Commonwealth v. Torres ( 2023 )

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22-P-389 Appeals Court
COMMONWEALTH vs. EDDIE TORRES.
No. 22-P-389.
Franklin. November 7, 2022. – March 6, 2023.
Present: Massing, Singh, & Hershfang, JJ.
Controlled Substances. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Plain
view, Probable cause. Probable Cause. Constitutional Law,
Probable cause, Search and seizure. Practice, Criminal,
Motion to suppress.
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on December 20, 2019.
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Francis
E. Flannery, J.
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory
appeal was allowed by Delila Argaez Wendlandt, J., in the
Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal
was reported by her to the Appeals Court.
Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
Esther J. Horwich for the defendant.
SINGH, J. The question presented by this appeal is whether
a State trooper's plain view observation of a used "crack" pipe
2
in a motor vehicle provides probable cause for a warrantless
search of the entire vehicle for contraband drugs. Concluding
that it does, we reverse the order of the Superior Court judge
suppressing evidence of drugs found in a vehicle in which the
defendant was traveling as a back seat passenger.1
Background. "We present the facts as found by the motion
judge, supplemented by uncontroverted facts from the record that
have been 'explicitly or implicitly credited' by the motion
judge."2 Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. 34, 35 (2020),
quoting Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431
(2015).
In the early morning hours of September 5, 2019,
Massachusetts State Police Troopers Michael Leslie and Benjamin
Poirier were traveling north on Interstate 91 near Bernardston
in a marked police cruiser. At about 3:23 A.M., they observed a
sedan cross over the rumble strip near exit 50A (then known as
1 The defendant is charged with trafficking in ten grams or
more of fentanyl, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (c 1/2); trafficking in
thirty-six grams or more, but less than one hundred grams, of
cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b) (2); and conspiracy to violate
drug laws, G. L. c. 94C, § 40. Following an evidentiary
hearing, a Superior Court judge allowed the defendant's pretrial
motion to suppress the narcotics. A single justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court allowed the Commonwealth's application
for interlocutory appeal and referred the matter to this court.
2 The judge explicitly found the testimony of both troopers,
who testified on behalf of the Commonwealth at the suppression
hearing, to be "entirely credible."
3
exit 28A) into a prohibited travel area. When they ran a check
of the vehicle's license plate number, the troopers learned that
the registered owner of the vehicle had a suspended Vermont
driver's license. The troopers maneuvered their cruiser behind
the vehicle and activated the cruiser's blue lights to initiate
a traffic stop; the vehicle pulled over without incident. As
they were coming to a stop in the breakdown lane, Trooper Leslie
observed the defendant, a back seat passenger, through the
vehicle's rear window: the defendant sat up, as if he had just
been lying down, looked out the back window toward the cruiser,
and then ducked down again. Trooper Leslie recognized him.
Trooper Leslie approached the vehicle on the driver's side,
while Trooper Poirier approached on the passenger's side. The
vehicle contained three occupants: the driver, the front seat
passenger, and the defendant. When he approached the vehicle,
Trooper Poirier observed that the defendant was not wearing a
seatbelt, prompting the trooper to ask the defendant for his
identification. The defendant refused this request.
Meanwhile, after identifying the driver as the registered
owner of the vehicle, Trooper Leslie ordered him out of the
vehicle to arrest him for driving with a suspended license. As
4
the driver stepped out, Trooper Leslie observed a "used crack
pipe" on the floor board near the driver's left leg.3
Trooper Leslie proceeded to handcuff the driver and place
him in the back seat of a cruiser. After providing the driver
with his Miranda rights, Trooper Leslie asked him for the
defendant's name. The driver responded that the defendant's
name was "Troy." Trooper Leslie had dealt with the defendant
before, and although he could not recall the defendant's name at
the time, he knew that the provided name was false.4 Trooper
Leslie next asked the driver if there was anything illegal or of
substantial value in the vehicle; the driver stated that there
were no drugs in the vehicle.
Following Trooper Leslie's discovery of the used crack
pipe, the defendant and front seat passenger were removed from
the vehicle and detained so the vehicle could be searched.
3 Trooper Leslie testified that the crack pipe was "a glass
hollow tube with burnt Brillo on the end, and [it was] charred
like a black char around the end." Based on his training and
experience, Trooper Leslie was familiar with the appearance of
crack pipes and knew how they were used. He also had previously
seized crack pipes and crack cocaine during his tenure in law
enforcement.
4 The judge found that "by this point[, Trooper Leslie]
recalled the defendant from a prior drug arrest." The defendant
contends that the evidence was to the contrary, i.e., that
Trooper Leslie did not recall the context of his earlier
interaction with the defendant until after the defendant was
already detained. We need not decide whether the judge's
finding as to this point is clearly erroneous, because we do not
consider it in our calculus.
5
During the search, the troopers discovered a large quantity of
heroin, cocaine, and fentanyl in the area where the defendant
had been sitting in the back seat.
Discussion. "In reviewing a decision on a motion to
suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact
absent clear error but conduct an independent review of [his]
ultimate findings and conclusions of law" (citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Rosario-Santiago, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 171
(2019). "The Commonwealth bears the burden of demonstrating
that the actions of the police officers were within
constitutional limits." Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231,
234 (2017).
"Under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights, warrantless searches 'are per se unreasonable -- subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions'" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Dame, 473
Mass. 524, 536, cert. denied, 580 U.S. 857 (2016). One of those
is the automobile exception. Id. "Due to the inherent mobility
of an automobile, and the owner's reduced expectation of privacy
when stopped on a public road, police are permitted to search a
vehicle based upon probable cause to believe that it contains
evidence of a crime." Commonwealth v. Davis, 481 Mass. 210, 220
(2019). The question we therefore consider here is "whether the
6
police, prior to the commencement of [the] warrantless search,
had probable cause to believe that they would find the
instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime in
the vehicle" (citation omitted). Id."Probable cause exists when 'the facts and circumstances
within the officer's knowledge at the time of making the search
. . . were sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in
believing' that a location contained evidence or contraband"
(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 792
(2012). "In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the very name
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical;
they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act" (citation omitted). Id. at 794. The probable cause
inquiry is "not a high bar" (citation omitted), Commonwealth v.
Guastucci, 486 Mass. 22, 26 (2020), and "does not require a
showing that evidence more likely than not will be found"
(citation omitted), Commonwealth v. Diaz-Arias, 98 Mass. App.
Ct. 504, 508 (2020).
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant's motion to
suppress should have been denied because Trooper Leslie's
observation of a used crack pipe on the floor board of the
vehicle established probable cause to search for further
evidence of a crime. The defendant counters that both the
7
seizure of the crack pipe and the subsequent warrantless search
of the vehicle were unlawful because possession of a crack pipe
is not illegal, and its presence did not justify a search for
contraband. We address each issue in turn.
1. Seizure of the crack pipe. "Under [the plain view]
doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they
view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately
apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to
the object, they may seize it without a warrant." Commonwealth
v. Perkins, 465 Mass. 600, 603-604 (2013), quoting Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). The plain view doctrine
applies under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
where police come across the object inadvertently. Perkins,
supra at 604.
Here, Trooper Leslie inadvertently observed the crack pipe
in plain view as the driver stepped out of the vehicle following
a lawful exit order. Based on his training and experience,
Trooper Leslie believed that the crack pipe, which was charred
and had burnt Brillo on the end, had been used. While the
possession of drug paraphernalia such as a crack pipe is not, in
and of itself, a crime,5 see G. L. c. 94C, § 32I, a reasonable
5 The parties do not dispute that a crack pipe fits within
the definition of "drug paraphernalia" under G. L. c. 94C, § 1.
8
officer could infer that the used crack pipe was intended to be,
and had been, used to smoke crack cocaine,6 any amount of which
is illegal to possess. See G. L. c. 94C, §§ 31, 34. It was
apparent then that the pipe was an instrumentality of crime.
See Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 694 (2010) ("In the
case of contraband and fruits and instrumentalities of crime,
the nexus to criminal activity is obvious" [citation omitted]).
It follows, as found by the motion judge, that "there was
probable cause to associate [the pipe] with criminal activity"
and its seizure was justified. See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 34
Mass. App. Ct. 645, 650 (1993) ("If there is some characteristic
of the particular baggie observed in plain view that indicates
that it is being used for an unlawful purpose, that fact alone
may be enough to justify seizure").
2. Search of the vehicle. We next consider whether
Trooper Leslie's discovery of the used crack pipe on the
6 On appeal, the defendant suggests that the crack pipe
could have been used to smoke legal substances. This argument
was not raised below, nor was there any evidence adduced at the
suppression hearing that the item seized had any lawful purpose.
Indeed, the judge made a finding, crediting the trooper's
testimony (based on his training and experience), that the
seized item was a used crack pipe. In any event, "[i]nnocent
explanations . . . do not vitiate the existence of probable
cause where there is a reasonable probability that criminal
activity is afoot." Commonwealth v. Wallace, 22 Mass. App. Ct.
247, 250 (1986). See Diaz-Arias, 98 Mass. App. Ct. at 510
("While one might imagine an innocent explanation for the
observed behavior, one does not have to indulge the innocent
explanations in evaluating probable cause").
9
floorboard in the driver's area furnished probable cause to
search the vehicle for additional evidence or contraband.
An officer's mere observation of a benign object often
associated with drug use or distribution generally will not
supply probable cause to search. See Garcia, 34 Mass. App. Ct.
at 650-652. A crack pipe, however, falls squarely outside this
class of objects, as it is primarily used for an illegal
purpose: smoking crack cocaine.7 This distinguishes it from
other items that have lawful applications but may also be -- or
used in close connection with -- contraband in other
circumstances. Cf. Commonwealth v. Landry, 438 Mass. 206, 210-
211 (2002) (hypodermic needle); Commonwealth v. Couture, 407
Mass. 178, 180-181, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951 (1990) (handgun);
Commonwealth v. Toole, 389 Mass. 159, 163 (1983) (empty gun
holster and ammunition); Garcia, supra (glassine baggie).
The defendant argues, as the motion judge found here, that
because there was no additional evidence suggesting that drugs
were in the vehicle, such as "some perceptible amount of crack
7 We have recognized that "although something may, in fact,
be perfectly innocent or legal it may, depending on the
circumstances, still establish reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to believe that a crime has been, will be, or is being
committed." Commonwealth v. Locke, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 497, 505
n.11 (2016).
10
cocaine"8 or signs of recent use, the presence of the used crack
pipe did not give rise to probable cause. In support of this
claim, the defendant points us to decisions from Massachusetts
and other jurisdictions where at least one of these factors was
present. But "[t]he issue is not the comparative strength of
the evidence [to other like cases], but whether the evidence
here was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause."
Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. 569, 576 (2002). We conclude
that it was.
Here, prior to the search of the vehicle, Trooper Leslie
and Trooper Poirier had probable cause to believe that a crime
had been committed (possession of crack cocaine) and that
evidence of that crime would be found in the vehicle. The most
reasonable inference on this record is that the crack pipe had
been used to smoke crack cocaine. The crack pipe's location in
the vehicle, on the floor board near the foot of the driver and
registered owner, also established a sufficient nexus between
8 The judge determined that the evidence did not permit him
to make an inference that the crack pipe contained any
contraband drugs. Although there was no explicit testimony
concerning the presence or absence of drugs or drug residue on
the pipe, the judge credited the description of it as "used"
with "burnt Brillo" and "black char" at one end. Because our
analysis does not turn on it, we need not decide whether the
evidence permitted an inference that the used crack pipe
contained at least a trace amount of crack residue. See Black's
Law Dictionary 1503 (10th ed. 2014) ("residue" is "[s]omething
that is left over after a part is removed or disposed of").
11
the vehicle and this suspected criminal activity. See
Commonwealth v. Ierardi, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 297, 300 (1983)
("When the police discovered cartridges in the pocket of the
defendant's trousers, immediately after his removal from the car
which he owned and had been driving, they could reasonably
believe that a search of the car would reveal a gun"). Cf.
Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 420 Mass. 542, 555 (1995) (no nexus
between cocaine found on passenger's person and automobile
itself). Given a used crack pipe's inherent connection to
criminal activity, Trooper Leslie's observation of the used
crack pipe in plain view on the floor of the vehicle raised a
fair probability that crack cocaine would be found therein. Cf.
Toole, 389 Mass. at 163-164 (empty holster and ammunition did
not establish probable cause that illegal gun was in vehicle).
We disagree with the motion judge's conclusion that an
officer's observation of certain drug paraphernalia, absent some
visible amount of contraband drugs or signs of recent
consumption, cannot supply probable cause to search a vehicle
for illegal drugs. While at least one of these factors is often
present in cases like the one at bar, there is no per se rule
requiring such evidence under our jurisprudence on probable
cause. Rather, our case law suggests that the absence of an
observable amount of contraband drugs is not determinative. See
Gentile, 437 Mass. at 576 (defendant's admission to smoking
12
marijuana previous day and statement that truck contained "pot
pipe" furnished probable cause to search truck for evidence of
marijuana possession). Nor is the absence of evidence
indicating recent use, as demonstrated by our decision in
Commonwealth v. Dolby, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 545, 550-551 (2000).
In Dolby, we held that an officer's plain view observation
of a "bong" containing marijuana residue, within a motor
vehicle, established probable cause to search the vehicle for
additional contraband. Dolby, 50 Mass. App. Ct. at 550-551.
There was no indication in that case that the bong was recently
used. The only material distinguishing factor between the facts
in Dolby and the instant case is the observable drug residue
within the paraphernalia. See id. at 546-547. In assessing
whether there is a reasonable belief that a vehicle contains
evidence of a crime, the inference to be drawn from the presence
of a crack pipe containing visible crack residue is essentially
the same as a crack pipe without such residue that shows other
clear signs of prior use. See id. at 550 (noting significance
of residue in chamber as "indicating prior use").
Moreover, to require particular evidence to be present to
establish probable cause in these circumstances would ignore the
fact that "no two cases are precisely alike," see Commonwealth
v. Rivera, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 44 (1989), and that probable
cause "is 'a fluid concept' that is 'not readily, or even
13
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules,'"9 District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018), quoting Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). Indeed, the "'ultimate
touchstone' of both the Fourth Amendment [to the United States
Constitution] and art. 14 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights] is reasonableness" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v.
Overmyer, 469 Mass. 16, 20 (2014). While "[i]t is unreasonable
for the police to spend time conducting warrantless searches for
contraband when no specific facts suggest criminality," that is
not what took place here (citation omitted). Id. Rather, the
discovery of the used crack pipe in the vehicle was evidence
that a crime had likely occurred.10
Applying the reasonable inferences drawn from Trooper
Leslie's plain view observation of a used crack pipe to the
flexible, commonsense probable cause standard, we conclude that
a reasonable officer would be warranted in believing that
contraband would be found inside the vehicle. Because the
9 The Supreme Judicial Court has resisted the imposition of
a categorical rule stating that one piece of evidence is
essential to a finding of probable cause in a particular
context. See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 426 Mass. 703, 710-711
(1998).
10Further specific facts suggesting criminality include the
defendant popping up in the back seat to look at the police and
then ducking back down, the defendant refusing to provide
identification, and the driver giving a false name for the
defendant.
14
warrantless search of the vehicle was supported by probable
cause, the defendant's motion to suppress should have been
denied.
Order allowing motion to
suppress reversed.