Kayla St. George v. Stewart Burlingame. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-136
KAYLA ST. GEORGE
vs.
STEWART BURLINGAME.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The mother appeals from an October 29, 2021, modification
judgment issued by a judge of the Probate and Family Court
insofar as the judge denied her request for joint legal custody
of the parties' minor child. We affirm.
Background. We summarize the facts as the judge found
them, supplemented by undisputed evidence from the trial,
reserving certain facts for later discussion. See Pierce v.
Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 288 (2009). The parties were never
married and have one child together, born May 7, 2014. A
judgment entered in November 2016 granting the father sole legal
and physical custody of the child and allowing the mother
supervised visits with her.1 The mother had a history of
1 The father has since married and has another child from that
marriage; the mother has another child of whom she has custody.
substance use, but by 2018 the mother was free of illegal drugs,2
had obtained an apartment, and was working. On March 12, 2018,
the parties entered a stipulated judgment (2018 judgment)
granting the mother a dinner visit one night per week, and a
visit on Saturday from 5 P.M. to 7 P.M. The stipulation also
contained provisions for holidays.
The mother maintained her sobriety, apartment, and job.
She also successfully completed a drug court program through the
District Court.3 Accordingly, in September 2018 the parties
reached an informal, verbal agreement that increased the
mother's parenting time to two dinners per week and visits every
other weekend. In July 2020, an incident at the child's
gymnastics recital led the father to rescind the informal
The father, his wife, and child live with the paternal
grandmother.
2 The mother was prescribed suboxone and held a medical marijuana
card. The clinical supervisor of the program who oversaw the
mother's suboxone use testified that the mother had been
undergoing drug testing through her program since at least 2017
and had consistently tested negative for illicit drugs. She was
aware that the mother sometimes used marijuana. The mother
testified that she used marijuana products to manage stress.
The mother's clinical supervisor testified that she had never
seen the mother "sedated or impaired," but based on a lack of
adequate clinical research on potential interactions between
marijuana and suboxone, could not testify about the risk, if
any, associated with the overlapping use of those drugs.
3 At trial, the mother introduced a letter of support from the
presiding justice of the drug court in which she participated.
In his letter, the judge noted that the mother not only
completed the program but acted as a mentor and role model for
other participants.
2
agreement. The mother, who understood that the gymnastics
facility's COVID-19 protocols limited the child to a single
guest at the facility itself, was watching the event via Zoom
when she saw not only the father, but also the father's wife and
mother in physical attendance at the event. In response, the
mother became disproportionately angry, and immediately drove
from her home to the gymnastics facility. As the children and
parents were escorted to the facility's lobby at the conclusion
of the event, there was an altercation between the mother and
the family group, including the father. According to a staff
member credited by the judge, the mother yelled aggressively,
flailed her arms, and called the father a "scumbag." The
confrontation continued in the parking lot, where the mother
blocked the father's car in with her car, got out, and began
"screaming and swearing" at the father, drawing the attention of
other children and their guests. The mother subsequently
"screeched" out of the parking lot. The incident left the child
in tears. The following day, the father had a no-trespass order
served on the mother.4
In August 2020, the mother filed a complaint for
modification of the 2018 judgment; on September 17, 2020, she
4 At some point prior to trial in April 2022, however, once the
mother "had calmed down," the informal arrangement made in
September 2018 was reinstated by the father.
3
filed the amended complaint for modification at issue in this
appeal (amended complaint). In the mother's amended complaint,
she sought joint legal and physical custody of the child based
on, among other alleged changes in circumstance, the mother's
graduation from drug court and continued sobriety, and the May
2020 closure of a pending case brought by the Department of
Children and Families (DCF) involving the mother and child. The
trial was held over three days on October 4, 5, and 18, 2021,
where the judge heard from six witnesses.
Based on the trial evidence, the judge concluded that,
while the mother had "taken positive steps" by obtaining work
and an apartment, and in maintaining her sobriety, she did not
recognize the impact of her earlier failures to do so on the
child. Additionally, the judge concluded that the parents'
continued inability to communicate directly about the child and
the mother's "lack of impulse control," as highlighted by her
conduct at the gymnastics event, indicated that she was still
unable to put the child's interests first. Ultimately, the
judge concluded that it was not in the child's best interests to
grant joint custody. The judge did, however, acknowledge the
mother's progress by formalizing the portion of the parties'
2018 verbal agreement that provided the mother with expanded
parenting time.
4
The mother appeals from the posttrial judgment. As we
explain, we do not agree that the judge committed any reversible
error.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. To obtain a custody
modification, the requesting party "must first establish that a
material and substantial change in circumstance has occurred to
warrant a change in custody, and that the change is in the
child's best interests." E.K. v. S.C., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 403,
408 (2020).
"When determining . . . modifications of custody awards
based on changed circumstances, the guiding principle
always has been the best interests of the children. . . .
The decision of which parent will promote a child's best
interests is a subject peculiarly within the discretion of
the judge. Discretion allows the judge when determining
the best interests of children, to consider the widest
range of permissible evidence, including the reports and
testimony of a court appointed investigator or [guardian ad
litem], evidence of the history of the relationship between
the child and each parent, evidence of each parent's
present home environment and over-all fitness to further
the child's best interests, and the judge's own impressions
upon interviewing the child privately in chambers"
(quotation omitted).5
Loebel v. Loebel, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 740, 747 (2010), quoting
Ardizoni v. Raymond, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 734, 738 (1996).
"In reviewing a modification judgment, we examine whether
the factual and legal bases for the decision are in error, or
5 In this case, there was no guardian ad litem appointed and the
judge was neither asked to interview the child in chambers nor
did so sua sponte.
5
whether the judge otherwise abused his discretion." Flor v.
Flor, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 363 (2017). "Findings of fact
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of
the credibility of the witnesses" (citation omitted). J.S. v.
C.C. 454 Mass. 652, 657 (2009).
2. Child's best interests. The mother argues that the
judge erred in denying her amended complaint insofar as he
denied joint custody. In our assessment of the record as a
whole, there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's
conclusion. We recognize, as did the judge, that at the time of
trial, the mother had been sober6 for approximately six years,
was working, and had an apartment. We assume that the judge
concluded that the mother's continued success in recovery for
the three years between the 2018 judgment and her complaint for
modification was a "change in circumstances" for the purposes of
the mother's request. Even so, there was no abuse of discretion
in the judge's refusal to grant joint custody of the child to
the mother where the judge found that at the time of trial, (1)
the parents remained unable to get along and (2) as a result,
joint custody was not then in the child's best interests. See
6 We are aware that the mother used suboxone and marijuana while
in recovery, but as nothing suggests that mother ever abused
either of those drugs, we consider it appropriate to refer to
the mother as "sober."
6
Smith v. McDonald, 458 Mass. 540, 547 (2010) (trial judge has
"considerable freedom to identify pertinent factors in assessing
the welfare of the child and weigh them as [he or] she sees
fit"). We are not persuaded that the judge's conclusion was the
result of unfair bias against the mother, or that to the extent
the judge erred in his findings, that the errors required
reversal.
The judge's determination that the parents could not
"communicate and plan with each other concerning the child's
best interests," G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (a), was amply supported by
the evidence. We consider this aspect of the judge's decision
with particular care, aware that there was evidence (which the
judge did not specifically discredit) to support the conclusion
that the father bore at least some responsibility for the
parties' history of poor communications. At trial, there was
evidence before the judge that the parenting time exchanges took
place not at the parties' homes, but at the Charlton police
station, and that the parties relied almost exclusively on the
paternal grandmother and the father's wife to communicate with
each other about even routine matters. These facts, coupled
with the evidence described above about the public incident at
the child's gymnastics event, supported the judge's decision.
See Mason v. Coleman, 447 Mass. 177, 182 (2006) (joint custody
appropriate "only if the parties demonstrate an ability and
7
desire to cooperate amicably and communicate with one another to
raise the children"). Additionally, where the mother's
testimony about the event diverged sharply in all important
details from the evidence the judge credited, the judge's
findings include his implicit conclusion that the mother either
lied about her conduct or was unable to perceive the events of
that day accurately. Although we are mindful that a single
instance of the mother's poor judgment -- even a dramatic one --
might not be dispositive of whether joint custody would be in
the child's best interests, a judgment granting joint custody
requires an affirmative finding of the parties' ability "to
communicate and cooperate concerning major decisions affecting
[the child]." In re Odette, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 905 (2004),
citing G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (a). To be successful, such an
arrangement requires not only both parents' interest in doing
what is best for the child -- and here, there is no question but
that both parents want what is best for their child -- but also
the ability to work together in an amicable way to achieve that
goal, even when there is conflict or a parent's patience is
tried. See Mason, 447 Mass. at 182. In the circumstances of
this case, we cannot say that the judge abused his discretion in
concluding that the mother had failed to carry her burden on the
issue.
8
To the extent that the mother takes issue with the judge's
rationale, her challenges are primarily to the judge's
assessments of the weight and credibility of the evidence,
assessments to which we defer. See J.S., 454 Mass. at 656 ("The
determination of which parent will promote a child's best
interests rests within the discretion of the [trial] judge"
[citation omitted]). "Absent clear error, we will not
substitute our weighing of the evidence for that of a trial
judge who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and form
conclusions about their credibility, even if our weighing of the
evidence might have differed from that of the judge." A.H. v.
M.P., 447 Mass. 828, 838 (2006).
Although the mother challenges a handful of the judge's
factual findings as clearly erroneous, to the extent we agree,
we conclude that the errors were not significant to the judge's
decision. Notably, while we agree that the evidence at trial
was that the mother consumed marijuana "gumm[ies]," and did not
"smok[e]" it, as the judge found, and that another witness, and
not the paternal grandmother, testified that the mother yelled
during the gymnastics incident, the judge's decision did not
turn on the erroneous details. The judge's findings that the
mother used marijuana products for stress and that the mother
yelled in a way that visibly upset the child were not clearly
erroneous and to the extent the judge relied on them, his doing
9
so was not improper. We are not persuaded that reversal is
required in these circumstances.7 See Care & Protection of Olga,
57 Mass. App. Ct. 821, 825 (2003) (decision affirmed where
erroneous findings not central to ultimate conclusion).
Our conclusion that the judge did not abuse his discretion
does not undermine our recognition of the significant strides
the mother has made in recovery, the amount of hard work the
mother has devoted to her recovery, her love for her child, and
the importance of her progress in recovery to the continuing
relationship between the mother and the child. Nor does our
current determination, or that of the trial judge, preclude the
possibility of shared custody in the future, should
communication between the parties improve.
3. Evidentiary rulings. a. Text messages. On the first
day of trial, the mother's counsel proffered as a trial exhibit
a series of text messages between the mother and others,
including the paternal grandmother. The father's counsel
7 Although on the bare transcript, the basis for the judge's
finding that the mother treats the father and his family with
"disdain" is not immediately apparent, we recognize that the
trial judge not only heard the testimony of the witnesses, but
also saw their demeanor and interaction during the trial. He
thus "had the unrivaled benefit of observing the parties at
close hand, with the commensurate ability to evaluate their
credibility, in light not only of their testimony but also of
their demeanor in court." Ginsberg v. Blacker, 67 Mass. App.
Ct. 139, 147-148 (2006). In any event, we discern no clear
error in this finding.
10
objected on the grounds that, contrary to the judge's order that
the parties disclose their exhibits several days in advance of
trial, the mother had not disclosed the texts -- which numbered
in "[the] hundreds" -- until 6:30 P.M. on the previous day.
Counsel for the mother conceded that she was in possession of
the text messages at issue prior to trial but did not disclose
them to opposing counsel because she had been occupied by
overlapping family matters, one of which she characterized as
"an emergency." The judge explained that, in keeping with his
pretrial order from April 29, 2021, he would not admit any
exhibits that had not been marked and exchanged prior to trial.8
Given the mother's failure to comply with the pretrial order,
the judge was within his discretion in ruling that the text
messages could not be used for substantive purposes. See Kace
v. Liang, 472 Mass. 630, 637 (2015) (recognizing judge's "broad
discretion" to admit or exclude evidence "the proponent has not
given proper notice of" [quotation and citation omitted]).
The judge did permit the mother's counsel to use the text
messages to refresh witness recollection during the trial, and
she did so when the paternal grandmother testified that she had
8 The father's attorney consented to certain text messages being
entered as exhibits. Additionally, the judge permitted the
mother to use the text messages for the nonsubstantive purpose
of refreshing the paternal grandmother's recollection, which she
did.
11
no present memory of sending messages to the mother suggesting
that she would help the mother obtain custody of the child.
When some of those attempts to refresh the witness's memory
failed, the mother's attorney sought to use the text messages to
impeach the witness. The father's counsel objected on the
grounds that the paternal grandmother had been called as a
witness by the mother, and "she can't impeach her own witness."
The judge sustained the objection.
While the judge was incorrect in stating that the mother
could not impeach her own witness, see Mass. G. Evid. §§ 607
& 613 (a) (1) (2022), the error was not a basis for reversal
because the mother was not prejudiced by it here. G. L. c. 231,
§ 119. This is because, the challenged ruling notwithstanding,
the paternal grandmother was impeached with the text messages.
The paternal grandmother initially denied that she "had [ever
had] a conversation with [the father] about [the] mother getting
custody." Mother's counsel then presented her with text
messages between herself and the mother; in response, the
paternal grandmother recanted her denial by admitting, "I may
have said that to him more than one time out of anger. . . .
More than one time out of anger, I'm sure." The statement came
in without objection. Where the judge heard the witness
acknowledge the prior inconsistent statement and the mother's
counsel stressed the discrepancy, we are satisfied that the
12
mother was not prejudiced by the erroneous ruling. See
Commonwealth v. Martin, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 120 (1984)
(failure to instruct on impeachment by prior inconsistent
statements harmless where defense counsel thoroughly brought
fact-finder's attention to inconsistencies).9
We discern no error in the judge's refusal to categorize
the paternal grandmother as a hostile witness during the
mother's examination. "The 'decision whether to allow leading
questions [is] left for the most part to the wisdom and
discretion of the trial judge.'" Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455
Mass. 307, 326 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Flynn, 362 Mass.
455, 467 (1972). Although a parent's bias in favor of his or
her own child -- here, the father -- could be of concern in a
modification trial, that assessment was for the trial judge to
make. We are satisfied that the judge was within his discretion
in refusing to label the paternal grandmother as adverse
considering her generally neutral testimony.10
9 There was no abuse of discretion in the judge's rulings on
mother's offers of proof in light of the foregoing discussion,
because an offer of proof is not necessary where the context is
clear. See Commonwealth v. Donovan, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 83, 88
(1983). Even if it were error, there is no prejudice based on
both the level of context clear to us from the record and the
apparent limited impact of the paternal grandmother's
impeachment.
10 The mother urges us to liken the facts of this case to those
in Commonwealth v. Bates, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 1117 (2018), an
unpublished decision pursuant to our former rule 1:28, wherein
we affirmed a judge's decision to label a witness hostile where
13
4. Duration of trial. The mother further argues that the
judge imposed unfair time limits on the trial by forcing her to
rest her case once all properly-summonsed witnesses had
testified and incorrectly denying her motions for issuance of
witness subpoenas on the last day of trial. Neither part of
this argument is persuasive. The judge repeatedly warned the
attorneys that they should finish their cases within the
scheduled trial dates to avoid a serious scheduling delay, but
did not foreclose the possibility of scheduling additional trial
days if necessary.11 Early in the trial, the mother's counsel
indicated her intention to call the mother's probation officer
and a sitting District Court judge as trial witnesses; she did
not, however, take the necessary steps to summons or subpoena
the witness provided evasive answers and claimed a lack of
memory. Notwithstanding the lack of precedential authority of
that decision, it is readily distinguishable. There, we
approved of the judge's determination based on the witness's
"demeanor, . . . testimony [that day,] and the background in
[the] case [of which the judge was] aware," not just the content
of the witness's responses. Id. Nothing in the record here
suggests that the paternal grandmother's demeanor or background
indicated that she was hostile to the mother.
11 On the first day of trial, the judge warned the attorneys:
"Attorneys, this case from what I've seen so far should have
been tried in less than a day. You've got two. Finish in two.
If you don't, I can't even tell you what the next date you'll
get is. My trial dates are far out. Plan accordingly." On the
second day of trial, the mother's attorney told the judge she
would probably not finish that day, and the judge warned her
that the next trial date would not be for about six months.
14
either one of them.12 Instead, on the final day of trial, she
moved for process to bring the probation officer and judge in
for a date to be scheduled in the future. Where the mother's
counsel put forward no reason for her delay in attempting to
bring the additional witnesses into court, and where the judge
reasonably concluded that allowance of the mother's motions
attempting to do so would have created an unreasonable delay in
the trial, the judge was within his discretion in denying the
motions.13 See Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Assocs., 50 Mass. App.
Ct. 480, 485 (2000) (noting "extensive discretion of trial
judges with respect to both the process of discovery and the
admission of evidence"); Clark v. Clark, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 737,
746 (1999) ("once time limits have been set it becomes the
obligation of the judge to ensure that the trial marches forward
without the parties engaging in repetitious and irrelevant
examination"). Even if the mother had followed a timely process
to have the subpoenas issued, the judge would not have abused
his discretion in denying the request, because so far as the
record shows, the judge's and probation officer's testimony
12 A subpoena to compel a judge or probation officer of the trial
court to testify must be accompanied by a court order approving
the subpoena. See Rule 1 of the Uniform Rules on Subpoenas to
Court Officials, Rule IX of the Rules of the Trial Court.
13 We are unpersuaded by mother's citation to Commonwealth v.
Conley, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 50, 62 (1993), where problems arose
"through no fault of counsel," and the defendant asked only to
recess ten minutes early to adjourn for the next scheduled day.
15
would have been merely cumulative of the information contained
in the judge's letter of support introduced as exhibit 7 at
trial.
The judge imposed no restrictions on the parties' ability
to call witnesses -- other than to follow the proper procedures
for doing so -- and did not impose time limits on the
examination of any witness. "A judge, as the guiding spirit and
controlling mind of the trial, should be able to set reasonable
limits on the length of a trial." Clark, 47 Mass. App. Ct. at
746.
To the extent that the mother raises other challenges to
the judge's evidentiary rulings, they do not rise to the level
of appellate argument, and we do not address them. See Mass. R.
A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).
Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that
there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of joint custody.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Sullivan,
Hand & Walsh, JJ.14),
Clerk
Entered: March 3, 2023.
14 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
16