Commonwealth v. John Doe. ( 2023 )


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  • NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
    23.0, as appearing in 
    97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017
     (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
    as amended by 
    73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001
     [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
    and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
    decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
    court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
    A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
    2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
    above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 
    71 Mass. App. Ct. 258
    , 260
    n.4 (2008).
    COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
    APPEALS COURT
    21-P-1079
    COMMONWEALTH
    vs.
    JOHN DOE.
    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
    The defendant, John Doe, was charged with assault and
    battery on his daughter in August of 2020.            The case was
    dismissed for lack of prosecution on November 19, 2020.               Some
    110 days after the dismissal, Doe filed a petition to seal his
    criminal record.      See G. L. c. 276, § l00C; Commonwealth v. Pon,
    
    469 Mass. 296
     (2014).       After a hearing in which a judge of the
    District Court considered the arguments of counsel and
    affidavits and documents filed by Doe, the judge denied the
    request on the grounds that neither the passage of time nor
    nature and reason for the disposition militated in favor of its
    allowance.1    We affirm.
    1   The Commonwealth took no position on the request.
    Discussion.   We review the motion judge's decision for an
    abuse of discretion or error of law.   Pon, 
    469 Mass. at 299
    .     In
    Pon, 
    supra at 321-322
    , the Supreme Judicial Court "announce[d]
    . . . a lower standard for sealing" a criminal record under
    G. L. c. 276, § 100C, requiring that a defendant's petition
    should "set[] forth facts that demonstrate good cause for
    overriding the presumption of public access to court records."
    Doe carried the burden, id. at 314, to show good cause for
    sealing based on the following factors:
    "the particular disadvantages identified by the defendant
    arising from the availability of the criminal record;
    evidence of rehabilitation suggesting that the defendant
    could overcome these disadvantages if the record were
    sealed; any other evidence that sealing would alleviate the
    identified disadvantages; relevant circumstances of the
    defendant at the time of the offense that suggest a
    likelihood of recidivism or of success; the passage of time
    since the offense and since the dismissal or nolle
    prosequi; and the nature of and reasons for the particular
    disposition."
    Id. at 316.
    We are confident that the judge did not abuse her
    discretion based on the record before her.   The police reports
    before the motion judge stated that Doe, a father of three in
    his mid-fifties, had an argument with his then-eighteen year old
    daughter, that she threw a metal cup of water at him, that he
    ran up the stairs demanding that she pick it up, and that he
    pushed her to the ground when she did not.   The daughter called
    2
    the police, but subsequently declined to press charges.2    Doe
    sought sealing on the grounds that he had no criminal history,
    his actions were uncharacteristic and borne of a fraught family
    dynamic based on his daughter's history, and the impact of the
    availability of this record on his career in health care.    We
    consider these arguments in turn.
    Doe maintains that the incident was isolated and would not
    be repeated, that he had no criminal record of any kind, and
    that sealing was therefore in order.   While there is some force
    to this argument, the judge was not required to accept it,
    particularly when the motion was brought less than four months
    after the dismissal of the charges.    To the extent that the
    judge's decision reflected a preference for evaluating Doe's
    risk of recidivism over a longer span of time, we cannot say
    that that determination fell outside the range of reasonable
    alternatives or demonstrated "a clear error of judgment in
    weighing the factors relevant to the decision" (quotation and
    citation omitted).   L.L. v. Commonwealth, 
    470 Mass. 169
    , 185
    n.27 (2014).
    Doe also contends that he risks losing important
    professional certifications as a health care provider if his
    2 Although Doe now suggests that the judge should not have
    credited the police report, it was attached as an exhibit to his
    petition, and he did not seek to testify or challenge it.
    3
    record is revealed to licensing authorities, thus imperiling his
    career of nearly three decades.       In essence, this is a challenge
    to the judge's decision not to find in Doe's favor on the first
    three Pon factors.   "As explained in Pon, 
    469 Mass. at 316
    , a
    defendant seeking to seal his record 'need not establish a risk
    of specific harm, [so long as] he . . . allege[s] with
    sufficient particularity and credibility some disadvantage
    stemming from [criminal offender record information (CORI)]
    availability that exists at the time of the petition or is
    likely to exist in the foreseeable future.'       'This can include,
    but is not limited to, a risk of unemployment [or]
    underemployment' (emphasis added)."       Commonwealth v. Doe, 
    90 Mass. App. Ct. 793
    , 797 (2016), quoting Pon, 
    supra at 316-317
    .
    However, as the Commonwealth points out on appeal, the
    relevant licensing authorities have "standard" CORI access, and
    therefore would not be privy to a record of a charge that was
    dismissed.   See G. L. c. 6, § 172 (a) (3); 803 Code Mass. Regs.
    § 2.05(4) (2021).    Doe has not cited any authority to the
    contrary.3   Doe's showing therefore fell short of demonstrating
    3 Doe also alleges that the Drug Enforcement Administration would
    seek his criminal record in the course of the renewal of his
    controlled substances registration, that a record of a dismissed
    charge would result in nonrenewal of this registration, and that
    his ability to prescribe would be limited as a result. However,
    G. L. c. 6, § 172 (a) (1), provides that "[c]riminal justice
    agencies may obtain all criminal offender record information,
    including sealed records, for the actual performance of their
    4
    "with sufficient particularity and credibility" that he would be
    disadvantaged in the licensing process.     Pon, 
    469 Mass. at 316
    .
    The judge was charged with determining whether there was
    good cause to seal Doe's record by carefully balancing Doe's
    interest in privacy against the public right of access.     Pon,
    
    469 Mass. at 316
    .   In the absence of a demonstrated risk of
    harm, together with the short span of time in which the petition
    was filed and the fact that the dismissal was based on the
    noncooperation of the daughter, we cannot say the judge abused
    her considerable discretion in striking that balance here.
    Order denying motion to seal
    affirmed.
    By the Court (Sullivan,
    Shin & Hodgens, JJ.4),
    Clerk
    Entered:   February 10, 2023.
    criminal justice duties" (emphasis added). Thus, Doe has not
    met his burden to show that sealing would ameliorate any risk
    regarding loss of registration.
    4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-P-1079

Filed Date: 2/10/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/22/2023