Adoption of Daphne ( 2020 )


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    SJC-12846
    ADOPTION OF DAPHNE.
    Norfolk.    January 6, 2020. - April 2, 2020.
    Present:     Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher,
    & Kafker, JJ.
    Adoption. Minor, Adoption. Parent and Child, Adoption.
    Jurisdiction, Probate Court, Personal, Equitable. Probate
    Court, Jurisdiction, General equity power. Practice,
    Civil, Adoption, Dismissal.
    Petition for adoption filed in the Norfolk Division of the
    Probate and Family Court Department on November 7, 2018.
    Judgment of dismissal was ordered by Patricia A. Gorman, J.
    The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
    transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
    Kathleen A. DeLisle for the father.
    Patience Crozier & Mary L. Bonauto, for GLBTQ Legal
    Advocates & Defenders, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
    Dean J. Hutchison, Natalie A. Kanellis, & Katelin P.
    Gaskill, for Circle Surrogacy, LLC, amicus curiae, submitted a
    brief.
    CYPHER, J.     In this case we determine whether, under G. L.
    c. 210, § 1, the Norfolk Division of the Probate and Family
    2
    Court Department has jurisdiction over a petition for adoption
    (petition) where the petitioner, who is the child's biological
    father (father) and is named as the child's parent on her birth
    certificate, lives outside the United States with the child and
    his same-sex partner, and where the child was born outside of
    marriage to a gestational carrier (mother) who lives in
    Massachusetts.   The father's first petition was rejected by a
    clerk for lack of jurisdiction, and his second was returned
    because it was completed on an outdated form.   After the father
    filed his third petition, a judge dismissed the petition with
    prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction.   We conclude that the
    Probate and Family Court has both subject matter jurisdiction
    under G. L. c. 210, § 1, and personal jurisdiction over the
    parties in this case.   On January 8, 2020, we issued an order
    vacating the judgment of dismissal and instructing the Probate
    and Family Court to accept the petition for immediate filing.
    This opinion states the reasons for that order.1
    Background.   The petition is uncontested, and the facts of
    this case are undisputed.   We now summarize those facts and
    provide an overview of the case's procedural background.
    1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of
    the father by GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) and
    Circle Surrogacy, LLC.
    3
    The father,2 the intended and genetic father of the child,
    together with his same-sex partner (partner), entered into a
    gestational carrier agreement with the mother, the child's birth
    mother.   The child was conceived as the result of an in vitro
    fertilization procedure.   During the procedure, eggs were
    retrieved from an egg donor selected by the father and partner
    and then fertilized with the father's sperm.    One of the
    resulting embryos was transferred to the uterus of the mother on
    June 28, 2017.   The embryo transfer procedure resulted in a
    successful clinical pregnancy, and the child was born on
    February 17, 2018, in Weymouth.
    Shortly after the child's birth, the father and mother
    executed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity (VAP)
    recognizing that the father is the genetic father of the child.
    The child's birth certificate lists both the father and mother
    as the child's parents.    For the child to become a citizen of
    the father's home country, he would have to submit a birth
    certificate as part of the child's application for registration.
    Therefore, the mother agreed to forgo a prebirth determination
    of parentage pursuant to Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med.
    Ctr., 
    435 Mass. 285
    (2001), and instead agreed to allow the
    father to pursue a postbirth adoption of the child in
    2 The father is not a resident or citizen of the United
    States.
    4
    Massachusetts to terminate the mother's parental rights and
    responsibilities, to remove her name from the child's birth
    certificate, and to establish the father as the child's sole
    legal parent.3
    On April 14, 2018, the mother signed a surrender form,
    pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 2, indicating her desire to
    "voluntarily and unconditionally" surrender the child to the
    care and custody of the father.   On April 30, 2018, the father
    filed the first of three petitions in the Probate and Family
    Court to establish his status as the child's sole legal parent.
    Following the birth, the father, partner, and child remained in
    Massachusetts pending the finalization hearing on the underlying
    petition.   On May 22, 2018, the petition was rejected on the
    ground that "[i]n accordance with [G. L. c. 210, § 1], we do not
    have jurisdiction to accept the adoption of [the child]."     In
    June 2018, the father, partner, and child returned to their home
    country.4
    On July 18, 2018, the father filed a second petition in the
    Probate and Family Court, adding a memorandum of law addressing
    3 The father's home country does not allow unmarried couples
    to adopt. However, it is a signatory to the Hague Convention
    and therefore will recognize a decree of adoption from the
    United States.
    4 The mother consented to the child traveling to this
    country with the father and partner.
    5
    the jurisdiction issue previously raised by a clerk of that
    court.   On August 9, 2018, the petition again was returned, this
    time because the father had not used the most updated petition
    form.5   On November 7, 2018, the father filed his third petition,
    this time using the new petition for adoption and affidavit of
    petitioner(s) form.    On March 8, 2019,6 a judge dismissed the
    adoption with prejudice for the reason that the court lacked
    jurisdiction.7   The father filed a notice of appeal on March 26,
    2019.    The case is now before this court on sua sponte transfer
    from the Appeals Court.
    Discussion.    Ultimately, the father's claim on appeal is an
    issue of statutory interpretation.    Review of a question of
    5 According to the return form, the petition for adoption
    (petition) was last updated on March 31, 2014. Court staff
    could have and should have assisted the father in avoiding this
    mistake by informing him in the previous rejection that he also
    had filed the incorrect form.
    6 This was a delay of more than four months between the
    filing of the petition and its rejection. The Probate and
    Family Court Department's time standards require action on
    uncontested adoptions within thirty days of filing. Standing
    Order 1-06: Case Management and Time Standards for Cases Filed
    in the Probate and Family Court Department (2006) ("If a
    Petition is filed as uncontested, due to the filing of necessary
    surrenders or termination decrees, and notice is not required, a
    hearing shall be scheduled within thirty [30] days of the filing
    of the Petition").
    7 The judgment of dismissal does not contain an explanation
    for the judge's determination. Rather, it states, "after review
    of submissions it is determined that Massachusetts does not have
    jurisdiction over the matter."
    6
    statutory interpretation is de novo.      Chin v. Merriot, 
    470 Mass. 527
    , 531 (2015).    Additionally, the petition was dismissed
    without any evidentiary hearing or oral argument.     "[W]here
    review is wholly based on documentary evidence, an appellate
    court stands in the same position as the . . . judge" in
    determining whether jurisdictional requirements are met
    (quotation and citation omitted).    Commonwealth v. Moffat, 
    478 Mass. 292
    , 298 (2017) (in appeal from denial of G. L. c. 278A,
    § 3, motion, de novo review appropriate because review limited
    to consideration of motion and supporting documents).
    "Under well-established principles of statutory
    construction, 'a statute must be interpreted according to the
    intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words
    construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language,
    considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the
    mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to
    be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may
    be effectuated.'"    
    Chin, 470 Mass. at 532
    , quoting Commonwealth
    v. Figueroa, 
    464 Mass. 365
    , 368 (2013).     "Although we look first
    to the plain language of the provision at issue to ascertain the
    intent of the Legislature, we consider also other sections of
    the statute, and examine the pertinent language in the context
    of the entire statute."    
    Chin, supra
    .   "Courts must ascertain
    the intent of a statute from all its parts and from the subject
    7
    matter to which it relates, and must interpret the statute so as
    to render the legislation effective, consonant with sound reason
    and common sense."   Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows
    of Harvard College, 
    445 Mass. 745
    , 749 (2006).
    1.   Subject matter jurisdiction under G. L. c. 210, § 1.
    We begin with the plain language of G. L. c. 210, § 1,8 which
    provides in relevant part:
    "A person of full age may petition the probate court in the
    county where he resides for leave to adopt as his child
    another person younger than himself, unless such other
    person is his or her wife or husband, or brother, sister,
    uncle or aunt, of the whole or half blood. . . . If the
    petitioner has a husband or wife living, competent to join
    in the petition, such husband or wife shall join therein
    8 Because of the unavailability of a prebirth determination
    in the circumstances presented here, we are forced to decide
    this case under the adoption statute. As previously stated in
    Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 
    435 Mass. 285
    , 291
    (2001), "[a]s is evident from its provisions, the adoption
    statute was not intended to resolve parentage issues arising
    from gestational surrogacy agreements." Culliton, supra at 290-
    291, specifically highlights the delay in time that often
    accompanies adoption proceedings; this can impose legal and
    custodial responsibilities on a gestational carrier who has no
    genetic or intended relationship with a child. In this case,
    for example, the child is now over two years old, and the
    initial petition was filed six weeks after her birth. We
    strongly urge the Legislature to consider a more expedient
    process for obtaining postbirth judgments of parentage in the
    context of gestational surrogacy. Under the Uniform Parentage
    Act, which has not been adopted in Massachusetts, parental
    rights are automatically assigned to the intended parents,
    provided that the gestational surrogacy agreement is
    enforceable. See Uniform Parentage Act § 809, 9B U.L.A. 260
    (Master ed. 2001). Other New England States have adopted
    similar legislation allowing for replacement certificates of
    birth and postbirth orders. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-
    48a; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, § 1934; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
    § 168-B:12; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15C, § 804.
    8
    . . . . If a person not an inhabitant of this commonwealth
    desires to adopt a child residing here, the petition may be
    made to the probate court in the county where the child
    resides."
    This section establishes five jurisdictional requirements before
    the final provision allowing for adoption by an out-of-State
    resident.
    Id. A petitioner
    must be (1) of "full age" adopting
    (2) a child younger than the petitioner, and (3) the child
    cannot be in one of the familial relationships to the petitioner
    as enumerated by the statute.
    Id. If the
    petitioner has a
    husband or wife, and he or she is competent to join the
    petition, (4) the spouse must join unless the court determines
    that the three conditions described by the statute are met.9
    Id. The petitioner
    also must file (5) in "the probate court in the
    county where he resides," unless the petitioner is "not an
    inhabitant of this commonwealth," in which case the petition
    must be filed in the probate court in the county where the child
    "resides."
    Id. 9 "[T]he
    prayer of the petition may be granted although the
    spouse of the petitioner is not a party to the petition if the
    court finds: (i) the failure of the spouse to join in the
    petition or to consent to the adoption is excused by reason of
    prolonged unexplained absence, legal separation, prolonged
    separation, incapacity or circumstances constituting an
    unreasonable withholding of consent; (ii) the husband and wife
    are not in the process of an ongoing divorce; and (iii) the
    granting of the petition is in the best interests of the child."
    G. L. c. 210, § 1.
    9
    Here, the father was thirty-nine years old (i.e., of "full
    age") at the time he filed his third petition,10 and the child
    was eight months old.    The child is his biological child, and
    this is the only familial relationship; none of the
    relationships prohibited by the statute applies.    The father is
    unmarried, so there is no requirement that his partner be
    joined.11   Because the father is not a Massachusetts resident,
    his petition must be filed according to the final provision of
    § 1.    Therefore, the only ambiguities are in the definitions of
    the words "residing" and "resides," which are each used once in
    § 1's final sentence:    "If a person not an inhabitant of this
    commonwealth desires to adopt a child residing here, the
    petition may be made to the probate court in the county where
    the child resides" (emphases added).
    In Krakow v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 
    326 Mass. 452
    , 454
    (1950), this court defined residency under G. L. c. 210, § 1, as
    the child's domicil.    The court in Krakow determined that the
    Although many of the father's arguments are based on the
    10
    filing date of the first adoption petition, we conduct our
    analysis based on the third petition. We note that the first
    petition should not have been rejected for the same reasons
    articulated here, but because the father did not appeal from
    that denial, we do not address it.
    The father lives in a country that criminalizes
    11
    consensual same-sex intercourse and does not allow or recognize
    marriage equality. Therefore, he and his partner are not
    married.
    10
    child's domicil was the domicil of his mother based on the
    ground that the child had been "abandoned by his father" or
    because the child was born outside of marriage.
    Id. See Restatement
    (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 14 (1971).     The
    domicil of the child is "the same as the domicil of their parent
    who has lawful custody of them."   Gil v. Servizio, 
    375 Mass. 186
    , 189 (1978).   Under the Massachusetts statute governing the
    custody of children born outside of marriage, "[p]rior to or in
    the absence of an adjudication or voluntary acknowledgement of
    paternity, the mother shall have custody of a child born out of
    wedlock."   G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (b).   See Smith v. McDonald, 
    458 Mass. 540
    , 545 (2010) ("Prior to a legal determination of
    paternity, the child's mother is vested with sole physical and
    legal custody, and that custody arrangement continues even after
    paternity is established until modified by a court").12
    Here, the child was born to an unmarried gestational
    carrier, the mother, domiciled in Weymouth.   Because the child's
    birth mother is domiciled in Weymouth, the child's domicil at
    birth was also Weymouth.
    12The father's postbirth signing of the voluntary
    acknowledgement of paternity (VAP) did not change the child's
    custody status or domicil at birth. We discuss what impact, if
    any, a VAP may have on a child's domicil infra.
    11
    There are three questions remaining:   whether the mother's
    postbirth surrender affected the child's domicil; whether the
    father's postbirth VAP changed the child's domicil; and whether
    the father's removal of the child to his home country changed
    the child's domicil.   Because a domicil of origin is not lost
    until a new domicil is acquired,13 the question actually is
    whether any of these actions caused the child to acquire a new
    domicil.
    The mother's postbirth surrender would not cause the child
    to acquire a new domicil, as this would frustrate the primary
    purpose of the adoption statute.   See Adoption of Tammy, 
    416 Mass. 205
    , 210 (1993) ("The primary purpose of the adoption
    statute, particularly with regard to children under the age of
    fourteen, is undoubtedly the advancement of the best interests
    of the subject child").   "The change in phrasing 'Any inhabitant
    of this Commonwealth' . . . to 'Any person' . . . manifestly was
    intended to permit the adoption of resident children by
    petitioners who were domiciled in another State . . . ."
    Farnsworth v. Goebel, 
    240 Mass. 18
    , 21 (1921).   Because of this
    express desire that resident children may be adopted by
    petitioners domiciled in another State, as reflected in the
    13See Tuells v. Flint, 
    283 Mass. 106
    , 109 (1933) ("A
    domicil once established continues until a new one is acquired
    regardless of changes in temporary sojourn").
    12
    language of G. L. c. 210, § 1, it would be illogical to
    interpret that the mother's surrender, pursuant to G. L. c. 210,
    § 2, would have any impact on the child's domicil without
    further court proceedings.
    Additionally, although the father's signing of the VAP,
    which occurred before the mother's surrender, grants him "a
    constitutionally protected right to parent and maintain a
    relationship with his child," thereby making him a "legal
    parent," this does not change the child's domicil.   
    Smith, 458 Mass. at 544
    .   Even if we determined that signing the VAP alone,
    and without further adjudication, granted the father shared
    legal custody of the child, this could not mean that the child
    acquired a new domicil as a result.   To declare so would mean
    that each time a court granted any custodial rights to a
    noncustodial parent, it would change a child's domicil.14
    The final question is whether the father's removal of the
    child from Massachusetts in June 201815 changes the domicil of
    the child.   Similar circumstances were presented in 
    Krakow, 326 Mass. at 453
    , where the adopting parents took the child to live
    14We also note that our inquiry into subject matter
    jurisdiction could have stopped here had the Probate and Family
    Court appropriately determined it had jurisdiction over the
    first petition filed two weeks after the child's birth.
    15The father's exact date of departure with the child is
    not in the record before us.
    13
    with them in New York "a few weeks" after the child's birth, and
    filed the petition in Massachusetts a month after that.      As we
    noted in Krakow, "the temporary abode of the minor with the
    [out-of-State] petitioners" did not change the child's domicil
    because "no decree granting the [adoption] petition could have
    been entered unless the minor had lived with the petitioners for
    at least six months" according to G. L. c. 210, § 5A (requiring
    that child reside in home of adoption petitioner for six months
    prior to petition decree).    Krakow, supra at 454.   Therefore,
    "[c]ompliance with this residential requirement, if held to
    effect a change in the child's domicil, would bar all petitions
    by nonresident petitioners.     That result could not have been
    intended by the Legislature."
    Id. at 454-455.
      Consequently,
    despite the child's removal to the father's home country during
    the adoption proceedings, the child's domicil remained in
    Weymouth.16   Because the child was "residing" in Weymouth, as
    defined under G. L. c. 210, § 1, we hold that the Probate and
    Family Court had subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a
    hearing on the father's petition.17
    16To be clear, the child will acquire a new domicil with
    her legal and custodial parent pursuant to Gil v. Servizio, 
    375 Mass. 186
    , 189 (1978), when the adoption is finalized.
    17This result is further supported by examining the
    adoption statute in conjunction with the Massachusetts Child
    Custody Jurisdiction Act, G. L. c. 209B, § 2 (a). According to
    the statute,
    14
    "Any court which is competent to decide child custody
    matters has jurisdiction to make a custody determination by
    initial or modification judgment if: (1) the commonwealth
    (i) is the home state of the child on the commencement of
    the custody proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home
    state within six months before the date of the commencement
    of the proceeding and the child is absent from the
    commonwealth because of his or her removal or retention by
    a person claiming his or her custody or for other reasons,
    and a parent or person acting as parent continues to reside
    in the commonwealth; or . . . (4) (i) it appears that no
    other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites
    substantially in accordance with paragraph (1), (2) or (3),
    or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on
    the ground that the commonwealth is the more appropriate
    forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is
    in the best interest of the child that a court of the
    commonwealth assume jurisdiction. . . ."
    If this matter were a custody proceeding, the Probate and Family
    Court would have jurisdiction under G. L. c. 209B, § 2 (a) (1)
    (ii), if the father and the child left the United States as
    early as May 8, 2018, because Massachusetts would have been the
    child's home State "within six months" before the petition was
    filed and the mother still resides in the Commonwealth. As
    mentioned previously, we do not know the father's exact date of
    departure; however, the court also would have jurisdiction under
    G. L. c. 209B, § 2 (a) (4), because there is no other State that
    would have jurisdiction to determine the custody of the child
    and it is in the best interest of the child that a Massachusetts
    court assume jurisdiction. See, e.g., Adoption of Anisha, 
    89 Mass. App. Ct. 822
    , 832 (2016). The term "best interest of the
    child" as found in § 2 (a) (4) is defined according to the
    requirements set forth in § 2 (a) (2) of the statute: (i) that
    the child and at least one parent have a significant connection
    to the Commonwealth and (ii) that "there is available in the
    commonwealth substantial evidence concerning the child's present
    or future care, protection, training, and personal
    relationships." See Redding v. Redding, 
    398 Mass. 102
    , 105-106
    (1986). Here, the mother still resides in the Commonwealth,
    where she gave birth to the child, and the child has legal
    domicil here, so the statutory requirements are met.
    15
    2.   Personal jurisdiction over the parties.   Because we do
    not know precisely on what ground the petition was dismissed, we
    also address the Probate and Family Court's jurisdiction over
    the parties.
    Given that we already have established that both the mother
    and child were domiciled in Weymouth, they are both subject to
    the Probate and Family Court's jurisdiction.   Although the
    father is not domiciled in Massachusetts, nor did he reside
    here, he consented to the court's personal jurisdiction by
    filing his petition in that court.   See Stearns v. Allen, 
    183 Mass. 404
    , 407 (1903) ("persons domiciled in another State
    voluntarily bring themselves within the jurisdiction of the
    court by filing their petition, and therefore there can be no
    question as to jurisdiction of the adopting parent[]").
    3.   Equity jurisdiction.   In a situation such as the one
    presented here, the Probate and Family Court also could have
    exercised equity jurisdiction pursuant to G. L. c. 215, § 6.
    See Hodas v. Morin, 
    442 Mass. 544
    , 547 (2004) ("as a general
    matter, the Probate and Family Court has subject matter
    jurisdiction in questions of law and equity concerning
    parentage").   In Hodas, we were asked to decide whether a
    Probate and Family Court judge had authority pursuant to G. L.
    c. 215, § 6, to issue a prebirth judgment of parentage where
    neither the genetic parents nor the gestational carrier with
    16
    whom they contracted resided in Massachusetts.    Hodas, supra at
    544-545.   The only connection to Massachusetts was that the
    gestational carrier agreement specified that the birth occur at
    a Massachusetts hospital.
    Id. at 546.
      We noted that the
    "equity statute poses no residency requirement" nor is there a
    "statutory directive [that] limits the court's jurisdiction in
    actions relating to gestational agreements to Massachusetts
    residents."
    Id. at 547
    & n.6.   We see no reason to hold
    otherwise here.
    Conclusion.    For the foregoing reasons, we issued an order
    on January 8, 2020, vacating the judgment of dismissal.       The
    Probate and Family Court has both subject matter jurisdiction
    under G. L. c. 210, § 1, and personal jurisdiction over the
    parties in this case.