Drake v. Town of Leicester ( 2020 )

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SJC-12781
KATHERINE DRAKE vs. TOWN OF LEICESTER.
Worcester. December 6, 2019. - February 28, 2020.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ.
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Notice, Claim under
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, Timeliness. Practice,
Civil, Presentment of claim under Massachusetts Tort Claims
Act, Motion to dismiss. Negligence, Municipality, School.
Municipal Corporations, Liability for tort, Notice to
municipality. Mail.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
March 26, 2018.
A motion to dismiss was heard by Rosemary Connolly, J.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Tom G. Vukmirovits for the plaintiff.
Melina McTigue Garland for the defendant.
LOWY, J. On January 19, 2016, the plaintiff, Katherine
Drake, slipped and fell at Leicester High School while picking
2
up her grandson during school hours. She suffered multiple
injuries, including a fractured knee and wrist.1
Before suing a public employer for negligence, claimants
must present their claim to the requisite public officer within
two years of their alleged injury. See G. L. c. 258, § 4.
Exactly two years after the claim arose, on Friday, January 19,
2018, Drake mailed her presentment letter, via certified mail,
to the defendant, the town of Leicester (town).2 The town
received Drake's presentment letter on Monday, January 22, 2018.
The town denied liability for Drake's injuries on February 7,
2018, and Drake commenced this negligence action against the
town the following month.
The town moved to dismiss the complaint under Mass. R. Civ.
P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), arguing that because Drake
failed to make presentment within the statutory deadline imposed
by G. L. c. 258, § 4, she could not state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. After a hearing, the Superior Court
judge agreed and dismissed Drake's complaint due to her untimely
presentment. Drake appealed, and we transferred this case on
1 We recite the facts as alleged in the complaint, accepting
them as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff's favor. See Edwards v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 254,
260 (2017).
2 The town's offices happened to be closed on January 19,
2018, but Drake does not assert that her letter could have
arrived that same day.
3
our own motion from the Appeals Court. We conclude that Drake's
presentment was untimely, and we affirm.
Discussion. We review the denial of a motion to dismiss de
novo. See Edwards v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 254, 260 (2017).
The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (act) makes public
employers liable for loss of property, personal injury, or death
caused by the negligence or wrongful conduct of public employees
acting within the scope of their employment. See G. L. c. 258,
§ 2. A claimant cannot institute a civil action against a
public employer for damages "unless the claimant shall have
first presented [her] claim in writing to the executive officer
of such public employer within two years after the date upon
which the cause of action arose." G. L. c. 258, § 4. Proper
presentment is accordingly a condition precedent to bringing
suit under the act, and failure to do so is fatal to the
plaintiff's complaint. See Estate of Gavin v. Tewksbury State
Hosp., 468 Mass. 123, 128 (2014), quoting Vasys v. Metropolitan
Dist. Comm'n, 387 Mass. 51, 55 (1982).
The parties do not dispute that Drake's presentment letter
was in writing and was presented to the proper executive
official. The parties do dispute, however, whether Drake's
presentment was timely. Therefore, the issue before us is what
act constitutes presentment under G. L. c. 258, § 4: placing a
4
presentment letter in the mail, as Drake argues,3 or receipt by
the proper executive officer, as the town argues. We determine
that there is a third ground and conclude that presentment
occurs upon delivery to the office of the proper executive
officer.4
We ordinarily begin with the plain language of the statute,
see Commonwealth v. Welch, 444 Mass. 80, 85 (2005); however, the
act does not define "presentment." See G. L. c. 258, § 1.
"When a statute does not define its words[,] we give them their
usual and accepted meanings, as long as these meanings are
consistent with the statutory purpose" (citation omitted).
Estate of Gavin, 468 Mass. at 129. "We derive the words' usual
and accepted meanings from sources presumably known to the
statute's enactors, such as their use in other legal contexts
and dictionary definitions" (citation omitted). Id.
The usual and accepted meaning of "presentment" is "[t]he
act of presenting or laying before a court or other tribunal a
formal statement about a matter to be dealt with legally."
3 Drake acknowledges that her claim arose on January 19,
2016, the date of her fall, and that thus presentment must have
occurred by January 19, 2018.
4 We note, however, that although presentment occurs upon
delivery to the office of the proper executive officer, the
presentment letter must still be addressed to the proper
executive officer. Compare Lopez v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 440 Mass.
1029, 1030-1031 (2003).
5
Black's Law Dictionary 1433 (11th ed. 2019). See Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 1793 (1993) (defining
"present" as "to lay or put before a person for acceptance").
To lay or to put an item, such as a presentment letter, before
another, the receiving person or entity must have the
opportunity to observe the item. Placing the presentment letter
in the mail, certified or otherwise, does not constitute proper
presentment under G. L. c. 258, § 4, as that act alone would not
provide the proper executive officer the opportunity to observe
the letter.5
Defining the act's presentment requirement as occurring
upon delivery to the office of the proper executive officer also
finds support in the Legislature's intent. The Legislature
intended the act (1) "to allow plaintiffs with valid causes of
action to recover in negligence against governmental entities;"
and (2) "to preserve the stability and effectiveness of
government by providing a mechanism which will result in payment
of only those claims against governmental entities which are
valid, in amounts which are reasonable and not inflated.".
5 The Federal Tort Claims Act has a similar presentment
requirement, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675, and similarly does
not articulate what act constitutes presentment, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2671. However, the regulation promulgated pursuant to the
statute does. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) ("a claim shall be deemed
to have been presented when a Federal agency receives from a
claimant . . . written notification of an incident").
6
Estate of Gavin, 468 Mass. at 131, quoting Vasys, 387 Mass. at
57.6
The presentment requirement furthers the act's second
purpose by providing the Commonwealth and other public employers
with "the opportunity to investigate and settle claims and to
prevent future claims through notice to executive officers.".
Estate of Gavin, 468 Mass. at 132, quoting Shapiro v. Worcester,
464 Mass. 261, 268 (2013). We have, therefore, previously
required that claimants strictly comply with the presentment
requirement contained in G. L. c. 258, § 4. See Shapiro, supra
at 267; Richardson v. Dailey, 424 Mass. 258, 261 (1997); Weaver
v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 43, 47 (1982); Pruner v. Clerk of the
Superior Court, 382 Mass. 309, 315-316 (1981) (plaintiff failed
to comply with presentment requirement within two-year period);
Martin v. Commonwealth, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 528-529 (2002)
(strict compliance focused on "proper party noticed" and
"timeliness").
The definition of the act's presentment requirement as
occurring upon delivery to the office of the proper executive
officer aligns with this purpose of the presentment requirement
When considering these dual
6 purposes, we seek to strike an
"appropriate balance . . . between the public interest in
fairness to injured persons and in promoting effective
government." Estate of Gavin, 468 Mass. at 131, quoting Vasys,
387 Mass. at 57.
7
by ensuring that the government has adequate time to investigate
and respond to such claims.7 See Shapiro, 464 Mass. at 268;
Lopez v. Lynn Hous Auth., 440 Mass. 1029, 1031 (2003) ("it is
undisputed that the claim was ultimately received in writing and
acted on by the appropriate executive officer," and thus, "the
purposes underlying the presentment requirement have been
satisfied").
Drake nonetheless argues for a liberal construction of the
presentment requirement. While we have done so in some past
cases, we have confined our conclusions to the unique
circumstances of those particular cases. Importantly, in those
cases, we concluded that the purposes underlying the presentment
requirement were satisfied: the proper executive officer was
notified of the claims within the statutory deadline. See
Estate of Gavin, 468 Mass. at 125 n.3, 135 (interpreting
"claimant" to include decedent's estate, "in the circumstances
of the present case"); Lopez, 440 Mass. at 1030-1031 ("in the
unique circumstances of this case, it is apparent that the
purpose of the presentment requirement has been fulfilled" even
7 We also note that this definition does not run afoul of
the act's other purpose of allowing injured parties with valid
claims to recover from the government, as the definition does
not decrease the statutory time frame within which those injured
persons must make their claims known to the proper executive
officer. See Estate of Gavin, 468 Mass. at 131. Indeed, the
injured party has a full two years to do so. See G. L. c. 258,
§ 4.
8
though claimant did not address presentment letter to proper
executive officer); Vasys, 387 Mass. at 52-53, 57 ("In the
unusual circumstances of this case, we believe that balance is
best struck by our holding that the defendant here is barred
from raising the issue of defective presentment . . .").
The straightforward circumstances of this case are not
unique. Drake mailed her presentment letter on the last day of
the statutory period, January 19, 2018. Drake does not contend
that her mailed letter could have arrived on that same day, nor
does she contest that the office of the proper executive officer
received the presentment letter on January 22, 2018 -- a full
two years and three days after she was injured. Given our
conclusion that presentment occurs upon delivery to the office
of the proper executive officer, we conclude that Drake's
presentment was untimely and affirm the motion judge's dismissal
of her complaint.
So ordered.