Commonwealth v. Loya ( 2020 )


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    SJC-12475
    COMMONWEALTH   vs.   ADRIAN T. LOYA.
    Barnstable.    November 8, 2019. - February 6, 2020.
    Present:     Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.
    Homicide. Criminal Responsibility. Insanity. Practice,
    Criminal, Capital case, Instructions to jury, Request for
    jury instructions, Acquittal by reason of insanity.
    Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
    Department on July 1, 2015.
    The cases were tried before Gary A. Nickerson, J.
    Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan also present)
    for the defendant.
    Elizabeth A. Sweeney, Assistant District Attorney, for the
    Commonwealth.
    LENK, J.    On February 5, 2015, the defendant broke into
    Lisa Trubnikova's home.     He confronted her in the bedroom, where
    she lay beside her wife, Anna Trubnikova.1      The defendant shot
    1 Because Lisa Trubnikova and Anna Trubnikova share a last
    name, we refer to them by their first names.
    2
    both women, killing Lisa and wounding Anna.    Before finally
    surrendering to police, the defendant also shot and wounded a
    responding police officer, Jared P. MacDonald.
    For more than one year, the defendant had been obsessed
    with killing Lisa, and in turn being killed by police.     The
    defendant eventually reduced this intended murder-suicide in a
    detailed, written plan labeled "Operation Purple Rebel" in his
    electronic files.   At trial, the defendant argued that this
    obsessive and self-destructive plot showed that the killing was
    not born out of malice; rather, he was mentally disturbed.
    Counsel unsuccessfully claimed that a mental disorder caused the
    defendant to suffer delusions that compelled him to plan and
    commit the crime.   On appeal, the defendant contends that our
    current law on criminal responsibility made this defense not
    viable, and therefore, because he was deprived of his only
    defense, a new trial is required.    Alternatively, the defendant
    asks us to reduce the verdict, pursuant to our authority under
    G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
    We discern no reason to order a new trial or to reduce the
    conviction.   Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.
    1.   Background.   a.   Facts.   We recite the facts as the
    jury could have found them, in the light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth, reserving certain details for later discussion.
    3
    The defendant first met Lisa in 2011, when they served
    together in the United States Coast Guard at a base in Kodiak,
    Alaska.   They worked together in an information technology
    office, and they developed a fast friendship.
    Their relationship took a dramatic turn in September of
    2012 following an incident at Lisa's home.     According to the
    defendant, Lisa invited him over to have drinks and watch some
    video recordings.   While he was there, however, Lisa became
    intoxicated and attempted to seduce him.     Although Lisa had no
    sexual contact with the defendant, this incident affected him so
    deeply that he would later refer to it as a "rape of the mind."
    The defendant eventually reported the encounter to his
    superiors.   In June of 2013, he was transferred from Kodiak to
    Chesapeake, Virginia.   On the day he arrived at his new base,
    the Coast Guard issued the defendant a "Page 7" reprimand for
    his role in the incident and ordered him to cut off all contact
    with Lisa and her wife Anna.    The defendant was shocked and
    refused to sign the letter acknowledging the outcome of the
    Coast Guard's investigation.    He felt wronged, and this feeling
    turned to anger.
    These events coincided with a deterioration of the
    defendant's mental health.     He became depressed, started taking
    Benadryl to help him sleep, and lost interest in the few
    activities that previously had interested him, such as playing
    4
    video games.    The defendant also began to harbor a hatred for
    the woman he blamed for his misfortune:     Lisa.   As his life
    seemed to unravel around him, the defendant ultimately decided
    that he no longer wanted to live.     He did not want to die,
    however, without seeking vengeance.     Therefore, he resolved to
    take Lisa's life.
    Over the following months, the defendant meticulously
    planned his killing.     Through the Internet, he learned that Lisa
    and Anna had relocated to the town of Bourne on Cape Cod.         In
    October of 2014, he traveled to Massachusetts and set up hunting
    cameras outside their new home to confirm that Lisa was living
    there.   When he returned home, he also began playing shooting
    games with plastic replica weapons, using plastic bullets,2 to
    gain more experience with wielding weapons in a combat
    situation.     In the midst of these preparations, the defendant
    documented his troubled history with Lisa, the downward spiral
    of his professional and personal life, and his plot to kill Lisa
    in a 250-page manifesto entitled "The Wrath of Loya."3     After
    2 The defendant obtained these weapons, sold for use in
    casual and competitive games, from a commercial manufacturer.
    3 The electronic file containing the manifesto was titled
    "The Loya Wars." The titles were references to the science
    fiction television and movie series Star Wars and Star Trek,
    respectively. Both series featured prominently in other aspects
    of the crime, including insignia the defendant wore during the
    5
    months of planning, he ultimately decided to carry out the
    killing on February 5, 2015, his thirty-first birthday.
    On February 1, 2015, the defendant left his home in
    Chesapeake, Virginia, and began making his way to Massachusetts.
    He arrived on February 3, 2015, checked into a local hotel, and
    prepared for the fatal encounter.     His original plan was to
    attack Lisa at her house, force her to confront what he had
    become, and stab her in the heart.4    He did not intend to harm
    Anna.    The defendant originally planned to cover Anna's ears
    with "ear protection" so that she would not have to hear any
    sounds that Lisa might make as she was dying.     Once Lisa was
    dead, the defendant then would provoke a firefight with police
    so that they would shoot and kill him.
    The defendant arrived at Lisa's house shortly before 2 A.M.
    on February 5, 2015.5   He parked his vehicle across the road
    approaching her house, and set it on fire to obstruct police
    shooting. Dr. John Daignault identified these references as
    further evidence of the defendant's delusional disorder.
    4 Many details of the defendant's planning and the
    commission of the crime come from his statements to police. As
    Dr. Martin Kelly, an expert called by the Commonwealth, noted,
    the defendant's recollection of these events was unusually
    precise. Kelly identified this "Eidetic memory" as further
    evidence of the defendant's mental disorder.
    5 Most of the following encounter was captured on video
    recording by a body camera that the defendant strapped to his
    chest. An edited version of this recording was played at trial,
    and the entire recording was entered as an exhibit.
    6
    access.   He also set up smoke grenades, noise makers, and fake
    explosive devices to further delay first responders.    Having
    staged the scene, the defendant breached the door to Lisa's
    house by shooting the lock off with a shotgun.    Once inside, he
    made his way up the stairs to her bedroom.
    The defendant found Lisa and Anna in their bed.    He ordered
    them to separate, threw handcuffs at them, and demanded that
    they put on the cuffs.    The women screamed and asked who he was
    and why he was in their house.    The defendant pulled off his
    mask, revealing his identity.    Lisa and Anna recognized him, and
    Lisa shouted his name.    The defendant responded, "See what you
    did to me" and "This is what I've become because of you."
    Lisa apologized to the defendant and said that she never
    meant to hurt him.    Both women pleaded with the defendant and
    promised that they would not tell anyone if he left them in
    peace.    Face-to-face with Lisa, the defendant froze, unsure of
    how to proceed.
    With the defendant momentarily distracted, Lisa and Anna
    attempted to shield themselves with their mattress.    The
    defendant exclaimed, "What do you think you're doing?"       Now
    refocused on completing his "mission," he drew his pistol and
    fired fifteen shots through the mattress in Lisa's direction.
    Eleven bullets struck Lisa, killing her in a matter of seconds.
    7
    Four bullets struck Anna.   The defendant heard gurgling sounds
    from Lisa's direction, and he concluded that she was dying.
    With his primary objective completed, the defendant
    intended to die at the hands of the police.    He went back
    outside, retrieved a rifle that he previously stashed in a snow
    bank, and prepared to engage with responding officers.     Soon
    thereafter, he saw the silhouette of an approaching police
    officer, Jared MacDonald.   The defendant fired four shots at
    MacDonald; one struck him in the spine.
    The defendant then retreated behind the victims' house to
    wait for more officers to come and end his life.    As the minutes
    slipped by, however, the defendant's resolve to kill himself
    weakened, and he decided to give himself up.    He discarded his
    weapons, approached the officers with hands raised, and was
    taken into custody.
    b.   Procedural history.   On July 1, 2015, the defendant was
    indicted on thirty counts, including murder in the first degree
    for the shooting death of Lisa.6   Trial commenced on August 28,
    6 The other indictments against the defendant were three
    counts of assault with intent to murder; three counts of
    aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon;
    two counts of armed home invasion; two counts of armed assault
    in a dwelling; three counts of using a firearm in the commission
    of a felony; two counts of armed kidnapping with bodily injury;
    one count of burglary and assault on an occupant; one count of
    burning a motor vehicle; one count of possessing a hoax device;
    8
    2017.   From the beginning of the trial, defense counsel
    acknowledged that this case was not a "whodunit."7   Rather, the
    key issue at trial was whether the defendant was criminally
    responsible for his actions.
    Four medical professionals testified concerning the
    defendant's mental condition at the time of the shooting.       Each
    expert opined as to whether the defendant met the standard to
    establish a lack of criminal responsibility set out in
    Commonwealth v. McHoul, 
    352 Mass. 544
    , 546–547 (1967):     "A
    person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
    such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
    substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
    [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
    requirements of law" (citation omitted).
    Two witnesses testified that the defendant had been
    criminally responsible, and two testified that he had not.      Dr.
    David W. Holtzen, a forensic psychologist at Bridgewater State
    Hospital, was asked by the Commonwealth to perform competency
    one count of assault and battery on a police officer; and ten
    counts of possessing a large capacity feeding device.
    7 Indeed, defense counsel stated the same in an extensive
    interview he gave to the Cape Cod Times on the day before trial
    began. The judge took pains to comment on this interview during
    empanelment, and to make sure that the article was preserved in
    the record. Exposure to media coverage was, appropriately, a
    subject of individual voir dire.
    9
    and criminal responsibility examinations of the defendant.      He
    testified that the defendant had not been suffering from any
    mental disorder or illness at the time of the killing.    Dr.
    Judith Edershein, a forensic psychiatrist based at a large
    teaching hospital,8 was engaged by the Commonwealth to reach a
    determination whether the defendant had been criminally
    responsible by reviewing the records and other experts'
    opinions, but she was precluded from speaking with the
    defendant.9   She testified that although the defendant had at
    least one personality disorder, it did not render him incapable
    of conforming his conduct to the law or appreciating the
    wrongfulness of his actions.
    Another of the Commonwealth's witnesses, Dr. Martin Kelly,
    a practicing psychiatrist also at a large teaching hospital,
    interviewed and examined the defendant three times, and reviewed
    records and the police reports.   Kelly testified that the
    defendant had high functioning Asperger's Syndrome, a disorder
    on the "autism spectrum," and that the condition was "hardwired"
    8 Dr. Judith Edershein also testified that she had graduated
    from Harvard Law School and become an attorney prior to entering
    psychiatry and ultimately becoming an assistant professor of
    psychiatry.
    9 Edershein was retained in December of 2016, after the
    Commonwealth's first expert, Kelly, completed his report.
    Edershein did not formally request to interview the defendant
    until May of 2017, at which point her request was denied by
    defense counsel.
    10
    in the brain, not something that is acquired, readily amenable
    to treatment, or "episodic."   Kelly considered and rejected
    diagnoses of schizoid personality disorder, major depressive
    disorder, and delusional disorder.   Based on his evaluation of
    the defendant and having examined the records, including the
    police reports, Kelly concluded that the defendant "suffered
    from a mental disease; and that as a result of that mental
    disease, he lacked the substantial capacity to conform his
    conduct to the requirements of the law."
    The defendant called a single expert, Dr. John Daignault, a
    forensic psychologist, who previously had been the clinical
    director of Bridgewater State Hospital.    Daignault determined
    that the defendant had not been criminally responsible for his
    actions on the night of the shooting, but concluded as well that
    the defendant suffered from a delusional disorder and did not
    suffer from Asperger's Syndrome.
    After deliberating over the course of three days, the jury
    convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on
    theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or
    cruelty.   The jury also found the defendant guilty of twenty-
    eight of the twenty-nine other indictments.   He was found not
    guilty of armed assault with intent to murder.   The defendant
    filed a notice of appeal in September 2017.
    11
    2.     Discussion.   Before us, the defendant argues that a new
    trial is required because our current law regarding criminal
    responsibility deprived him of a meaningful defense.      The
    defendant contends that the trial judge committed reversible
    error by denying two motions the defendant filed to remedy these
    flaws.    One motion proposed a verdict slip that presented the
    jury's decision in a series of yes-or-no questions, in addition
    to a general verdict of "guilty," "not guilty," or "not guilty,
    lack of criminal responsibility."     The other motion asked the
    judge to instruct the jury to consider a verdict of "guilty but
    not criminally responsible" rather than "not guilty, lack of
    criminal responsibility."     As appellate counsel acknowledged at
    oral argument, both motions advocated for a departure from our
    current law regarding the defense of a lack of criminal
    responsibility.    We decline to adopt the defendant's recommended
    changes, and discern no error in the trial judge's decision to
    deny these motions.
    a.     Verdict slips.   At the beginning of trial, counsel
    filed a motion requesting that the verdict slips include several
    yes-or-no questions on whether the Commonwealth had met its
    burden.10    Ultimately, however, the defendant expressed
    10By way of illustration, the defendant suggested the
    following language:
    12
    satisfaction with the verdict slips, drafted by the judge, that
    omitted these questions.   Therefore, as the parties agree, any
    error in the judge's decision to deny the motion is unpreserved
    and would be reviewed for a substantial likelihood of a
    "1. Has the government proven that the Defendant committed
    the act of an unlawful killing of a human being without
    justification?
    "__________Yes                                __________No
    "If the answer to the above is yes, proceed to Question 2.
    "2. Has the government proven beyond every reasonable
    doubt that the Defendant, at the time of such killing, was
    not suffering from a mental disease or defect?
    "__________Yes                                __________No
    "If the answer to this question is no, proceed to Question
    3. If the answer is yes, proceed to Question 4.
    "3. Has the government proven beyond every reasonable
    doubt that such mental disease or defect did not affect the
    Defendant so that [he] was unable to appreciate the
    wrongfulness of [his] conduct or conform his conduct to the
    requirements of the law?
    "__________Yes                                __________No
    " . . .
    "4. Has the government proven beyond every reasonable
    doubt that at the time of the killing that the Defendant
    was not suffering from a mental disease or Defect that
    reduced his capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness
    of his conduct or to conform [his] conduct to the
    requirements of the law?
    "__________Yes                                __________No"
    13
    miscarriage of justice.    See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 
    470 Mass. 24
    , 40 (2014).
    "[W]e review these claims to determine whether there was
    error and, if so, whether it created a substantial likelihood of
    a miscarriage of justice."    Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    477 Mass. 805
    , 814–815 (2017), cert. denied, 
    139 S. Ct. 54
    (2018).     "In
    analyzing a claim under the substantial likelihood standard, we
    review the evidence and case as a whole and consider whether any
    error made in the course of the trial was likely to have
    influenced the jury's conclusion."    Commonwealth v. Berry, 
    457 Mass. 602
    , 618 (2010), S.C., 
    466 Mass. 763
    (2014).     Where there
    is no error, this court need not reach the question of
    prejudice.   See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gomes, 
    459 Mass. 194
    , 207
    (2011) (analysis stops at determination there was no error).
    The defendant's motion most fairly is read as a motion for
    special questions pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 27 (c), 
    378 Mass. 897
    (1979).11    Special questions are "rarely resorted to in
    criminal trials."     Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Servs.,
    11Alternatively, the defendant's motion could be
    interpreted as a motion for a "special verdict," i.e., one that
    "involves no determinative, ultimate verdict from a jury but
    only a statement of facts the jury have found from which the
    judge determines the appropriate judgment." Commonwealth v.
    Licciardi, 
    387 Mass. 670
    , 675 (1982). Only general verdicts are
    permitted in criminal trials. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 27 (a), 
    378 Mass. 897
    (1979); 
    Licciardi, supra
    (recognizing that
    Massachusetts rules of criminal procedure eliminated special
    verdicts in criminal trials).
    14
    Inc. (No. 1), 
    389 Mass. 902
    , 916 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v.
    Lussier, 
    333 Mass. 83
    , 94 (1955).    Although they sometimes may
    "aid in the disposition of a case," Commonwealth v. Licciardi,
    
    387 Mass. 670
    , 676 (1982), the decision to issue them typically
    is "discretionary with the judge."   Dane Entertainment Servs.,
    Inc. (No. 
    1), supra
    , quoting 
    Lussier, supra
    .   We have required
    special questions only where they are necessary to ensure that,
    should a jury convict a defendant of an offense, they are
    unanimous as to the theory of that offense.    Compare
    Commonwealth v. Santos, 
    440 Mass. 281
    , 287–288 (2003) (where
    Commonwealth pursues multiple theories of murder in first
    degree, verdict slip must indicate unanimous theory of
    culpability), with Commonwealth v. Shea, 
    460 Mass. 163
    , 175
    (2011) (no special question necessary where Commonwealth pursued
    only one theory of murder in first degree), and Commonwealth v.
    Arias, 
    78 Mass. App. Ct. 429
    , 433 (2010) (no special question
    required on different methods of committing assault by means of
    dangerous weapon).
    We discern no compelling reason to require special
    questions when the jury consider criminal responsibility.12
    Although the criminal responsibility defense presents special
    12We do not decide whether, in other circumstances, special
    questions may be required for some purpose other than to ensure
    the unanimity of a verdict.
    15
    problems for a jury, see part 2.b, infra, it is unclear how yes-
    or-no questions on the Commonwealth's burden would help the jury
    to deliberate fairly on this issue.      Indeed, such questions are
    at least as likely to steer the jury towards a verdict of
    guilty.     See 
    Licciardi, 387 Mass. at 676
    , quoting Commonwealth
    v. Golston, 
    373 Mass. 249
    , 260-261 (1977), cert. denied, 
    434 U.S. 1039
    (1978) (special questions "must avoid any 'tendency to
    lead the jurors step by step to a verdict of guilty'").      See
    United States v. Spock, 
    416 F.2d 165
    , 182 (1st Cir. 1969)
    ("There is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a verdict
    of guilty than to approach it step by step").      To the extent
    that a jury may require additional guidance on how to consider
    whether a defendant lacked criminal responsibility, the proper
    source of that guidance is the jury charge.      See Commonwealth v.
    Wolfe, 
    478 Mass. 142
    , 152 (2017) (Lowy, J., dissenting) ("the
    long-standing principle that the jury are presumed to follow the
    judge's instructions . . . lies at the very heart of our justice
    system" [citation omitted]).
    Thus, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the
    defendant's motion for special questions to which he was not
    entitled.
    b.      Jury instructions.   In addition to his motion for
    special questions, the defendant filed a "Motion to Permit the
    Jury to Consider Whether the Defendant is Guilty But Insane."
    16
    Through this motion, he requested that the jury consider a
    verdict of "guilty but not criminally responsible," rather than
    the verdict set forth in the then-existing model instruction,
    "not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility."    See
    Model Jury Instruction on Homicide 11 (2013).
    At the charge conference, however, defense counsel did not
    renew this request, and ultimately declared himself satisfied
    with the judge's instructions on criminal responsibility.    We
    therefore review the judge's decision to deny this motion for a
    substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.   See Brown,
    477 Mass. at 814–815.
    The defendant argues that the option of finding him "guilty
    but not criminally responsible" was necessary in order for the
    jury fairly to consider the role that mental illness played in
    his crimes.   The defendant maintains that, to the average juror,
    a finding of "not guilty" is tantamount to a finding of factual
    innocence.    In addition to potentially confusing the jurors, the
    defendant argues, this formulation requires them to
    compartmentalize their knowledge of the defendant's actions and
    separately to consider if he nonetheless was not guilty.    The
    defendant contends that, given the particularly egregious acts
    17
    in this case, asking the jury to equate the defendant with the
    term "not guilty" was simply unrealistic.13
    Without discounting these concerns, we conclude that the
    instruction the defendant requested was not warranted.
    Instructing the jury to consider a verdict of "guilty but not
    criminally responsible" would be inconsistent with our long-
    standing jurisprudence on criminal responsibility.    As the
    defendant acknowledged at trial, he can point to no
    Massachusetts authority that supports his requested language.
    Furthermore, the defendant's requested instruction would
    invite unnecessary confusion.   A verdict of "guilty but not
    criminally responsible" is an oxymoron:   if the Commonwealth is
    unable to prove a defendant is criminally responsible beyond a
    13"[E]xperience in this Commonwealth has shown that it is
    most difficult for a defendant to prevail on a claim of
    insanity." Commonwealth v. Keita, 
    429 Mass. 843
    , 854 (1999),
    overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Lawson, 
    475 Mass. 806
    (2016). Jurors' objections to the criminal responsibility
    defense, particularly in the homicide context, are well-
    documented outside the Commonwealth as well. See Brooks, Guilty
    by Reason of Insanity: Why a Maligned Defense Demands a
    Constitutional Right of Inquiry on Voir Dire, 20 Geo. Mason L.
    Rev. 1183, 1202-1203 (2013); Grachek, The Insanity Defense in
    the Twenty-First Century: How Recent United States Supreme
    Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 Ind. L.J. 1479, 1487-
    1488 (2006). This resistance may stem from suspicions that
    defendants malinger, and that the expert testimony on which a
    criminal responsibility defense depends is susceptible to bias.
    See Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1539,
    1575-1577 (2007). In any event, it is clear that jurors do not
    easily reach the "chilling determination that the defendant is
    an insane killer not legally responsible for his acts."
    Commonwealth v. Mutina, 
    366 Mass. 810
    , 822 (1975).
    18
    reasonable doubt, the defendant is not guilty.    See Commonwealth
    v. Bruneau, 
    472 Mass. 510
    , 517 (2015); Golden, petitioner, 
    341 Mass. 672
    , 674 (1961) (affirming "the undoubted premise that one
    acquitted by reason of insanity has been found guilty of no
    crime").    To make sense of this instruction, the jury would have
    to parse the difference between factual "guilt" in the context
    of criminal responsibility and legal "guilt" as it applies to
    the charges as a whole.    Particularly in light of the other
    complications that the jury face when considering criminal
    responsibility, it would be unwise to add this complexity to the
    equation.
    The nomenclature the judge used, "not guilty by lack of
    criminal responsibility," was proper.    This language has deep
    roots in our common law.    See Commonwealth v. Green, 
    17 Mass. 515
    , 515 (1822) (defendant "found not guilty, by reason of
    insanity").14   We recently affirmed this formulation in our Model
    Jury Instructions on Homicide.    See Model Jury Instructions on
    Homicide 10-11 (2018).     The Legislature similarly has employed,
    and thereby sanctioned, this language.    See G. L. c. 123, § 16
    (establishing commitment procedures for those found "not guilty by
    14 We since have moved away from the formulation "by reason
    of insanity," see Commonwealth v. Goudreau, 
    422 Mass. 731
    , 738
    (1996) (Appendix), in favor of "by reason of a lack of criminal
    responsibility." See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 10-11
    (2018).
    19
    reason of mental illness or mental defect").   It was not error for
    the judge to rely upon this well-established formulation.
    Viewing the entire jury charge in light of the evidence at
    trial, it is clear that the issue of criminal responsibility was
    properly and fully before the jury.   The judge accurately
    explained the law on criminal responsibility before commencing
    to instruct on the numerous specific offenses with which the
    defendant had been charged.   When discussing each offense, the
    judge again reminded the jury that even should they find that
    the elements were met, they still had to consider whether the
    defendant was criminally responsible.15   These instructions
    informed the jury that they could recognize that the defendant
    had committed unlawful acts, but still find him not guilty by
    reason of lack of criminal responsibility.16
    15The judge also informed the jury that they could consider
    the role that mental illness might have played in the
    defendant's ability to form the requisite intent for certain
    offenses.
    16To the extent that a defendant may seek further
    clarification in future cases, a better practice would be for
    the judge to provide an additional instruction on the
    relationship between criminal responsibility and factual guilt.
    An appropriate instruction would mirror the language we
    sanctioned in Commonwealth v. Odgren, 
    483 Mass. 41
    , 52 (2019):
    "If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the
    defendant committed a crime, you must decide whether the
    Commonwealth . . . prove[d] that the defendant was criminally
    responsible beyond a reasonable doubt." This language would
    clarify that a verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of
    criminal responsibility necessarily includes a conclusion that
    20
    With these instructions in hand, the jury were well
    equipped to consider the evidence from both sides that bore on
    the defendant's responsibility:    the opinions of four expert
    witnesses;17 the video recording of the defendant's planning and
    commission of the offense; the defendant's recorded statements
    to police; and the defendant's manifesto.     The jury deliberated
    over a period of three days before reaching their verdicts.      In
    sum, the defendant was not deprived of a meaningful defense; the
    jury rejected it.
    c.   Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.    Having reviewed the
    entirety of the record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278,
    § 33E, we are left with no doubt that mental illness played a
    central role in this crime.    Nonetheless, although the defendant
    presented "substantial evidence supporting his insanity
    defense," Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    449 Mass. 747
    , 773 (2007), we
    discern no reason to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278,
    § 33E.    Mental illness does not equate with the absence of
    criminal responsibility.    The jury could properly credit the
    opinions of Edershein and Holtzen that, assuming the defendant
    the defendant committed the act that constitutes the charged
    offense. See 
    id. at 52-53; Commonwealth
    v. Bruneau, 
    472 Mass. 510
    , 517 (2015) (not guilty by reason of criminal responsibility
    verdict "is unlike an acquittal because it includes a finding
    that the defendant committed the criminal act").
    17 In addition to the witnesses' testimony, by agreement of
    the parties, each expert's report was introduced as an exhibit.
    21
    suffered from a qualifying mental disorder, he nonetheless was
    able to conform his actions to the law and to understand the
    wrongfulness of his brutal actions.    Their testimony provided
    sufficient support for the jury's verdict.    On similar facts, we
    have concluded that, "[s]ince the issue of the defendant's
    criminal responsibility was fully and fairly before the jury[,]
    . . . justice does not require that their verdict be
    disturbed.'"   
    Brown, supra
    , quoting Commonwealth v. Lunde, 
    390 Mass. 42
    , 50 (1983).   We likewise conclude that this verdict was
    consonant with justice.
    Judgments affirmed.