Church of the Holy Spirit of Wayland v. Heinrich ( 2023 )


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    SJC-13326
    CHURCH OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF WAYLAND & others1 vs. MARILYN J.
    HEINRICH & others2 (and a companion case3).
    Middlesex.     December 5, 2022. - March 14, 2023.
    Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
    & Georges, JJ.
    Church. Cemetery.     Contract, Church, Construction of contract.
    Common Law.
    Civil action commenced in the Middlesex Division of the
    Probate and Family Court Department on August 29, 2017.
    The case was heard by Camille F. Sarrouf, Jr., J., sitting
    under statutory authority, on motions for summary judgment.
    1 The Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts and Saint
    Philopateer Mercurius & Saint Mina Coptic Orthodox Church, Inc.
    2 John Doe Heinrich No. 1, John Doe Heinrich No. 2, Mary
    Wilson, John Doe Wilson, John Doe Hodgins, Christopher Woodcock,
    John Doe Woodcock No. 1, John Doe Woodcock No. 2, Carolyn J.
    Kiradjieff, John Doe Jobes No. 1, John Doe Jobes No. 2, Mary Ann
    Montague, John Doe Turner No. 1, John Doe Turner No. 2, Judy
    Mosedale, John Doe Mosedale No. 1, John Doe Mosedale No. 2,
    Stephanie P. Edwards, John Doe Edwards No. 1, and John Doe
    Edwards No. 2.
    3 Mary J. Wilson & others   vs.   Church of the Holy Spirit of
    Wayland & others.
    2
    Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
    June 28, 2019.
    A motion to dismiss was heard by Camille F. Sarrouf, Jr.,
    J.
    After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial
    Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.
    William F. Gramer (Nicholas K. Holmes also present) for
    Marilyn J. Heinrich & others.
    Jennifer Grace Miller for Church of the Holy Spirit of
    Wayland & another.
    Audrey Y. Botros for Saint Philopateer Mercurius & Saint
    Mina Coptic Orthodox Church, Inc.
    LOWY, J.   This case concerns the scope of rights conveyed
    by a set of burial certificates, as sold by a church to its
    parishioners.    After dwindling membership compelled the Church
    of the Holy Spirit of Wayland (Church of the Holy Spirit, or
    church) to close and sell its property, do the certificates
    permit the church to disinter and relocate the cremated remains
    buried on that property despite the objections of the decedents'
    families?
    Although we acknowledge the sensitive -- even sacred --
    nature of the subject matter of this dispute, we conclude that
    the burial certificates' unambiguous language permits the
    disinterment and that no common-law right held by the families
    prevents it.    We therefore affirm.
    Background.   The material facts are undisputed.   The Church
    of the Holy Spirit was established in 1961 as a parish of the
    3
    Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts.   In the late 1960s, the
    church set aside a portion of its land for use as a "Memorial
    Garden," also referred to as a "Churchyard."   Parishioners could
    arrange for cremated remains (cremains) to be interred in the
    Churchyard by purchasing a certificate from the church.       Between
    1969 and 2008, a number of such certificates were sold.       The
    one-page certificates each granted the purchaser a right to one
    or more interments that were "subject to the regulations of the
    Churchyard now or hereafter in force."
    The referenced regulations were wide ranging.      They
    covered, among other things, the Churchyard's operations and
    layout, groundskeeping restrictions, permitted styles of
    memorial plaques, and procedures for interment.    The regulations
    also contemplated disinterment of cremains, specifying that
    disinterment was forbidden "without the consent of [the Church
    of the Holy Spirit]."   And, consistent with the certificates,
    the regulations further provided that they were subject to "be
    amended or revised from time to time" by the church.
    Beginning in 2000, the church's membership began to wane.
    As the years passed, its financial difficulties mounted, and in
    March of 2015, the congregation concluded that it was "unable to
    function as a viable church" and voted to close.    The church
    subsequently entered into negotiations with St. Mark Coptic
    Orthodox Church of Boston (St. Mark) for sale of its property,
    4
    including the Churchyard.     Although St. Mark agreed to meet the
    asking price, it objected to taking ownership of the Churchyard
    as it was, largely because the Coptic Church's religious beliefs
    do not permit cremation.     The church ultimately agreed to
    disinter and relocate the cremains as a condition of the sale.4
    St. Mark took the deed to the Wayland property in 2016, and
    shortly thereafter it resold the property and assigned its
    rights under the purchase and sale agreement to Saint
    Philopateer Mercurius & Saint Mina Coptic Orthodox Church, Inc.
    (St. Philopateer).   For the same religious reasons, St.
    Philopateer shared St. Mark's objections to the cremains
    remaining on the property.
    At the time of the sale of the land to St. Mark, the
    cremains of at least forty-nine individuals were interred in the
    Churchyard.   The church contacted the families of the deceased
    and requested their consent for relocation and reinterment of
    the cremains, to be undertaken at the church's expense.
    Although most consented, family members representing the
    cremains of twelve individuals (hereinafter, families) did not.5
    4 The purchase and sale agreement memorializing that term
    further specified that the church's obligation to remove the
    cremains would survive the sale's closing.
    5 The next of kin for certain interred individuals could not
    be located.
    5
    At an impasse, the church subsequently amended the
    Churchyard regulations.   The newly enacted provisions
    specifically authorized the church to shutter the Churchyard and
    relocate the cremains:
    "If the Church of the Holy Spirit ceases operations or
    ceases operations at the property where the Churchyard
    Memorial Garden is located, then the Vestry or Executive
    Committee, as the case may be, may cause the Churchyard
    Memorial Garden to be discontinued or moved to an alternate
    location, and/or cause all cremated remains located in the
    Churchyard Memorial Garden to be disinterred and relocated
    to one or more other locations within the Diocese of
    Massachusetts or returned to the families of the cremains."
    The church and St. Philopateer then filed a complaint in
    the Probate and Family Court seeking a declaration that the
    regulations, as amended, permitted removal of the cremains.
    Certain members of the families who had objected to the proposed
    disinterment asserted counterclaims for breach of contract,
    tortious interference with contractual relations, and violations
    of G. L. c. 93A.   As those counterclaims lay beyond the court's
    jurisdiction, they were dismissed and refiled in the Superior
    Court, with an additional claim for violation of the covenant of
    good faith and fair dealing.   The presiding Superior Court judge
    was then specially assigned to sit as a Probate and Family Court
    judge so that the two related actions could be consolidated.
    Upon cross motions for summary judgment in the Probate and
    Family Court case, the judge entered judgment dismissing the
    families' claims and declaring that the church had the right to
    6
    disinter and relocate the cremains in the Churchyard.6    The judge
    reasoned that the regulations entitled the church to close the
    Churchyard, thereby extinguishing any common-law rights the
    families may have in the burial plots, which could exist only
    "so long as the place continues as a burial ground."     Trefry v.
    Younger, 
    226 Mass. 5
    , 9 (1917).     The families filed a timely
    appeal, and in a published opinion, the Appeals Court reversed.
    See Church of the Holy Spirit of Wayland v. Heinrich, 
    101 Mass. App. Ct. 32
    , 53 (2022).     We granted the church's petition for
    further appellate review.
    Discussion.   "Summary judgment is appropriate where there
    is no material issue of fact in dispute and the moving party is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.     Our review of a
    decision on a motion for summary judgment is de novo" (quotation
    and citation omitted).    Le Fort Enters., Inc. v. Lantern 18,
    LLC, 
    491 Mass. 144
    , 148–149 (2023).
    1.   The certificates.   The rights and responsibilities of
    the parties are governed by the language of the certificates,
    which are indisputably contracts.    See McAndrew v. Quirk, 
    329 Mass. 423
    , 425 (1952) (burial rights are "subject to whatever
    conditions were contained in the instrument [granting the]
    interest in the lot"); Green v. Danahy, 
    223 Mass. 1
    , 4 (1916)
    6 The judge also granted a parallel motion to dismiss the
    claims in the Superior Court case.
    7
    (applying contract principles to dispute over obligations under
    burial certificate).   "When the words of a contract are clear,
    they must be construed in their usual and ordinary sense
    . . . ."   General Convention of the New Jerusalem in the U.S. of
    Am., Inc. v. MacKenzie, 
    449 Mass. 832
    , 835 (2007).   Such
    language, "plainly and intelligibly stated[,] . . . is the best
    possible evidence of the intent and meaning of those who are
    bound by the contract, and of those who are to receive the
    benefit of it."   Stackpole v. Arnold, 
    11 Mass. 27
    , 31 (1814).
    The certificates are exceedingly straightforward.     They
    grant "right[s] of . . . interments" and state that any such
    right conveyed is subject to regulation by the church.7
    Importantly, they further provide that the church may amend the
    regulations after the contract is executed, a right that is
    reiterated in the regulations themselves.   Such terms are not
    unique in burial contracts.   See McAndrew, 
    329 Mass. at 425
    ;
    7 The certificates and regulations lack any language
    associated with property rights or covenants that run with the
    land. Compare Trefry, 
    226 Mass. at 8
     (burial rights conveyed
    "under seal and in the form of a grant" and "run to the grantee
    'and his heirs forever'"). Cf. Feeley v. Andrews, 
    191 Mass. 313
    , 315-316 (1906) (burial easement "can be created only by
    grant under seal"). Although the regulations contain a
    reference to "perpetual care," that term is explicitly defined
    as "simple maintenance of the Churchyard, keeping individual
    lots and the Memorial Grounds free of fallen branches and trees,
    trimming of trees when necessary, and maintaining a path through
    the Churchyard." This language evinces no intent to convey a
    permanent property right.
    8
    Green, 
    223 Mass. at 4
     (certificate for burial in Catholic
    cemetery stated right was "subject always to the following
    regulations, or such others as may be from time to time
    prescribed").
    Neither the certificates nor the regulations themselves
    place any limits on the nature and extent of permissible
    regulation of the Churchyard, and accordingly, the regulations
    reach a wide range of matters related to the Churchyard,
    including disinterment.     Not only do the regulations contemplate
    disinterment, but by requiring the church's consent to disinter,
    they do so in a manner that makes clear that the church
    exercises control over the prospect.     Further, the certificates
    put no constraints on the church's ability to amend the
    regulations as it sees fit.
    In sum, there is nothing in the plain language of the
    certificates and attendant regulations that prohibits
    disinterment by the church.     It was permitted under the
    certificates to regulate the Churchyard and amend the
    regulations, and it did so.     Its planned course of action
    pursuant to the amended regulations therefore is, as a simple
    matter of contract law, permissible.     See Green, 
    223 Mass. at 4
    (applying contract law to conclude that, where party to burial
    certificate committed breach of contract, disinterment was
    permitted).     Cf. Feeley v. Andrews, 
    191 Mass. 313
    , 316–317
    9
    (1906) (licensee could not maintain action for damages over
    disinterred remains).
    2.   Burial law.     The families respond that the church's
    contractual authority under the certificates and regulations are
    circumscribed by our common law.    They urge us to recognize that
    certain trust-like property rights are held by all families of
    those interred, rights that the church may not regulate out of
    existence by contract.
    Although entanglement with State action prevents it from
    being squarely on point, Sohier v. Trinity Church, 
    109 Mass. 1
    (1871), is nevertheless our most apposite case.    Sohier
    concerned the plan of Trinity Church (Trinity) to sell its land
    in Boston and relocate to a new location in the city.     
    Id. at 16-17
    .   The prevailing law at the time compelled Trinity to
    obtain legislative authorization for the sale.    
    Id. at 17
    .
    Under Trinity's buildings were dozens of tombs, and the
    "representatives" of four of those tombs -- presumably family
    members of the deceased -- brought suit to enjoin the sale and
    prevent disinterment of the tombs' remains.    
    Id. at 2, 6-9
    .
    Resolution of the matter required us to consider both the extent
    of the power available to Trinity, as authorized by the
    Legislature, and the nature of the rights held by the
    plaintiffs.   As to Trinity, we concluded that authorization of
    the sale and removal of the remains was constitutional under the
    10
    Legislature's police powers, given that the Legislature had
    determined that leaving the remains in place would be a danger
    to public health.   
    Id. at 21-22
    .   As to the families, we noted
    that burial rights are "peculiar . . . and are not very
    dissimilar to rights in pews," that is, "qualified and
    usufructuary right[s], being a right to occupy under certain
    restrictions."   
    Id. at 20-21
    .
    Weighing those qualified rights against the Legislature's
    empowerment of Trinity to consummate the sale, we concluded that
    Trinity was "justified in removing the bodies and remains
    interred under their church."8   
    Id. at 22
    .   We further observed
    that there were many such situations where the need of a church
    to close and sell its property would permit, or even require,
    any remains on that property to be relocated:
    "There are other causes which are obviously sufficient to
    authorize the removal of bodies and tombs placed under a
    church. The edifice may be consumed by fire, or otherwise
    destroyed; or it may decay; or the place may become
    unsuitable for such a building; or for various other
    reasons it may be proper to abandon or sell it. And in
    such cases it would be improper to leave the tombs and the
    remains deposited in them; obvious propriety would require
    8 In so concluding, we cited with approval several cases
    from other jurisdictions that authorized disinterment under
    similar circumstances. See Sohier, 
    109 Mass. at 21-22
    , citing,
    e.g., Windt v. German Reformed Church, 
    4 Sand. Ch. 471
     (N.Y.
    1847) ("it was held that the sepulture of friends and relatives
    in a cemetery belonging to a religious society confers no right
    or title upon the survivors, and they cannot prevent a sale of
    such cemetery by the corporation and the removal of the interred
    remains, when such removal is in all respects conducted
    according to law").
    11
    that the remains should be removed to some suitable place;
    and . . . the owners of the tombs and the friends of the
    deceased have no title to the lands, but only an interest
    in the structures and in their proper use . . . ."9
    Id. at 22-23.
    While we realize that there is no State action or
    authorization by the Legislature here, the same principles
    discussed in Sohier apply.   Sohier does address the nature of
    the rights of decedents' families, and whatever common-law
    property rights the families have here can be no more extensive
    than those analyzed there.   Applying Sohier's principles, we
    conclude that the failing membership and financial unviability
    of the Church of the Holy Spirit -- both facts that are
    undisputed on the summary judgment record -- make it "proper to
    . . . sell" the church's land and permit it to relocate the
    cremains as a necessary condition of that sale.   Id. at 23.
    This conclusion is further supported by our cases regarding
    pew rights, which, as Sohier pointed out, are analogues to
    burial rights.   Pew owners are holders of "qualified, subsidiary
    and dependent" rights, and our law has consistently held that if
    a church closes "not wantonly or unreasonably or with intent to
    9  Presumably because of takings concerns, in this paragraph
    we also noted that, in relocating the remains, "the public
    authorities do not violate [the plaintiffs'] rights of property,
    if proper provision is made for compensation or substitution."
    As the Church of the Holy Spirit is a private actor, no similar
    issue arises here.
    12
    injure the pew holders . . . , the pew owner is without remedy."
    Massachusetts Baptist Missionary Soc'y v. Bowdoin Sq. Baptist
    Soc'y, 
    212 Mass. 198
    , 200–201 (1912) (collecting cases).
    Indeed, we have held this to be true in cases of church closure
    due to failing membership:
    "Now as every member of a religious society may at any time
    dissolve his membership at his pleasure, it may often
    happen that the members of a religious society may withdraw
    therefrom in such numbers as to disable the society to
    maintain public worship; and when a religious society or
    parish is thus disabled, it is clear that the pewholders
    would have no cause of complaint if the society or parish
    should abandon their meetinghouse, and wholly cease to
    occupy it as a place of public worship."
    Fassett v. First Parish in Boylston, 
    19 Pick. 361
    , 363 (1837).
    Review of our limited cases addressing burial rights
    reveals no common-law rights of the kind asserted by the
    families.10   Given this lack of Massachusetts authority, the
    families urge us to adopt the reasoning of Hines v. State, 
    126 Tenn. 1
     (1911).   In Hines, the Tennessee Supreme Court examined
    10 The next closest case we can identify is Messina v.
    LaRosa, 
    337 Mass. 438
     (1958), where a decedent's second wife
    scrubbed the deceased first wife's dates of birth and death off
    of the family tombstone and relocated it to a new plot for her
    own use. 
    Id. at 440
    . The second wife changed the dates on the
    tombstone, and not the name, because -- improbably -- both women
    were named Josephine LaRosa. 
    Id. at 438-440
    . We acknowledged
    that the first wife's sister had standing to sue for restoration
    of the tombstone based on the sensational facts of the case,
    tellingly disclaiming reliance on any generally applicable
    common-law rights: "This [holding] is not an application of any
    rule of property law, but is a recognition of principles of
    ethics, propriety, and common decency which equity is peculiarly
    qualified to enforce." 
    Id. at 442
    .
    13
    the rights of family members in a family burial plot on land
    that had passed from family ownership to strangers.    It held
    that the family had the right to access and maintain the plot,
    proclaiming the existence of trust-like rights:
    "When land has been definitely appropriated to burial
    purposes, it cannot be conveyed or devised as other
    property, so as to interfere with the use and purposes to
    which it has been devoted. When once dedicated to burial
    purposes, and interments have there been made, the then
    owner holds the title to some extent in trust for the
    benefit of those entitled to burial in it, and the heir at
    law, devisee, or vendee takes the property subject to this
    trust."
    Id. at 4-5.
    Even if we were to put aside that the certificate and
    regulations control, and Sohier's teaching that no common-law
    rights preclude disinterment here, we would still think that
    Hines is a poor fit for the case at bar.11   The land at issue
    there was a small family burial plot, those interred there were
    buried when an individual in the family was its fee owner, and
    the context of the discussion was a criminal prosecution.    The
    dispute was not between a church and parishioners over burial in
    a churchyard, and there was no governing contract or
    11Hines was considered by the Appeals Court in Sanford v.
    Vinal, 
    28 Mass. App. Ct. 476
     (1990), on facts that were much
    more similar than those of this case. The Sanford court never
    reached the issue whether Massachusetts should adopt Hines,
    however, because the family burial plot in question had been so
    long abandoned that it could not be located. See 
    id.
     at 486-
    487.
    14
    certificate, nor any regulations authorized by such a contract.
    Moreover, Hines no longer even governs burial ground closures
    and disinterment in its home State, having been superseded by
    statute.12   See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 46-4-101
     et seq. (establishing
    statutory scheme for closing burial grounds and relocating
    remains).
    We see no need to adopt Hines here, where we may
    comfortably decide the case by applying Massachusetts law.
    Nowhere does our law forbid the Church of the Holy Spirit from
    disinterring the cremains in the Churchyard.   Rather, the
    closest analogues in our case law provide that this is the type
    of situation where relocation of the cremains is proper.13   See
    Sohier, 
    109 Mass. at 22-23
    .
    12In a concurrence in an earlier case, Chief Justice John
    Shields, the author of Hines, opined that burial grounds'
    "sacred character" rendered them "forever withdrawn from all the
    incidents to which other real estate may be liable," including
    eminent domain. See Memphis State Line R.R. v. Forest Hill
    Cemetery Co., 
    116 Tenn. 400
    , 422 (1906). Chief Justice Shields
    was buried in a family plot on his estate in 1934, and just a
    few years after his passing, his remains were disinterred and
    relocated when the Tennessee Valley Authority built the Cherokee
    Dam and flooded the area. See Paine, Cemetery Law: Moving
    Chief Justice Shields, 49 Tenn. B.J. 35 (Sept. 2013).
    13In light of this conclusion, we also reject the families'
    argument that the church's amendment of the Churchyard
    regulations violated the covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing. Cf. T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 
    456 Mass. 562
    , 573 (2010).
    15
    In other circumstances, a different result might obtain.
    As with past disputes over burial rights, future disputes will
    turn on the particulars of each case, including the language of
    the instrument granting the rights, see Feeley, 
    191 Mass. at
    316–317 (documents in evidence established, at best, revocable
    license to be buried); the relationship between the parties, see
    G. L. c. 114, § 32 (establishing statutory right to burial "in
    any burial lot or tomb of which [one's] spouse was seized at any
    time during marriage"); the status of the burial ground, see
    Sohier, 
    109 Mass. at 21-23
    ; and any other relevant equitable
    considerations, see Messina v. LaRosa, 
    337 Mass. 438
    , 442
    (1958).   On the particulars of the case before us, summary
    judgment was properly granted.14
    Conclusion.   Although we resolve this case by applying
    long-standing legal principles, we, of course, recognize the
    human element involved.   We also reiterate that in other
    circumstances a different result might obtain.   Disinterring the
    remains of one's ancestors will forever be a sensitive,
    difficult prospect.   To repeat our words from Antoniewicz v. Del
    Prete, 
    340 Mass. 742
    , 743 (1960):
    14As we decide the case on nonconstitutional grounds, we
    need not consider the argument that a declaration that the
    cremains may stay in place would violate the church's or St.
    Philopateer's constitutional right to the free exercise of
    religion.
    16
    "The court is fully aware that a decent respect for the
    memory of those who have been buried requires that there be
    no disturbance of the remains of one deceased unless the
    law as applied to the particular circumstances compels such
    a conclusion. Here, with considerable reluctance, that
    conclusion seems necessary to the court."
    The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed.15
    So ordered.
    15 The Superior Court's declaration included certain
    deadlines for compliance. Should the parties believe that the
    terms of the declaration require modification owing to the
    interval between its initial entry and entry of the rescript
    from this court, they may move for modification in the Superior
    Court.