Rc International Temp Services, Inc. v. Coliseum Companies, Inc. ( 2023 )


Menu:
  • NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
    23.0, as appearing in 
    97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017
     (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
    as amended by 
    73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001
     [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
    and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
    decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
    court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
    A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
    2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
    above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 
    71 Mass. App. Ct. 258
    , 260
    n.4 (2008).
    COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
    APPEALS COURT
    22-P-247
    RC INTERNATIONAL TEMP SERVICES, INC.
    vs.
    COLISEUM COMPANIES, INC.1
    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
    The plaintiff, RC International Temp Services, Inc. (RC
    International), appeals from a judgment of dismissal, without
    prejudice, entered for lack of prosecution.            RC International
    argues that the judge erred in dismissing the case and in
    denying the plaintiff's "Motion to Appoint Receiver."               We
    affirm.
    Background.    In April 2018, RC International, a temporary
    employment agency, filed its first amended complaint2 against the
    defendant, Coliseum Companies, Inc. (Coliseum), an operator of
    commercial laundry facilities in Massachusetts.             RC
    International alleged, inter alia, that it provided "temporary
    1   Doing business as Bay State Linen.
    2 RC International filed its original complaint on March 26,
    2018.
    workers" for employment at Coliseum; Coliseum agreed to pay RC
    International the "cost" of each temporary worker; the cost of
    each temporary worker included compliance with each worker's
    "legally mandated wages" (including but not limited to minimum
    and overtime wages, unemployment, workers' compensation, and
    Federal Insurance Contributions Act tax obligations); Coliseum's
    payments to RC International were insufficient to pay for the
    workers' legally mandated wages; and, as a result, Coliseum
    "prevented [RC International] from satisfying those obligations
    and has given rise to outstanding claims against [RC
    International and other temporary employment agencies] for
    certain sums and for potential penalties."   In other words,
    because of Coliseum's breaches of its contract and obligations,
    RC International could not pay the temporary workers what they
    were owed and thus those workers have claims against RC
    International.3
    At some later date in 2018, RC International's sole owner
    and officer, who is subject to Massachusetts criminal
    proceedings and Federal immigration restrictions, moved to the
    Dominican Republic.   RC International's counsel has not had any
    3 At the hearing on the motion to dismiss and motion to appoint a
    receiver, counsel for RC International further represented,
    inter alia, that it filed suit to "get compensation for the
    asset which was converted," the asset being RC International's
    temporary workers that Coliseum allegedly stole from RC
    International.
    2
    contact with him since he left the United States.    On June 28,
    2019, RC International was "dissolved by Court Order or by the
    [Secretary of the Commonwealth]."    Although the parties engaged
    in limited discovery in 2019 and early 2020, discovery and
    litigation halted in or around February or March of 2020.    Per
    the case tracking order, the discovery deadline passed on March
    16, 2020, and the summary judgment deadline passed on May 14,
    2020.   Neither party moved to extend the case tracking order or
    other deadlines.   The case remained dormant, in effect, until
    the parties received a notice to appear for a pretrial
    conference to be held on November 15, 2021.
    On November 10, 2021, counsel for RC International filed a
    "Request to Cancel the Nov. 15, 2021 Pre-Trial Conference As No
    Pre-trial Memo Can be Drafted; Alternatively a Request for
    Remote Hearing."   That motion represented as follows:   Robert
    Carrion, the sole and controlling officer of RC International,
    was in the Dominican Republic, subject to ongoing Massachusetts
    criminal proceedings and Federal immigration restrictions, and
    "highly unlikely" to return to the United States; counsel for RC
    International has thus been "unable to obtain any engagement,
    information or instructions regarding [RC International's]
    litigation of this matter and has been unable to prepare a pre-
    trial memo"; and Carrion "has been unable or unwilling to
    communicate with [RC International's] attorney on the matters at
    3
    issue, and under these circumstances [counsel for RC
    International] must serve . . . a Motion to Withdraw."     On
    December 13, 2021, Coliseum filed a motion to dismiss the
    plaintiff's action with prejudice for failure to prosecute under
    Mass. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (2), 
    365 Mass. 803
     (1974).     The next
    day, RC International filed a motion to appoint a receiver.       A
    Superior Court judge scheduled a conference pursuant to Mass. R.
    Civ. P. 16, as amended, 
    466 Mass. 1401
     (2011).4    On December 16,
    2021, following a hearing on both motions, the judge denied the
    motion to appoint a receiver and allowed the motion to dismiss
    without prejudice.
    Discussion.   1.   Appointment of receiver.   RC International
    argues that the judge erred in denying its motion to appoint a
    receiver because a dissolved corporation continues its corporate
    existence and may continue its litigation and wind up its
    business and affairs.   See G. L. c. 156D, §§ 14.05, 14.21.       See
    also G. L. c. 155, § 52.   The claim is unavailing.
    "A receivership is an equitable remedy designed to protect
    and preserve the assets of a corporate debtor for those
    creditors who the court ultimately decides are entitled to them"
    4 Although the record is unclear, it appears that the motion to
    dismiss and the motion to appoint a receiver were discussed at a
    status conference or pretrial conference held in mid-November,
    at which the judge instructed the parties to file their
    respective motions prior to December 16, 2021.
    4
    (citation omitted).   Charlette v. Charlette Bros. Foundry, Inc.,
    
    59 Mass. App. Ct. 34
    , 45 (2003).    "Generally, the appointment of
    a receiver rests in the sound discretion of the court."     Lopez
    v. Medford Community Center, Inc., 
    384 Mass. 163
    , 169 (1981),
    quoting Falmouth Nat'l Bank v. Cape Cod Ship Canal Co., 
    166 Mass. 550
    , 568 (1896).   "It is equally clear, however, that the
    remedy is sparingly invoked.   A decree appointing a receiver
    'can often have irreversible and far-reaching consequences for
    the (entity placed in receivership) and others.    Therefore,
    particular care must be exercised by a judge in order to
    ascertain that facts exist which justify, and in the judge's
    discretion require, the appointment of a temporary or permanent
    receiver.'"   Lopez, supra, quoting George Altman, Inc. v. Vogue
    Internationale, Inc., 
    366 Mass. 176
    , 179 (1974).    See Perez v.
    Boston Hous. Auth., 
    379 Mass. 703
    , 733 (1980) (receivership
    always characterized as remedy of "last resort"); 12 C.A.
    Wright, A.R. Miller, & R.L. Marcus, Federal Practice and
    Procedure § 2983, at 18 (2014) (receiverships under Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 66 are "an extraordinary remedy that should be employed with
    the utmost caution and granted only in cases of clear necessity
    to protect plaintiff's interests in the property").    In
    addition, "receivership is not meant to determine or confer
    liability on the corporation or order payment of debts.     Rather,
    receivership is a prophylactic measure to protect assets, in the
    5
    event that a particular creditor can prove that the corporation
    is liable on a debt" (Emphasis deleted).       Charlette, supra at
    46.
    With these standards in mind, we need not dwell at length
    on the claim.   RC International sought the appointment of a
    receiver for itself.    As discussed, RC International had been
    dissolved and had no active officer, owner, or -- as far as the
    pleadings and record show -- shareholders.       Furthermore, RC
    International represented that a receiver would be needed should
    it somehow ultimately succeed in litigation that had come to a
    halt, and in which RC International, by its own admission, had
    no engagement, information, or instructions to proceed.       RC
    International cites no precedent or authority, from any
    jurisdiction, where a receiver has been appointed in a scenario
    like the present one, much less a case where a judge was found
    to have abused her discretion for failing to appoint a receiver
    in such a situation.    In these circumstances, and on the limited
    record before us, we cannot say that the denial of the motion to
    appoint a receiver was arbitrary, capricious, or fell outside of
    the reasonable range of alternatives.       See L.L. v. Commonwealth,
    
    470 Mass. 169
    , 185 n.27 (2014).       Thus, there was no abuse of
    discretion.
    2.   Dismissal.   RC International also contends that the
    judge abused her discretion by dismissing the first amended
    6
    complaint, without prejudice, for lack of prosecution.   We
    disagree, albeit for reasons somewhat different than those
    relied on by the judge. See Lopes v. Commonwealth, 
    442 Mass. 170
    , 181 (2004), quoting Gabbidon v. King, 
    414 Mass. 685
    , 686
    (1993) ("We may affirm the judgment on 'any ground apparent on
    the record that supports the result reached in the [trial]
    court'").
    As stated above, counsel for RC International was "unable
    to obtain any engagement, information or instructions regarding
    [RC International's] litigation of this matter and has been
    unable to prepare a pre-trial memo," and could not proceed in
    the litigation without the appointment of a receiver.5   Having
    represented to the judge that without the appointment of a
    receiver it could not even file a pretrial conference report,
    much less answer ready for trial or proceed with the litigation,
    RC International violated Mass. R. Civ. P. 16 as well as the
    judge's order.6   See Mass. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (2) ("On motion of
    5 Asked at oral argument why it did not refile its complaint
    where the dismissal of the case was without prejudice, counsel
    for RC International responded, in essence, that even assuming
    RC International could somehow renew the litigation, it would
    ultimately need the appointment of a receiver to pursue and
    successfully conclude the litigation.
    6 Although the December 16, 2021, hearing before the judge
    appears to have been scheduled as both a pretrial conference and
    a motion hearing, the docket and record before us are somewhat
    unclear. That notwithstanding, it is undisputed that in
    response to the judge's pretrial orders, counsel for RC
    7
    the defendant, with notice, the court may, in its discretion,
    dismiss any action for failure of the plaintiff . . . to comply
    with these rules or any order of court").       Contrast Dewing v.
    J.B. Driscoll Ins. Agency, 
    30 Mass. App. Ct. 467
    , 471 (1991) ("A
    plaintiff who has completed all the discovery . . . who
    manifests an intention to go to trial, and who is merely
    awaiting the scheduling of a trial date . . . need do no more
    and, indeed, as a practical matter can do no more, to accelerate
    the case for trial").
    In addition, where the judge did not abuse her discretion
    in denying the motion to appoint a receiver, we likewise cannot
    say that she abused her discretion in dismissing the case
    without prejudice in light of RC International's representations
    that it could not otherwise proceed.      See Mass. R. Civ. P. 41
    (b) (2).   In these circumstances, the decision of the Superior
    Court judge "did not rest on whimsy, caprice, or arbitrary or
    idiosyncratic notions."   Bucchiere v. New England Tel. & Tel.
    Co., 
    396 Mass. 639
    , 642 (1986).       Thus, under the unique facts
    International represented that it was unable to move forward
    without the appointment of a receiver, had no "engagement,
    information or instructions" regarding the litigation, was
    unable to prepare a pretrial memorandum, and could not comply
    with Mass. R. Civ. P. 16. Even assuming, arguendo, that there
    was no violation of rule 16, the judge did not err in dismissing
    the case for the reasons further stated herein.
    8
    and posture of this case, and on the limited record before us,
    we discern no error or abuse of discretion.
    Judgment affirmed.
    By the Court (Neyman, Shin &
    Hodgens, JJ.7),
    Clerk
    Entered:    February 23, 2023.
    7   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
    9