Commonwealth v. Steed , 95 Mass. App. Ct. 463 ( 2019 )

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18-P-172 Appeals Court
COMMONWEALTH vs. CHARLES STEED.
No. 18-P-172.
Middlesex. April 9, 2019. - June 11, 2019.
Present: Green, C.J., Sullivan, & Ditkoff, JJ.
Deriving Support from Prostitution. Trafficking. Evidence,
Authentication, Hearsay. Practice, Criminal, Argument by
prosecutor, Instructions to jury, Failure to object.
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on March 21, 2017.
The cases were tried before Merita A. Hopkins, J.
Adam Us for the defendant.
Caitlin Lyta Gemmill, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
GREEN, C.J. On appeal from his convictions of trafficking
of persons for sexual servitude and deriving support from the
earnings of a prostitute, the defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the latter charge,
because police placed him under arrest before he received any
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portion of the money paid by an undercover officer to a
prostitute for sexual services as part of a "sting" operation.
On the evidence in the case before us, we conclude that the
interruption of the transaction before the defendant gained
physical possession of his share of the proceeds does not bar
his conviction on a charge of deriving support from a
prostitute, as a share of the money was his, by prior
arrangement, as soon as it was paid by the officer to one of the
women trafficked by the defendant. Discerning in the
defendant's other claims1 no cause to disturb the judgments, we
affirm.
Background. We summarize the evidence the jury could have
found, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).
On January 12, 2017, a police sergeant with the Woburn
Police Department began an undercover investigation into human
trafficking. The officer began the investigation by locating an
advertisement on Backpage.com, an "online classified" services
website frequently used to advertise escort services. The
officer's attention was drawn to a particular advertisement
because it involved a telephone number that he recognized from
1 The defendant also claims error in the admission of
certain evidence and in the jury instructions, and contends that
the prosecutor's closing argument created a substantial risk of
a miscarriage of justice.
3
another investigation. The advertisement contained images of
two females and offered a "two girl special." The advertisement
gave two telephone numbers, one ending in 7659 and one ending in
6078, to contact the women to arrange a meeting. The
advertisement was labeled with a unique Backpage.com "Post ID"
of 37877418. The officer then prepared an undercover operation
to contact the women in the advertisement. He called and texted
both numbers but received a response only from the 6078 number;
the officer then arranged a "date" with the person on the other
end of that telephone number.2 He arranged to meet two women for
the price of $500 at a hotel in Woburn that evening.
The defendant drove two women, D.M. and V.G., to the
designated Woburn hotel to meet the officer. While en route,
D.M. communicated with the officer by cell phone to let him know
that she and V.G. were on their way to the hotel. The defendant
provided the women with condoms to bring on the date. The
defendant was nervous about the date and insisted that D.M. ask
the officer to send a "dick pic" to her to verify that he was
2 The officer explained that a "date" in that context
described "a meeting . . . for the delivery of commercial sexual
services."
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not a police officer.3 D.M. then text messaged a photograph of
herself and V.G. to the officer.4
The defendant dropped the two women off at the designated
hotel in Woburn, where the officer was waiting. The officer
gave D.M. $500 in cash and discussed what he wanted them to do.
D.M. placed the $500 in her purse and sent a text message to the
defendant saying, "We're good," meaning that she had the money.
At that point, the officer signaled to other officers waiting in
adjoining hotel rooms, and they began interviewing V.G. and D.M.
Both women gave the officers their cell phones and
consented to searches of those cell phones. Through their
interviews with V.G. and D.M., the officers were able to
identify the other woman in the January 12, 2017, Backpage.com
advertisement as O.S. All three women testified at trial
pursuant to a grant of immunity.
V.G. was present at the encounter at the Woburn hotel. She
met the defendant approximately two years prior to trial while
homeless in Boston; the defendant saw her, pulled his car over,
offered her "crack" cocaine, and gave her his cell phone number.
3 The officer explained that a "dick pic" is a photograph of
the prospective customer's penis. The officer declined to send
the requested picture.
4 D.M. was one of the two women depicted in the Backpage.com
advertisement for a "two girl special."
5
She knew the defendant by the nicknames "Rick," "Tyreki," and
"Cash." The "next time" she saw the defendant, she began
working for him as a prostitute. In exchange for her services,
the defendant fed her cocaine and heroin addiction. The
defendant told her they "could make money," "took [her] to a
store and bought [her] new clothes, took [her] to a house and
gave [her] a shower[,] [a]nd put an ad on Backpage." The
defendant posted advertisements for V.G.'s sexual services
online on Backpage.com; she witnessed him post those
advertisements, which referred to her as "Honey," the nickname
he gave her, "on multiple occasions." She also saw the
defendant pay for the advertisements on multiple occasions using
"a prepaid card." The defendant gave V.G. a cell phone on which
customers could contact her to arrange a date. The defendant
also arranged hotel rooms for V.G. to meet with customers and
drove her to those hotels or to customers' homes. The only
person who ever drove her to meet a customer was the defendant,
and the defendant set all the monetary rates for her sexual
services. Dates with V.G. always involved sex.
In December 2016, V.G. was hospitalized for several weeks
with a wrist infection that required surgery. After her
surgery, V.G. left the hospital against medical advice. The
defendant picked her up from the hospital with an intravenous
line still in her body and brought her to a hotel in Boston,
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where she "got high and started talking about working again;
doing dates." The encounter with the Woburn police officer
occurred less than twenty-four hours after the defendant picked
her up from the hospital.
D.M., the other woman present at the encounter at the
Woburn hotel, met the defendant in the summer of 2016 when she
was addicted to heroin and "crack"; the defendant "picked [her]
up for a date," which meant "sex for money," and told her
afterward that he sold "crack," which she wanted. She knew the
defendant by the name "Cash."
She began working for the defendant in October 2016,
immediately after she was released from a drug treatment center.
The defendant created advertisements for her sexual services
that were "posted on Backpage." D.M. occasionally watched the
defendant create these advertisements. The defendant set the
"rate" for her sexual services and listed the number of the
prepaid cell phone he gave her as the contact number on the
advertisements. Customers contacted her by text messaging or
calling her cell phone to set up dates, and the defendant drove
her to those dates. The defendant sometimes spoke directly with
those customers, and other times D.M. would speak with the
customers. Dates with D.M. usually involved sex.
D.M. knew there was an advertisement for her services
posted on Backpage.com on January 12, 2017, "[b]ecause we did it
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every day," meaning that the defendant posted an advertisement
for her on Backpage.com every day, "and [the] phone that [she]
used never stopped ringing." D.M. paid the defendant fifty
percent of her earnings from a date with a customer, but
"inevitably it all went to [the defendant]" because she would
also buy drugs from him. D.M. identified two of the images on
the January 12, 2017, Backpage.com advertisement at trial as her
own face and body, recognized her own cell phone number in the
advertisement, and denied making the advertisement herself. She
further testified that the defendant was "in control of every
phone on every encounter," so he knew what the arrangements were
with customers who responded to the Backpage.com advertisements.
Following the officer's meeting with V.G. and D.M. at the
Woburn hotel, the defendant was pulled over on the highway by
other officers, arrested, and searched. Inside the defendant's
vehicle, officers located a large bag of condoms, numerous cell
phones, and an unknown female's driver's license. The defendant
had $1,190 in cash on his person at the time of arrest.
Officers also seized a cell phone from the defendant's person;
the number assigned to that cell phone ended in 9709.
Business records showed that the 9709 cell phone number was
registered to a "Cee Cash Brown"; this was also the same number
listed in the cell phone obtained from D.M. under the contact
name "C Cash" and in the cell phone obtained from V.G. under the
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contact name "Cash." The cell phone in the possession of V.G.
was a cell phone "used mostly" by the defendant "for business
purposes." A forensic examination of that cell phone revealed
an associated e-mail address of ceecash85@gmail.com, images of
the defendant, and images of the women in various stages of
undress. Finally, business records for the January 12, 2017,
Backpage.com advertisement showed that the unique Backpage.com
"Post ID" was registered to the same e-mail address,
ceecash85@gmail.com, and had an associated telephone number
ending in 9709 –- the same number as the cell phone in the
defendant's possession.
O.S., whose photograph and telephone number also appeared
in the Backpage.com advertisement to which the undercover
officer responded on January 12, 2017, also testified at trial,
though she was not present at the encounter at the Woburn hotel.
The defendant first approached O.S. in the summer of 2016 when
she was homeless in Boston and asked her if she would "like to
party and make money." She knew him by the nicknames "C,"
"Cash," and "Rick." The defendant took her to Cape Cod to
provide sexual services for payment. At the time, she was
addicted to heroin and "crack." The defendant supplied her with
drugs, which she would pay for out of her earnings while working
for the defendant. She always paid the defendant forty percent
of the proceeds of her dates and would then pay him additional
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amounts for drugs. The defendant advertised her sexual services
"on Backpage." The defendant was responsible for setting rates
for her sexual services and always drove her to the dates.
Though O.S. was not present for the date arranged at the Woburn
hotel, she recognized various characteristics about the
advertisement the undercover officer responded to. She
identified two photographs of herself in the advertisement,
identified the description "Nerd Librarian" in the advertisement
as a nickname given her by the defendant, and identified one of
the telephone numbers listed in the advertisement as being hers.
She also recognized another photograph in the advertisement as
depicting D.M.
Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. To establish
the crime of deriving support from the earnings of a prostitute
under G. L. c. 272, § 7, the Commonwealth must prove "that a
particular individual was a prostitute, that the defendant knew
the individual was a prostitute, and that the defendant shared
in some way in the earnings or proceeds of this person's
prostitution." Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 454 n.10
(2011).
The defendant's principal challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence rests on his observation that he did not receive
any portion of the money paid by the undercover police officer
to one of the women trafficked for sexual services on January
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12, 2017, and his contention that evidence of his receipt of
some portion of that money was essential to prove the crime.5 We
reject the defendant's contention that interruption of the
transfer to him of money paid for sexual services to a person he
has trafficked precludes a conviction of deriving support from a
prostitute on the basis of that payment -- at least in the
circumstances of the present case. D.M., who received payment
from the undercover officer, testified that she would give the
defendant fifty percent of her earnings from a date with a
customer (and also testified that she had done so on numerous
prior occasions). In such circumstances, a rational jury could
conclude that the defendant's share of the proceeds became his,
by prior arrangement, as soon as payment was received by D.M.,
and that his share of the funds was simply held by her on his
behalf pending her delivery of that share to him.6
5 The defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence that he knew the women were prostitutes is without
merit for a variety of reasons, not least because the women
testified that they would pay the defendant a share of the funds
received from dates the defendant arranged for them, that he
drove them to and from those dates, and that he supplied them
with condoms for use during their dates. On such testimony, a
rational jury could infer the defendant's knowledge that the
women were prostitutes. The defendant does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence that the women whose services the
defendant advertised on Backpage.com were prostitutes; their
testimony acknowledged that they were prostitutes.
6 We note as well that, though the indictment referred to
the defendant's derivation of support from prostitution only "on
or about the Twelfth day of January in the year of our Lord two
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2. Admission of Backpage.com advertisement. The
defendant's challenge to the admission of the January 12, 2017,
Backpage.com advertisement is likewise without merit. As a
threshold matter, we observe that the defendant did not object
to admission of the advertisement at trial. "We generally do
not consider the admission of evidence that was introduced
without objection to be error, per se. See Commonwealth v.
Stewart, 398 Mass. 535, 543 (1986) ('hearsay evidence admitted
without objection may be considered by the jury and may be given
any probative value it possesses')." Commonwealth v. Haggett,
79 Mass. App. Ct. 167, 174 n.10 (2011). The purpose of the
objection is to permit the trial judge an opportunity to ensure
that inadmissible evidence is removed from the jury's
consideration. "If a timely objection is not made, the evidence
is properly admitted, and the fact finder is entitled to give it
such probative effect as it deems appropriate." Mass. G. Evid.
§ 103(a) note, at 6 (2019). However, even though the claim of
error is unpreserved, we nonetheless consider whether the
evidence was admissible and, if not, whether its admission
thousand and seventeen at Woburn," the evidence of the women's
past practice of sharing proceeds from paid sexual encounters
was admitted without limitation, and was relevant to
establishing the nature of the ongoing business conducted by the
defendant.
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created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See
Haggett, supra.
Contrary to the defendant's claim, admissibility of the
Backpage.com advertisement did not depend on proof of the
defendant's authorship of the advertisement. It was relevant to
prove the offer of sexual services by two women, without regard
to the identity of the person who authored, paid for, or posted
the advertisement. The advertisement was sufficiently
authenticated by the testimony of the undercover police officer,
who identified it as the advertisement to which he responded
when he arranged his meeting with the women at the Woburn hotel
for paid sexual services. See Purdy, 459 Mass. at 447 & n.5.
In any event, however, there was ample evidence that the
defendant authored the advertisement, including the e-mail and
telephone numbers furnished to Backpage.com incident to placing
the advertisement (both of which were associated with the
defendant), and the women's testimony that the defendant posted
similar advertisements every day. See id. at 448.
3. Specific unanimity. As the Commonwealth observes, a
specific unanimity instruction is not required when the
Commonwealth does not proceed "'on alternate theories' of
guilt." Commonwealth v. Arias, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 429, 432
(2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Santos, 440 Mass. 281, 287-288
(2003). In the present case, the Commonwealth based its
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prosecution for human trafficking on but one theory of guilt --
an ongoing course of conduct by the defendant offering sexual
services of various women, including Internet advertisements to
solicit customers, driving them to and from arranged sexual
encounters with customers, and sharing in the proceeds from such
encounters. No instruction on specific unanimity was required.7
4. Closing argument. Finally, we see no impropriety in
the prosecutor's closing argument, and therefore no substantial
risk of a miscarriage of justice.8 The prosecutor's argument
that the immunized witnesses were credible was based in the
evidence and did not constitute improper vouching. See
Commonwealth v. Brewer, 472 Mass. 307, 315 (2015). See also
Mass. G. Evid. § 1113(b)(3) (2019). There also was evidence in
the record to support the prosecutor's comment that the
defendant "targeted" the women he trafficked for sexual
services, based on their homelessness and drug addiction.
Judgments affirmed.
7 We note as well that the defendant did not request such an
instruction.
8 Again, the defendant raised no objection at trial.