Carmody v. Boston Gas Light Co. , 162 Mass. 539 ( 1895 )

Barker, J.

The plaintiffs asked the court to instruct the jury “ that there was evidence enough of want of proper care on the part of the defendant to make it responsible, on the ground that it was bound to conduct its gas in a proper manner, and that the fact that the gas escaped was prima facie evidence of some neglect on the part of the defendant.” This request was copied from a ruling given in Smith v. Boston Gas Light Co. 129 Mass. 318, where this court said of it that, as applied to the facts of that case, it could not be said to be wrong. The presiding justice in the present case declined to give the instruction, but instructed the jury in other terms, which fully and correctly dealt with the phases of the cause to which the request was addressed.

While the ruling requested is sufficiently correct if it be construed as declaring that there was enough evidence of want of proper care to be submitted to the jury, it would invade the proper province of the jury if it was understood by them to mean that there was evidence enough to require them to find the defendant negligent, and the presiding justice was not bound to give a ruling which, as applied to the case upon trial, might have been so understood. Nor was he bound to use the Latin phrase upon which the plaintiffs insisted, but might well say, in place of it, that the fact that gas escaped was evidence of neglect “ and evidence the force of which it was for them to determine in connection with any other evidence in the case bearing on the same subject.”

The plaintiffs’ exception did not go to the charge as given, but merely to the refusal of the request. They nevertheless argue that the statement of the charge, that “ the mere fact that a pipe broke and the gas escaped is not of itself sufficient to establish the liability of the company,” was incorrect. But there was evidence with which the jury had to deal tending to show that the defendant had used due care to conduct its gas in a proper manner, and that the escape of gas by which the plaintiffs were injured was due to the acts of third persons of which the defendant had no notice, and not to any negligence of the defendant.

It is apparent, from the situation of the evidence and the context of the charge, that the sentence to which the plaintiffs now object could not have been understood by the jury as forbidding them to draw the inference of negligence from the facts that a pipe broke and that gas escaped; but that, as there was other evidence bearing upon the question of negligence, they must consider and weigh it all, and not come to a conclusion upon two circumstances merely.

The true construction of the ruling asked, as applied to the case at bar, would be, that, as matter of law, the breaking of a pipe and the consequent escape of gas prove negligence. The true rule is, that a jury may find negligence from those circumstances, but it is for them to say whether they will do so ; and, if there are other circumstances bearing on the question, they must weigh them all.

Instructions that evidence “is sufficient to show,”-or “ has a tendency to show,” or “ is enough to show,” or “ is prima fade evidence of,” are not to be understood as meaning that there is a presumption of fact, but that the jury are at liberty to draw the inference from them. Commonwealth v. Clifford, 145 Mass. 97. Commonwealth v. Keenan, 148 Mass. 470. And so the instruction in a case where a number of circumstances bearing upon a question of fact are in evidence, that a part of them are not of themselves sufficient to establish the fact, coupled with explicit instructions that they are to be considered, must be understood as directing the jury to weigh together all the pertinent circumstances, and not to draw their inference from a part without considering all. Exceptions overruled.