Mendes's Case ( 2020 )

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SJC-12857
MARK MENDES'S CASE.
Suffolk. March 3, 2020. - October 29, 2020.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher,
& Kafker, JJ.1
Workers' Compensation Act, Jurisdiction of Industrial Accident
Board. Words, "Significant contacts."
Appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Reviewing
Board.
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.
John M. Sahady for the claimant.
Richard L. Neumeier (John C. White also present) for the
insurer.
Kathy Jo Cook, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers, & Patrick
M. Groulx, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, amicus
curiae, submitted a brief.
BUDD, J. The claimant, Mark Mendes, is a Massachusetts
resident who entered into an employment contract, performed much
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on
this case prior to his death.
2
of the work, and was injured all outside the Commonwealth.
After protracted administrative proceedings in the Department of
Industrial Accidents (department), his claim for workers'
compensation ultimately was denied and dismissed by the
department's reviewing board (board), which determined that the
department lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.
The claimant appealed from that determination to the Appeals
Court, and we granted an application for direct appellate
review.
We conclude that, given the significant contacts between
the claimant's employment and the Commonwealth, the workers'
compensation act (act), G. L. c. 152, confers jurisdiction on
the department to adjudicate his claim.2
Background. 1. Workers' compensation act. Originally
passed in 1911, see St. 1911, c. 751, the act was a "response to
strong public sentiment that the remedies afforded by actions of
tort at common law did not provide adequate protections to
workers." Neff v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Indus. Accs.,
421 Mass. 70, 73 (1995), citing Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346,
349 (1914). The act provides: "If an employee . . . receives a
personal injury arising out of and in the course of his
employment . . . in the business affairs or undertakings of his
2We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys.
3
employer, and whether within or without the commonwealth, he
shall be paid compensation by the insurer or self-insurer" as
provided for in the act. G. L. c. 152, § 26.
"The act was intended to guarantee that workers would
receive payment for any workplace injuries they suffered,
regardless of fault; in exchange for accepting the statutory
remedies, the worker waives any common-law right to compensation
for injuries. . . . The workers' compensation scheme provides
predictability for both employee and employer, balancing
protection for workers with certainty for employers" (quotations
and citations omitted). Benoit v. Boston, 477 Mass. 117, 122
(2017). It did so by "establish[ing] a scheme of interlinked
rights, obligations, and remedies 'all its own, not previously
known to the common or statutory law.'" Merchants Ins. Group v.
Spicer, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 267 (2015), quoting Ahmed's Case,
278 Mass. 180, 184 (1932).
Payments to injured workers are made pursuant to insurance
policies that employers are required to obtain under the act.3
See G. L. c. 152, § 25A. See Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc.,
460 Mass. 484, 494 (2011). Depending on the nature and severity
of the injury and the degree of the resulting incapacity, a
3 Alternatively, employers may join a workers' compensation
self-insurance group, or license as self-insurer. See G. L.
c. 152, § 25A.
4
covered employee4 may be entitled to an array of benefits
including compensation for medical bills, lost earnings, and
lost earning capacity. See G. L. c. 152, §§ 30, 31, 34, 34A,
35, 36. Where an injured employee's claim for benefits is
contested by the insurer, it advances through a series of
procedural stages in the department to determine whether the
claimant is entitled to benefits, and if so, the type and
amounts of those benefits. See generally Murphy v. Commissioner
of the Dep't of Indus. Accs., 415 Mass. 218, 223-225 (1993),
S.C., 418 Mass. 165 (1994); G. L. c. 152, §§ 10-11C.
Over the years, the Legislature has amended the act to
broaden the protections and benefits afforded to injured
employees. See, e.g., Sellers's Case, 452 Mass. 804, 812, 814
(2008) (Legislature broadened definition of "average weekly
wages," made employer participation in workers' compensation
scheme mandatory, and established fund to pay benefits to
employees of uninsured employers); Lavoie's Case, 334 Mass. 403,
406-407 (1956) (amendments to G. L. c. 152, § 26, intended to
enlarge, not restrict, act's scope). In sum, the act is "a
humanitarian measure designed to provide adequate financial
4 An employee has the right to opt out of the workers'
compensation scheme and retain the right to sue the employer in
tort by making such an intention clear in writing upon hire.
See G. L. c. 152, § 24; Wentworth v. Henry C. Becker Custom
Bldg. Ltd., 459 Mass. 768, 773 n.6 (2011).
5
protection to the victims of industrial accidents." LaClair v.
Silberline Mfg. Co., 379 Mass. 21, 27 (1979).
2. Factual and procedural history. The material facts,
taken from the record, are undisputed. Franklin Logistics, Inc.
(employer),5 a freight transportation trucking company, employed
between 800 and 900 tractor-trailer drivers who transported
goods across approximately twenty States east of the Mississippi
River.
The employer advertised for drivers nationally; the
claimant responded to an advertisement the employer placed in a
local Massachusetts newspaper. He completed an online
application for a position. After screening the claimant's
application, the employer invited him to its Pennsylvania
headquarters to participate in a three-day orientation program.
In January 2009, the claimant entered into an employment
contract with the employer at the employer's Pennsylvania
headquarters after successfully completing the program.
As a tractor-trailer driver, the claimant picked up
trailers loaded with goods and delivered them throughout the
northeast and numerous other States. Although the employer did
not own cargo terminals in Massachusetts, it used three
5At the time the claimant filed the claim, Franklin
Logistics, Inc., was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Smith
Transport Inc. Neither was incorporated in Massachusetts.
6
facilities belonging to customers in Bondsville, Leominster, and
Weymouth where drivers, including the claimant, exchanged empty
trailers for trailers loaded with goods to be delivered.
Over the course of his employment, the claimant drove a
total of 112,436.2 miles. Of those miles, he drove 31,739.9
miles (28.23%) in Pennsylvania; 13,289.3 miles (11.82%) in
Massachusetts; 11,416.4 miles (10.15%) in New York; and 10,754.2
(9.56%) in Connecticut. He drove the remaining 45,236.4 miles
(40.2%) in twenty-one other States. In addition, the claimant
made 110 trips for which a city in Massachusetts was at least
the city of origin, the city where goods were loaded into his
trailer for hauling, the destination city where the goods were
delivered, or the terminating city. On an employer-generated
report of the claimant's driving history with the company,
Massachusetts appears more than 150 times as the location of a
major trip event. In total, the claimant drove or parked his
truck in Massachusetts on approximately 166 of the 356 days
during which he was employed by the employer, more than were
spent in any other State.
On January 18, 2010, the claimant injured his lower back
while attempting to attach a loaded trailer to his truck at a
location in Maine. He was diagnosed with a bulging disc that
caused him to be physically unable to continue his work as a
truck driver.
7
The claimant filed a claim for workers' compensation
benefits with the department.6 Although an administrative judge
found that the claimant was disabled physically as a result of
the work-related injury and had no earning capacity, the judge
dismissed the claim on a procedural ground, determining that
Massachusetts lacked jurisdiction over the claim because it was
neither the place of injury nor the place of hire.
The claimant appealed from this decision to the board,
which recommitted the matter to the administrative judge for
further findings. On remand, a different administrative judge7
found that the claimant's "numerous and ongoing contacts with
Massachusetts" conferred jurisdiction in Massachusetts.
The matter once again was appealed to the board, this time
by the insurer. The board concluded that the administrative
judge erred in concluding that the department had jurisdiction
over the claim and therefore reversed the decision.8
6 The claimant sought temporary total incapacity benefits,
G. L. c. 152, § 34; partial incapacity benefits, G. L. c. 152,
§ 35; and medical benefits, G. L. c. 152, §§ 13 and 30.
7 The original administrative judge held further hearings on
remand; however, he left the bench prior to making any
additional findings. The matter was transferred to a second
administrative judge who relied on the testimony and exhibits
already entered in evidence.
8 The employer initially argued that Indiana had exclusive
jurisdiction over the claimant's claim based on a forum
selection agreement the claimant signed upon hire. When the
board found that the forum selection agreement was not
8
The claimant appealed from the board's decision to the
Appeals Court in accordance with G. L. c. 152, § 12 (2). We
granted the insurer's application for direct appellate review.
Discussion. "Subject matter jurisdiction . . . among the
[Commonwealth's] trial courts and administrative agencies 'is
both conferred and limited by statute.'" Middleborough v.
Housing Appeals Comm., 449 Mass. 514, 520 (2007), quoting Edgar
v. Edgar, 403 Mass. 616, 619 (1988), S.C., 406 Mass. 628 (1990).
The act empowers the department to administer the Commonwealth's
workers' compensation system. The question of the department's
jurisdictional limits, therefore, is one of statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., Merchants Ins. Group, 88 Mass. App.
Ct. at 267.
"The interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with
primary responsibility for administering it is entitled to
substantial deference." Gateley's Case, 415 Mass. 397, 399
(1993). See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (in reviewing board
decisions, we give "due weight to the experience, technical
competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency").
"[U]ltimately, [however,] the duty of statutory interpretation
enforceable in Massachusetts as against public policy, the
employer argued instead that the claimant's employment was
localized in Pennsylvania, the place of hire, and that
Pennsylvania -- and not Massachusetts -- had jurisdiction under
a theory of localization of employment.
9
is for the courts" (quotation and citation omitted). Moss's
Case, 451 Mass. 704, 709 (2008). We review the board's
interpretation of the act on a de novo basis. See McDonough's
Case, 448 Mass. 79, 81 (2006); Merchants Ins. Group, 88 Mass.
App. Ct. at 267.
1. Jurisdiction under the act. "Our primary duty is to
interpret a statute in accordance with the intent of the
Legislature." Pyle v. School Comm. of S. Hadley, 423 Mass. 283,
285 (1996). We have noted on previous occasions that the act
"is a remedial statute and should be given a broad
interpretation, viewed in light of its purpose and to promote
the accomplishment of it beneficent design" (quotation and
citation omitted). Neff, 421 Mass. at 73. See Higgins's Case,
460 Mass. 50, 53 (2011), quoting McCarty's Case, 445 Mass. 361,
364 (2005).
Although the act states that it applies to employees who
receive a work-related injury "whether within or without the
commonwealth,"9 G. L. c. 152, § 26, it does not specify its
jurisdictional limits. We have recognized, though, that the
quoted language was intended to "enlarge, not restrict, the
scope of the act." Lavoie's Case, 334 Mass. at 407. See
Conant's Case, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 695, 697 (1992) ("Underlying
9The act was amended to include the quoted language in
1927. See St. 1927, c. 309, § 3.
10
that provision is the State's legitimate interest in avoiding
the undesirable consequence to a resident worker injured in
another State of being unable to travel to seek benefits and
possibly becoming a public charge").
We have interpreted the provision to grant Massachusetts
jurisdiction over a claim where the employment contract was made
in the Commonwealth even if the injury occurred elsewhere. See
McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217, 220 (1931). We also have
determined that Massachusetts may exercise jurisdiction over a
claim when the injury occurred in the Commonwealth even if the
employment contract was entered into elsewhere. See Lavoie's
Case, 334 Mass. at 407. However, this court apparently has not
had occasion before now to consider whether jurisdiction lies in
circumstances where the Commonwealth is neither the place of
hire nor the place of injury, although the board has. See
Carlin's Case, 3 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 41, 42 (1989).
Acknowledging that the act is to be interpreted so as "to
broaden, rather than narrow, Massachusetts jurisdiction," the
board has considered an alternative test to determine
jurisdiction -- the "place of the employment relation."
Hillman's Case, 15 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 67, 74 (2001). See
Carlin's Case, 3 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. at 42. As framed by
the board, the place of the employment relation is the place of
hire, unless something has happened to transfer the employment
11
relation to another State. The employment relation may be
transferred from the place of hire if a new contract is formed
in another State, or if the employee acquires "a fixed and non-
temporary employment situs" in another State. Hillman's Case,
supra at 72, quoting Carlin's Case, supra. Applying this test
to determine the location of the employment relationship in
Carlin's Case, the board determined, in the circumstances of
that case, that an employee who was hired and injured elsewhere
had "sufficient contacts" with Massachusetts such that he had
"acquired a fixed and non-temporary employment situs," thus
giving Massachusetts jurisdiction over his workers' compensation
claim. Carlin's Case, supra. See Hillman's Case, supra at 75
(Massachusetts had jurisdiction where "employee maintained
sufficient contacts" with Commonwealth following involuntary
transfer out of State such that employment relation was not
transferred to other State).
Other States also have used the location of the employment
relationship as an alternative test to determine whether
jurisdiction lies for the purposes of adjudicating workers'
compensation claims. See, e.g., DiMuro v. Industrial Comm'n of
Ariz., 142 Ariz. 57, 61 (1984) ("For out-of-state injuries, it
is the presence of the employment relationship in Arizona which
establishes Arizona's interest for purposes of applying its
compensation laws"); Burse v. American Int'l Airways, 262 Conn.
12
31, 38 (2002) (jurisdiction lies if State is "[1] the place of
the injury; [2] the place of the employment contract; or [3] the
place of the employment relation" [citation omitted]); Johnson
v. United Airlines, 550 So. 2d 134, 135 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989) (in
determining jurisdiction under State workers' compensation
statute, "it is the principal location of the claimant's
employment and not the principal location of the employer's
business which is relevant"); Shannon v. Communications
Satellite Corp., 302 A.2d 582, 585 (Me. 1973) (jurisdiction may
lie if State is "place employment relationship exists or is
carried out"); Matter of Bugaj v. Great Am. Transp. Inc., 20
A.D.3d 612, 613 (N.Y. 2005), citing Matter of Nashko v. Standard
Water Proofing Co., 4 N.Y.2d 199, 201 (1958) ("The inquiry does
not focus on the location of the employer, but upon the location
of the employment"); Todacheene v. G & S Masonry, 116 N.M. 478,
481 (1993) (claimant may recover under State workers'
compensation act if employment "principally localized" in State,
as defined by statute to mean employee is domiciled in State and
spends "substantial part of his working time in service of his
employer" in State); Perkins v. Arkansas Trucking Servs., 351
N.C. 634, 637 (2000) (jurisdiction lies for out-of-State
injuries if [1] employment contract was made in State; [2]
employer's principal place of business is in State; or [3] "the
employee's principal place of employment" is in State); Madden
13
v. The Holland Group of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898-899
(Tenn. 2009) (by statute, jurisdiction may lie if employment is
"principally localized" in State or if employee is resident of
State and State has "substantial connection" to employer-
employee relationship).
States have taken different approaches to determining
whether an employment relationship is located within their
borders. Some, as did the board here, start from the
presumption that the place of hire is the place of the
employment relationship unless that relationship has been
transferred to another State. See, e.g., DiMuro, 142 Ariz. at
62. Other States conduct a comparative analysis of the contacts
between the State and the employment relationship, concluding
that jurisdiction may only lie if the State has more significant
contacts with the employment relationship than does any other
State. See, e.g., Perkins, 351 N.C. at 638 (jurisdiction lies
where State is employee's "principal place of employment" and no
other State has same degree of "significant contacts to
plaintiff's employment"). Still other States have concluded
that the location of the employment relationship within those
States depends upon the nature and extent of the employment
contacts with the State. See, e.g., Burse, 262 Conn. at 38
(ties to Connecticut must be significant in order for it to be
place of employment relationship); Hazealeferiou v. Labor Ready,
14
947 So. 2d 599, 605 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007) (for court evaluating
"principal localization" of employment relationship, "temporal
distribution" of employment is "a critical factor," which must
be considered in conjunction with nature of contacts with State
to determine whether sufficient contacts with State exist);
Harlow v. Emery-Waterhouse Co., 484 A.2d 1002, 1004-1005 (Me.
1984) (evaluating contacts with State arising from employment
relationship); Matter of Nashko, 4 N.Y.2d at 201 ("If sufficient
significant contacts with this State appear so that it can
reasonably be said that the employment is located here, then the
Workmen's Compensation Board has jurisdiction"); Knapp v. Hamm &
Phillips Serv. Co., 824 N.W.2d 785, 789 (S.D. 2012) ("We look
for factors that tend to show a 'substantial connection' with
South Dakota on a case-by-case basis to determine the location
of the employment relationship" [citation omitted]); Madden, 277
S.W.3d at 900-901 (Tennessee resident must demonstrate
"substantial connection" between State and employer-employee
relationship to establish jurisdiction based on employment
relationship). See also Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330
U.S. 469, 476 (1947) (State's "legitimate interest in providing
adequate work[ers'] compensation measures for its residents
. . . depends upon some substantial connection between the
[State] and the particular employee-employer relationship").
15
In the instant case, the board appears to have adopted the
narrowest of these tests for determining whether an employment
relationship is located in Massachusetts. Citing Carlin's Case,
3 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 41, the board concluded that because
Massachusetts was neither the place of hire nor the place of
injury, the only way for the Commonwealth to have jurisdiction
over the employee's claim would be if "something happened" to
transfer the relationship from the place of hire, Pennsylvania,
to Massachusetts. Because the employee did not make such a
showing, the board concluded that jurisdiction in the
Commonwealth could not be established.
Given the remedial nature of the statute, and the mandate
to broaden rather than restrict jurisdiction under the act, we
conclude that a more flexible approach is necessary. We hold,
therefore, that jurisdiction to adjudicate workers' compensation
claims lies in Massachusetts where there are sufficient
significant contacts between the Commonwealth and the employment
such that the employment can be said to be located in the
Commonwealth.10 Consideration of the location of the employment
10We note that it is possible for jurisdiction to lie in
more than one State. See Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. National Van
Lines, Inc., 613 F.2d 972, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (State with
"substantial contacts to an employment relationship may apply
its compensation laws without regard to whether another
jurisdiction has or could have asserted jurisdiction"); Springer
v. J.B. Transp., 145 Conn. App. 805, 817 (2013) (question of
16
relationship for jurisdictional purposes more accurately
embodies the intent of the Legislature because it better
reflects the reality of the geographical mobility of large
segments of workers.
Although determining the location of the employment
relationship will depend upon the facts of each case, relevant
considerations may include whether the employee is a resident of
the Commonwealth; the employer's contacts with and presence in
the Commonwealth; whether the employee was recruited or hired in
the Commonwealth; whether and under what conditions the employee
is able, or expected, to return to the Commonwealth between
assignments; and whether the employer procured workers'
compensation insurance in Massachusetts. See Burse, 262 Conn.
at 40; Matter of Nashko, 4 N.Y.2d at 202; Matter of Galster v.
Keen Transp., 158 A.D.3d 959, 960-961 (N.Y. 2018); Matter of
Bugaj, 20 A.D.3d at 613-614; Matter of Edick v. Transcontinental
Refrigerated Lines, 300 A.D.2d 848, 849 (N.Y. 2002); Knapp, 824
N.W.2d at 790-791.
2. Analysis. Evaluating the contacts between the
claimant's employment and the Commonwealth, we note that prior
jurisdiction based on location of employment relationship does
not require showing that employment relationship exists only in
forum State); Martin v. American Colloid Co., 804 N.W.2d 65, 69
n.2 (S.D. 2011) (more than one State may have "substantial
connection to employment relationship, and both could therefore
be considered the location of the employment relationship").
17
to and during his employment, the claimant was a Massachusetts
resident who was licensed by the Commonwealth to drive
commercial vehicles, including tractor-trailers. See, e.g.,
Matter of Edick, 300 A.D.2d. at 849. The claimant learned of
the position with the employer by way of an advertisement placed
in a local Massachusetts newspaper. See, e.g., Matter of Bugaj,
20 A.D.3d at 614.
During the course of his employment, the claimant drove the
employer's tractor-trailer thousands of miles in Massachusetts,
more than he drove in any other State except Pennsylvania.
Further, the claimant had employment-related contact with
Massachusetts on almost one-half (46.6%) of the days he worked
for the employer, more than with any other State. He picked up
tons of goods from, and delivered tons of goods to, the
employer's Massachusetts customers. See, e.g., Springer v. J.B.
Transp., Inc., 145 Conn. App. 805, 825-826 (2013).
The employer made regular use of three customer-owned
facilities where drivers, including the claimant, regularly
would drop off empty trailers and pick up loaded ones. See,
e.g., Matter of Edick, 300 A.D.2d. at 849. The claimant was
permitted to park the tractor-trailer in Massachusetts and stay
at home during days off. See, e.g., Matter of Bugaj, 20 A.D.3d
at 614.
18
After sustaining his injury, the claimant returned to
Massachusetts for medical care. See, e.g., Matter of Galster,
158 A.D.3d at 960. The employer maintained workers'
compensation insurance with the insurer, which provided
insurance to Massachusetts companies. See, e.g., Matter of
Nashko, 4 N.Y.2d at 202.
Considering the foregoing, there were sufficient
significant contacts between Massachusetts and the claimant's
employment such that the employment relationship was located in
Massachusetts. We therefore conclude that the Commonwealth has
jurisdiction over the claimant's claim.
Conclusion. We vacate the board's decision and remand the
case to the department for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
So ordered.