were made to Spencer Trask, a PortfolioScope
    insider, for the benefit of KKP, controlled by Kimberlin; (2)
    the transfers involved substantially all of PortfolioScope's
    assets, rendering it insolvent; (3) KKP never perfected its
    security interest until after Weiler commenced this litigation;
    (4) neither Whelihan nor Kimberlin ever informed Weiler that
    PortfolioScope was unable to pay him because it was required to
    pay its secured creditor, KKP; and (5) both Kimberlin and
    Whelihan engaged in a series of actions that were intended to
    28
    The judge expressly discredited Whelihan's testimony that
    he was owed $500,000 for his work both at PortfolioScope and at
    Spencer Trask. She further rejected Whelihan's assertion that
    he had been working for years as a Spencer Trask employee
    without compensation, citing the fact that Whelihan was
    receiving a monthly $9,000 retainer from Spencer Trask.
    29
    This sum consisted of the $5.2 million wired on
    November 12 and the $1.296 million wired on November 17. The
    judge did not find the approximately $1.231 million transfer,
    apparently designed to satisfy the Superior Court escrow order
    in the Hunt litigation, to be a fraudulent transfer under UFTA.
    24
    conceal the transfers from Weiler and avoid his attempts to
    collect what was due him. 30
    The defendants contend that the trial judge's finding that
    the transfers to Whelihan and to Spencer Trask were made with
    intent to hinder or delay was clearly erroneous.    We disagree. 31
    i.   Transfers to Whelihan.   The defendants' only argument
    as to why the transfers made to Whelihan are not fraudulent
    within the meaning of UFTA is that the payment to Whelihan was,
    in actuality, a transfer to KKP, PortfolioScope's secured
    creditor.   As discussed, the trial judge's findings do not
    support this factual claim, therefore the issue of paying a
    secured creditor is irrelevant.    The question that remains is
    whether the evidence showed that the Whelihan transfers were
    made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud, or more
    particularly, whether the judge's finding that they were made
    30
    The Appeals Court concluded that the transfers at issue
    did not violate UFTA. Weiler, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 231-233.
    That court reasoned that, because "the transfers were made at
    the instruction of KKP, a secured creditor and holder of a
    demand note," id. at 232, Weiler was required to prove that
    PortfolioScope received some hidden benefit in making the
    transfers. Id. at 232-233.
    31
    Essentially, the defendants' argument is that KKP was a
    secured creditor of PortfolioScope, that the various transfers
    were made in satisfaction of that security interest, and that
    accordingly they are insulated from being found to have violated
    UFTA. Additionally, they claim that there was insufficient
    evidence to support the finding that the transfers to Spencer
    Trask were to an "insider," and to support the finding that
    PorfolioScope became insolvent as a result of the transfers.
    25
    with such intent was clearly erroneous.      Cf. Max Sugarman
    Funeral Home, Inc. v. A.D.B. Investors, 
    926 F.2d 1248
    , 1255 (1st
    Cir. 1991) (finding of actual intent to hinder, delay, or
    defraud under § 548 of United States Bankruptcy Code "is a
    finding of fact, which [is] not disturb[ed] absent clear
    error"). 32
    General Laws c. 109A, § 5 (b), provides a nonexclusive list
    of factors that may be considered in determining whether the
    parties made the transfers with actual intent to hinder, delay,
    or defraud. 33    See Alford v. Thibault, 
    83 Mass. App. Ct. 822
    , 828
    32
    See In re Spatz, 
    222 B.R. 157
    , 164 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
    (noting that provisions of UFTA parallel § 548 of Bankruptcy
    Code).
    33
    The factors set forth in G. L. c. 109A, § 5 (b), are
    whether:
    "(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
    "(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the
    property transferred after the transfer;
    "(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or
    concealed;
    "(4) before the transfer was made or obligation was
    incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;
    "(5) the transfer was of substantially all of the
    debtor's assets;
    "(6) the debtor absconded;
    "(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
    26
    (2013).   "While the 'presence of a single badge of fraud may
    spur mere suspicion, the confluence of several can constitute
    conclusive evidence of an actual intent to defraud.'"    Hasbro,
    Inc. v. Serafino, 
    37 F. Supp. 2d 94
    , 98 (D. Mass. 1999), quoting
    Max Sugarman Funeral Home, Inc., supra at 1254-1255.
    The subsidiary findings listed by the judge in support of
    her ultimate finding of actual intent included at least four
    indicia listed in UFTA, see G. L. c. 109A, § 5 (b):    the
    transfers to Whelihan, the chief executive officer of
    PortfolioScope, were to an insider, see § 5 (b) (1) 34; Whelihan
    and Kimberlin concealed the transfers from Weiler, see § 5 (b)
    (3); the transfers to Whelihan, combined with the virtually
    simultaneous transfers to Spencer Trask, accounted for
    substantially all of PortfolioScope's assets at that time, see
    "(8) the value of the consideration received by the
    debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset
    transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
    "(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent
    shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was
    incurred;
    "(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly
    after a substantial debt was incurred; and
    "(11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of
    the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an
    insider of the debtor."
    34
    See also G. L. c. 109A, § 2 (officer of debtor
    corporation is insider for purposes of UFTA).
    27
    § 5 (b) (5); and, because Whelihan was not a secured or
    unsecured creditor of PortfolioScope and had no entitlement to
    any portion of the iFlex litigation settlement proceeds,
    PortfolioScope received no value -- much less something of
    equivalent value -- as a result of the transfer, see § 5 (b)
    (8).    As the trial evidence supports these findings, the judge's
    determination that the transfer of $515,000 to Whelihan was made
    with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud was not clearly
    erroneous.
    ii.   Transfers to Spencer Trask.   Kimberlin principally
    argues that because KKP was a secured creditor of
    PortfolioScope, the approximately $6.5 million in transfers to
    KKP through Spencer Trask represented a preference of paying one
    creditor over another, and, therefore, it is not fraudulent
    under UFTA.     "Fraudulent conveyance laws, such as the Bankruptcy
    Code and [S]tate statutes adopting some form of the Uniform
    Fraudulent Conveyance Act or the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers
    Act, are intended to prevent shareholders, secured creditors,
    and others from benefitting at the expense of others, including
    unsecured creditors" (emphasis added).      In re Hechinger Inv. Co.
    of Del., 
    274 B.R. 71
    , 81 (D. Del. 2002).      Accordingly,
    compliance with the law of secured transactions, see G. L.
    c. 106, §§ 9-101 to 9-709, does not by itself protect a secured
    creditor from a fraudulent transfer claim.      See Steel Co. v.
    28
    Morgan Marshall Indus., Inc., 
    278 Ill. App. 3d 241
    , 250-252
    (1996) (although no dispute that art. 9 of Uniform Commercial
    Code was complied with, genuine issue of material fact remained
    whether transfers made with actual intent to defraud).     Cf.
    Sheffield Progressive, Inc. v. Kingston Tool Co., 
    10 Mass. App. Ct. 47
    , 50 (1980), quoting 1B Coogan, Hogan & Vagts, Secured
    Transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code § 13.07(1), at
    1381 (1980) ("Clearly, article 9 does not replace the Uniform
    Fraudulent Conveyance Act").
    Cases decided before the enactment of UFTA in Massachusetts
    have stated that when a debtor has paid one creditor over
    another, even when the payment comprised substantially all of
    the debtor's assets, this fact by itself is insufficient to
    establish an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.     See, e.g.,
    Goldstein v. Columbia Diamond Ring Co., Inc., 
    366 Mass. 835
    ,
    843-844 (1975).    See also Mason v. Wylde, 
    308 Mass. 268
    , 281-
    283, cert. denied, 
    314 U.S. 638
     (1941).    Implicit in those
    cases, however, is a premise that the debtor is acting in good
    faith in making the challenged transfers -- that the debtor's
    motivation or purpose in doing so was to pay the creditor the
    antecedent debt, not to advance a goal of secretly benefiting
    the debtor's own, personal interests at the expense of the
    unpaid creditor.    See Mason, supra at 282-283.   As to the
    approximately $6.5 million in transfers to Spencer Trask, the
    29
    judge expressly rejected a conclusion that PortfolioScope,
    acting through Whelihan and Kimberlin in effecting these
    transfers, was acting in good faith, concluding instead that the
    defendants' purpose was to benefit Kimberlin and Whelihan at
    Weiler's expense.   And, as is true of the transfers to Whelihan,
    the indicia of actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud found
    by the judge -- the defendants' failure at the time of making
    the transfers to explain to Weiler that PortfolioScope was
    unable to pay him because of the need to pay its secured
    creditor KKP; their concealment from Weiler of the transfers;
    and the fact that the transfers to Spencer Trask, combined with
    the transfers to Whelihan, constituted substantially all of
    PortfolioScope's assets -- are supported by the evidence. 35,36
    35
    The judge also found that the $6.5 million in transfers
    to Spencer Trask effectively rendered PortfolioScope insolvent.
    The defendants, as noted, contend that this finding was clearly
    erroneous. It may be that the evidence failed to show that
    PortfolioScope was insolvent within the meaning of UFTA, see
    G. L. c. 109A, § 3. Nevertheless, there still is sufficient
    evidence of actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud to affirm
    the judge's conclusion that the transfers were fraudulent under
    § 5 (a) (1) of UFTA.
    36
    The defendants argue that, although Spencer Trask may
    have qualified as an insider under UFTA as it was a ninety per
    cent owner of PortfolioScope, Spencer Trask was a transferee in
    "name only"; the actual transferee was KKP, its secured
    creditor. We are not convinced that we should ignore that
    Spencer Trask was the initial transferee for purposes of UFTA,
    especially where Kimberlin admitted that he did not have a "good
    answer" as to why he directed Whelihan to wire the settlement
    proceeds purportedly for KKP to a Spencer Trask brokerage
    account. In any event, even if the transfers were not made to
    30
    e.   G. L. c. 93A, § 11.   The trial judge concluded that by
    improperly using the iFlex litigation settlement proceeds to
    benefit themselves rather than meeting PortfolioScope's
    contractual obligations to pay Weiler and by intentionally
    misleading and concealing their improper conduct, the defendants
    acted unfairly or deceptively within the meaning of G. L. c.
    93A, § 11, and did so knowingly and wilfully, entitling Weiler
    to double damages and attorney's fees.   The Appeals Court
    disagreed.   Although the defendants had not raised the issue in
    the Superior Court or on appeal, the Appeals Court concluded
    that Weiler was not entitled to recover under G. L. c. 93A, §
    11, because "the dispute . . . arose out of a private
    transaction between PortfolioScope and Weiler in his role as a
    former employee and options holder of the company," Weiler, 83
    Mass. App. Ct. at 230, and as a result Weiler did not meet the
    trade or commerce requirement of the statute.   Id. at 230-231.
    Weiler argues that the defendants have waived this defense --
    that it is too late for them to take up the intra-corporate
    transaction banner at this stage of the case.   The defendants do
    not contest that they did not previously raise this issue, but
    claim that the "trade or commerce" requirement of c. 93A, § 11,
    an insider, they were nonetheless made to an entity with which
    PortfolioScope "had an intimate financial relationship." Max
    Sugarman Funeral Home, Inc. v. A.D.B. Investors, 
    926 F.2d 1248
    ,
    1255 (1991).
    31
    goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction and therefore
    cannot be waived.
    Our cases make clear that G. L. c. 93A, § 11, does not
    cover internal employment or intra-enterprise disputes.    See,
    e.g., Selmark Assocs., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 
    467 Mass. 525
    , 549-551
    (2014); Psy-Ed Corp., 
    459 Mass. at 719-720
    ; Manning v.
    Zuckerman, 
    388 Mass. 8
    , 12-15 (1983).   This does not mean,
    however, that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction even to
    entertain arguments that the plaintiff's claim of unfair or
    deceptive conduct on the part of various individuals and
    entities falls squarely within the proper "trade or commerce”
    scope of § 11, and is not a private employment or intra-
    corporate dispute.   See G. L. c. 93A, § 11, first par. (granting
    Superior Court jurisdiction to hear such claims). 37   See also
    Wachovia Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Schmidt, 
    546 U.S. 303
    , 316 (2006)
    (question for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction is, "Has
    the Legislature empowered the court to hear cases of a certain
    37
    General Laws c. 93A, § 11, first par., provides in
    relevant part:
    "Any person who engages in the conduct of any trade or
    commerce and who suffers any loss of money or property
    . . . as a result of the use or employment by another
    person who engages in any trade or commerce of an unfair or
    deceptive act or practice declared unlawful by [§ 2] . . .
    may, as hereinafter provided, bring an action in the
    superior court . . . for damages and such equitable relief,
    including an injunction, as the court deems to be necessary
    and proper."
    32
    genre?"); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd., No. 3974 v. Sex
    Offender Registry Bd., 
    457 Mass. 53
    , 56-57 (2010). 38   Our cases
    routinely have addressed the argument or defense that a dispute
    is intra-corporate in nature, and therefore fails to satisfy the
    "trade or commerce" requirement of § 11, as a basis for a motion
    to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
    granted under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 
    365 Mass. 754
     (1974).
    See, e.g., First Enters., Ltd. v. Cooper, 
    425 Mass. 344
    , 345
    n.3, 347-348 (1997) (analyzing whether G. L. c. 93A, § 11, claim
    38
    Our cases addressing whether an issue is one of subject
    matter jurisdiction have distinguished between the general
    "'nature of the case assigned' to [the court]," which implicates
    the court's subject matter jurisdiction, and "the elements of a
    prima facie case before the [court]," which do not. Doe, Sex
    Offender Registry Bd., No. 3974 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,
    
    457 Mass. 53
    , 57 (2010) (Doe, No. 3974). See Wachovia Bank,
    Nat'l Ass'n v. Schmidt 
    546 U.S. 303
    , 316 (2006) ("Subject matter
    jurisdiction . . . concerns a court's competence to adjudicate a
    particular category of cases"). Here, the Superior Court is
    clearly granted the authority to hear G. L. c. 93A claims. See
    G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (1) and 11. Whether the parties were engaged
    in "trade or commerce" at the time the alleged unfair or
    deceptive practices occurred is a substantive question. Cf.
    Doe, No. 3974, supra at 57 (whether sex offender was person who
    resides in Massachusetts, which board was required to prove for
    statutory definition of "sex offender," was substantive question
    not going to board's subject matter jurisdiction, and was waived
    when not raised until appeal); Middleborough v. Housing Appeals
    Comm., 
    449 Mass. 514
    , 520-521 (2007) (requirement that project
    be "fundable" before permit decision could be challenged was
    substantive as opposed to jurisdictional). Contrast St.
    Joseph's Polish Nat'l Catholic Church v. Lawn Care Assocs.,
    Inc., 
    414 Mass. 1003
    , 1003 & n.1 (1993) (Housing Court lacked
    jurisdiction to hear G. L. c. 93A action where claim was that
    defendant failed "properly to perform an agreement for grading,
    seeding and paving work on a cemetery owned by the plaintiff,"
    as claims were only tangentially related to housing).
    33
    was properly dismissed for failure to state claim under rule 12
    [b] [6] because it constituted intra-enterprise dispute);
    Manning, 
    388 Mass. at 9, 12-14
     (same); Cavicchi v. Koski, 
    67 Mass. App. Ct. 654
    , 655, 662-663 (2006) (same).   We continue to
    view a rule 12 (b) (6) motion as the proper vehicle for a party
    to raise such a defense.   A rule 12 (b) (6) motion, however,
    does not implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction, and
    it may be waived.   See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (h) (2), 
    365 Mass. 754
     (1974) (failure to state claim on which relief can be
    granted may be raised by pleading, motion to dismiss, motion for
    judgment on pleadings, or at trial).   Compare Mass. R. Civ. P.
    12 (h) (3), 
    365 Mass. 754
     (1974) ("Whenever it appears by
    suggestion of a party or otherwise that the court lacks
    jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the
    action" [emphasis added]).   Because the defendants did not raise
    the issue of employment or intra-enterprise dispute before
    judgment entered in the Superior Court (and also did not raise
    the issue before the Appeals Court), it is waived. 39   The
    39
    Although we do not decide the issue, it is far from clear
    that the dispute here in any event could qualify as a private,
    employment-related or intra-enterprise controversy outside the
    trade or commerce boundary line of G. L. c. 93A, § 11.
    Kimberlin was not a stockholder, officer, director, or employee
    of PortfolioScope, there are a variety of separately organized
    entities involved in this case, and the conduct of the
    defendants giving rise to Weiler's claim under § 11 took place
    six years after the five per cent agreement and five per cent
    amendment were signed –- six years in which Weiler had been
    34
    defendants do not challenge the judge's disposition of Weiler's
    c. 93A claim on any other ground, and therefore, the judgment on
    this claim is affirmed.
    3.   Conclusion.   The judgment of the Superior Court is
    affirmed as to all counts of the first amended complaint with
    the exception of count 9 for conversion, and as to that count,
    the judgment is reversed.
    So ordered.
    working not as an employee of PortfolioScope but as a
    consultant. In short, the factual circumstances of this case
    appear to be significantly different from the direct
    employer-employee or shareholder-corporation disputes to which
    we have held G. L. c. 93A inapplicable. Contrast, e.g., Selmark
    Assocs., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 
    467 Mass. 525
    , 550 (2014), quoting
    Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 
    451 Mass. 547
    , 563 (2008);
    Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 
    402 Mass. 650
    , 662-663 (1988) (G. L. c. 93A
    inapplicable to transactions and disputes between fellow
    shareholders in close corporation); Manning v. Zuckerman, 
    388 Mass. 8
    , 15 (1983) (G. L. c. 93A in applicable to dispute
    between employer and employee).