AM Properties, LLC v. J&W Summit Ave, LLC ( 2017 )

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us
15-P-1343 Appeals Court
AM PROPERTIES, LLC vs. J&W SUMMIT AVE, LLC.
No. 15-P-1343.
Suffolk. May 17, 2016. - March 8, 2017.
Present: Cypher, Blake, & Henry, JJ.
Adverse Possession and Prescription. Real Property, Adverse
possession.
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on
September 27, 2013.
The case was heard by Alexander H. Sands, III, J., on
motions for summary judgment.
Joseph L. Bierwirth, Jr. (Ryan P. McManus also present) for
the defendant.
Ann M. Sobolewski for the plaintiff.
HENRY, J. The plaintiff, AM Properties, LLC (AM), brought
an action in the Land Court seeking to (1) establish title by
adverse possession to a strip of land (the strip) that is part
of the property of the defendant, J&W Summit Ave, LLC (J&W), and
(2) permanently enjoin J&W from interfering with rights in an
2
easement for passage over J&W's property (the passageway). J&W
counterclaimed, denying AM's claim of title to the strip and
asserting its own adverse possession claim to extinguish AM's
rights to the passageway. The central issue in the case is
whether AM is entitled to include, or "tack" on, an approximate
six-year period of nonpermissive use of the strip by a tenant of
a prior owner to satisfy the twenty-year requirement for a claim
of adverse possession. On cross motions for summary judgment, a
Land Court judge answered this question in the affirmative and
ruled in AM's favor on all claims. J&W has now appealed from
that judgment.
As is well established, a review of a summary judgment
ruling is de novo, taking the facts, along with the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, in a light most
favorable to the party against whom judgment is to enter. See
Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007); Albahari v. Zoning
Bd. of Appeals of Brewster, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 245, 248 n.4
(2010). To that end, we conclude that there is no genuine
dispute of material fact1 and that AM is entitled as a matter of
law to tack on the prior period of tenancy to establish adverse
possession. Accordingly, we affirm.
1
In many instances where J&W has "disputed" facts, it
disputes the legal significance of those facts, not the facts
themselves.
3
Background. The following undisputed material facts are
evident from the record. A specialty food store named Bazaar
International Gourmet (Bazaar) has operated on the AM property
at 1432 and 1432A Beacon Street in Brookline since December,
1993, initially under a lease that commenced September 1, 1993.
At that time, the lessee and operator of Bazaar was a
corporation formed by Alexander Zelfond called I.G.F., Inc.
(IGF). Subsequently, Zelfond formed AM to purchase the property
in 1999. Zelfond then formed a third entity, I.V.A. Foods, Inc.
(IVA), in April, 2000, to continue to operate Bazaar.
The J&W property is north of the AM property and borders on
Summit Avenue. Most of the J&W property is occupied by a
parking lot.
1. The strip. At issue here is a rectangular strip of
land on the J&W property located between the rear boundary of
the AM property and the southern end of the J&W parking lot.
The strip is at a "significantly" lower elevation than the
balance of the J&W property, and is bounded on the north by a
cement retaining wall rising 5.23 feet in height from the level
of the strip to the level of the J&W parking lot. On the
southerly edge of the strip, a railroad tie retaining wall runs
the length of the boundary between the strip and the AM
property, just a few feet from the rear of the building housing
Bazaar. The strip is at a higher elevation than the AM
4
property,2 but the elevation difference is significantly less
than the difference between the strip and the parking lot on the
other side. A set of stairs allows for travel from the AM
property and the strip up to the J&W parking lot, and then to
the passageway to Summit Avenue.
a. The tenancy. The lease between IGF and the former
owner of the AM property (the landlord), executed in August,
1993, designated the leased premises by reference to the street
address, "together with the basement thereunder." The lease did
not include a description of the square footage, a reference to
any plan, or any specific mention of the strip. During
Zelfond's negotiation of the lease with the landlord, no
distinction was made between the strip and the area behind the
building on the AM property. Zelfond and an agent of the
landlord walked through the building and onto the strip during
negotiations and the agent never suggested that the strip was
not part of the leased premises. Subsequently, during the many
conversations the two had throughout the term of the tenancy,
the landlord's agent never told Zelfond to stop using the strip.
Zelfond also never sought or received permission from anyone
connected with the J&W property to use the strip.
2
The record does not provide an exact measurement of the
difference in elevation or height of the railroad tie retaining
wall.
5
b. Use of the strip. The Zelfond-related entities (IGF,
IVA, and AM) took actions consistent with ownership of the
strip. In August, 1993, before the lease term commenced, IGF
took possession of the AM property and began to use the strip.
During August and September, 1993, IGF levelled the strip and
used it as a temporary staging area while it renovated the
property. Since the day Bazaar first opened in December, 1993,
the store has operated seven days per week, only closing for
legal holidays. Throughout that time, Zelfond and employees of
Bazaar continuously used the strip to store equipment and
supplies related to the operation of the store, repaired the
retaining wall along the J&W parking lot, maintained the strip
by clearing it of snow and leaves and by pruning trees and
bushes, and accessed the strip, sometimes dozens of times per
day, for these and other purposes. IVA or AM maintained
compressors on the strip, if not continuously throughout the
relevant time period, then at least for stretches of time
throughout that period.3 Beginning in 1995, IVA or AM also
3
In addition to the evidence that compressors were
installed on the strip prior to the December, 1993, opening of
Bazaar, compressors were observed on the strip in, at the very
least, 1998 and 2001, and were still located on the strip at the
time of the summary judgment proceedings in 2015.
6
installed and began frequently accessing a walk-in cooler on the
strip.4
In 2007, AM hired a contractor to install a metal chain
link fence along the top of the concrete retaining wall bounding
the parking lot and the strip, which bore a sign facing the
parking lot that read, "No trespassing, Private property."
There is no evidence in the record that anyone connected with
the J&W property objected to the installation of the fence or
sign, and both remained in place through the summary judgment
proceedings.
The only evidence that anyone connected with the J&W
property accessed and used the strip is the testimony of a
property manager hired by J&W's predecessor to the effect that,
once a year during his tenure from 1998 to 2011, he would
inspect the concrete retaining wall.5 There is no evidence in
the record that the property manager ever encountered, or was
4
This cooler was removed in 1999. It was replaced in 2007,
and remained in place on the strip through the time of the
summary judgment proceedings.
5
The property manager also hired a cleaning company to
occasionally "police" the J&W property, including the strip, for
trash.
7
observed by, anyone connected with the AM property when he
conducted these inspections.6
2. The passageway. There is no space between the building
on the AM property that houses Bazaar and the buildings on the
properties located immediately to the east and west. As such,
there are only two means of ingress and egress from the AM
property. The first is to and from the sidewalk along Beacon
Street in front of the building. The second is via the
passageway -- a five-foot-wide deeded easement to Summit Avenue
that travels over the J&W property.7
J&W's parking lot has been licensed for sixteen cars since
June, 1993. In 1999, the parking lot was resurfaced and lines
delineating the parking spaces were painted. Several of these
parking lines extended into the passageway. As a result, cars
parked in those spaces extended into the passageway and
obstructed travel along the easement. There is no evidence in
6
Zelfond and certain employees and contractors connected
with the AM property never observed anyone connected with the
J&W property on the strip.
7
The deed to AM describes the easement rights: "Together
with the right to use the five foot passageway on the North and
Northwesterly side of said lot A-2 leading out to Summit Avenue
in common with others entitled thereto." Slightly more than
half way across the J&W property the five-foot-wide easement
joins a ten-foot-wide easement before it empties onto Summit
Avenue. The ten-foot-wide easement does not otherwise appear to
be at issue in this case.
8
the record that there were painted parking lines on the surface
of the parking lot prior to 1999.8
Discussion. 1. AM's adverse possession of the strip.
"Title by adverse possession can be acquired only by proof of
nonpermissive use which is actual, open, notorious, exclusive
and adverse for twenty years." Ryan v. Stavros, 348 Mass. 251,
262 (1964). "The burden of proof in any adverse possession case
rests on the claimant and extends to all of the necessary
elements of such possession." Sea Pines Condominium III Assn.
v. Steffens, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 838, 847 (2004). To satisfy the
twenty-year requirement, a claimant may "tack" onto its own
period of use a period during which a predecessor in privity
asserted an adverse right to the property. See Shoer v. Daffe,
337 Mass. 420, 424 (1958).
a. Tacking on a period of tenancy. The motion judge
concluded that AM could satisfy the twenty-year adverse
possession requirement as to the strip by "tacking" together the
use of the strip during AM's fourteen years of ownership of the
property on which Bazaar was located, and IGF's prior use of the
strip for six years while it occupied the property as a tenant.
J&W argues that such tacking is not permissible unless the
8
J&W's former property manager recalled that, even before
the lines were painted in 1999, cars would park within the
bounds of the passageway. His involvement with the J&W
property, however, dated back only to 1998.
9
landlord during IGF's period of tenancy had possession of the
disputed property, or claimed title to it, and included it in
the lease to IGF. In support of this proposition, J&W cites to
Holmes v. Turner's Falls Co., 150 Mass. 535 (1890) (Turner's
Falls), and Holmes v. Johnson, 324 Mass. 450 (1949) (Johnson).
The rule enunciated in those two cases, however, has been
implicitly overruled. See Ottavia v. Savarese, 338 Mass. 330(1959); Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619 (1992); Totman v.
Malloy, 431 Mass. 143 (2000). The argument, therefore, cannot
be sustained.
In Turner's Falls, the Supreme Judicial Court first
addressed the tacking of a period of tenancy for purposes of
adverse possession and held:
"If one person disseises another of land, and while in
possession leases the land to a tenant who continues to
occupy it under his lease, the adverse possession of the
tenant may be tacked to that of the landlord, and the
possession of the tenant may be said to be that of the
landlord; but if the landlord never had possession of the
land, nor claimed title to it, and did not include it in
the lease, the possession of the tenant beyond the
boundaries of the land contained in the lease is not the
possession of the landlord, even although the tenant
believes that he is occupying only the land demised."
150 Mass. at 547.
Almost sixty years later, the issue came to the fore again
in Johnson. There, the plaintiff's mother had owned their
property, and the plaintiff and her family had openly used the
adjacent, disputed strip of land as though it were their own,
10
for a period of thirteen to fifteen years. 324 Mass. at 451-
452. Subsequently, after the bank holding her mother's mortgage
foreclosed, the plaintiff continued both to occupy the property
as a tenant of the bank and use and possess the disputed strip
as her own. Ibid. Then, after approximately four years as a
tenant, the plaintiff purchased the property back from the bank
and continued to live there, using the disputed strip, for some
seven years more, at which point the adjoining landowner, the
defendant Johnson, entered the strip and asserted ownership.
Ibid.
According to the Supreme Judicial Court, the "question for
decision [in Johnson was] whether the plaintiff has shown that
the possession of her family and herself was under a continuous
claim of right or title for twenty years." Id. at 453. The
court answered that question in the negative and held:
"[W]hen title to [the leased property] was in the bank and
the plaintiff was its tenant, [the tenant's] possession of
the disputed area was under a claim of right to hold it not
in fee but only as a tenant of the bank. As the bank never
had possession of the disputed area, nor claimed title to
it, and did not include it in its letting to the tenant,
the possession of the tenant beyond the boundaries of [the
lessor's premises] cannot be considered to be the
possession of the [lessor]. Holmes v. Turner's Falls Co.,
150 Mass. [at] 547; Elwell v. Barbrick, 279 Mass. 272, 277
[1932]. As the continuity of possession under a claim of
right to the title was interrupted, the conclusion of the
master that the plaintiff has not acquired title by adverse
possession was correct."
Id. at 454-455.
11
Ten years later, however, the Supreme Judicial Court
decided Ottavia, wherein it acknowledged that the rule in
Johnson had been "severely criticized" and that "there seems to
be no justification for requiring a claim of right or title as
essential to an adverse possession." Ottavia, 338 Mass. at 333(quotation omitted). Instead, the court shifted the focus to
nonpermissive use, stating:
"'The great majority of the cases establish convincingly
that the alleged requirements of claim of title and of
hostility of possession mean only that the possessor must
use and enjoy the property continuously for the required
period as the average owner would use it, without the
consent of the true owner and therefore in actual hostility
to him irrespective of the possessor's actual state of mind
or intent.' Am. Law of Property, § 15.4, pp. 776-777.
From the standpoint of the true owner, the purpose of the
various requirements of adverse possession . . . is to put
him on notice of the hostile activity of the possession so
that he, the owner, may have an opportunity to take steps
to vindicate his rights by legal action. Where a claim of
right is made or where an intention to oust exists and is
communicated or is open and notorious, the purpose of
notice is satisfied, for it is likely that the encroachment
and the fact of its hostility will come to the attention of
the true owner. The nonexistence of a claim of right or
intent to oust does not, however, necessarily preclude
notice. Where the user has acted, without license or
permission of the true owner, in a manner inconsistent with
the true owner's rights, the acts alone (without any
explicit claim of right or intent to dispossess) may be
sufficient to put the true owner on notice of the
nonpermissive use."
Id. at 333-334.
The court subsequently elaborated upon this shift. First,
in Kendall, the court cited Ottavia and stated that, "[i]nstead
of focusing on what the parties said twenty or more years ago,
12
we have held repeatedly that courts must look to the physical
facts of entry and possession as evidence of an intent to occupy
and to hold property as of right. . . . The justification for
this position is that, if inconsistent with the true owner's
rights, the possessor's actions and not his intent provide
notice of nonpermissive use to the true owner." Kendall, 413
Mass. at 624. Then, in Totman, the court cited Ottavia and
Kendall and declared that "[t]he guiding principle behind the
elements of adverse possession is not to ascertain the intent or
state of mind of the adverse claimant, but rather to provide
notice to the true owner, allowing for the legal vindication of
property rights." Totman, 431 Mass. at 145.
Whereas Turner's Falls and Johnson focused on whether the
landlords in those cases had asserted a technical claim to title
and their intent as to the disputed area,9 Ottavia shifted the
focus to the nature and extent of the actual possessor's use of
the disputed property and whether that use is sufficient to put
a reasonable owner on notice of the hostile activity and thus
9
The motion judge concluded that AM satisfied the rule of
Turner's Falls and Johnson because, based upon the topography of
the strip, located significantly below the grade of the balance
of the J&W property and on nearly the same grade as the AM
property, as well as a clause in the lease that required IGF to
keep the leased premises in a clean and sanitary manner, it
could be implied that the landlord had claimed title to the
strip and intended it to be included under the lease. Given our
ruling, that issue is moot.
13
afford the owner an opportunity to act to vindicate his or her
rights. Ottavia, 338 Mass. at 333-334.
Here, therefore, the focus is not on whether the landlord
had possession of the strip, claimed title to it, or included it
in the lease to IGF. Rather, the focus is properly on the
nature and extent to which IGF used the strip and whether that
was sufficient to put a reasonable owner of the J&W property on
notice. The undisputed facts in the record establish that,
irrespective of IGF's landlord's actual state of mind or intent,
IGF used the strip "as the average owner would use it," Kendall,
413 Mass. at 624, throughout the tenancy, without the consent of
J&W, the true owner. IGF's use was such that it should have
come to the attention of the owner of the J&W property.
Of course, the tacking analysis does not end there, because
privity between AM and IGF, as well as between AM and IVA is
also required. See Shoer, 337 Mass. at 424. "To produce the
necessary privity [for tacking of successive periods of adverse
use] there must be some relation between the successive users of
such a nature that the use by the earlier user can fairly be
said to be made for the later user, or there must be such a
relation between them that the later user can be fairly regarded
as the successor to the earlier one. Am. Law of Property,
§ 8.59." Ryan, 348 Mass. at 264. As an initial matter, we note
that J&W has not challenged whether privity exists between AM
14
and the other two entities. Nor could it. AM, IGF, and IVA
were all formed by Zelfond and were connected, as either
landlord or tenant, with the operation, or preparation to
operate Bazaar on the AM property for more than twenty years.
As matter of law, therefore, privity exists.
b. Exclusivity of possession of the strip. J&W also
argues that there is a genuine dispute as to whether AM and its
predecessor, IGF, maintained exclusive possession of the strip
throughout the required twenty-year period. J&W makes two
claims. First, J&W claims that IGF's earliest uses of the
property were not sufficient to support a claim of adverse
possession. We disagree. The summary judgment record amply
supports IGF's use of the property commencing in August, 1993.
Second, J&W argues that exclusive possession of the strip
was interrupted by activities of J&W's property manager from
1998 to 2011. However, "[n]ot every act by the owner on the
land interrupts actual adverse possession." Rothery v.
MacDonald, 329 Mass. 238, 241 (1952). "To stop the running of
the [prescriptive period], the owner's entry, with few
exceptions [not applicable here], must be done openly on the
land, so as to give notice of the interruption." Pugatch v.
Stoloff, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 536, 541-542 (1996). Even accepting
that the J&W property manager actually stepped onto the strip
15
when he conducted his inspections,10 these inspections were so
infrequent and innocuous that they cannot be deemed to have put
AM or its predecessor on notice that the owner of the J&W
property was purporting to exercise dominion and control over
that disputed piece of property.11 In fact, the evidence shows
that no one connected with the AM property ever saw the J&W
property manager conduct these inspections. J&W's claim of
error, therefore, cannot be sustained.
In sum, as detailed above, beginning in August, 1993, and
continuing for more than twenty years thereafter,12 AM and its
predecessor engaged in significant and continual activity on the
strip. The activity was both inconsistent with the rights of
the owners of the J&W property and consistent with a claim of
dominion and control over the strip by AM and its predecessor.
The activity was open and notorious and sufficient to put all of
the world, including the owners of the J&W property, on notice
10
During his inspections, the J&W property manager usually
did not venture much further than the set of stairs that lead
down to the strip.
11
With respect to the cleaning company the J&W property
manager hired to occasionally "police" the strip for trash, even
if we infer that the cleaning company employees actually went on
the strip, despite the lack of direct evidence to that effect,
such activity was so infrequent as to be immaterial. See note
6, supra.
12
It is immaterial whether one instead uses September 27,
2013, the date of the filing of AM's complaint, as the trigger
date for calculating the twenty-year period.
16
of the nonpermissive use. Based upon the undisputed facts,
therefore, AM established the necessary elements for adverse
possession of the strip.
2. J&W's adverse possession of the passageway. J&W argues
that the judge erroneously granted summary judgment in AM's
favor on J&W's claim of adverse possession of the passageway.
Specifically, J&W contends that the judge erroneously concluded
that J&W had "offered no evidence suggesting any adverse use of
the [p]assageway . . . prior to 1999." J&W relies on the
testimony of its property manager to the effect that cars were
parked within the bounds of the passageway both before and after
the parking space lines were painted on the parking lot in 1999.
As noted previously, the property manager's tenure spanned 1998
to 2011 only. As a result, he could not provide testimony as to
what transpired at the J&W property and parking lot prior to
that time. J&W further notes that the parking lot has been
licensed for sixteen parking spaces since at least June, 1993.
That does not establish, however, that the spaces were
configured in a manner that caused cars to block the passageway
prior to 1999. Absent such evidence, J&W is unable to establish
adverse use of the passageway for the requisite twenty-year
period. The claim for adverse possession of the passageway,
therefore, fails as a matter of law.
Judgment affirmed.