Silva v. Steadfast Insurance Co. , 87 Mass. App. Ct. 800 ( 2015 )


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    14-P-987                                              Appeals Court
    GARY P. SILVA   vs.   STEADFAST INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 14-P-987.
    Hampden.       March 5, 2015. - August 7, 2015.
    Present:   Cypher, Kafker, & Green, JJ.
    Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Insurance, Unfair act or
    practice, Settlement of claim. Consumer Protection Act,
    Insurance, Offer of settlement, Unfair act or practice,
    Consumer, Businessman's claim.
    Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
    November 14, 2012.
    The case was heard by Constance M. Sweeney, J., on motions
    for summary judgment.
    Mark J. Albano for the plaintiff.
    Timothy O. Egan for the defendant.
    KAFKER, J.     Gary P. Silva appeals from the entry of summary
    judgment in favor of Steadfast Insurance Company (Steadfast).
    In his complaint, Silva claimed that Steadfast violated G. L.
    c. 176D, § 3(9), and G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2 and 11, by failing to
    effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of earlier
    litigation arising out of damage to Silva's business caused by a
    2
    botched demolition project by Associated Building Wreckers, Inc.
    (Associated), a company insured by Steadfast.    Silva maintains
    that Steadfast should have made a settlement offer after
    judgment entered in the earlier litigation even though (1) Silva
    was appealing multiple aspects of that judgment and seeking to
    expand the scope of both liability and damages, and (2)
    postjudgment motions by both Silva and Steadfast to recalculate
    the amount of damages were ultimately allowed.    We affirm.
    Background.   The city of Holyoke hired Associated to
    demolish an abandoned building that was adjacent to Silva's
    property, on which Silva operated his auto body and repair
    business, S&L Automotive.   During demolition, which took place
    on January 19, 2006, the building collapsed onto Silva's
    property and severely damaged his business.   Steadfast was
    Associated's liability insurer at the time.   On December 29,
    2006, Silva brought suit in Superior Court against Associated
    seeking, among other things, damages for his business and
    property and for personal injuries.1   At the close of Silva's
    1
    Silva's complaint set forth seven counts: Count I, a
    negligence and breach of contract claim for property damage and
    business loss; Count II, a negligence and breach of contract
    claim for his personal injuries; Count III, a negligence claim
    by Silva's wife for loss of consortium (which was dismissed by
    stipulation before trial); Count IV, a trespass claim for his
    injuries and damages; Count V, a nuisance claim for his injuries
    and damages; Count VI, an ultra-hazardous activity/strict
    liability claim for his injuries and damages; and Count VII, a
    claim under G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2 and 11, for injuries and damages.
    3
    evidence in that trial, the judge directed a verdict for
    Associated on Silva's nuisance, strict liability, and G. L.
    c. 93A claims.   At the conclusion of the trial on June 21, 2010,
    the judge awarded Silva $366,607.36 on his first breach of
    contract claim,2 including damages for building repair, removal,
    and demolition costs, along with $10,000 for personal property
    damage.   The judge ruled in favor of Associated on Silva's
    claims for negligence, personal injury, and trespass.
    Associated did not appeal.   Silva appealed the directed
    verdicts, his trespass claim, and the amount of damages awarded.
    See Silva v. Associated Bldg. Wreckers, Inc., 
    82 Mass. App. Ct. 1106
    (2012).   The appeal was ultimately unsuccessful and the
    judgment was affirmed, resulting in an execution on the judgment
    issuing to Silva on November 9, 2012, in the amount of
    $671,216.74.   Between the entry of the judgment on June 21,
    2010, and the execution issued in November, 2012, Silva made no
    demands on Associated or Steadfast to pay the judgment or any
    2
    In Silva's appeal from that judgment, this court explained
    in an unpublished decision issued pursuant to our rule 1:28 that
    "[t]he contract between [Associated] and the city provided that
    [Associated] would restore any structures and items damaged as a
    result of the demolition. At the beginning of the trial, the
    parties stipulated that [Silva] was a third-party beneficiary of
    this contract. [Associated] conceded that it was responsible
    for the damage to the plaintiff's building." Silva v.
    Associated Bldg. Wreckers, Inc., 
    82 Mass. App. Ct. 1106
    (2012).
    4
    portion thereof, nor were any offers made by Steadfast to settle
    the claims.
    On November 14, 2012, Silva filed the instant action,
    alleging that Steadfast violated G. L. c. 176D, § 3(9), and
    G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2 and 11, by failing to effectuate a prompt,
    fair, and equitable settlement after the original judgment in
    Silva's favor entered on June 21, 2010.
    On December 17, 2012, Associated filed a motion for relief
    from judgment in the underlying action pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P.
    60(a), 
    365 Mass. 828
    (1974), because, it contended, the judgment
    failed to apply the setoff to the judgment amount provided for
    by the judge in his written findings.   Associated's motion was
    allowed over Silva's objection.3   The judge found that Silva had
    already "received insurance payments [from Steadfast] in the
    amount of $186,464, and [Associated] may offset the award by the
    amount received [from] the insurance company."   Silva v.
    Associated Bldg. Wreckers, Inc., 
    87 Mass. App. Ct. 1104
    (2015).
    Later, Silva moved to amend the judgment to add additional
    costs, and that motion was allowed in part.   On March 5, 2013,
    an amended judgment of $342,201.53 entered for Silva, which was
    comprised of the principal amount of $180,143.36, with
    3
    Silva appealed the application of the setoff, and the
    motion judge's decision was ultimately affirmed by this court.
    Silva v. Associated Bldg. Wreckers, Inc., 
    87 Mass. App. Ct. 1104
    (2015).
    5
    prejudgment interest of $75,660.21, postjudgment interest of
    $84,415.18, and costs of $1,982.79.     On March 28, 2013,
    Steadfast paid Silva the full amount of the March 5, 2013,
    judgment.
    In October, 2013, a judge of the Superior Court held a
    hearing on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment in
    the instant case.    In January, 2014, the judge granted summary
    judgment to Steadfast.    The judge ruled that Steadfast had not
    violated G. L. c. 176D because "Silva rendered uncertain the
    total liability of Steadfast's insured by appealing the June 21,
    2010, judgment."    Judgment entered in March, 2014, dismissing
    Silva's complaint, and Silva filed a timely appeal.
    Discussion.     1.   Standard of review.   "Summary judgment is
    appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact
    and the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law."
    Kanamaru v. Holyoke Mut. Ins. Co., 
    72 Mass. App. Ct. 396
    , 398
    (2008), citing Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), as amended, 
    436 Mass. 1404
    (2002).   We view the facts in the light most favorable to Silva,
    against whom judgment was entered, see ibid., to determine
    whether he "has 'no reasonable expectation of proving an
    essential element' of his case."    Bobick v. United States Fid. &
    Guar. Co., 
    439 Mass. 652
    , 659 (2003), quoting from Kourouvacilis
    v. General Motors Corp., 
    410 Mass. 706
    , 716 (1991).      "Our review
    is de novo," Auto Flat Car Crushers, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
    6
    
    469 Mass. 813
    , 820 (2014), and "we may consider any ground
    apparent on the record that supports the result reached in the
    lower court."    Demeo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 38 Mass.
    App. Ct. 955, 956 (1995), quoting from Gabbidon v. King, 
    414 Mass. 685
    , 686 (1993).
    2.    Relationship between G. L. c. 93A and G. L. c. 176D.
    General Laws c. 93A, the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act,
    protects consumers and businesses alike from unfair business
    practices that are "immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
    unscrupulous; or within the bounds of some statutory, common-law
    or other established concept of unfairness."     Ellis v. Safety
    Ins. Co., 
    41 Mass. App. Ct. 630
    , 640 (1996).     Similarly,
    "[G. L.] c. 176D, § 3, prohibits 'unfair or deceptive acts or
    practices in the business of insurance,' and § 3(9) enumerates
    acts and omissions that constitute unfair claim settlement
    practices."   Hopkins v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
    434 Mass. 556
    ,
    564 (2001).     However, c. 176D, § 3, does not itself provide a
    private right of action.     See Dodd v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
    
    373 Mass. 72
    , 75 (1977), superseded in part by statute as stated
    in Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, 
    465 Mass. 297
    , 301 n.7 (2013); Morrison v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., Mass. 
    59 Mass. App. Ct. 613
    , 617 n.7 (2003), S.C., 
    441 Mass. 451
    (2004);
    Adams v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
    60 Mass. App. Ct. 55
    , 63 n.14
    (2003).   To proceed against an insurer who has violated G. L.
    7
    c. 176D, § 3(9), a plaintiff must bring a claim under G. L.
    c. 93A, § 9 or § 11.    In the present case, Silva has brought his
    claim pursuant to c. 93A, § 11, which governs claims by persons
    acting in a business context.   See Frullo v. Landenberger, 
    61 Mass. App. Ct. 814
    , 821 (2004).
    It is important to recognize at the outset of our analysis
    that G. L. c. 93A, § 11, does not expressly incorporate
    violations of G. L. c. 176D, § 3(9), in contrast to c. 93A, § 9,
    which has been amended to allow consumers to bring c. 93A claims
    alleging violations of c. 176D without regard to whether those
    violations constitute an unfair business practice under c. 93A,
    § 2.   See Polaroid Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 
    414 Mass. 747
    ,
    754 (1993); DiVenuti v. Reardon, 
    37 Mass. App. Ct. 73
    , 79
    (1994).   That being said, if a business establishes a relevant
    "business context" between it and the insurer as a prerequisite
    for liability under c. 93A, §§ 2 and 11, "a judge may
    nonetheless rely on a c. 176D violation as evidence of an unfair
    business practice [for the purpose of] § 11."    Northern Security
    Ins. Co. v. R.H. Realty Trust, 
    78 Mass. App. Ct. 691
    , 696 n.12
    (2011).   However, "[t]here is no one-to-one relationship between
    [c.] 176D and [c.] 93A" in the c. 93A, § 11, context, as
    "violations of chapter 176D run the gamut from those that are
    somewhat technical to those that are gravely offensive.    Given
    this range, conduct that abridges the unfair claim practice
    8
    statute may or may not abridge the unfair trade practice
    statute."   Continental Ins. Co. v. Bahnan, 
    216 F.3d 150
    , 157
    (1st Cir. 2000).    This distinction can be important when
    determining whether an alleged claim settlement practice
    provides grounds sufficient to overcome a motion for summary
    judgment in a c. 93A, § 11, action.
    3.   Classification of Silva's G. L. c. 93A claim.       Before
    reaching the substance of Silva's appeal as it relates to G. L.
    c. 176D, we first address Steadfast's argument that Silva's
    G. L. c. 93A claim should be read as a claim under c. 93A, § 9
    -- the branch of c. 93A that provides a right of action to
    individual consumers -- not c. 93A, § 11.    If Silva's claim is
    determined to fall under the province of c. 93A, § 9, Steadfast
    argues, the claim should have been dismissed on the ground that
    Silva failed to send Steadfast a demand letter in compliance
    with the statute.   See Spilios v. Cohen, 
    38 Mass. App. Ct. 338
    ,
    342 (1995) ("demand letter is a condition precedent to
    commencing an action under G. L. c. 93A, § 9").    Steadfast
    asserts that Silva's claim falls under c. 93A, § 9, because
    Silva pursued both personal and business damages.    Steadfast
    also contends that it is unprecedented for third-party claimants
    in an insurance context to file a claim under c. 93A, § 11,
    given the lack of privity between third-party claimants and
    insurers.   We are unpersuaded by Steadfast's argument.
    9
    The first prong of Steadfast's argument is readily disposed
    of given that current case law does not prevent Silva, as a
    matter of law, from bringing suit under G. L. c. 93A, § 11,
    simply because he pursued damages relating to both his personal
    and business injuries.   See Begelfer v. Najarian, 
    381 Mass. 177
    ,
    190-191 (1980) (inquiry whether § 11 "business context" has been
    established is fact-specific, requiring consideration of "the
    circumstances of each case").4   Moreover, Silva, Associated, and
    Steadfast were all engaged in trade or commerce during the
    claims, incidents, and transactions at issue.    Silva's
    automotive repair business was damaged by Associated's
    demolition business, which was insured by Steadfast's insurance
    business.
    Steadfast's third-party claimant argument is equally
    unpersuasive.   In Clegg v. Butler, 
    424 Mass. 413
    , 418 (1997)
    (Clegg), the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the right of third-
    party claimants to file suit against insurers under G. L.
    c. 93A, though this interpretation was based on the statutory
    language of c. 93A, § 9, not of §§ 2 and 11.    "While the
    majority of c. 93A actions [relating to c. 176D] involve an
    4
    This analysis includes "the nature of the transaction, the
    character of the parties involved, and the activities engaged in
    by the parties. . . . Other relevant factors are whether
    similar transactions have been undertaken in the past, whether
    the transaction is motivated by business or personal reasons
    . . . , and whether the participant played an active part in the
    transaction." Begelfer v. 
    Najarian, 381 Mass. at 191
    .
    10
    insured's attempt to enforce its rights against its own insurer,
    'the specific duty contained in subsection [3(9)](f) [of c.
    176D] is not limited to those situations where the plaintiff
    enjoys contractual privity with the insurer.'"   Pacific Indem.
    Co. v. Lampro, 
    86 Mass. App. Ct. 60
    , 64 (2014), quoting from
    Clegg, supra at 419.
    Although in Clegg the court interpreted G. L. c. 93A, § 9,
    there are also cases that demonstrate the ability of third-party
    claimants to bring suit under c. 93A, § 11.   See R.W. Granger &
    Sons, Inc. v. J & S Insulation, Inc., 
    435 Mass. 66
    , 68-72 (2001)
    (R.W. Granger & Sons) (breach of contract claim between
    subcontractor and general contractor; after judgment entered in
    favor of subcontractor, surety for general contractor was liable
    to subcontractor pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 29, and violated
    G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2 and 11); Adams v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 60 Mass. App. Ct. at 63
    n.14 (plaintiff chiropractor's third-party
    claim against workers' compensation insurer "adequately
    constitute[d] a claim for relief under G. L. c. 93A, § 11").
    Moreover, the goal behind G. L. c. 176D -- to facilitate
    settlement of insurance claims -- "is equally desirable whether
    the plaintiff is an insured or a third-party claimant," Clegg,
    supra at 419, and whether the plaintiff is an individual
    consumer or a business.   We discern no basis for a bright-line
    11
    rule that would prohibit third-party claimants in the c. 176D
    context from filing claims pursuant to c. 93A, § 11.
    4.   Alleged violation of G. L. c. 176D, § 3(9).   "The duty
    of fair dealing in insurance settlement negotiations is
    established by statute under G. L. c. 176D, § 3(9)."    Clegg,
    supra at 419.   The over-all purpose of this statute is to
    "encourage the settlement of insurance claims . . . and
    discourage insurers from forcing claimants into unnecessary
    litigation to obtain relief."   
    Ibid. Of the fourteen
    insurance
    settlement practices described by c. 176D, § 3(9), at issue here
    is subsection (f), which requires insurance companies "to
    effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in
    which liability has become reasonably clear."   G. L. c. 176D,
    § 3(9)(f), inserted by St. 1972, c. 543, § 1.
    In evaluating the settlement practices here, we stress that
    Silva objects only to Steadfast's postverdict settlement
    practices.5   Indeed neither party has addressed the $186,464
    insurance payment made before trial in the underlying case,
    which was the subject of a prior decision of this court.       Silva
    v. Associated Bldg. Wreckers, 
    87 Mass. App. Ct. 1104
    .     We
    5
    Though less common than their pretrial counterparts, G. L.
    c. 176D violations arising out of postjudgment settlement
    practices have been recognized. See Van Dyke v. St. Paul Fire &
    Marine Ins. Co., 
    388 Mass. 671
    , 674 n.3 (1983) (discussing
    possibility of posttrial violation); R.W. Granger & 
    Sons, 435 Mass. at 78-79
    (no error in ruling that defendant's postverdict
    conduct constituted a violation).
    12
    therefore only consider whether Steadfast's postverdict
    settlement practices are actionable.   See R.W. Granger & 
    Sons, 435 Mass. at 69
    ("The judge limited the G. L. c. 93A claim . . .
    to events 'occurring subsequent to' the jury's . . . verdict").
    Silva argues that he demonstrated as a matter of law that
    Steadfast violated G. L. c. 176D, § 3(9)(f), when it failed to
    effectuate a settlement between June 21, 2010, when judgment
    originally entered for Silva, and March 28, 2013, when Steadfast
    finally paid the judgment.   Steadfast responds that its
    liability only became "reasonably clear" on March 5, 2013, after
    the resolution of Silva's appeals and the parties' respective
    motions to amend the judgment.
    "Although whether a particular set of acts, in their
    factual setting, is unfair or deceptive is a question of fact,
    the boundaries of what may qualify for consideration as a
    [G. L.] c. 93A violation is a question of law."   Chervin v.
    Travelers Ins. Co., 
    448 Mass. 95
    , 112 (2006) (citation omitted).
    See R.W. Granger & 
    Sons, 435 Mass. at 73
    .   We conclude that
    Steadfast's postjudgment actions fell outside those boundaries
    and therefore Steadfast was entitled to summary judgment as a
    matter of law.
    As directed by G. L. c. 176D, § 3(9)(f), insurers must
    attempt to settle claims once liability has become reasonably
    clear.   For this purpose, "liability encompasses both fault and
    13
    damages."   
    Clegg, 424 Mass. at 421
    .    See R.W. Granger & 
    Sons, 435 Mass. at 75
    .   Whether fault and damages were reasonably
    clear here postjudgment is not a simple inquiry.     When judgment
    entered in Silva's favor on June 21, 2010, Silva did not seek to
    enforce the judgment or make a settlement request or demand for
    full or partial payment but, rather, appealed the judgment on
    multiple grounds, thereby opening up both the scope of liability
    and the amount of damages.     Associated, however, did not file an
    appeal, so some amount of liability and damages had, at that
    point, been established.     Further complicating matters,
    Steadfast had previously paid Silva $186,464, the basis of the
    offset that was the subject of Silva's second round of appellate
    litigation.   Between entry of the original judgment on June 21,
    2010, and the execution issued in November, 2012, Steadfast made
    no additional settlement offers.     Thus, the question is whether
    Steadfast's failure to make a postjudgment settlement offer
    constituted a violation of G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2 and 11.        We
    conclude that Steadfast did not as a matter of law engage in
    unfair and deceptive practices pursuant to c. 93A, §§ 2 and 11,
    in these circumstances.
    We so conclude because the amount of damages was not
    reasonably clear once Silva chose to appeal multiple claims
    previously found to be without merit by the trial judge.          See
    Clegg, supra at 421.   The subsequent appellate and postjudgment
    14
    litigation confirmed the reasonableness of Steadfast's actions,
    as Silva's claims were once again determined to be without merit
    and the amount of damages required multiple adjustments in the
    trial court.   Cf. Jet Line Servs., Inc. v. American Employers
    Ins. Co., 
    404 Mass. 706
    , 717 (1989) ("As a general rule, an
    insurance company does not act unfairly or deceptively within
    the meaning of G. L. c. 93A, § 2, with respect to a claim made
    under a policy of insurance simply by making a legally correct
    disclaimer of coverage"); Ben Elfman & Sons, Inc. v. Home Indem.
    Co., 
    411 Mass. 13
    , 21 (1991) ("Because we have decided that the
    defendant rightfully refused to pay interest under the policy,
    its actions in that regard do not constitute unfair and
    deceptive acts").
    Our holding is consistent with established Massachusetts
    case law.   In R.W. Granger & 
    Sons, 435 Mass. at 75
    -76, the
    Supreme Judicial Court held there was a postverdict violation of
    G. L. c. 176D, § 3(9)(f), within the G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2 and 11,
    context where the defendant insurer argued that liability was
    not reasonably clear given that the amount of attorney's fees
    was still disputed.   The court found the defendant's argument
    unpersuasive when comparing the potential amount of "reasonable
    attorney's fees" to the certainty of the jury verdict and
    interest.   In addition, the plaintiff had made a demand for
    payment within a month of the verdict, and the defendant
    15
    insurer's tardy settlement offer "was neither 'fair' nor
    'equitable.'"   
    Id. at 76.
    The court reached a similar conclusion in Rhodes v. AIG
    Domestic Claims, Inc., 
    461 Mass. 486
    (2012), a G. L. c. 93A,
    § 9, case involving catastrophic injuries, including permanent
    paraplegia.   Liability was certain and the postjudgment
    settlement offer in response to the demand letter was "not only
    unreasonable, but insulting."   
    Id. at 494.
      The actions of Silva
    and Steadfast in the case at bar are in stark contrast to both
    R.W. Granger & Sons and Rhodes, as the amount of damages here
    was uncertain once Silva appealed the judgment in the underlying
    litigation.   The fact that both Silva and Steadfast later filed
    successful motions to amend the judgment amount gives further
    credence to the judge's conclusion here that the amount of
    damages was not "reasonably clear" until March of 2013.
    These differences also lead us to distinguish this case
    from those that hold "[a]n insurer's statutory duty to make a
    prompt and fair settlement offer does not depend on the
    willingness of a claimant to accept such an offer," Hopkins v.
    Liberty Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 434 Mass. at 567
    , and "[e]ven excessive
    demands on the part of a claimant . . . do not relieve an
    insurer of its statutory duty to extend a prompt and equitable
    offer of settlement once liability and damages are reasonably
    clear."   Bobick v. United States Fid. & Guar. 
    Co., 439 Mass. at 16
    662.   While that maxim is true when both liability and damages
    are reasonably clear, in the instant case at least the amount of
    damages remained uncertain until the appeals and postjudgment
    motions were resolved.   As such, the grant of summary judgment
    in favor of Steadfast was appropriate.
    Judgment dated March 12,
    2014, affirmed.