Commonwealth v. Dones ( 2023 )

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SJC-13271
COMMONWEALTH vs. MIGUEL REMI DONES.
Hampden. December 7, 2022. – June 23, 2023.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
& Georges, JJ.
Youthful Offender Act. Firearms. Practice, Criminal, Sentence.
Department of Youth Services. Juvenile Court, Probation.
Statute, Construction.
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on February 8, 2021.
Following transfer to the Hampden County Division of the
Juvenile Court Department, a motion to revise the sentence was
heard by David B. Paradis, J.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Cynthia Cullen Payne, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
Debbie F. Freitas for the defendant.
Sara LoPresti, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for
youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel
Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
GEORGES, J. At issue in this case is the question whether
a Juvenile Court judge may commit a youthful offender to the
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custody of the Department of Youth Services (DYS) until his
twenty-first birthday, and then suspend that commitment with
conditions of probation. We conclude that a judge in the
Juvenile Court has such discretion to suspend a commitment in
that manner, and that the judge in this case did not abuse his
discretion in doing so. We therefore affirm the denial of the
Commonwealth's motion to revise the juvenile's sentence.1
1. Background. During a motor vehicle stop, a State
police trooper saw a firearm in plain view in the vehicle driven
by the juvenile, who was then seventeen years old. The trooper
removed the juvenile from the vehicle and arrested him. The
juvenile subsequently was indicted as a youthful offender, see
G. L. c. 119, § 54, on a charge of carrying a firearm without a
license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). Because the juvenile's family
was unable to post bail, the juvenile was held at a DYS facility
for eight months prior to entering into a plea agreement.
In tendering his plea, the juvenile recommended a
continuation without a finding, with supervised probation and a
condition that he possess no weapons, until his nineteenth
birthday. The Commonwealth recommended that the juvenile be
found guilty as a youthful offender and sentenced to eighteen
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services,
Attorney Naoka Carey, and Citizens for Juvenile Justice.
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months in a house of correction. After a plea colloquy, the
Juvenile Court judge adjudicated the juvenile to be a youthful
offender and ordered him committed to DYS until he reached the
age of twenty-one, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 58 (c). The
judge then suspended the commitment pursuant to G. L. c. 279,
§ 2, with conditions of probation, see G. L. c. 276, § 87, until
the day before the juvenile's twenty-first birthday.
As required by G. L. c. 119, § 58, fourth par.,2 prior to
imposing sentence, the judge conducted a sentencing
recommendation hearing and made a number of findings. The
record shows that the judge considered all of the statutory
factors set out in that paragraph to the extent that they were
2 General Laws c. 119, § 58, fourth par., provides in
relevant part:
"In making [a] determination [of a youthful offender,] the
court shall conduct a sentencing recommendation hearing to
determine the sentence by which the present and long-term
public safety would be best protected. At such hearing,
the court shall consider, but not be limited to, the
following factors: the nature, circumstances and
seriousness of the offense; victim impact statement; a
report by a probation officer concerning the history of the
youthful offender; the youthful offender's court and
delinquency records; the success or lack of success of any
past treatment or delinquency dispositions regarding the
youthful offender; the nature of services available through
the juvenile justice system; the youthful offender's age
and maturity; and the likelihood of avoiding future
criminal conduct. In addition, the court may consider any
other factors it deems relevant to disposition."
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applicable to the juvenile's offense. The Commonwealth does not
dispute any of the judge's findings.
The judge found that the juvenile lived with his mother,
father, and four brothers. He was welcome in the family home
and got along with all of his family members. He had a two year
old child and took an active role in raising that child. With
respect to the juvenile's age and maturity level, the judge
noted that, at eighteen years old, the juvenile enjoyed playing
basketball, "hang[ing] out" with friends, and playing video
games. The judge found that even though the juvenile was
"immature" for his age, he was young enough that "probation
and/or DYS" would "have time to work with him and assist in his
maturing process."
With respect to the eight months that the juvenile spent in
a DYS facility awaiting disposition, the judge found that the
juvenile had done very well. The juvenile was able to maintain
the highest behavioral level and earned recognition as the
"group member of the week" multiple times. The juvenile met
with his clinician daily and actively participated in daily
psycho-educational groups, including substance use disorder
prevention, interpersonal effectiveness, and "DBT Mindfulness."
He did not instigate any problems, and if he was targeted by
peers, he was able to express his concerns to staff and to ask
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for help. The judge also considered the Juvenile Court's
policies on dispositional and sentencing best practices.
Based on his considerations of the sentencing policies and
all of his findings, the judge determined that, pursuant to
G. L. c. 119, § 58, the present and long-term safety of the
public would best be served by committing the juvenile to DYS
until he reached the age of twenty-one, with the commitment
suspended and conditions of probation imposed. In addition to
the standard conditions of probation, the judge added a number
of special conditions: that the juvenile must either obtain
employment or work toward a general equivalency diploma; that he
not possess drugs or alcohol and must submit to random screens;
and that he not possess firearms or other dangerous weapons.
The Commonwealth then timely moved for a revision of the
juvenile's sentence. Specifically, the Commonwealth challenged
the judge's decision to suspend the juvenile's commitment to DYS
and to place him on probation. The judge denied the motion, and
the Commonwealth appealed to the Appeals Court. We transferred
the matter to this court on our own motion.
2. Discussion. This case requires us to consider the
interplay of four statutes: G. L. c. 119, § 58, which, inter
alia, sets forth dispositional options for youthful offenders;
G. L. c. 279, § 2, which generally authorizes a Juvenile Court
judge to suspend a juvenile's commitment to DYS; G. L. c. 276,
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§ 87, which generally permits a judge of certain Trial Court
departments, including the Juvenile Court, to place a defendant
on probation; and G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), which prescribes
punishments for unlawful possession of a firearm. Whether these
statutes provide a Juvenile Court judge with the discretion to
suspend a youthful offender's commitment to DYS, with probation
being imposed in lieu of the committed sentence, is a legal
issue that we consider de novo. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Beverly, 485 Mass. 1, 11 (2020).
"As with all matters of statutory construction, our goal in
construing [a] . . . statute is to ascertain and effectuate the
intent of the Legislature." Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 489 Mass.
589, 593 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483 Mass.
186, 192 (2019). "[T]he language of the statute[s] . . . is
'the principal source of insight' into the intent of the
Legislature." Id. "Therefore, we start with the language of
the statute[s themselves] and presume, as we must, that the
Legislature intended what the words of the statute[s] say"
(quotations omitted). Rossetti, supra, quoting Commonwealth v.
Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 679 (2012). If the legislation is
found to be ambiguous, we give the juvenile the benefit of the
ambiguity. Commonwealth v. Connor C., 432 Mass. 635, 642
(2000), citing Charles C. v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 58, 70
(1993).
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We begin with G. L. c. 119, § 58, a statute that is to "be
liberally construed so that the care, custody and discipline of
the children brought before the court shall approximate as
nearly as possible that which they should receive from their
parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated,
not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement
and guidance." G. L. c. 119, § 53. When a child is adjudicated
to be a youthful offender, G. L. c. 119, § 58, requires the
sentencing judge to impose one of three dispositional options:
"(a) a sentence provided by law [for the criminal offense
charged in the indictment]; or
"(b) a combination sentence which shall be a commitment to
the department of youth services until [the child] reaches
the age of twenty-one, and an adult sentence to a house of
correction or to the [S]tate prison as is provided by law
for the offense. The adult sentence shall be suspended
pending successful completion of a term of probation, which
shall include, but not be limited to, the successful
completion of the aforementioned commitment to the
department of youth services. . . . ; or
"(c) a commitment to the department of youth services until
[the child] reaches the age of twenty-one."
Otherwise put, paragraph (a) authorizes the judge to impose the
most severe option, namely, "the punishment the child would
receive were [the child] an adult"; paragraph (b) authorizes an
intermediate "combination sentence"; and paragraph (c), "the
least severe option," authorizes a commitment to DYS until the
child reaches the age of twenty-one. Connor C., 432 Mass. at
638.
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Here, the judge determined that, given all of the
circumstances, the least severe option, commitment to DYS, was
appropriate. The Commonwealth does not contest the judge's
decision to commit the juvenile to DYS pursuant to G. L. c. 119,
§ 58 (c), instead of imposing a more severe adult or combination
sentence under G. L. c. 119, § 58 (a) or (b). Rather, the
Commonwealth takes issue with the judge's decision to suspend
the commitment to DYS and to place the juvenile on probation.
As the Commonwealth points out, nothing in G. L. c. 119,
§ 58, expressly authorizes such a disposition. At the same
time, however, nothing in the language of that section prohibits
a judge from suspending a commitment to DYS that has been
imposed upon a youthful offender pursuant to G. L. c. 119,
§ 58 (c). By contrast, G. L. c. 119, § 58, seventh par.,3
expressly prohibits the suspension of a commitment to DYS
3 General Laws c. 119, § 58, seventh par., provides:
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, a
person adjudicated a delinquent child by reason of a
violation of [G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), (c), or (d), or G. L.
c. 269, § 10E], shall be committed to the custody of the
commissioner of youth services who shall place such child
in the custody of a facility supported by the
[C]ommonwealth for the care, custody and training of such
delinquent children for a period of at least [180] days or
until such child attains his eighteenth birthday or his
nineteenth birthday in the case of a child whose case is
disposed of after he has attained his eighteenth birthday,
whichever first occurs, provided, however, that said period
of time shall not be reduced or suspended" (emphasis
added).
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imposed on a juvenile who has been adjudicated a delinquent
child by reason of a violation of, inter alia, G. L. c. 269,
§ 10 (a), the provision under which the juvenile here was
convicted as a youthful offender. We held in Connor C., 432
Mass. at 645, that the seventh paragraph of G. L. c. 119, § 58,
by its plain language, applies only to delinquent children and
not to youthful offenders. Accordingly, this provision does not
deprive a judge of the authority to suspend a youthful
offender's commitment to DYS. Moreover, the fact that the
Legislature expressly prohibited the suspension of a delinquent
child's commitment to DYS shows that it knew how to preclude
suspension of a commitment to DYS if it chose to do so. In the
nearly twenty-three years since this court's decision in
Connor C., the Legislature has not seen fit to do so with
respect to youthful offenders. Cf. DiMasi v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, 491 Mass. 186, 197 (2023), quoting Casseus v.
Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 796 (2018) (if Legislature had
intended different meaning from how statute was written, then
"the wording of the statute could have easily reflected [the
Legislature’s intent]").
The Commonwealth argues that because G. L. c. 119,
§ 58 (b), authorizes a Juvenile Court judge to suspend the adult
portion of a combination sentence, the Legislature could have
also authorized the suspension of a commitment to DYS in G. L.
10
c. 119, § 58 (c), but chose not to do so. We do not agree.
General Laws c. 119, § 58 (b), does not bestow on a judge
discretionary authority to decide whether to suspend the adult
portion of such a sentence; the provision rather requires that
"[t]he adult sentence shall be suspended pending successful
completion of a term of probation, which shall include, but not
be limited to, the successful completion of the aforementioned
commitment to" DYS until the juvenile reaches the age of twenty-
one (emphasis added). That a judge is required to suspend the
adult portion of a combination sentence under G. L. c. 119,
§ 58 (b), says nothing about a judge's discretion to suspend a
commitment to DYS under G. L. c. 119, § 58 (c).
At first glance, it might appear incongruous to conclude
that where a juvenile violates G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), the
commitment to DYS may not be suspended if the juvenile is
adjudicated a delinquent child, but may be suspended if the
juvenile is found to be a youthful offender. The Legislature,
however, rationally could require a delinquent child to serve
out a commitment to DYS until the child reaches the age of
eighteen (or, in some cases, nineteen) while permitting judges
to decide to suspend the longer commitment of a youthful
offender until the age twenty-one.
"[I]t is evident from the Legislature's over-all approach
to the sentencing of youthful offenders that it intended to give
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the sentencing judge wide latitude in fashioning a sentence that
best serves the needs of the community and the youthful
offender." Commonwealth v. Lucret, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 629
(2003). Moreover, the Legislature presumably has been aware, at
least since our decision in Connor C., 432 Mass. at 638, 645-
646, that G. L. c. 119, § 58, seventh par., applies only to
delinquent children, and not to youthful offenders, and it has
not chosen to amend that provision. "We do not read into the
statute a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to put
there, nor add words that the Legislature had an option to, but
chose not to include." Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 799,
807-808 (2019), quoting Commissioner of Correction v. Superior
Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the County of Worcester, 446
Mass. 123, 126, (2006).
In addition, we note that certain other statutes expressly
provide a Juvenile Court judge the authority to suspend a
commitment to DYS and then to impose probation. In particular,
G. L. c. 279, § 2, provides:
"In all cases the execution of orders of commitment to any
training school or reformatory, however named, the
department of youth services, or the department of public
welfare may be suspended, and such suspension continued or
revoked, in the same manner and with the same effect as the
execution of sentences in criminal cases."
This provision, by its plain terms, authorizes a Juvenile Court
judge to suspend an order committing a juvenile to DYS "[i]n all
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cases." Contrary to the Commonwealth's argument, we do not read
the final phrase of G. L. c. 279, § 2 -- "in the same manner and
with the same effect as the execution of sentences in criminal
cases" -- as limiting a judge's authority to suspend a
commitment to DYS only in instances where an ordinary criminal
sentence could be suspended.
The statutory language provides that a commitment to DYS
may be suspended "in the same manner and with the same effect"
as a criminal sentence, not that it may be suspended in the same
circumstances as a criminal sentence (emphasis added). G. L.
c. 279, § 2. In other words, the provision simply analogizes
the suspension of a DYS commitment to the suspension of a
criminal sentence, without limiting the judge's authority to
suspend the DYS commitment by any restrictions on suspension
that are enumerated in the criminal statute.4 In construing the
provision in this manner, we are mindful that juvenile justice
laws "shall be liberally construed," and that "[p]roceedings
against children under said sections shall not be deemed
4 General Laws c. 279, § 2, authorizes a Juvenile Court
judge to suspend a DYS commitment in all cases, except, of
course, where a suspension of a DYS commitment is specifically
prohibited. As discussed supra, such a prohibition does not
exist for the cases of juveniles adjudicated as youthful
offenders for violations of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).
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criminal proceedings." G. L. c. 119, § 53.5 Restricting
juvenile sentencing, even for youthful offenders, to adult
sentencing provisions, would be contrary to the plain statutory
language, as well as the Legislature's intent in adopting this
provision. See Connor C., 432 Mass. at 641-642 (noting that
language of G. L. c. 119, § 53, "does not label a 'youthful
offender' proceeding as 'criminal'"). See also Commonwealth v.
Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 630, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 946 (2012)
("an adjudication of a juvenile as a youthful offender . . .
does not transform [the juvenile's] illegal act from an act of
delinquency into a crime"). If the Legislature had intended to
limit a judge's authority in the manner the Commonwealth
5 "Independent of the rule of lenity, we have said that
interpreting an ambiguous statute against a juvenile would
conflict with the statutory command of G. L. c. 119, § 53."
Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 476 Mass. 497, 506 (2017), citing
Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 810-813 (2013).
General Laws c. 119, § 53, "requires a liberal construction of
the juvenile justice laws in order to ensure that juveniles who
commit offenses are 'treated[] not as criminals, but as children
in need of aid, encouragement, and guidance.'" Samuel S.,
supra, quoting G. L. c. 119, § 53.
To be sure, G. L. c. 119, § 53, mandates that liberal
construction shall apply to G. L. c. 119, §§ 52-63, and G. L.
c. 279, § 2, is not included within those sections. However,
this case requires us to consider G. L. c. 279, § 2, a provision
concerning the suspension of sentences to DYS, in light of our
interpretation of G. L. c. 119, § 58, and other juvenile justice
statutes. Therefore, the command of G. L. c. 119, § 53, is
instructive here. See Samuel S., 476 Mass. at 506.
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suggests, then it would have done so in plain and unambiguous
language.
In determining whether the juvenile's sentence was
permissible, we also must consider the effect of certain
language in G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). General Laws c. 269,
§ 10 (a), first par., which prohibits unlawful possession of a
firearm, provides that a person who violates it shall be
punished by a minimum term in State prison or in a house of
correction, and that "[t]he sentence imposed on such person
shall not be reduced to less than [eighteen] months, nor
suspended." This language plainly precludes a judge from
suspending an adult offender's committed sentence to less than a
period of eighteen months. Two paragraphs later, the provision
states:
"The provisions of [G. L. c. 276, § 87,6] shall not
apply . . . to any child between ages fourteen and
[eighteen] so charged, if the court is of the opinion that
the interests of the public require that [the child] should
be tried as an adult for such offense instead of being
dealt with as a child."
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (6), third par.
6 General Laws c. 276, § 87, permits a Juvenile Court judge
to place
"on probation in the care of [the court's] probation
officer any person before it charged with an offense or a
crime for such time and upon such conditions as it deems
proper, with the defendant's consent, before trial and
before a plea of guilty, or in any case after a finding or
verdict of guilty."
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Reading the paragraphs of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (6), in
harmony with one another, see Hovagimian v. Concert Blue Hill,
LLC, 488 Mass. 237, 241 (2021), we conclude that the statutory
language in no way prohibits a Juvenile Court judge from
suspending a youthful offender's commitment to DYS. While there
is such a prohibition for juveniles adjudicated delinquent for
violations of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), here, the Juvenile Court
judge sentenced the defendant as a youthful offender under the
"least severe" option under G. L. c. 119, § 58 -- commitment to
DYS. Connor C., 432 Mass. at 638. We again note that the
declared policy of G. L. c. 119, § 53, is that the "operative
provisions of the [juvenile sentencing] statutes shall be
liberally construed to require rehabilitative 'aid,
encouragement and guidance' rather than criminal dispositions
for children who offend." Id. at 641 ("the provisions of the
1996 amendments [to the juvenile sentencing provisions of G. L.
c. 119, §§ 52-63,] did not eviscerate the longstanding principle
that the treatment of children who offend our laws are not
criminal proceedings").
Accordingly, a judge's determination that a juvenile should
be sentenced as a youthful offender under G. L. c. 119, § 58,
does not amount to an adjudication of the juvenile in a criminal
proceeding that would implicate adult sentencing requirements.
See Connor C., 432 Mass. at 646 ("an 'adjudication' that a child
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has violated a law generally is not a 'conviction' of a crime").
Here, the judge was not bound by the language in G. L. c. 269,
§ 10 (a), that prohibited suspended sentences for "any person
convicted under [that] subsection."7 Cf., Commonwealth v. Hanson
H., 464 Mass. 807, 813-814 (2013) (for purposes of sentencing
statute, phrase "[a]ny person" did not include juveniles, but
only adults, due to "the inherent differences between juvenile
and adult offenders"). As a result, the judge was within his
discretion in suspending the juvenile's commitment pursuant to
G. L. c. 276, § 87. In so holding, we bear in mind that the
ultimate "goal of our juvenile system is to act in the best
interests of children by encouraging and helping them to become
law-abiding and productive members of society, and not to label
and treat them as criminals." Connor C., supra.
7 Nor does the language in G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), third
par., apply. That paragraph prohibits a judge from placing a
juvenile aged fourteen to eighteen, who has been charged with a
violation of § 10 (a), on probation before or after a trial or
before a guilty plea, where the "court is of the opinion that
the interests of the public require that [the juvenile] should
be tried as an adult for such offense instead of being dealt
with as a child." Under the youthful offender regime created by
the 1996 legislation, a juvenile proceeded against as a youthful
offender and sentenced under G. L. c. 119, § 58 (c), is still
considered a child within the juvenile justice system, not an
adult. See St. 1996, c. 200, §§ 2, 7; G. L. c. 119, § 53
("Proceedings against children under said sections shall not be
deemed criminal proceedings"). Thus, a judge is not statutorily
barred from placing on probation a juvenile who has been
adjudicated as a youthful offender and sentenced to the least
severe sentencing option for a firearms charge.
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3. Conclusion. The order denying the Commonwealth's
motion to revise the juvenile's sentence is affirmed.
So ordered.