Doucet v. FCA US LLC ( 2023 )

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SJC-13354
AMY DOUCET1 & another2 vs. FCA US LLC3 & another.4
Essex. February 8, 2023. - June 8, 2023.
Present: Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
& Georges, JJ.
Jurisdiction, Personal, Long-arm statute, Nonresident. Due
Process of Law, Jurisdiction over nonresident. Practice,
Civil, Motion to dismiss.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
May 17, 2021.
A motion to dismiss was heard by Janice W. Howe, J.; a
motion for reconsideration was considered by her, and entry of
separate and final judgment was ordered by her.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
1 As guardian of Paul Gregory Doucet.
2 Denise Sutton, as guardian of Paul Gregory Doucet.
3 Formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC.
4 Sudbay Chrysler Dodge, Inc.
2
Deepak Gupta, of the District of Columbia (Andrew D.
Nebenzahl, Carly J. LaCrosse, & Matthew W.H. Wessler also
present) for the plaintiffs.
Peter M. Durney (Christopher J. Hurst also present) for FCA
US LLC.
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
Ben Robbins & Daniel B. Winslow for New England Legal
Foundation.
Jeffrey R. White & Robert S. Peck, of the District of
Columbia, Peter J. Ainsworth, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers,
& Kyle A. Camilleri for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys
& another.
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Charles W. Rhodes, & Linda
Sandstrom Simard, pro se.
Larry E. Coben, of Pennsylvania, Michael Brooks, of the
District of Columbia, & Michael K. Gillis for Center for Auto
Safety & another.
KAFKER, J. Paul Doucet was rendered incapacitated by an
automobile accident in New Hampshire in 2015. His guardians
(the plaintiffs) have brought a tort suit against the
manufacturer of the car in which he was a passenger, FCA US LLC
(FCA US), and the Massachusetts distributor-dealership, Sudbay
Chrysler Dodge, Inc. (Sudbay).5 The car in question, a 2004
Chrysler Sebring, was first sold by Sudbay in Massachusetts and
later purchased in New Hampshire by Doucet, a New Hampshire
resident. At issue is whether Massachusetts has personal
jurisdiction over one of the defendants, FCA US, under the
Commonwealth's long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the due
5 Sudbay, which is incorporated in and maintains a principal
place of business in Massachusetts, is not involved in this
appeal.
3
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. We conclude that it does, and we vacate the trial
court's dismissal of FCA US as a party to this case.6
1. Background. At this stage of the proceedings, we
"accept[] the allegations in the complaint as true and draw[]
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Harrington
v. Costello, 467 Mass. 720, 724 (2014). FCA US is a Delaware
limited liability company with its principal place of business
in Michigan. FCA US's predecessor in interest7 manufactured the
Sebring around which this case revolves.
A dealership in Rhode Island first received the Sebring
from the manufacturer before transferring it to Sudbay, a
dealership in Gloucester. Sudbay initially leased the car to a
Massachusetts resident in 2003. The car was then purchased by a
Massachusetts resident in 2006, and it subsequently was sold to
two other Massachusetts residents, before a New Hampshire
resident purchased the vehicle in 2011. This resident then sold
6 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by New England
Legal Foundation; Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys and
American Association for Justice; civil procedure and Federal
courts professors; and Center for Auto Safety and Attorneys
Information Exchange Group.
7 FCA US is the successor in interest to Chrysler Group LLC
and inherited certain of its liabilities, including the products
liability claim at issue. Previously, FCA US argued that it did
not acquire liability for the claims brought by the plaintiffs,
but it has since abandoned that argument.
4
it in a private sale to Doucet, also a New Hampshire resident,
in 2013.
In 2015, Doucet was riding in the front passenger's seat of
the Sebring when it was involved in a front-end collision in New
Hampshire. He suffered a traumatic brain injury after the
passenger's side A-pillar (windshield and roof support) struck
his head. Consequently, the plaintiffs first brought a products
liability action solely against FCA US in the Superior Court in
New Hampshire. FCA US removed the case to the United States
District Court for the District of New Hampshire, where a judge
ruled in FCA US's favor that New Hampshire lacked personal
jurisdiction over it, and dismissed the case.
The plaintiffs then filed their suit in the Superior Court
in Suffolk County against both FCA US and Sudbay (collectively,
the defendants). Again, FCA US removed the case to the Federal
District Court in the State in which the plaintiffs had filed
suit -- this time, the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts. The Federal District Court judge
ruled that Massachusetts has personal jurisdiction over FCA US
but remanded the matter to the Superior Court for lack of
subject matter diversity jurisdiction in the Federal court, as
the inclusion of the defendant Sudbay as a Massachusetts
corporation prevented complete diversity.
5
FCA US then filed a motion to dismiss for want of personal
jurisdiction and improper venue in the Superior Court in Suffolk
County. The motion judge transferred the case to the Superior
Court in Essex County, the county in which Sudbay operates its
sole place of business. There, after a hearing on the motion,
the judge ultimately concluded that Massachusetts lacked
personal jurisdiction over FCA US under both the Commonwealth's
long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the Federal
Constitution's due process clause.8 The judge dismissed FCA US
as a party to the case, and the plaintiffs appealed.9 We
transferred the case sua sponte from the Appeals Court.
2. Discussion. "Jurisdictional questions are questions of
law, which we review de novo." Bask, Inc. v. Municipal Council
of Taunton, 490 Mass. 312, 316 (2022). "For a nonresident to be
subject to the authority of a Massachusetts court, the exercise
of jurisdiction must satisfy both Massachusetts's long-arm
statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the requirements of the due
8 In evaluating personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal
due process, the judge in the Superior Court in Essex County
found that the plaintiffs failed to establish "relatedness";
therefore, the judge did not consider other components of this
analysis.
9 The plaintiffs first filed a motion for reconsideration
or, in the alternative, entry of separate and final judgment on
two counts of their complaint against FCA US. The trial court
denied the former and allowed the latter, paving the way for
this appeal.
6
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ." Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 312, 314 (2018), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 794 (2019) (Exxon Mobil). The plaintiffs argue that
these requirements are satisfied with respect to FCA US, a
nonresident of Massachusetts, while FCA US maintains that they
are not. We address each argument in turn, beginning with our
long-arm statute to "avoid unnecessary consideration of
constitutional questions." SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., 478
Mass. 324, 325 (2017) (SCVNGR). We conclude that Massachusetts
has personal jurisdiction over FCA US, pursuant to both State
and Federal law, vis-à-vis the plaintiffs' claims. We therefore
reverse the motion judge's dismissal of FCA US as a defendant to
this case and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.10
a. Long-arm statute. "General Laws c. 223A, § 3, sets out
a list of specific instances in which a Massachusetts court may
acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant."
Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 416 Mass. 763, 767 (1994). Among the
enumerated options provided is "transacting any business in this
commonwealth." G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a). We routinely have
10The plaintiffs have requested that, should we conclude
they have not demonstrated personal jurisdiction on the facts
before us, we grant them jurisdictional discovery. Because we
conclude that personal jurisdiction exists on these facts, we
need not reach that issue.
7
construed this clause broadly. Tatro, supra. To meet this
criterion, a plaintiff must allege facts that "satisfy two
requirements -- the defendant must have transacted business in
Massachusetts, and the plaintiff's claim must have arisen from
the transaction of business by the defendant." Id.
Here, the plaintiffs argue that their claims arose from FCA
US's predecessor's transaction of business in the Commonwealth
as demonstrated by a Massachusetts distributor-dealership first
leasing and selling the Sebring, all in the stream of commerce.
In response, FCA US counters that neither it nor its predecessor
in interest "transact[ed] any business" in connection with the
plaintiffs' claims. First, the Sebring was initially sent to a
Rhode Island -- not a Massachusetts -- dealership, and second,
the assumption of liability as a successor in interest does "not
qualify as" the transaction of business. Furthermore, FCA US
argues, even if it has transacted business in Massachusetts, the
plaintiffs' claims did not arise from any such transactions
because Doucet did not purchase the Sebring in Massachusetts.
We first consider whether FCA US, through its predecessor
in interest, transacted business in the Commonwealth. "Although
an isolated (and minor) transaction with a Massachusetts
resident may be insufficient, generally the purposeful and
successful solicitation of business from residents of the
8
Commonwealth, by a defendant or its agent, will suffice to
satisfy this requirement." Tatro, 416 Mass. at 767.
In Exxon Mobil, 479 Mass. at 317-318, we concluded that
Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon) had transacted business in the
Commonwealth when it executed franchise agreements with "a
franchise network of more than 300 retail service stations" in
Massachusetts. Business deals with "Massachusetts-based limited
liability compan[ies] . . . represent[ed] Exxon's 'purposeful
and successful solicitation of business from residents of the
Commonwealth." Id. at 318, quoting Tatro, supra. Similarly,
FCA US, formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC, contracts with
former Chrysler dealerships, like Sudbay, throughout
Massachusetts, to conduct business under the FCA US name.
Through these preexisting and ongoing business agreements with
Sudbay and other FCA US dealerships in Massachusetts, FCA US
engages in the "purposeful and successful solicitation of
business from residents of the Commonwealth," Exxon Mobil,
supra, by distributing cars manufactured by FCA US and Chrysler
as FCA US's predecessor in interest. We conclude, therefore,
that FCA US has transacted business in Massachusetts.
We turn next to whether the plaintiffs' claims arise from
FCA US's transaction of business in Massachusetts. To make this
determination, we employ a "but for" causation test. See Tatro,
416 Mass. at 770-771 (comparing proximate and "but for" cause
9
interpretations across several jurisdictions). The "but for"
causation test requires us to consider whether the distribution
of the Sebring in Massachusetts by FCA US's predecessor in
interest is "the first step in a train of events that results in
the personal injury." Id. at 770. We conclude that it is.
In Tatro, 416 Mass. at 765-768, the defendant, a California
hotel, contracted with a national organization to provide
accommodations at a special rate for an upcoming conference, and
the plaintiff, a Massachusetts resident and member of the
national organization, booked a room directly with the hotel
based on the mailing she received from the organization,
advertising the conference rate. During her stay, she fell and
was allegedly injured in her room. Id. at 766. We recognized
that, "but for the defendant's solicitation of business in
Massachusetts," id. at 771, including the hotel's contract with
the organization and "arrangements with several Massachusetts
corporations," id. at 766, "and its agreement to provide the
plaintiff with hotel accommodations in . . . California, the
plaintiff would not have been injured in a room of the hotel,"
id. at 771-772. The fact that the injury occurred out of State
did not mean the injury did not arise from those business
transactions in Massachusetts, see id. at 771, and so "the
requirements of G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a) [were] satisfied," id. at
774.
10
Recently, in von Schönau-Riedweg v. Rothschild Bank AG, 95
Mass. App. Ct. 471, 472, 474 (2019), the plaintiff, a Swiss
citizen, sought relief against a Swiss bank based on the actions
of its agent, a director at the bank, for significant monetary
losses stemming from the director's advice. The director had
advised the plaintiff to invest in "two Massachusetts-based
companies" with whom he had extensive business transactions.
Id. at 472, 489-490. Although the trial court dismissed the
bank for lack of personal jurisdiction under the long-arm
statute, the Appeals Court remanded for a hearing after
concluding that the plaintiff met her prima facie burden that
jurisdiction existed, should the director be an agent of the
bank. Id. at 473-474, 490-491. If the director was acting as
the bank's agent, then "a direct line [could] be drawn from his
Massachusetts contacts and [his] advice, such that 'but for'
[his] actions in Massachusetts" the plaintiff would not have
invested in the Massachusetts businesses. Id. at 490, quoting
Tatro, 416 Mass. at 771.
We conclude that the "but for" causation requirement is
satisfied in the instant case. The automobile was first sold in
Massachusetts and remained here for several years before it was
sold to a resident of a neighboring State. But for the first
sale here, the Sebring would not have ended up with Doucet. FCA
US argues, however, that "the only connection to Massachusetts
11
is a highly tangential one," because its predecessor initially
shipped the car to a Rhode Island dealership, and second, once
FCA US's distributor placed the Sebring into the stream of
commerce in Massachusetts with the initial lease and sale,
several others purchased it in Massachusetts and New Hampshire
before Doucet's purchase and injury in New Hampshire. Although
there are multiple links in the factual chain, our decision in
Tatro supports personal jurisdiction. But for FCA US's
extensive business transactions in Massachusetts, which included
distributing the Sebring through the Massachusetts dealership,
Doucet would not have been injured in New Hampshire, making FCA
US's distribution in Massachusetts "the first step in a train of
events that results in the personal injury." See Tatro, 416
Mass. at 770. Consistent with our broad construction of G. L.
c. 223A, § 3 (a), see id. at 767, we conclude that Doucet's
claims arose from FCA US's transaction of business in the
Commonwealth, in satisfaction of our long-arm statute.
b. Federal due process. Having first established
jurisdiction under our long-arm statute, we now consider whether
specific personal jurisdiction over FCA US in Massachusetts
comports with due process under the Federal Constitution. See
SCVNGR, 478 Mass. at 325. "The Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause limits a [S]tate court's power to exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant." Ford Motor Co. v. Montana
12
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (Ford
Motor). "The primary focus of" the Federal "personal
jurisdiction inquiry is the defendant's relationship to the
forum State." Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of
Cal., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017) (Bristol-Myers).
This long-standing constitutional requirement for personal
jurisdiction "depends on the defendant's having such 'contacts'
with the forum State that 'the maintenance of the suit' is
'reasonable, in the context of our [F]ederal system of
government,' and 'does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.'" Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1024,
quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-
317 (1945) (Int'l Shoe). Defendants, as well as plaintiffs,
must be treated "fairly," and the principles of "interstate
federalism" must be respected "to ensure that States with
'little legitimate interest' in a suit do not encroach on States
more affected by the controversy." Ford Motor, supra at 1025,
quoting Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 263.
The plaintiffs assert that they have demonstrated these
requirements, whereas FCA US contends that the trial court
correctly determined that personal jurisdiction fails on the
ground that the plaintiffs' claims are not sufficiently related
to FCA US's contacts in the forum, especially in light of recent
United States Supreme Court decisions.
13
In analyzing these due process requirements, we focus our
attention on the case-specific facts, particularly the extensive
business FCA US undertakes in Massachusetts, as well as the
nexus between the plaintiffs' claims and FCA US's business in
Massachusetts -- specifically the sale of the automobile first
in Massachusetts, and then to Doucet in the neighboring State of
New Hampshire, where he was eventually injured. In this
circumstance, where FCA US engages in extensive business
dealings in Massachusetts, and a causal relationship between
those dealings and the plaintiffs' claims exists, we conclude
that Massachusetts's exercise of personal jurisdiction over FCA
US, with regard to the plaintiffs' claims, satisfies Federal due
process.
i. Purposeful availment. We begin with "the contacts
needed for" specific personal jurisdiction, which "often go by
the name 'purposeful availment.'" Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at
1024, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985) (Burger King). To satisfy this prong of the due process
inquiry for personal jurisdiction, the plaintiffs must
demonstrate that FCA US "has purposefully avail[ed] itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws"
(quotation omitted). Knox v. MetalForming, Inc., 914 F.3d 685,
691 (1st Cir. 2019), quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
14
253 (1958). Accord Ford Motor, supra at 1024-1025. This
"requirement ensures that the exercise of jurisdiction is
essentially voluntary and foreseeable, and is not premised on a
defendant's random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts"
(quotation and citations omitted). Knox, supra. Accord Burger
King, supra. Foreseeability means "the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there," World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (World-
Wide Volkswagen), while "[v]oluntariness requires that the
defendant's contacts with the forum [S]tate proximately result
from actions by the defendant himself" (quotation and citation
omitted), PREP Tours, Inc. v. American Youth Soccer Org., 913
F.3d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 2019) (PREP Tours). Ultimately,
foreseeability and voluntariness ensure that the plaintiff's
"unilateral activity" does not form the basis for jurisdiction
over the defendant. Id., quoting Burger King, supra at 474.
They also lend "a degree of predictability to the legal system"
by "allow[ing] potential defendants to structure their primary
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct
will and will not render them liable to suit." PREP Tours,
supra, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, supra.In the instant case, this requirement is readily satisfied.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that FCA US "transacts
15
business and contracts to supply services and/or things in this
Commonwealth and has derived substantial revenue therefrom."
That business includes the distribution of automobiles into the
stream of commerce within Massachusetts, including the Sebring
in the instant case. The defendant Sudbay, a Massachusetts
corporation, "operat[es] a car dealership that distributes FCA
[US] vehicles into the stream of commerce within the
Commonwealth," including the Sebring at issue. The plaintiffs
allege that FCA US and Sudbay are also both involved in the
"inspecting, . . . selling, advertising, and marketing" of these
automobiles. The plaintiffs further allege that Sudbay
initially sold or leased the Sebring "to a Massachusetts
resident in May 2003," and that Sudbay, and other Massachusetts
dealerships, serviced the vehicle up until it was "sold to a New
Hampshire resident in April of 2011." FCA US also has a
registered agent in the Commonwealth.
The plaintiffs have thus clearly alleged that FCA US,
through these ongoing distribution, maintenance, and marketing
channels, "has purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within" Massachusetts as "the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws"
(quotation and citation omitted). Knox, 914 F.3d at 691. See
Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1028 (purposeful availment where
automobile manufacturer's "dealers . . . regularly maintain and
16
repair" its cars). Massachusetts's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over FCA US, therefore, results from FCA US's
"voluntary" acts and their "foreseeable" consequences and is not
premised on "random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts"
(citation omitted). Knox, supra.11
ii. Relatedness. Although FCA US's extensive, voluntary
business transactions in Massachusetts are a significant part of
the due process analysis, they are not dispositive, as there
must also be a relationship between the actions voluntarily
undertaken in the jurisdiction and the plaintiffs' claims. See
Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1025. After the plaintiffs
demonstrate that the defendant "'exploit[ed] a market' in the
forum State," id., quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285
(2014), they must also show that their claims "'arise out of or
relate to the defendant's contacts' with the forum," Ford Motor,
supra, quoting Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 262. Known as
relatedness, this prong of the due process analysis requires a
11 Plus, FCA US has already faced a products liability suit
for a car purchased from another Chrysler dealership in
Massachusetts, Costa v. FCA US LLC, 542 F. Supp. 3d 83, 90 (D.
Mass. 2021), without "rais[ing] personal jurisdiction
objections" in that suit, further "bolster[ing]" a "finding of
purposeful availment," Tom's of Me. v. Acme-Hardesty Co., 565 F.
Supp. 2d 171, 182 (D. Me. 2008). Literally speaking, FCA US has
already been "haled into court" in this forum State. See World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
17
"demonstrable nexus" between the claim and "the defendant's
forum contacts." Knox, 914 F.3d at 691.
In the context of a company doing extensive business in the
forum State, this requirement is most clearly articulated in the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers, 582
U.S. 255. In that case, the Supreme Court determined that a
California State court lacked personal jurisdiction over
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS), id. at 268, "a large
pharmaceutical company . . . incorporated in Delaware and
headquartered in New York," for the nonresident plaintiffs'[12]
claims for "injuries allegedly caused by" one of the
prescription drugs manufactured and sold by BMS, id. at 258-259.
In so holding, the Court noted that "[t]he nonresident
plaintiffs did not allege that they obtained [the drug] through
California physicians or from any other California source; nor
did they claim that they were injured by [the drug] or were
treated for their injuries in California." Bristol-Myers, 582
U.S. at 259. The nonresident plaintiffs also did not allege
that the drug "was designed and developed in BMS's California
research facilities" (citation and alteration omitted). Id. at
260-261. Instead, they relied on the claims raised by resident
12BMS did not argue against personal jurisdiction for the
claims brought by California residents in that mass tort action.
See Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 259.
18
plaintiffs who "prescribed, obtained, and ingested [the drug] in
California," id. at 265, seemingly in an attempt to forum shop
in a favorable State, Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1031.
Thus, the nonresident plaintiffs' claims had no actual
connection to the forum State because "all the conduct giving
rise to the nonresidents' claims occurred elsewhere." Bristol-
Myers, 582 U.S. at 265. Simply, there was no "adequate link
between the [forum] State and the nonresidents' claims." Id. at
264. Specific personal jurisdiction over BMS for these claims,
therefore, was inappropriate in California, regardless of BMS's
"extensive forum contacts that [were] unrelated to those
claims," because, as the Court explained, "a defendant's general
connections with the forum are not enough." Id.
In the instant case, unlike in Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at
264, not only did FCA US engage in extensive business dealings
in the forum, but there is also a causal connection between its
business dealings and the injury, albeit an indirect one, as the
automobile was first sold in Massachusetts and eventually
purchased by Doucet, a resident of a neighboring State. As
explained supra in our discussion of personal jurisdiction under
the Commonwealth's long-arm statute, "but for" the first sale of
the automobile in Massachusetts, Doucet would not have ended up
purchasing, driving, and being injured in the automobile in the
neighboring State of New Hampshire. FCA US, nonetheless, claims
19
that this causal connection is too attenuated to support
jurisdiction in Massachusetts.
In evaluating this attenuation argument, and whether these
facts are sufficient to establish the necessary nexus between
the defendant's contacts and the plaintiff's claims, both
parties turn to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ford
Motor, 141 S. Ct. 1017, for guidance, as do we. In that case,
the plaintiffs brought separate products liability suits against
Ford Motor Company (Ford) in the courts of two States where
serious car accidents occurred and where the victims resided.
Id. at 1022-1023. Ford had argued that the State courts lacked
personal jurisdiction "because the particular car involved in
the crash was not first sold in the forum State, nor was it
designed or manufactured there." Id. at 1022.13
The court, as well as the concurring opinions, rejected
this analysis as unduly constrictive. See Ford Motor, 141 S.
Ct. at 1026; id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 1039 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the
13 Thus, Ford was making the exact opposite argument of the
one being made by the automobile company here: that is, that
due process required jurisdiction in the State of first sale,
not the State in which the injury occurred. See Ford Motor, 141
S. Ct. at 1022-1023. Indeed, FCA US successfully made the same
argument, albeit before the issuance of Ford Motor, when the
plaintiffs first sought to bring this suit in New Hampshire. As
a result, in this case, the plaintiffs have been placed in a
Kafkaesque procedural predicament by the defense.
20
judgment). They all concluded that the combination of extensive
business dealings in the forum State and an injury in that State
was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. In so holding, none of
the opinions expressly ruled out that the combination of
extensive dealings in the forum State and the first sale of the
automobile at issue in the forum State would be sufficient.
Nonetheless, FCA US argues here that such an interpretation is
implicit in the Court's and the concurrences' reasoning. We
disagree.
In upholding jurisdiction, Justice Kagan, writing for the
Court, rejected Ford's strict "causation-only approach" as
unnecessarily narrowing the bounds of specific personal
jurisdiction. Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. In so doing, she
emphasized that causation is one -- but not the only -- way to
satisfy the "arise out of or relate to" requirement, which may
be read in two parts. Id. "The first half of that standard
asks about causation; but the back half, after the 'or,'
contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction
without a causal showing." Id. In other words, the "relate to"
clause captures more conduct than the "arise out of" clause,
which hews more closely to "proof of causation -- i.e., proof
that the plaintiff's claim came about because of the defendant's
in-[S]tate conduct." See id. Furthermore, in evaluating how
Ford's "conduct" in the forum States "relate[d] to the claims"
21
presented by forum State resident plaintiffs, the Court
explained that the plaintiffs' suits "ar[ose] from . . . car
accident[s] in" States where Ford "advertised, sold, and
serviced" the allegedly defective car models (emphases added).
Id. at 1028. The Court concluded, therefore, that this behavior
established "a strong relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation -- the essential foundation of
specific jurisdiction" (quotations and citation omitted). Id.
As stated supra, the Court did not rule out jurisdiction
where the first sale of the automobile at issue occurs in the
State. Rather, the thrust of the opinion was to expand, not
contract, jurisdiction, beyond requiring "but for" causation.
See Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. Nevertheless, FCA US argues
here that that was the Court's intent. It does so based mostly
on the discussion between the Court and Justice Gorsuch's
concurring opinion, particularly the footnote addressing the
concurrence written by Justice Gorsuch. See id. at 1027 n.3.
In that footnote, the Court wrote,
"In thus reiterating this Court's longstanding approach, we
reject Justice Gorsuch's apparent (if oblique) view that a
[S]tate court should have jurisdiction over a nationwide
corporation like Ford on any claim, no matter how unrelated
to the State or Ford's activities there. See [id.] at
1039. On that view, for example, a California court could
hear a claim against Ford brought by an Ohio plaintiff
based on an accident occurring in Ohio involving a car
purchased in Ohio. Removing the need for any connection
between the case and forum State would transfigure our
specific jurisdiction standard as applied to corporations.
22
"Case-linked" jurisdiction, see [id.] at 1024-1025, would
then become not case-linked at all."
Id. at 1027 n.3. See id. at 1035 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in
the judgment).
We reject this interpretation by FCA US of that footnoted
discussion and of the Court's decision as a whole. Where a
first sale of the automobile that caused the injury occurred in
the State, there is a relationship between the claim stemming
from that injury and the defendant's contacts in the forum. See
Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. There are not only extensive
business dealings by the defendant in the State in which
jurisdiction is sought, but also business dealings related to
the automobile that is the subject of the litigation. See id.
at 1022, 1026. Consequently, there is a "strong relationship
between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation" (quotation
and citation omitted). Id. at 1028. See id. at 1035 (Gorsuch,
J., concurring in the judgment) (State in which allegedly
defective automobile at issue in suit is sold has "strong
interest in ensuring [it does not] become marketplace[] for
unreasonably dangerous products").14
14Our interpretation of Ford Motor is consistent with those
of Federal and other State courts that have applied Ford Motor
since its recent issuance. For example, in the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho, the court found
relatedness stemming from a "but for" causation relationship in
which a foreign corporation sold and shipped products to a
distributor in Idaho, who then sold the defective product to
23
iii. Reasonableness and interstate federalism. Lastly,
"[o]nce it has been decided that a defendant purposefully
established minimum contacts within the forum State, these
contacts may be considered in light of other factors to
determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would
comport with 'fair play and substantial justice,'" Burger King,
471 U.S. at 476, quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320, and the
principles of interstate federalism, Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at
1025, 1030. We conclude that specific personal jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania plaintiffs, causing injury to them there in their
State of residence. See McHugh vs. Vertical Partners W., LLC,
U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 2:20-cv-00581-DCN, slip op. at 2, 11-12 (D.
Idaho Apr. 19, 2021). Like this case, the plaintiffs brought
their suit not in their State of residence, but in the State
where the defective product was first sold. Id. at 2. Unlike
this case, however, the plaintiffs purchased the item directly
from the forum State distributor. Id. Regardless, "but for"
the foreign corporation first sending its defective product to
the forum State distributor, the injury would not have occurred
out of State. See id. That is the same scenario presented
here: but for FCA US sending the Sebring to a Massachusetts
dealership-distributor, Doucet's injury would not have occurred
in New Hampshire.
In a products liability case this year, the First District
Appellate Court of Illinois recognized personal jurisdiction
over a South Korean corporation, which manufactured a battery
that allegedly exploded inside another product and caused injury
to the plaintiff. Kothawala v. Whole Leaf, LLC, 2023 IL App
(1st) 210972, ¶¶ 1, 4, 6. The court reasoned that "given that a
finding of relatedness requires something short of but-for
causation under Ford [Motor], it [was] difficult to see how
anyone could plausibly argue that [the] plaintiff's claims
[were] not at least 'related to'" the foreign corporation's
"activities in" the forum State, id. at ¶ 54, based on the
corporation's "direct shipment of battery packs to a distributor
for resale," id. at ¶ 51, in the forum State.
24
Massachusetts over FCA US LLC for the plaintiffs' claims is
consistent with these "two sets of values." See id. at 1025,
citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293.
As an initial matter, we emphasize that "a defendant who
has purposefully directed [its] activities at" the forum "must
present a compelling case that the presence of some other
considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 477. As discussed supra, and conceded by FCA
US at the motion hearing, there is no question that FCA US
"purposefully directed" its activities at Massachusetts. See
id. Indeed, those contacts are significant and widespread. The
first sale of the automobile in question also provides a causal
connection between those activities and the automobile in
question. See Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. That automobile
also remained on the streets and highways of Massachusetts for
eight years before it was sold to Doucet in a neighboring State.
Although the Court in Ford Motor, and perhaps Justice Alito
in his concurrence in that case, may suggest that the connection
to the litigation is stronger in the State in which the injury
occurred (New Hampshire) than in the State in which the first
sale occurred (Massachusetts), both are strong enough where the
defendant does substantial business in the State at issue to
satisfy the requirements of due process. See Ford Motor, 141 S.
Ct. at 1030; id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring in the
25
judgment). "When minimum contacts exist, due process demands no
more than a reasonable forum." O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel
Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 325 (3d Cir. 2007). It does not demand
"the best forum."15 Just because "principles of 'interstate
federalism' support jurisdiction" over the plaintiffs' suit in
the State in which Doucet was injured and lives does not mean
these principles do not also support jurisdiction in the State
of first sale when substantial business is done in that State.
See Ford Motor, supra at 1029-1030.
As emphasized by Justice Gorsuch in his concurrence in Ford
Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1035, a State has a significant interest in
protecting itself against the sale of defective products within
its borders. Accordingly, FCA US's purposefully directed
activities within Massachusetts enhance the Commonwealth's
interest in this litigation, where the allegedly defective
automobile at issue remained in Massachusetts for eight years
prior to its sale to a resident of a neighboring State, and
15Of additional consideration in this instance is the
presence of two defendants: Sudbay, which is "at home" only in
Massachusetts, and FCA US, which is not at home in either
Massachusetts or New Hampshire. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571
U.S. 117, 134-139 (2014). Although Massachusetts may exercise
its general personal jurisdictional powers over Sudbay, see id.,the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that Sudbay has the
minimal contacts related to this suit in New Hampshire to bring
this suit against it there, see Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1024.
Massachusetts, therefore, provides an efficient forum for the
resolution of this case. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292(discussing importance of "efficient" forum).
26
where there may be other defective vehicles within our borders,
by virtue of FCA US's ongoing contacts. Finally, there is no
issue of the plaintiffs bringing a suit in a State to which
their claims have no connection as a means of forum shopping, as
there was in Bristol-Myers. See Ford Motor, supra at 1031;
Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 265-266. The plaintiffs originally
filed their suit in New Hampshire, the State of residence and
injury, and only brought this suit in the State of first sale
after the defendants argued, and the Federal District Court in
New Hampshire concluded, prior to the Ford Motor decision, that
jurisdiction did not lie in the State in which the injury
occurred. As the defendants are now arguing the exact opposite
position, and the plaintiffs have been bounced from court to
court for years, the values of "fair play and substantial
justice," as well as interstate federalism, clearly now support
jurisdiction in Massachusetts. See Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at
1024, 1030, quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Burger King,
471 U.S. at 476.
3. Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude
that personal jurisdiction exists in Massachusetts over FCA US
for these claims, pursuant to both the Commonwealth's long-arm
statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. We therefore vacate the judgment
27
dismissing FCA US as a party to the case and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.