Cape Cod Collaborative v. Director of the Department of Unemployment Assistance ( 2017 )


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    15-P-436                                               Appeals Court
    CAPE COD COLLABORATIVE vs. DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
    UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE & another.1
    No. 15-P-436.
    Barnstable.       January 7, 2016. - May 4, 2017.
    Present:     Hanlon, Sullivan, & Maldonado, JJ.
    Employment Security, Partial unemployment, Eligibility for
    benefits, School bus driver, Judicial review.
    Civil action commenced in the Barnstable Division of the
    District Court Department on April 29, 2013.
    The case was heard by W. James O'Neill, J.
    David A. Guberman, Special Assistant Attorney General, for
    the defendant.
    Kevin F. Bresnahan for the plaintiff.
    MALDONADO, J.        In this case, we consider whether Stephanie
    Hennis, a full-time bus driver for the Cape Cod Collaborative
    1
    Stephanie Hennis.
    2
    (collaborative),2 is entitled to partial unemployment
    compensation benefits for the three days she did not work and
    was not paid during the week ending Saturday, November 24, 2012,
    which included the Thanksgiving recess.     Because we conclude
    that G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(c), does not bar the payment of such
    benefits in the circumstances of this case, we reverse the
    judgment of the Barnstable Division of the District Court
    Department (District Court), which reached a contrary
    conclusion.
    1.   Statutory framework.    We begin with a brief overview of
    the Unemployment Insurance Law, G. L. c. 151A, so as to put the
    underlying facts in context.     The fundamental purpose of the
    statute is to "afford benefits to [individuals] who are out of
    work and unable to secure work through no fault of their own."
    Connolly v. Director of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance, 
    460 Mass. 24
    , 25 (2011), quoting from LeBeau v. Commissioner of the
    Dept. of Employment & Training, 
    422 Mass. 533
    , 538 (1996).        We
    are required to construe G. L. c. 151A "liberally in aid of its
    purpose, which purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls
    2
    The Cape Cod Collaborative is an education collaborative
    established by written agreement among the school committees of
    nineteen school districts on Cape Cod pursuant to G. L. c. 40,
    § 4E. It provides educational programs and services, including
    transportation, to the students of its member school districts.
    The parties have assumed that the collaborative falls within
    G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(d), thus bringing the case within the
    purview of § 28A(a)-(c).
    3
    on the unemployed worker and [her] family."    G. L. c. 151A,
    § 74, as appearing in St. 1990, c. 177, § 340.
    With respect to employees of educational organizations,
    however, the Legislature has carved out certain exceptions to
    the general availability of unemployment compensation benefits.
    As pertinent here, G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(c), as appearing in St.
    1977, c. 720, § 29, provides that, with respect to services
    performed for an educational institution, "benefits shall not be
    paid to any individual on the basis of such services for any
    week commencing during an established and customary vacation
    period or holiday recess if such individual performs such
    services in the period immediately before such vacation period
    or holiday recess, and there is a reasonable assurance that such
    individual will perform such services in the period immediately
    following such vacation period or holiday recess" (emphasis
    added).   A "week" is defined as "seven consecutive days
    beginning on Sunday."    G. L. c. 151A, § 1(t), as appearing in
    St. 1941, c. 685, § 1.
    2.    Factual and procedural background.   The essential facts
    of this case are not in dispute.   Since April 27, 2009, Hennis
    has been employed by the collaborative as a school bus driver,
    transporting students to and from their educational programs.
    She typically works approximately forty-five hours per week, one
    shift in the morning and another shift in the afternoon, from
    4
    Monday through Friday.    Under the terms of Hennis's employment,
    she did not receive holiday pay for time off when school was not
    in session.3   In 2012, Thanksgiving was on Thursday, November 22.
    During that week of Thanksgiving, schools were closed on
    Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.    Consequently, Hennis worked
    only two days, for approximately fifteen hours.    The
    collaborative did not pay her for the remaining three days when
    schools were closed, even though she was ready and available for
    work.    Following the Thanksgiving recess, Hennis resumed her
    regular schedule as a school bus driver for the collaborative.
    Not having been paid for the three days she did not work,
    Hennis filed an application for unemployment compensation
    benefits for the week ending Saturday, November 24, 2012.    The
    Department of Unemployment Assistance (department) approved her
    claim, stating that Hennis was partially unemployed, see G. L.
    c. 151A, § 1(r)(1), and not subject to any statutory
    disqualification where the collaborative was unable to provide
    her a full-time schedule of work for the week ending November
    24, 2012.
    The collaborative appealed the determination and requested
    a hearing before a review examiner, at which its personnel
    3
    The record does not include either Hennis's employment
    contract or the schedule that was given to employees at the
    beginning of the school year setting forth their hours and bus
    routes.
    5
    coordinator asserted that, pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, § 28A,
    employees of the collaborative were precluded from collecting
    unemployment compensation benefits during school vacations and
    any days not included in their contracts.    The review examiner
    affirmed the department's decision, finding that § 28A(c) did
    not preclude Hennis from collecting unemployment compensation
    benefits because she had worked Monday and Tuesday during the
    week ending November 24, 2012, and § 28A(c) bars claims only
    "for any week which begins during a vacation week" (emphasis
    supplied).    See G. L. c. 151A, § 1(t) (defining "Week" as "seven
    consecutive days beginning on Sunday"); G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(c)
    ("[B]enefits shall not be paid to any individual on the basis of
    . . . services for any week commencing during an established and
    customary vacation period or holiday recess" [emphasis
    supplied]).
    Pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, § 1(r)(1), as appearing in St.
    1976, c. 473, § 2, "an individual shall be deemed to be in
    partial unemployment if in any week of less than full-time
    weekly schedule of work [s]he has earned or has received
    aggregate remuneration in an amount which is less than the
    weekly benefit rate to which [s]he would be entitled if totally
    unemployed during said week; provided, however, that certain
    earnings as specified in [G. L. c. 151A, § 29(b),] shall be
    disregarded."   Having determined that Hennis was precluded from
    6
    receiving total unemployment benefits, the review examiner
    considered whether she had experienced a period of partial
    unemployment under the statute.    Given that Hennis's gross
    earnings for this particular week were less than her weekly
    benefit rate plus her disregarded earnings, the review examiner
    determined that Hennis was partially unemployed during that week
    and, therefore, was eligible to receive partial unemployment
    compensation benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, § 29(b).4
    The collaborative appealed the review examiner's decision
    to the department's board of review (board) in accordance with
    G. L. c. 151A, § 40.   The board denied the application for
    further review, thereby rendering the review examiner's decision
    the final decision of the board for purposes of judicial review.
    See G. L. c. 151A, § 41(c).
    The collaborative then filed a complaint for judicial
    review in the District Court.     Relying on G. L. c. 151A,
    § 28A(c), it alleged that, because Hennis performed services for
    the collaborative during the period immediately before the
    Thanksgiving recess, and had a reasonable assurance of
    performing services for the collaborative immediately following
    the Thanksgiving recess, she was not eligible to receive partial
    unemployment compensation benefits for the week ending November
    4
    Hennis's gross earnings for the week ending November 24,
    2012, were $293. Her weekly unemployment compensation benefit
    rate was $358, with disregarded earnings of $119.
    7
    24, 2012.5   In the collaborative's view, the board erred when it
    determined that G. L. c. 151A, § 28A, was not applicable to the
    facts of this case.
    Following a hearing, a judge of the District Court reversed
    the board's decision.    He found that, because the day before and
    after Thanksgiving must be considered a customary vacation
    period or holiday recess, the language of § 28A(c) precluded
    Hennis from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.      The
    judge stated that it should have been clear to Hennis that she
    would not be working over the Thanksgiving recess and,
    consequently, would not be getting paid for those days.
    Further, he continued, any suggestion that § 28A(c) was not
    applicable because the vacation period did not begin on Sunday
    of the relevant week would constitute a tortured interpretation
    of the statute.6    The department filed the present appeal.
    5
    See G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(c), providing in pertinent part:
    "[B]enefits shall not be paid . . . if such individual
    performs such services in the period immediately before
    such vacation period or holiday recess, and there is a
    reasonable assurance that such individual will perform such
    services in the period immediately following such vacation
    period or holiday recess."
    6
    A different judge allowed the department's motion for
    entry of judgment and ordered the entry of a final judgment, but
    none appears on the docket or in the record appendix.
    Nonetheless, it is clear that the parties reasonably considered
    the matter to be final and appealable, so we address the merits.
    See GTE Prods. Corp. v. Stewart, 
    421 Mass. 22
    , 24 n.3 (1995);
    Tech Plus, Inc. v. Ansel, 
    59 Mass. App. Ct. 12
    , 14 n.5 (2003).
    8
    3.   Standard of review.    Our review of the board's decision
    is governed by the standards set out in G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).
    See G. L. c. 151A, § 42.    The board's decision "may only be set
    aside if the court determines that the decision is unsupported
    by substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse
    of discretion, or not in accordance with law."    Coverall N.
    America, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Div. of Unemployment
    Assistance, 
    447 Mass. 852
    , 857 (2006).   We "give due weight to
    the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge
    of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority
    conferred upon it."    G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), as appearing in St.
    1973, c. 1114, § 3.    However, where an agency determination is
    based on a question of law, we review the matter de novo.    See
    Raytheon Co. v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 
    364 Mass. 593
    , 595 (1974).
    4.   Discussion.    The department contends that G. L.
    c. 151A, § 28A(c), does not disqualify Hennis from receiving
    unemployment compensation benefits for the week ending November
    24, 2012, because the week commenced before, not during, the
    Thanksgiving recess.    We agree.
    "It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that
    'statutory language should be given effect consistent with its
    plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless
    to do so would achieve an illogical result.'"    Boston Hous.
    9
    Authy. v. National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 3, 
    458 Mass. 155
    , 162 (2010), quoting from Sullivan v. Brookline, 
    435 Mass. 353
    , 360 (2001).    Although "[t]he duty of statutory
    interpretation is for the courts . . . the details of
    legislative policy, not spelt out in the statute, may
    appropriately be determined, at least in the first instance, by
    an agency charged with administration of the statute."     Cleary
    v. Cardullo's, Inc., 
    347 Mass. 337
    , 344 (1964).     See Attorney
    Gen. v. Commissioner of Ins., 
    450 Mass. 311
    , 319 (2008).      The
    party challenging an agency's interpretation of a statute has
    the burden of proving that such interpretation is unreasonable.
    See 
    ibid.
    The plain meaning of G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(c), precludes the
    payment of benefits for "any week commencing during an
    established and customary vacation period or holiday recess"
    (emphasis supplied).     Hennis sought benefits for the week ending
    Saturday, November 24, 2012.    Given that the week commenced on
    Sunday, November 18, that Hennis worked her regular hours on
    Monday and Tuesday, and that the Thanksgiving recess did not
    start until Wednesday, November 21, she is not precluded from
    receiving unemployment compensation benefits by the exclusion
    set forth in § 28A(c).    Simply put, the week did not commence
    during a holiday recess where such recess did not begin until
    Wednesday.   See, e.g., North Penn Sch. Dist. v. Unemployment
    10
    Compensation Bd. of Review, 
    662 A.2d 1161
    , 1163 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
    1995) (State statute denying unemployment compensation benefits
    for any week which "commences during an established and
    customary vacation period or holiday recess" did not apply to
    school bus drivers who did not work for five days due to Monday
    holiday and snow emergency that closed school for subsequent
    four days because week began on Sunday, which was not vacation
    period).
    Our interpretation of G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(c), is
    consistent with relevant Federal law.   We note that "[a]ll
    federal-state cooperative unemployment insurance programs are
    financed in part by grants from the United States pursuant to
    the Social Security Act, 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 501-503
    .   No grant may be
    made to a State for a fiscal year unless the Secretary of Labor
    certifies the amount to be paid, 
    42 U.S.C. § 502
    (a).   The
    Secretary of Labor may not certify payment of federal funds
    unless [the Secretary] first finds that the State's program
    conforms to federal requirements."   California Dept. of Human
    Resources Dev. v. Java, 
    402 U.S. 121
    , 125 (1971).   See 
    42 U.S.C. § 503
    (a)(1) (2012) (State unemployment compensation law must,
    among other provisions, "insure full payment of unemployment
    compensation when due").   See also 
    26 U.S.C. § 3304
    (a) (2012)
    (listing requirements for State unemployment compensation law
    approval by Secretary of Labor under Federal Unemployment Tax
    11
    Act).   When the Legislature amended G. L. c. 151A in 1977
    (including § 28A[c]), it did so for the purpose of providing
    that "the employment security law of the commonwealth shall
    conform with the federal employment security law."    St. 1977,
    c. 720, preamble.   Consequently, our interpretation of § 28A(c)
    should comport with Federal law, thereby ensuring the ongoing
    payment of Federal funds that underwrite the administration of
    the Massachusetts unemployment compensation system.    Cf. Rosen
    v. Rosen, 
    90 Mass. App. Ct. 677
    , 682-683 & nn.7-9 (2016) (G. L.
    c. 119A, §§ 1 et seq., enacted to maintain eligibility for
    certain Federal grants).
    The language of G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(c), corresponds to 
    26 U.S.C. § 3304
    (a)(6)(A)(iii) (2012), which provides that with
    respect to services for an educational institution,
    "[unemployment] compensation payable on the basis of such
    services shall be denied to any individual for any week which
    commences during an established and customary vacation period or
    holiday recess if such individual performs such services in the
    period immediately before such vacation period or holiday
    recess, and there is a reasonable assurance that such individual
    will perform such services in the period immediately following
    such vacation period or holiday recess" (emphasis added).     In
    response to an inquiry from the department, the State Conformity
    12
    and Compliance Team of the United States Department of Labor
    opined that
    "Federal law only permits the denial of a week[] which
    commences during an established and customary vacation
    period. Benefits cannot be denied under the holiday
    provision unless the week of unemployment commences during
    the holiday recess.
    "If a Thanksgiving vacation began on a Thursday and
    continued through the following Tuesday, the holiday denial
    would not be applicable to the week that included the first
    two days of the vacation (since that week commenced on the
    Sunday prior to the vacation period, rather than during the
    vacation period)."7
    This interpretation of Federal law is persuasive and supports
    our construction of § 28A(c), particularly where the Legislature
    specifically sought to conform the Massachusetts unemployment
    compensation law to Federal law.   See generally Skidmore v.
    Swift & Co., 
    323 U.S. 134
    , 140 (1944) ("rulings, interpretations
    and opinions of the [responsible agency have] . . . power to
    persuade, if lacking power to control"); School Comm. of
    Wellesley v. Labor Relations Commn., 
    376 Mass. 112
    , 116 (1978).
    7
    This informal opinion from the State Conformity and
    Compliance Team is consistent with a response issued by the
    Employment and Training Administration of the United States
    Department of Labor to a question regarding "Draft Language and
    Commentary to Implement the Unemployment Compensation Amendments
    of 1976, P.L. 94-566," 
    90 Stat. 2667
     (1976). In its response,
    the Department of Labor explained that a statutory provision
    denying benefits to school employees during a vacation period or
    holiday recess could not be applied with respect to a week that
    included a vacation or holiday, but did not begin during a
    vacation or holiday.
    13
    Given the clear and unambiguous language in other
    provisions of G. L. c. 151A, § 28A, the Legislature has
    determined that the unemployment compensation law is not
    intended to provide benefits for employees during a school
    vacation "week" beginning on a Sunday if there is a reasonable
    assurance of reemployment once the vacation period is over.
    Compare G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(b), as appearing in St. 1977,
    c. 720, § 29 (with respect to services performed for educational
    institution, "benefits shall not be paid on the basis of such
    services to any individual for any week commencing during a
    period between two successive academic years or terms if such
    individual performs such services in the first of such academic
    years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance that such
    individual will perform such services in the second of such
    academic years or terms").    However, it is also apparent from
    the plain language of § 28A(c) that the Legislature did not
    intend to prohibit the payment of unemployment compensation
    benefits to individuals such as Hennis, who experience a period
    of partial unemployment during a vacation period that covers
    only a portion of a "week," where the "week" did not commence
    during the vacation recess.   The Legislature has balanced
    competing concerns, and carved out a clear policy that comports
    with a Federal mandate.   Benefits are not provided for school
    vacations that cover a complete week as defined in the statute.
    14
    Other periods of partial unemployment may be covered, depending
    on the circumstances, as set forth in § 28A(c).8
    We are required to construe § 28A(c) liberally, G. L.
    c. 151A, § 74, and are mindful of the fact that the fundamental
    purpose of G. L. c. 151A is "to provide temporary relief for
    those who are realistically compelled to leave work through no
    'fault' of their own, whatever the source of the compulsion,
    personal or employer-initiated."   Raytheon Co. v. Director of
    the Div. of Employment Security, 
    364 Mass. at 596
    .   Accordingly,
    8
    The collaborative argues for the first time on appeal that
    Mattapoisett v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 
    392 Mass. 546
    , 548-549 (1984), precludes Hennis's claim for benefits
    because she was not in "partial unemployment" under G. L.
    c. 151A, § 1(r)(1), during the week ending November 24, 2012.
    Because the collaborative did not raise this argument before the
    administrative agency, it is waived on appeal. See Rivas v.
    Chelsea Hous. Authy., 
    464 Mass. 329
    , 336 (2013); Lincoln
    Pharmacy of Milford, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Div. of
    Unemployment Assistance, 
    74 Mass. App. Ct. 428
    , 436 (2009).
    Even if we were to consider the collaborative's argument, we are
    not persuaded that Mattapoisett is applicable to the present
    case. There, the court concluded that "the Legislature did not
    intend a part-time [police officer] whose hours vary from week
    to week to be considered in partial unemployment for any week in
    which he does not work as many hours as a full-time employee."
    Mattapoisett, supra at 549. Here, Hennis is a full-time bus
    driver whose eligibility for benefits during the Thanksgiving
    holiday is governed by a statutory provision applying to
    employees of educational institutions. Construing the pertinent
    provisions of G. L. c. 151A, as a harmonious whole, see
    Commissioners of the Bristol County Mosquito Control Dist. v.
    State Reclamation & Mosquito Control Bd., 
    466 Mass. 523
    , 529
    (2013), we are not of the view that, were Mattapoisett
    applicable to the facts of this case, it should be read to
    override either the explicit statutory scheme governing holiday
    pay for employees of educational institutions, or the Federal
    mandate with which this statutory scheme complies.
    15
    while we recognize that it may appear to be counterintuitive
    that Hennis should receive unemployment benefits here,
    notwithstanding that, under the terms of her employment, it was
    agreed she would not receive holiday pay for time off when
    school was not in session, we conclude that, applying the
    statutory scheme to the circumstances presented here, Hennis is
    entitled to partial unemployment compensation benefits for the
    days she was out of work during the week ending Saturday,
    November 24, 2012, which included the Thanksgiving recess.
    5.   Conclusion.   The judgment of the District Court is
    reversed, and a new judgment shall enter affirming the decision
    of the board.
    So ordered.