Commonwealth v. Davidson ( 2023 )

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SJC-13438
COMMONWEALTH vs. MARK DAVIDSON.
Suffolk. September 13, 2023. - December 6, 2023.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
& Georges, JJ.
Anti-Discrimination Law, Housing. Lead Poisoning. Housing
Court, Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, Housing Court.
Statute, Construction. Practice, Civil, Interlocutory
appeal.
Complaint filed in the Superior Court Department on March
30, 2022.
Following transfer to the Northeast Division of the Housing
Court Department, a motion to transfer the case to the Superior
Court Department was heard by Alex Mitchell-Munevar, J.
A proceeding for interlocutory review was heard in the
Appeals Court by Peter W. Sacks, J., and the case was reported
by him to a panel of the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial
Court transferred the case on its own initiative.
David Rangaviz, Assistant Attorney General, for the
Commonwealth.
Dierdre Ann Hosler, for Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
2
BUDD, C.J. The Attorney General commenced a civil action
in the Superior Court alleging housing discrimination against
the defendant, Mark Davidson, on behalf of Laura Smith and
Daniel Hocking (complainants). The defendant thereafter
transferred the case to the Housing Court. The Attorney
General, who was unsuccessful in having the matter transferred
back to the Superior Court, sought interlocutory relief.
Because the Housing Court does not have jurisdiction over a
discrimination claim in this procedural posture, the case must
be returned to the Superior Court.
Background. The complainants filed an administrative
complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination (commission) alleging that the defendant had
discriminated against them in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4,
and G. L. c. 111, § 199A. Specifically, the complainants
alleged that when the defendant learned that Smith was pregnant,
he terminated their lease in an attempt to avoid having to
comply with G. L. c. 111, § 197, the lead containment or
abatement statute. See G. L. c. 111, § 199A (prohibiting
housing discrimination against individuals with children to
avoid having to comply with G. L. c. 111, § 197).
After the commission gave notice to the defendant that
probable cause existed to pursue the complaint, he elected to
have the matter heard in court rather than by the commission.
3
See G. L. c. 151B, § 5. The commission subsequently transferred
the matter to the Attorney General's office, which in turn
commenced this action against the defendant in the Superior
Court as required by statute. See id. The defendant thereafter
filed a notice of transfer to the Housing Court.
After the case was transferred, the Attorney General moved
to transfer the case back to the Superior Court on
jurisdictional grounds. Believing that he did not have
authority to transfer the case back to the Superior Court, the
Housing Court judge directed the Attorney General to request the
transfer pursuant to Trial Court Rule XII (1).1 Taking the
position that the trial court rule was inapplicable, the
Attorney General instead filed a petition for interlocutory
relief with a single justice of the Appeals Court. The single
justice ordered the case transferred back to the Superior Court
and reported the matter to the full panel of the Appeals Court.
This court transferred the matter here on our own motion.
1 Trial Court Rule XII (1) states in pertinent part:
"If two or more actions are pending in different
departments of the Trial Court, and if a judge, Clerk
Magistrate, register, or party determines that the separate
actions are related actions involving substantially the
same or similar issues and parties, the judge, Clerk-
Magistrate, register, or party may request that the Chief
Justice [of the Trial Court] make an appropriate
interdepartmental assignment so that one judge may hear all
related matters."
4
Discussion. To determine whether the Housing Court
department has jurisdiction over this matter, we turn to G. L.
c. 151B, § 5, which deals with enforcement of the Commonwealth's
antidiscrimination laws and details how discrimination
complaints filed with the commission are handled when either
party chooses to have the matter heard in court.2 The statute
states in pertinent part:
"If any complainant or respondent elects judicial
determination as aforesaid, the commission shall authorize,
and not later than thirty days after the election is made
the attorney general shall commence and maintain, a civil
action on behalf of the complainant in the [S]uperior
[C]ourt for the county in which the unlawful practice
occurred."
G. L. c. 151B, § 5.
When interpreting a statute, we begin, as always, with the
statutory language. The language of § 5 unambiguously indicates
that the Superior Court is the proper court for actions such as
this one. Further, the Legislature's use of the word "shall" is
instructive here, as it commands, rather than suggests, that the
action is to be commenced in the Superior Court, and not
elsewhere. Id. See Galenski v. Erving, 471 Mass. 305, 309
(2015), quoting Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 609 (1983)
2 Although we typically review decisions of the single
justice of the Appeals Court for error of law or abuse of
discretion, see Vega v. Commonwealth, 490 Mass. 226, 230 (2022),
where, as here, the issue turns on a question of statutory
interpretation, we review the matter de novo. See Chadwick v.
Duxbury Pub. Sch., 475 Mass. 645, 651 (2016).
5
("The word 'shall' is ordinarily interpreted as having a
mandatory or imperative obligation"). Finally, the use of the
phrase "commence and maintain" is an equally clear directive
that such actions brought by the Attorney General, once
initiated, are to remain in the Superior Court. See
Commonwealth v. Disler, 451 Mass. 216, 227 (2008), citing Matter
of a Civil Investigative Demand Addressed to Yankee Milk, Inc.,
372 Mass. 353, 358 (1977) ("every word in a statute should be
given meaning"); Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard &
Nantucket S.S. Auth., 352 Mass. 617, 618 (1967) ("[n]one of the
words of a statute is to be regarded as superfluous" [citation
omitted]).
We are unpersuaded by the defendant's argument that the
Housing Court has concurrent jurisdiction over this matter.3 It
is true that G. L. c. 185C, § 3, establishes the Housing Court's
broad subject matter jurisdiction, as encompassing "all civil
actions . . . concerned directly or indirectly with the health,
safety, or welfare, of any occupant of any place . . . of human
habitation." However, the unambiguous and mandatory language of
G. L. c. 151B, § 5, takes precedence over the generalized grant
3 Although the defendant did not submit a brief and waived
participation in oral argument, his argument is laid out in both
his oppositions to the Attorney General's motion to transfer the
case and to the Attorney General's appeal from the denial of
that motion.
6
of jurisdiction in G. L. c. 185C, § 3. See Lexington Pub. Sch.
v. K.S., 489 Mass. 309, 329 (2022), quoting Pereira v. New
England LNG Co., 364 Mass. 109, 118 (1973) ("If a general
statute and a specific statute cannot be reconciled, the general
statute must yield to the specific statute"). See also G. L.
c. 151B, § 9 (instructing that "any law inconsistent" with
c. 151B "shall not apply" to operation of c. 151B).4
Notably, the complainants had the option of commencing a
civil action in the Housing Court rather than filing a complaint
with the commission. See G. L. c. 151B, § 9.5 Had they done so,
the Housing Court properly would have had jurisdiction over the
matter. However, because the complainants filed with the
commission and the defendant elected to have the matter heard in
court, the Superior Court is the only court with jurisdiction
4 Nor are we persuaded by the defendant's argument that
G. L. c. 185C, § 20, which generally authorizes the transfer of
cases within the Housing Court's jurisdiction to that court, is
helpful to his argument. That statute states, in part, that
"[a]ny civil action within the jurisdiction of the [H]ousing
[C]ourt department which is pending in another court department
may be transferred to the [H]ousing [C]ourt department by any
party thereto." Although the statute provides for the transfer
of cases to the Housing Court, it does not confer Housing Court
jurisdiction over those cases. As stated above, cases brought
by the Attorney General pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 5, are not
within the jurisdiction of the Housing Court. Therefore, G. L.
c. 185C, § 20, is inapplicable here.
5 General Laws c. 151B, § 9, also provides for the
commencement of such actions in the Probate and Family Court or
the Superior Court.
7
given the plain language of G. L. c. 151B, § 5. Thus, transfers
of such actions to the Housing Court or any other trial court
department is prohibited.6 As for the procedure to transfer the
matter back to the Superior Court, we agree with the Attorney
General that Trial Court Rule XII (1), which provides for the
consolidation of two or more related actions pending in
different trial court departments, is not applicable because
here there is only one case at issue.
However, G. L. c. 211B, § 9, empowers the Chief Justice of
the Trial Court to engage in the "general superintendence of the
judicial policy of the trial court." Among those powers
explicitly granted to the Chief Justice of the Trial Court is
the authority to "monitor and to assist in the case processing
and caseflow management capabilities of the trial court
departments" and to "transfer cases and matters from a court to
any other court." Id. See Konstantopoulos v. Whately, 384
Mass. 123, 129-130 (1981) ("the proper procedure is for the
judge to ask the Chief Administrative Justice to transfer the
case . . . to the appropriate department of the Trial Court").
Thus, where a judge of a particular trial court department finds
that the court lacks jurisdiction over a particular matter, the
6 Given the clarity of § 5's plain meaning, we need not
address the additional arguments raised by the Attorney General.
8
judge may request an order from the Chief Justice of the Trial
Court to transfer the case to the appropriate court department.7
Conclusion. For the aforementioned reasons, the Housing
Court lacks jurisdiction over enforcement actions brought by the
Attorney General under G. L. c. 151B, § 5. We clarify that a
trial court department may seek to transfer cases outside its
subject matter jurisdiction by requesting a transfer order from
the Chief Justice of the Trial Court.
The order of the single justice of the Appeals Court is
affirmed, and the stay of any proceedings in the Superior Court
is vacated.
So ordered.
7 The Attorney General urges this court to hold that the
"inherent powers of the judiciary" enable Housing Court judges
to transfer cases outside their subject matter jurisdiction to
other judicial departments. See Bower v. Bournay-Bower, 469
Mass. 690, 698 (2014), quoting O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of
the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 510, 514 (1972)
(inherent powers of judiciary are those "necessary to 'secure
the full and effective administration of justice' and thus
extend beyond adjudication to ancillary functions such as rule-
making and judicial administration'"). However, we do not find
it necessary in this case to elaborate on the inherent powers of
the Housing Court, where the Chief Justice of the Trial Court is
authorized by statute and well positioned to assist in resolving
issues of this nature.