Commonwealth v. Doughty ( 2023 )

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SJC-13112
COMMONWEALTH vs. WES DOUGHTY.
Essex. January 9, 2023. - May 2, 2023.
Present: Budd, C.J., Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.
Homicide. Practice, Criminal, Mistrial, Argument by prosecutor,
Instructions to jury, Jury and jurors, Conduct of juror,
Indictment, Capital case. Mental Impairment.
Intoxication. Jury and Jurors. Burning a Dwelling House.
Attempt. Jurisdiction, Superior Court. Superior Court,
Jurisdiction.
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on May 9, 2017.
The cases were tried before Timothy Q. Feeley, J.
Jeffrey L. Baler for the defendant.
Kathryn L. Janssen, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
WENDLANDT, J. The defendant, Wes Doughty, was convicted on
two counts of murder in the first degree in connection with the
February 2017 killings of Mark Greenlaw and Jennifer O'Connor
inside a Peabody home. The defendant admitted to killing
2
Greenlaw, whom he shot in the face at close range; however, he
contended that the killing was committed in a heat of passion
stemming from Greenlaw's treatment of David Moise, a "crack"
cocaine dealer who was wheelchair-bound and who also lived in
the Peabody residence. He also admitted to killing O'Connor,
whom he stabbed and slashed more than twenty times as she
pleaded for her life, asked to see her father, and gasped
futilely for breath; but the defendant contended that he had
been under the influence of crack cocaine. The jury convicted
the defendant of murder in the first degree on the theory of
premeditation as to both victims, and on the theory of extreme
atrocity or cruelty as to O'Connor.1
On appeal, the defendant maintains that the trial judge
abused his discretion in denying his motion for mistrial, that
the prosecutor's closing argument was improper, that the jury
instructions were erroneous, that a juror should have been
dismissed, and that the attempted arson indictment was
defective. He also asks this court to exercise its authority
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt or
1 He was also convicted of one count of attempted burning of
a dwelling, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 5A; one count of
armed carjacking, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 21A; one count
of kidnapping, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 26; and one count
of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, in
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b).
3
order a new trial. We affirm the convictions and discern no
reason to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
1. Background. a. Facts. The following facts are
supported by the evidence presented at trial.
The events leading to the killings took place in the
Peabody home from which Moise ran his drug distribution
operation. Shortly before the killings, Greenlaw moved into the
home. Greenlaw assisted Moise in his drug-selling enterprise,
gradually replacing Michael Hebb, who, along with his
girlfriend, Christine Cummisky, also resided in the home.
The defendant was one of Moise's regular buyers; he came to
the home daily to use cocaine and also to help care for Moise,
whom he called "Dad." On the afternoon of the killings,
Cummisky heard Hebb and the defendant discussing Greenlaw in the
second-floor bedroom. Both men were angry.2
Hebb complained that Greenlaw was "moving in" on Moise's
drug dealing business and was adamant that he "wasn't letting it
happen." The defendant disapproved of the care Greenlaw
provided to Moise, who required assistance in eating and
2 Disagreements among the residents began after Greenlaw
began spending more time at the house; a week before the
killings, Greenlaw slapped Hebb, giving him a black eye, and
Hebb later responded by discharging a rifle into the garage when
he believed Greenlaw was inside. Cummisky suspected that Hebb
knew she had twice been intimate with Greenlaw. Hebb also may
have owed Greenlaw money.
4
toileting. The defendant and Hebb discussed "doing something"
to Greenlaw. The defendant told Hebb, "When you see me standing
in this spot, you know shit is about to happen," referring to a
spot between two lion figures in front of the house.
Soon thereafter, Cummisky saw the defendant standing in the
agreed spot, and she notified Hebb, who had gone to the second-
floor bathroom to shower. The defendant reentered the home and
went upstairs into the bedroom; he was holding a revolver.
Cummisky heard the first-floor bathroom door open, and the
defendant ran downstairs; Hebb stayed upstairs with Cummisky.
Cummisky heard the defendant and Greenlaw arguing, and then
she heard gunshots. The medical examiner later opined that
Greenlaw was killed by a close-range shotgun blast between his
eyes.3
Cummisky next heard a woman -- presumably O'Connor, who was
engaged to Greenlaw -- scream, "[O]h, my God. What did you do?"
and plead with Greenlaw to "wake up."4 Cummisky then heard
O'Connor say, "[P]lease just let me leave. I just want to go
3 Police officers eventually recovered a shotgun in a marsh
or wood through which the defendant and Hebb had fled, see
infra; it was capable of firing the type of shot that killed
Greenlaw and contained a live round. Officers also recovered a
rifle, a shotgun, and a revolver in the basement of the Peabody
house, but none of these was likely the murder weapon.
4 Hebb went downstairs and then returned a few minutes
later.
5
see my dad," and, "If you're going to rape me, kill me first,"
followed by whimpering.5 The medical examiner testified that
O'Connor was stabbed and sliced twenty times, including twice on
her torso, with one stab wound penetrating her left lung and one
penetrating to her spine. She had at least a dozen wounds in
her neck; her jugular vein was severed, and her carotid artery
was cut.6 The medical examiner testified that the hemorrhaging
from the wounds on her torso indicated that they likely were
inflicted after the stab wounds in the neck. As she was dying
from blood loss, she would have tried to breathe faster and
deeper, but the injury to her left lung would have interfered
with her ability to do so. Most likely, she did not die
instantaneously, but rather over the course of minutes.
When the defendant returned upstairs, he was shirtless and
covered in blood. Hebb went downstairs and returned with a
shotgun or rifle wrapped in a pair of jeans. Hebb also carried
Moise, who was crying, upstairs. Cummisky heard banging
5 Forensic evidence later determined that O'Connor was
killed on Moise's bed, which was located on the first floor, but
on the other side of the house from where Greenlaw had been
killed; her blood was found on the bedframe, floor, and walls.
The defendant was very likely a minor contributor to
deoxyribonucleic acid found under O'Connor's nails.
6 Two knives stained with human blood were later recovered
from the basement: a folding knife and a serrated single-edge
saw-type knife.
6
downstairs and asked Hebb whether the defendant had shot
Greenlaw; Hebb confirmed that the defendant had done so.
The next day, the defendant ordered Cummisky to clean blood
off the kitchen cabinets, which Cummisky did.7 The defendant
followed her as she cleaned. By this point, the crack cocaine
supply in the house had been depleted; Hebb and the defendant
called a supplier to deliver more. When the supplier arrived,
he noticed the kitchen and living room had been cleaned; the
defendant was carrying a shotgun and looked "strange."
The defendant and Hebb then spent time in the basement;
they told Cummisky to bang on the stairs if anyone pulled into
the driveway. While the defendant and Hebb were in the
basement, Cummisky fled from the home, without shoes or a coat
despite the winter conditions. Cummisky waved down a driver in
a passing vehicle and dove into the vehicle headfirst, screaming
that "[t]hey just killed two people." The driver took Cummisky
to the police station, where Cummisky reported the killings. A
marked police cruiser established a loose perimeter at the home.
Early the following morning, a former buyer of the drug
distribution business arrived at the home; all the lights were
off. The buyer observed that the defendant was "high as a
Cummisky had asked Hebb whether the defendant planned to
7
kill her; Hebb responded that the defendant did not, but Hebb
warned Cummisky not to "act crazy in front of him."
7
kite," and she saw him do "a couple of hits" of crack cocaine.
The defendant, whom the buyer described as "a strange person,"
"an idiot," "always off," "a weird dude," and "always a little
different," was "acting even stranger than he usually did." The
defendant pointed a rifle or shotgun at the buyer's face and
asked repeatedly whether law enforcement officials were outside.
After the defendant escorted the buyer from the home, the buyer
sent Hebb a text message informing him of the presence of a
police cruiser on the street outside the house.
The defendant and Hebb fled from the home in a van before a
special weapons and tactics team entered the home. In the
basement, the law enforcement officials found gasoline
containers and a welding torch hose threaded down the bulkhead
leading to two rolled up rugs; inside the rugs were the victims'
bodies, wrapped in cellophane and placed in body bags. The
officers also found a bloody mattress, garbage bags, and a
disassembled shotgun or rifle. The welding torch hose was
connected to an acetylene tank filled with flammable gas.8 The
rugs and garbage bags were covered in flammable liquid; inside
the bags were blood-soaked clothing and bedding, along with a
pocket knife. The kitchen smelled strongly of cleaning
products.
8 The defendant had experience with welding.
8
When the van in which the defendant and Hebb had fled broke
down, Hebb called a friend to pick them up. When the friend
arrived, Hebb emerged from the woods wearing a mechanic's
outfit, followed several minutes later by the defendant. Both
were soaking wet.
Later, the defendant arrived alone at the Middleton home of
one of his childhood friends; the defendant was wet and
apparently cold. The defendant said, "I'm in some trouble.
I've got -- it was them or me. I've got a couple of bodies."
The defendant made a gesture as if he were handling a rifle.
The friend declined to help him, and the defendant stole a car
from the property and fled.
A few days later, the defendant entered Kenneth Metz's car
and forced him into the passenger's seat at knifepoint, tying
him up with a seatbelt and driving to various locations. The
defendant twice mentioned "the Farm Ave. killing,"9 apparently
assuming Metz had seen news coverage of it. Metz testified that
the defendant said he had been "really angry because the other
people there had been giving medical-grade heroin to a relative
or his godfather and he didn't want his godfather getting
addicted to heroin." The defendant told Metz that he "went in
without any weapons but used whatever was in the house." He
9 The Peabody home where the killings occurred was on Farm
Avenue.
9
also stated, "I've killed one person now. It won't matter too
much if I have to kill another one." Metz managed to escape,
and he later reported to the police that the defendant stated he
had killed "these people." Metz also stated that he "knew
pretty quick this guy wasn't altogether" and that the
defendant's "attitude was fluctuating." The defendant drove
Metz's car to South Carolina, where he was apprehended a few
days later.10
On his return trip to Massachusetts, police officers found
the defendant to be "odd." On the drive to the airport, the
defendant asked to see the officers' cell phones to view media
coverage of the killings. The defendant asked one officer
whether he was tired and offered to drive, which the officer
found "[e]xtremely weird." The defendant also commented that he
had "made great time" driving down to South Carolina and pointed
out landmarks, behavior which the officer found "odd." The
defendant assigned nicknames to the officers. He asked the
officers if they were right- or left-handed and commented that
he needed to lace his boots tight in case he needed to run. At
the airport, the defendant shook his handcuffs, drawing
attention to himself, behavior which the officers also found
"odd." On the airplane, the defendant tried to speak with other
10Hebb was apprehended in Peabody; he pleaded guilty to
accessory after the fact and attempted burning of a dwelling.
10
passengers, stating to a passenger with a crucifix, "I'm evil."
He also asked an officer whether he would "let [the defendant]
go" if the plane crashed into the ocean. Again, the officer
found these statements "bizarre" and "[v]ery strange."
b. Procedural history. The defendant was indicted in
May 2017 on two counts of murder in the first degree, in
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1; one count of rape, in violation
of G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b);11 one count of attempted burning of a
dwelling, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 5A; one count of armed
carjacking, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 21A; one count of
kidnapping, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 26; and one count of
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, in violation
of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b). A jury trial was held in
September 2019.12
The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first
degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation as to the
killing of both Greenlaw and O'Connor, and also on the theory of
extreme atrocity or cruelty as to O'Connor. The defendant was
sentenced to two consecutive life sentences without parole for
11As discussed infra, a nolle prosequi was entered on the
rape charge.
12At the start of jury selection, defense counsel raised
the issue whether to ask about sexual assault during voir dire;
the judge did not add the proposed questions, explaining that
the inquiry could bring to the attention of the jury a question
about which there would potentially be no evidence.
11
the two counts of murder in the first degree.13 He filed a
timely notice of appeal.
2. Discussion. On appeal, the defendant raises several
errors, which we address in turn.
a. Mistrial. The defendant maintains that the judge
abused his discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after
Cummisky testified to O'Connor's statement, "If you're going to
rape me, kill me first."
i. Testimony regarding victim's fear of rape. Prior to
the trial, a nolle prosequi was entered on the rape charge.14
The defendant filed a motion to exclude as hearsay certain
statements that Cummisky said Hebb had made relating to this
charge. In particular, Cummisky had disclosed that, following
Greenlaw's killing when Hebb returned upstairs carrying Moise,
Hebb had told Cummisky that "[the defendant] is having sex with
[O'Connor]" and "his DNA is going to be all in her." The
13The jury also found the defendant guilty as to the other
charges. On the count of armed carjacking, the defendant was
sentenced to a term of from twelve years to fifteen years,
concurrent with the first life sentence, and a $1,000 fine. On
the count of kidnapping, the defendant was sentenced to a term
of from eight years to ten years, concurrent with the first life
sentence. On the counts of attempted burning of a dwelling and
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, the
defendant was sentenced to twenty years' probation each, to run
concurrently with one another and the first life sentence.
14The indictments were not renumbered; as a result, there
was no count three either when the indictments were read aloud
or on the verdict slips.
12
prosecutor consented to the motion and further agreed to exclude
evidence that Cummisky heard sounds of sexual intercourse.
On the sixth day of trial, Cummisky testified that after
she heard gunshots, she heard a woman screaming15 and that Hebb
went downstairs where the killings occurred and then came back
upstairs. The judge allowed defense counsel's request for a
sidebar. Defense counsel asked whether the prosecutor had
instructed Cummisky not to testify as to hearing sounds of
sexual intercourse, consistent with the parties' agreement. The
prosecutor asked for a recess during which she reminded Cummisky
not to testify regarding the sounds and not to testify as to
Hebb's excluded statements.
When Cummisky returned to the witness stand, the prosecutor
asked Cummisky whether she continued to hear O'Connor downstairs
and what she heard O'Connor say; Cummisky responded that
O'Connor said, "Please just let me leave. I just want to go see
my dad." The prosecutor asked whether she heard O'Connor say
"anything else." Cummisky then testified that she heard
O'Connor say, "If you're going to rape me, kill me first."16
15As set forth supra, the woman (presumably O'Connor)
screamed, "[O]h, my God. What did you do?" and pleaded with
Greenlaw to "wake up."
16The prosecutor continued, asking whether Cummisky had
heard O'Connor say "anything else"; Cummisky had not. Finally,
the prosecutor asked whether Cummisky heard screaming or other
noises of pain; Cummisky responded that she heard whimpering.
13
The defendant moved for a mistrial. The prosecutor
explained that consistent with the parties' agreement, she had
instructed Cummisky not to reference Hebb's excluded statements
and the sounds of sexual intercourse. She also represented
that, prior to Cummisky's testimony, she had not known that
Cummisky had heard O'Connor's statement that O'Connor feared
being raped.
The judge credited the prosecutor's explanation and denied
the motion. The judge reasoned that Cummisky's testimony
regarding O'Connor's statement was different from the excluded
evidence related to sexual noises and Hebb's statements. He
also explained that the statement did not "suggest that this
witness [had] knowledge that, in fact, a rape did or did not
occur"; it was "a statement that she heard that is totally
consistent with the charges that remain . . . and [did] not
disclose to the jury . . . that there [was] any suggestion in
the Commonwealth's evidence of a rape."
The judge offered to give a curative instruction and to
have the statement struck from the record; defense counsel
declined, determining that either option "would draw more
attention to the issue." Cummisky's testimony regarding
O'Connor's statement was not mentioned again.
ii. Analysis. "The decision whether to declare a mistrial
is within the discretion of the trial judge." Commonwealth v.
14
Bryant, 447 Mass. 494, 503 (2006). This is because the judge is
in the best position to determine whether the jury likely would
be prejudiced. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 496
(1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1003 (1998). Thus, our review is limited to determining
whether "the judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing
the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that the
decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives"
(quotation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185
n.27 (2014).
The defendant speculates that the statement, coupled with
the gap in the numbered indictments, changed the tenor of the
jury's consideration by causing them to believe that rape was
the missing charge. He contends that the judge abused his
discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. We disagree.
To begin, O'Connor's statement was relevant to the issue of
extreme atrocity or cruelty. Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass.
216, 227 (1983) (listing factors to be considered by jury in
determining extreme atrocity or cruelty, including
"consciousness and degree of suffering of the victim").17 See
Commonwealth v. Witkowski, 487 Mass. 675, 683-684 (2021)
17After the defendant's trial, we modified the Cunneen
factors prospectively. See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass.
852, 864-866 (2020).
15
(victim's "fear and terror" relevant to theory of extreme
atrocity or cruelty); Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 44
(2017) (victim's "emotional response" was relevant to theory of
extreme atrocity or cruelty). See also Commonwealth v.
Teixeira, 490 Mass. 733, 744 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v.
Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 864 (2020) ("a victim's substantial
degree of conscious suffering may support a finding of extreme
atrocity or cruelty where it is the reasonably likely
consequence of the defendant's actions").18
Moreover, the statement, which was a surprise to the
prosecutor,19 was not highlighted; indeed, it was not repeated or
otherwise referenced during the entire two-week trial.20 On this
18Contrary to the defendant's contention, the statement,
which concerned the victim's fear that she might be raped, was
not evidence of a prior bad act used to demonstrate bad
character or propensity to commit crime. See Commonwealth v.
McDonagh, 480 Mass. 131, 140-141 (2018) ("evidence of the
defendant's other bad acts . . . may be admissible to prove a
material issue separate and distinct from the defendant's
character or propensity to commit the crime charged").
19We defer to the judge's credibility determination. See
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 486 Mass. 763, 780 (2021) ("Given the
deference owed trial judges, particularly involving credibility
determinations, we cannot conclude that the trial judge abused
his discretion here . . ."). "There is nothing in the record to
suggest that the [testimony] was planned or even that the
prosecutor had any reason to suspect" Cummisky would testify to
the statement. Santiago, 425 Mass. at 496.
20For this same reason, we are not persuaded by the
defendant's contention that the isolated statement was
prejudicial because there was no voir dire regarding sexual
offenses during empanelment. See note 12, supra.
16
record, there was no abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v.
Gallagher, 408 Mass. 510, 517-518 (1990) (not abuse of
discretion to deny motion for mistrial based on one reference to
defendant's incarceration in ten-day trial). See also Bryant,
447 Mass. at 503-504 (collecting cases in which witness's
spontaneous testimony was not so inflammatory as to require
mistrial).
b. Closing arguments. The defendant contends that the
prosecutor's closing argument impermissibly appealed to the
jury's sympathy and contained misstatements of the evidence.
"In determining whether an argument was improper we examine the
remarks in the context of the entire argument, and in light of
the judge's instructions to the jury and the evidence at trial."
Teixeira, 490 Mass. at 740, quoting Commonwealth v. Kolenovic,
478 Mass. 189, 199 (2017).
i. Appeal to sympathy. The defendant maintains that the
prosecutor impermissibly appealed to emotion by stating, "
[Greenlaw] and [O'Connor] were human beings. They were loved.
And, despite the battles they were losing at the time of their
deaths, they deserved a chance to win the war."
It is well settled that a prosecutor may not appeal to the
jury's sympathy. Commonwealth v. Guy, 454 Mass. 440, 444-445
(2009). Neither may a prosecutor emphasize "personal
characteristics [that] are not relevant to any material issue,"
17
if such emphasis would "risk[] undermining the rationality and
thus the integrity of the jury's verdict" (citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 487 Mass. 770, 791 (2021), cert.
denied, 142 S. Ct. 831 (2022) (discussing repeated reference to
victim's age as relevant to extreme atrocity or cruelty and
concluding that such reference as well as additional
characterization of victim as "innocent boy" did not require new
trial where jury were instructed that closing arguments are not
evidence and that they were to be guided by "[r]eason, logic,
[and] common sense" and "not emotion, not sympathy, not
sentiment"). A prosecutor may, however, "tell the jury
something of the person whose life had been lost in order to
humanize the proceedings." Fernandes, supra, quoting Santiago,
425 Mass. at 495.
Here, the prosecutor's statement was not quite the same as
a statement that the victim did not "deserve" to die, which we
have previously said is improper. Compare Commonwealth v.
Gentile, 437 Mass. 569, 580 (2002) ("victim 'didn't deserve to
die this way'"). Instead, the statement was a plea that the
jury not "write off" the victims (as well as the other occupants
of the Peabody home, including the defendant) as unworthy of
their attention, a theme to which the prosecutor returned at the
end of her argument:
18
"It would be really easy, ladies and gentlemen, to write
off the residence of Farm Ave., to think of it as just
that, a parallel universe that has nothing to do with us
and that, frankly, the people who enter there deserve what
they get.
"Nobody in this case, not [Greenlaw], not [O'Connor], not
[the defendant,] not . . . Cummisky or . . . Hebb, nobody
grew up thinking that they would end up at Farm Ave. It is
not what anyone plans for their life, and nothing about
having been at Farm Ave. or having been an addict means
that anyone deserved what they got . . . ."
Nonetheless, we agree with the defendant that the statement was
not material to any disputed issue, compare Fernandes, 487 Mass.
at 791 (references to victim's young age material to extreme
atrocity or cruelty), and it bordered on the types of emotional
appeals we have discouraged, see Commonwealth v. Lodge, 431
Mass. 461, 470-471 (2000) (statement that victim "was entitled
to the right to live and this man took it" improper);
Commonwealth v. Barros, 425 Mass. 572, 581 (1997) (statement
that victim had "right to live, and these guys, these guys took
it away from him" improper). See also Commonwealth v. Torres,
437 Mass. 460, 465 (2002) ("remarks concerning the victims'
rights were improper appeals to sympathy"). Although asking the
jury not to "write off the residence" as people who "deserve
what they get" was permissible humanizing, the prosecutor went
further, stating that the victims "deserved a chance to win the
war," which was impermissible.
19
We conclude, however, that the statement, to which no
objection was made at trial, did not create a substantial
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Commonwealth v.
Alemany, 488 Mass. 499, 511 (2021) ("Where the defendant did not
object at trial, we review for a substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice"). The prosecutor did not suggest that
the jury base their verdict on sympathy for the victims.
Compare Santiago, 425 Mass. at 495 (request for jury to "think
about" victim's age and pregnancy improper). The comment was
fleeting and made in the context of an otherwise proper closing
argument. See Alemany, supra at 512-513 (no substantial
miscarriage of justice where improper comments were made during
course of otherwise proper closing argument). The judge
instructed the jury three times that closing arguments were "not
evidence" and that the jurors must decide the case based on the
evidence and not on "[e]motion or sympathy." See Fernandes, 487
Mass. at 791 (jury instruction not to be guided by emotions
cured any prejudicial effect of prosecutor's improper remark
during closing); Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 419
(2020) (same). And, as set forth supra, the evidence of the
defendant's guilt was overwhelming. See Alemany, supra at 513-
514 ("evidence against the defendant was overwhelming");
Commonwealth v. Kent K., 427 Mass. 754, 761 (1998) (appeal to
sympathy "troubling" but "less crucial" where guilt was clear).
20
ii. Misstatements. The defendant also contends that the
prosecutor's statement that "there is no view of this evidence
[that the defendant] didn't take pleasure in the killing of
. . . O'Connor"21 was unsupported by the evidence.
"In closing argument, a prosecutor may not 'misstate the
evidence or refer to facts not in evidence.'" Commonwealth v.
Joyner, 467 Mass. 176, 188-189 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v.
Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 129 (2013). See Mass G. Evid.
§ 1113(b)(3)(A) (2022). "However, a prosecutor may argue
reasonable inferences from the evidence." Joyner, supra at 189,
quoting Lewis, supra.The prosecutor's statement, which was relevant to the issue
of extreme atrocity or cruelty, was a fair inference from the
evidence, inter alia, that the defendant had alternative means
of killing O'Connor quickly with the shotgun and instead chose
to prolong her death by using a knife; that he brought her away
from Greenlaw's body to Moise's bed and there slit her throat;
and that he stabbed her additional times while she whimpered and
begged for her father in the minutes during which she was
bleeding out, gasping for breath, and dying. See Castillo, 485
Mass. at 865 ("whether the defendant was indifferent to or took
21The prosecutor later stated, "He took pleasure in that
killing. He killed her slowly in the worst possible way . . . .
And then he took pleasure in the media coverage of it."
21
pleasure in the suffering of the deceased" is factor upon which
jury can make finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty); Cunneen,
389 Mass. at 227.
c. Jury instructions. i. Mental impairment instruction.
The judge instructed that, in determining whether the defendant
formed the intent to kill required for murder in the first
degree under the theory of deliberate premeditation, the jury
could consider "any credible evidence that the defendant was
affected by his ingestion of drugs." The judge denied the
defendant's request to instruct the jury to also consider
whether he "suffered from a mental impairment." The judge
concluded that "the evidence would not warrant any reasonable
jury in drawing inferences that mental impairment may have
affected his ability to form the intent with deliberate
premeditation to commit murder." That evidence consisted of lay
witness testimony that the defendant generally was "odd,"
"weird," or "strange." One witness testified that, following
the killings, the defendant was "even stranger" than usual.
Metz observed, also after the killings, that the defendant
"wasn't altogether" and exhibited "fluctuating" attitudes. And
officers who escorted the defendant back from South Carolina
where he had fled also thought the defendant "odd" and described
his strange behaviors en route back to the Commonwealth. No
evidence linked these observations to the defendant's drug use,
22
and no evidence tied the drug use to a mental impairment, much
less a mental impairment at the time of the killings.
On this record, the judge did not err in denying the
defendant's request for a mental impairment instruction. See
Commonwealth v. Santiago (No. 2), 485 Mass. 416, 426-427 (2020)
("to be entitled to an instruction on mental impairment, a
defendant must, at a minimum, introduce evidence that such an
impairment existed at the time of the conduct in question").
Cf. Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 485 Mass. 172, 197 (2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 1111 (2021) ("Evidence that the defendant
consumed alcohol in proximity to the crime[, two to three beers
over several hours,] does not itself establish a resulting state
of 'debilitating intoxication' such as could support reasonable
doubt about the defendant's capability to form the requisite
criminal intent"); Commonwealth v. Lennon, 463 Mass. 520, 522-
523 (2012) (no impairment instruction warranted where only
evidence was that defendant "might have been under the influence
of alcohol to some degree about two hours before the stabbing").
Contrast Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 794, 796-799
(2011) (mental impairment instruction required based on evidence
of defendant's "long history of mental illness," including
hospitalizations and diagnoses).
ii. Mitigating circumstances instruction. The defendant
next contends that the jury instruction that the defendant's
23
ingestion of drugs was not a mitigating circumstance that would
reduce murder to manslaughter contradicted the instruction that
the jury could consider the defendant's voluntary ingestion of
drugs as it related to his intent to commit murder. "A trial
judge has the duty to state the applicable law clearly and
correctly, but is not required to grant a particular instruction
so long as the charge, as a whole, adequately covers the issue"
(quotations and citations omitted). Teixeira, 490 Mass. at 742.
"Trial judges have considerable discretion in framing jury
instructions, both in determining the precise phraseology used
and the appropriate degree of elaboration" (quotation and
citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 688
(2015). "In assessing the sufficiency of the jury instructions,
we consider the charge in its entirety, to determine the
probable impact, appraised realistically upon the jury's
factfinding function" (quotation and alteration omitted).
Teixeira, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Wall, 469 Mass. 652,
670 (2014). "Instructions that convey the proper legal
standard, particularly when tracking model jury instructions,
are deemed correct." Green, petitioner, 475 Mass. 624, 629
(2016).
The judge properly instructed that the jury "may consider
any credible evidence that the defendant was affected by his
ingestion of drugs" in deciding whether the defendant acted with
24
the requisite intent for deliberate premeditation or extreme
atrocity or cruelty.22
The judge also correctly explained:
"The law recognizes that in certain circumstances which we
refer to as mitigating circumstances, a crime is a lesser
offense than it would have been in the absence of one or
more mitigating circumstances.
"The killing of . . . Greenlaw that would otherwise be
murder in the first or second degree is reduced to the
lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter i[f] the defendant
killed . . . Greenlaw under mitigating circumstances. Not
every circumstance you may think [is] mitigating is
recognized as mitigating under the law."
See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 48-49 (2018).
The judge then explained that "voluntary ingestion of drugs
is not a mitigating circumstance." This also was a correct
statement of the law. Voluntary ingestion of drugs, like mental
impairment, is relevant to intent, but it is not a "mitigating
circumstance" as that term is used in the law to reduce murder
to manslaughter.23 See Commonwealth v. Johnston, 446 Mass. 555,
559-560 (2006) ("While mental impairment [and voluntary
22These instructions were largely taken from the model jury
instructions. See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 47, 54
(2018). See also Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 222
(2014); Commonwealth v. Mercado, 456 Mass. 198, 207-208 (2010);
Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 292, 300 (1992).
23"Mitigating circumstances" are limited to "heat of
passion on a reasonable provocation," "heat of passion induced
by sudden combat," and "excessive use of force in self-defense
or in defense of another." Model Jury Instructions on Homicide
49 (2018).
25
intoxication] may be considered . . . on the question whether a
defendant formed a specific intent to kill," "a specific intent
to cause grievous bodily harm," or "intent to do an act, in
circumstances known to the defendant, that a reasonable person
would know creates a plain and strong likelihood of death," "it
is not a mitigating factor that would reduce murder to
manslaughter").
Thereafter, the judge explained that "mitigating
circumstances" serve to reduce murder to manslaughter, and then
described the particular mitigating circumstances at issue in
the case. Viewed as a whole, these instructions "state[d] the
applicable law clearly and correctly" such that a reasonable
jury could apply the law to the facts; there was no error.
Teixeira, 490 Mass. at 742.
iii. Drug use instruction. We agree with the defendant
that the judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that they
could consider voluntary ingestion of drugs in determining
extreme atrocity or cruelty, in addition to considering it in
determining intent. See Commonwealth v. Boucher, 474 Mass. 1, 7
(2016) ("When the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty is in
play, an instruction on voluntary intoxication that links
consideration of intoxication only to a defendant's intent or
knowledge, without also explaining that the jury may consider
26
intoxication in relation to whether the defendant committed the
killing with extreme atrocity or cruelty, is in error").
Because the jury also convicted the defendant on the theory
of deliberation premeditation, however, the error did not create
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. See
Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 220 (2007) ("If [the] jury
return a guilty verdict based on two theories, the verdict will
remain undisturbed even if only one theory is sustained on
appeal").
d. Alleged juror misconduct. The defendant contends that
the judge erred in declining to dismiss a juror accused of
premature deliberation.
i. Allegation of premature deliberation. After alternate
jurors were selected and the jury retired for deliberations, an
alternate juror, juror no. 10, reported to the judge that a
deliberating juror, juror no. 15, had made comments about the
case a few days prior. Juror no. 10 reported that juror no. 15
commented that "the defense is not bringing up anybody" and
asked other jurors how long the deliberations would take,
stating that deliberations "shouldn't take that long."
Additionally, juror no. 10 reported that juror no. 15 had
stated, before the trial began and before the judge had
instructed the jury, "I hate to do this to someone, but you have
to do what you've got to do."
27
The judge then questioned all other jurors; each answered
that no one had expressed any thoughts or comments about the
substance of the case prior to deliberations. When juror no. 15
was informed that the judge had received information that she
may have commented about how long deliberations would take,
juror no. 15 did not recall whether the comment had been made,
but added, "I could have asked that because I don't know how
long they take." Juror no. 15 was also asked about forming
opinions on the strength of the case prior to deliberations;
juror no. 15 explained, "I don't feel like my mind was made up."
The judge denied the defendant's motion to dismiss juror
no. 15, based on the lack of corroboration by other jurors and
"concerns about the credibility and the motives" of juror no.
10, given the fact that juror no. 10 waited days to report the
allegations, only disclosing them after being made an alternate,
perhaps on the hope of becoming a deliberating juror.24 "[G]iven
the lack of corroboration of any statements by any other fellow
jurors, some of whom were alleged to have been present" when
juror no. 15 was alleged to have made the statements, and juror
no. 15's responses, the judge concluded, "I don't find
misconduct, and I have substantial questions . . . about the
bona fides of the report." The judge excused juror no. 10.
24The prosecutor noted that juror no. 10 had been "visibly
angry" after being selected as an alternate.
28
ii. Analysis. We review the judge's decision not to
excuse juror no. 15 for abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth
v. Philbrook, 475 Mass. 20, 31 (2016). "Prohibiting premature
jury deliberations, and extraneous influences on jurors,
safeguards a defendant's right to trial before an impartial
jury." Id. at 30. "A judge's 'determination of a juror's
impartiality is essentially one of credibility, and therefore
largely one of demeanor,'" to which we give "great deference."
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Alicea, 464 Mass. 837, 849 (2013).
"Jurors 'inevitably formulate impressions as they hear evidence.
This is natural and cannot be prevented. . . . The question is
whether jurors can suspend final judgment and keep their minds
open to other evidence that they hear.'" Philbrook, supra at
31, quoting Commonwealth v. Guisti, 434 Mass. 245, 254 (2001),
S.C., 449 Mass. 1018 (2007).
Here, the record is devoid of any basis to doubt the
judge's findings, after questioning the jurors, that juror no.
10 was not credible, that there was no misconduct by juror no.
15, and that juror no. 15's statement about being able to keep
an open mind should be credited.25 See Commonwealth v. Torres,
25Juror no. 15 first explained, "I think everybody kind of
forms an opinion as you're going along." As we explained in
Philbrook, this is "natural and cannot be prevented"; it is
acceptable so long as the juror keeps an open mind. Philbrook,
475 Mass. at 31, quoting Guisti, 434 Mass. at 254.
29
453 Mass. 722, 735 (2009) ("The judge was in the unique position
to note the juror's demeanor, and nothing in the record leads us
to conclude that his decision to retain her was clearly
erroneous or an abuse of discretion").
e. Indictment charging attempted burning of a dwelling.
The defendant maintains, for the first time, that the indictment
charging the attempted burning of a dwelling should be dismissed
because it failed to specify the crime charged and failed
further to set forth the overt act constituting the alleged
attempt. "In a criminal case," however, "any defense or
objection based upon defects in the . . . indictment, other than
a failure to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an
offense, shall only be raised prior to trial." G. L. c. 277,
§ 47A. The parties suggest that the argument is preserved
because it pertains to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
See Commonwealth v. Nick N., 486 Mass. 696, 702 (2021), quoting
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 440 Mass. 147, 151 (2003) ("A question
of subject matter jurisdiction 'may be raised at any time and is
not waived even when not argued'" [alterations omitted]). This
is not accurate.26
26In fairness to the parties, our case law has not always
been consistent in describing the defect caused by the failure
of an indictment to charge a crime. See Commonwealth v.
Garrett, 473 Mass. 257, 264 (2015), citing Commonwealth v.
Senior, 454 Mass. 12, 14 (2009) ("whether an indictment fails to
allege an offense is a matter of jurisdiction, which may be
30
Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the power of the court
to entertain a particular category of case. See Black's Law
Dictionary 1017, 1020 (11th ed. 2019) (defining "jurisdiction"
as "[a] court's power to decide a case or issue a decree" and
"subject-matter jurisdiction" as "[j]urisdiction over the nature
of the case and the type of relief sought"); Black's Law
Dictionary 1425 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "[s]ubject matter
jurisdiction" as "court's power to hear and determine cases of
the general class or category to which proceedings in question
belong; the power to deal with the general subject involved in
the action"). See also J.W. Glannon, Civil Procedure: Examples
and Explanations 73 (2d ed. 1992) ("Subject matter jurisdiction
. . . concerns the court's authority to hear generic types of
cases. All state court systems have a set of trial courts with
raised at any time"); Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 547
(2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Palladino, 358 Mass. 28, 31
(1970) ("No court has jurisdiction to sentence a defendant for
that which is not a crime"); Commonwealth v. Cantres, 405 Mass.
238, 239-240 (1989), citing Commonwealth v. Andler, 247 Mass.
580, 581-582 (1924) ("if an indictment fails to state a crime,
no court has jurisdiction to entertain it, . . . and the
jurisdictional question may be raised at any time"). Rather
than strip the court of subject matter jurisdiction, such an
indictment violates constitutional principles, such as those
secured by art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
See Canty, supra at 546-547 (failure of indictment to charge
crime violates defendant's "due process rights under art. 12
. . . , which provides that '[n]o subject shall be held to
answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is fully and
plainly, substantially and formally, described to him'");
Palladino, supra ("A conviction on an indictment that charges no
crime would be sheer denial of due process").
31
very broad subject matter jurisdiction. These courts . . . have
subject matter jurisdiction over a wide range of suits . . .");
A.B. Spencer, Civil Procedure: A Contemporary Approach 13 (5th
ed. 2018) (subject matter jurisdiction addresses whether courts
"have competency to hear a case, meaning they are authorized to
adjudicate disputes of a particular kind").
The Superior Court has "original jurisdiction of all
crimes." G. L. c. 212, § 6. The failure of an indictment
charging the attempted burning of a dwelling to set forth the
crime charged or an overt act does not strip the court of the
power to hear the cause, let alone the category of criminal
actions generally; in other words, a defect in an indictment has
no bearing on the court's authority to hear a category of cases,
here, all criminal cases.
Having clarified that a defect in an indictment is not a
question concerning the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court, we turn to the defendant's argument that the indictment
failed to charge a crime because it did not specify that he was
charged with an attempt to burn a "dwelling."27 See G. L.
27 The indictment stated:
"Wes Doughty, of Peabody, in the county of Essex, on or
about February 18, 2017 at Peabody in the County of Essex
aforesaid, did willfully and maliciously attempt to set
fire to, or attempt to burn, or aid, counsel[,] or assist
in such an attempt to set fire to or burn, or did commit
any act preliminary thereto or in furtherance thereof,
32
c. 277, § 47A (challenge based on indictment's "failure to
charge" crime preserved). Here, the indictment was captioned
"Attempted Burning of a Dwelling" and cited "266/5A" (emphases
added). Accordingly, the defendant's challenge fails because
the caption together with the other words of the indictment
identifies that the offense charged is a violation of G. L.
c. 266, § 5A, which is a crime. See Commonwealth v. Canty, 466
Mass. 535, 548 (2013) (indictment provided "fair notice of the
crime charged" "where the caption identified the criminal
statute that was violated").
The defendant also challenges the indictment on the ground
that the absence of an overt act from the indictment violates
art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts
Constitution. Passing over whether the defendant has waived any
challenge based on this purported defect in the indictment, we
conclude that the absence of an overt act from the attempted
arson indictment, charging a violation of G. L. c. 266, § 5A,
did not violate art. 12.
Article 12 provides that "[n]o subject shall be held to
answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is fully and
plainly, substantially and formally, described to him." The
against the peace of the Commonwealth aforesaid, and
contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and
provided."
33
defendant was charged with attempted burning of a dwelling in
violation of G. L. c. 266, § 5A, which delineates the overt acts
that "constitute an attempt":
"[t]he placing or distributing of any flammable, explosive
or combustible material or substance or any device in or
against any building, structure[,] or property . . . in an
arrangement or preparation with intent eventually to
willfully and maliciously set fire to or burn such
building, structure[,] or property, or to procure the
setting fire to or burning of the same."
G. L. c. 266, § 5A. In view of the statute's express
delineation of the overt acts, the indictment was not required
to restate these overt acts.28 "Provided there is fair notice of
the crime charged, '[i]t is not necessary for the Commonwealth
to set forth in the complaint or indictment every element of the
crime . . . .'" Canty, 466 Mass. at 547, quoting Commonwealth
28The defendant was not charged under the general attempt
statute, which provides: "Whoever attempts to commit a crime by
doing any act toward its commission, but fails in its
perpetration, or is intercepted or prevented in its
perpetration" shall be punished." G. L. c. 274, § 6. "We have
. . . recognized that a 'charge of attempt [under the general
attempt statute] should set forth in direct terms that the
defendant attempted to commit the crime, and should allege the
act or acts done toward its commission.'" Senior, 454 Mass. at15 n.3, quoting Commonwealth v. Gosselin, 365 Mass. 116, 121
(1974). Thus, we have held that an indictment under the general
attempt statute, G. L. c. 274, § 6, must "allege the act or acts
done toward its commission"; "[o]vert acts not alleged may not
be relied on." Gosselin, supra, citing Commonwealth v. Peaslee,
177 Mass. 267, 274 (1901). But see Commonwealth v. Lourenco,
438 Mass. 1018, 1019 (2003) (question "whether the overt act
requirement remains valid to describe fully and plainly the
charge of attempt to the defendant, or if it reflects an
anachronistic view of sufficient indictments and complaints").
34
v. Fernandes, 430 Mass. 517, 520 (1999), cert. denied sub nom.
Martinez v. Massachusetts, 530 U.S. 1281 (2000). See Canty,
supra at 548 ("the absence of a required element in an
indictment does not by itself establish that a crime is not
charged, even if acquittal is required if the prosecution were
to prove only the allegations in the indictment"). See also
G. L. c. 277, § 34 ("An indictment shall not be dismissed or be
considered defective or insufficient if it is sufficient to
enable the defendant to understand the charge and to prepare his
defense; nor shall it be considered defective or insufficient
for lack of any description or information which might be
obtained by requiring a bill of particulars"). As such, the
defendant's challenge to the indictment has no merit.29
f. Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. After review of the
entire record, we discern no error warranting relief under G. L.
c. 278, § 33E.
Judgments affirmed.
29The defendant also maintains that the indictment is
defective because it failed to list the particular dwelling in
question; this argument also fails. The defendant did not ask
for a bill of particulars, which could have provided him with
the address of the dwelling. See G. L. c. 277, § 34. Moreover,
he was provided with the grand jury minutes, which identified
the specific dwelling alleged to have been the subject of the
attempted arson.